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CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

CHAPTER XX.

MENON.

Page

Persons of the Dialogue 1
Question put by Menon—Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon *ib.*
Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity entailed by it 2
Answer of Menon—plurality of virtues, one belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them ... 3
Analogous cases cited—definitions of figure and colour 4
Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and distinctions—Neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into system ... ... *ib.*
Definition of virtue given by Menon; Sokrates pulls it to pieces 5
Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock—Sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search by both 6
But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it ... ... *ib.*
Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates—anterior immortality of the soul—what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten 7

Page

Illustration of this theory—knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon ... 7
Enquiry taken up — Whether virtue is teachable? without determining what virtue is ... 8
Virtue is knowledge—no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of knowledge ... ... *ib.*
Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can be found ... 9
Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue ... ... *ib.*
Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown 10
Sokrates modifies his premisses—knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results—right opinion will do the same *ib.*
Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others—good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods ... *ib.*
All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods 11
But what virtue itself is, remains unknown ... ... *ib.*
Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates ... ... *ib.*

CHAPTER XX.—*continued.*

Page

Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions, when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled 12

Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon —desire of good alleged to be universally felt—in what sense this is true 13

Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine—knowledge, of what? 14

Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras—diversity of handling—Plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it ... ... *ib.*

Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research 15

Great question discussed among the Grecian philosophers—criterion of truth—Wherein consists the process of verification? 16

None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato—that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience ... ... *ib.*

Plato's view of the immortality of the soul—difference between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon 18

Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind—how far correct? 19

Plato's doctrine about *à priori* reasonings—different from the modern doctrine 20

Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience ... 22

Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms 23

What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning—his distinction between knowledge and right opinion ... *ib.*

This distinction compared with modern philosophical views ... 24

Manifestation of Anytus—intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally 25

The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the Sophists—Practical statesmen 27

The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen 28

CHAPTER XXI.

PROTAGORAS.

Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue 29

Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippocrates to become acquainted with Protagoras ... 30

Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from Protagoras ... ... *ib.*

Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach 32

Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge brought to light 33

Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras 34

Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist 34

Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company 36

Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens ... ... *ib.*

Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not ... 37

Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe 38

Mythe. First fabrication of men

CHAPTER XXI.—*continued.*

Page

by the Gods. Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus 38
Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants, but could not give them the social art. Mankind are on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society ... 39
Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all 40
Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment ... ... *ib.*
Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent 41
Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c. ... 42
All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own individual aptitude 43
Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others 44
The sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists 45
Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself.. *ib.*
Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art ... 46
Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras—he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions 47
One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer 48
Questions by Sokrates—Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous? ... *ib.*

Page

Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, "If you please" 49
Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same contrary 50
Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term ... ... *ib.*
Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated 51
Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity ... ... *ib.*
Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart 52
Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue 53
Claim of a special *locus standi* and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric ... ... *ib.*
Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him ... ... *ib.*
Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song 54
Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech ... ... *ib.*
Character of this speech—its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech 55
Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras

CHAPTER XXI.—*continued.*

consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering 57
Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose 59
The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue ... ... *ib.*
Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack 60
Identity of the pleasurable with the good—of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate ... *ib.*
Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant 61
Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures ... 62
Pleasure is the only good—pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future—resolves itself into pleasure and pain 63
Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly—all the security of our lives depends upon it... 65
To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance 66
Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasure or freedom from pain, are honourable ... ... *ib.*
Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible 67
Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras... 6
Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates 7
Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates... 7
Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates ... ... *ib*
Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry 7
Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony 7
Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out 74
Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner 7
Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction ... ... *ib.*
Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere 76
The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the common consciousness ... *ib.*
Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides 77
Ethical view given by Sokrates—worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent 78
Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory... 79
Reasoning of Sokrates... ... ... *ib.*
Application of that reasoning to the case of courage 80
The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues 81

CHAPTER XXI.—*continued.*

Page

Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential 82
Comparison with the Republic ... 83
The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates ... ... *ib.*
The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself 85
Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage 86
Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists 87
Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency 88
Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue 89

CHAPTER XXII.

GORGIAS.

Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias ... ...
Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês...
Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition
Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion 92
The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise? 93
The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant ... ... *ib.*
Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates 94
Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery ... ... *ib.*
Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind—and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure 96
Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish ... 96
All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power 97
Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia—Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so—Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it 98
Sokrates maintains—1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 99
Sokrates offers proof—Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe—Proof of the first point 100
Proof of the second point ... ... *ib.*
The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him 102
Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished ... ... *ib.*
Argument of Sokrates paradoxical

CHAPTER XXII.—*continued.*

Page

—Doubt expressed by Kalliklês whether he means it seriously 103
Principle laid down by Sokrates—That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery 104
Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good—Evil—Happiness ... ... *ib.*
Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning 105
Examination of the proof given by Sokrates—Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations—Law and Nature 106
The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold 108
Worse or better—for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible ... ... *ib.*
Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it 109
If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed... 110
Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper—Material difference between the two—Distemper must be felt by the distempered person 111
Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates—he takes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature—Reply of Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly understood 112
What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês—rhetor and politician ... 113
Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it 114
Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative 118
Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical? ... ... *ib.*
Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them 119
Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the Protagoras 120
Views of critics about this contradiction ... ... *ib.*
Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates in both dialogues 121
Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias 122
Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense—not recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues 123
In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by the agent ... ... *ib.*
Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but differing in classification 124
Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the Protagoras 125
The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is unsuccessful—it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally

CHAPTER XXII.—*continued.*

Page

the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras 126
Permanent elements—and transient elements—of human agency —how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues ... 127
In the Protagoras 128
In the Gorgias 129
Character of the Gorgias generally —discrediting all the actualities of life 130
Argument of Sokrates resumed—multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure ... 132
The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public—even the best past Rhetors have done nothing else —citation of the four great Rhetors by Kalliklês ... ... *ib.*
Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the condition of virtue and happiness ... 133
Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force 134
Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for better or for worse ... ... *ib.*
Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself—to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction 135
Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this 136
Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased persons therein, according to their merits during life—the philosopher, who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be rewarded... *ib.*
Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates —Rhetorical or dogmatical character of the Gorgias 137
He merges politics in Ethics—he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community ... ... *ib.*
Idéal of Plato—a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his own 138
Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health—

Page

incomplete analogy — circumstances of difference 138
Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter, on important points, should acquire any public influence 139
Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic 140
Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric ... ... *ib.*
Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen 141
Probable feelings of Plato on this subject. Claim put forward in the Gorgias of an independent *locus standi* for philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by Sokrates 142
Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion. Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance 143
Issue between philosophy and rhetoric—not satisfactorily handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which it is presented by Polus and Kalliklês 145
Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias 146
The Athenian people recognise a distinction between the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato conceived 147
Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences raised by the Kalliklês of Plato 149
The Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good. Divergent ideas about virtue ... *ib.*
How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato does not advise us 150
The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher 151

CHAPTER XXIII.

PHÆDON.

Page

The Phædon is affirmative and expository 152
Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic interest which they inspire ... *ib.*
Simmias and Kebês, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates... 153
Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner 155
Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being influenced by his authority —that they shall follow only the convictions of their own reason *ib.*
Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent 156
Phædon and Symposion—points of analogy and contrast 157
Phædon—compared with Republic and Timæus. No recognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body ... 159
Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone 160
The life and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables him to do this completely 161
Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is relieved from all communion with body 163
Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers 164
Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate 165
Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine—That the soul is a sort of harmony—refuted by Sokrates 166
Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed ... 167
First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he rejected it ... ... *ib.*
Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of Anaxagoras ... 168
Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes efficient and causes co-efficient ... 169
Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and embraced a third doctrine about cause ... 171
He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain attributes ... 172
Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences 173
Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks upon it 174
The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon different views as to a true cause ... ... *ib.*
Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought solution... 175
Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes and co-efficients ... ... *ib.*
Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates 177
The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out, either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general words, and adopts the theory of ideas 179
Vague and dissentient meanings

CHAPTER XXIII.—*continued.*

Page

attached to the word Cause. That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his inquisitive feelings 180
Dissension and perplexity on the question.—What is a cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates —no intuition to guide him ... 183
Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation, causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation, elaborated in modern times ... ... *ib.*
Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to words—to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of particulars 186
Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality 187
Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this 189
The soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal ... ... *ib.*
The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence — animals as well as man—also the metempsychosis, or translation of the soul from one body to another 190
After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal, Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the death of the body. He describes a Νεκυία ... 191
Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of the blest.

Page

Reply to Kriton about burying his body 192
Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates 193
Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler ... *ib.*
Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death 194
Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these personal details 195
Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the Phædon ... 196
Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the Apology 197
Total renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phædon. Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues ... 198
Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined 200
The philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul unattached to any body 201
Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question remained debated and problematical 203

CHAPTER XXIV.

Phædrus—Symposion.

These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both 206
Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece ... ... *ib.*
Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment 209
All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it

CHAPTER XXIV.—*continued.*

Page

by various means. The name *Eros* is confined to one special case of this large variety 210

Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus 211

Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty *in genere*. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all 212

Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers: closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades 213

Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon 214

Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it ... *ib.*

Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge ... 215

Eros as presented in the Phædrus —Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros—Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros 216

Panegyric—Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety 217

Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas ... ... *ib.*

Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the intellectual faculties of man—Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable — Reminiscence 218

Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas 219

Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory 221

Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter 222

Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion 223

Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion ... ... *ib.*

Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy—Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere 224

Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion— —Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths ... ... *ib*

Perfect self-command of Sokrates —proof against every sort of trial 226

Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion—Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process ... ... *ib.*

Symposion and Phædon—each is the antithesis and complement of the other 227

Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon 228

Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion ... 230

Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic 231

Second half of the Phædrus—passes into a debate on Rhetoric.

CHAPTER XXIV.—*continued.*

Page

Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise 232

Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill? 233

Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack? 234

Theory of Sokrates—that all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth ... ... *ib.*

Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define 235

Logical processes—Definition and Division—both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates ... ... *ib.*

View of Sokrates—that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic—The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless 237

What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be—Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art ... ... *ib.*

Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case... 238

The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour 239

Question about Writing—As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little—Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows ... ... *ib.*

Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary 240

The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer 244

Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher ... ... *ib.*

Date of the Phædrus—not an early dialogue 245

Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses—His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic ... ... *ib.*

His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured—it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed ... *ib.*

The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn... 246

The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied—guiding them methodically from error to truth ... *ib.*

He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case 247

Plato's *Idéal* of the Rhetorical Art—involves in part incompatible conditions—the Wise man or philosopher will never be listened to by the public... 248

The other part of the Platonic *Idéal* is grand but unattainable—breadth of psychological data and classified modes of discourse ... 249

Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers—Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an accomplished man 250

The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners 252

Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule ... ... *ib.*

Plato's charge against the Rhe-

CHAPTER XXIV.—*continued.*

torical teachers is not made out 254
Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle *ib.*
No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus... ... 255
Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant 256
Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know —or as an elegant pastime ... 257
Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high too be realised 258
No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy 258
Plato's *idéal* philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here 259
Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus 260
Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind—Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute—Extreme of specialising adaptation to individuals and occasions 261

CHAPTER XXV.

PARMENIDES.

Character of dialogues immediately preceding — much transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides... ... 263
Sokrates is the juvenile defendant — Parmenides the veteran censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant ... ... *ib.*
Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides 265
Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in which his partisan Zeno defended him ... ... *ib.*
Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them 266
Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates. Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas 267
What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &c? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c? No ... ... *ib.*
Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the philosopher... 268
Remarks upon this—Contrast between emotional and scientific classification ... ... *ib.*
Objections of Parmenides — How can objects participate in the Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof 270
Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be represented by a higher Idea—and so on *ad infinitum* ... ... *ib.*
Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more? Impossible 271
The Ideas are types or exemplaria, and objects partake of them by being likened to them? Impossible 272
If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas ... ... *ib.*
Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess 273
Form of Cognition, superior to our

CHAPTER XXV.—*continued.*

Page

Cognition, belongs to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us 274

Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion... *ib.*

Dilemma put by Parmenides—Acuteness of his objections ... 275

The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues ... 276

Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês 277

Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of his own ... ... *ib.*

Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search 278

The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural *ib.*

Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas 279

Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura 280

Answer of Sokrates—That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped... 281

Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to the present day—Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it 284

Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded 286

Continuation of the Dialogue—Parmenides admonishes Sokrates

Page

that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise... 286

What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the consequences of each 287

Impossible to do this before a numerous audience—Parmenides is entreated to give a specimen —After much solicitation he agrees 288

Parmenides elects his own theory of the *Unum*, as the topic for exhibition—Aristoteles becomes respondent ... ... *ib.*

Exhibition of Parmenides—Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from *Unum Est*—next from *Unum non Est* 289

The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation ... ... *ib.*

Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies and the dialogue generally ... 290

No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising ... 294

This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared... 295

The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or *ἀπορίαι*... 297

Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant ... *ib.*

The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many other Antinomies 2

CHAPTER XXV.—*continued.*

Page

These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers ... 300

In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result 301

Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c. 302

In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is made to bear very different meanings 303

First Demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions. *Reductio ad Absurdum* of the assumption—Unum non Multa 304

Second Demonstration 305

It ends in demonstrating *Both*, of that which the first Demonstration had demonstrated *Neither* 306

Startling paradox—Open offence against logical canon—No logical canon had then been laid down 308

Demonstration third—Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of Demonstrations I. and II. ... *ib.*

Plato's imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous—Breaches or

Page

momentary stoppages in the course of time 309

Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both 310

The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory—The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour ... 311

Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII.... 312

Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides 313

Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered — Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning—The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words ... ...

Demonstrations VIII. and IX.—Analysis of Demonstration VIII. 315

Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian ... ...

Demonstration IX.—*Neither* following *Both* ... ... *ib.*

Concluding words of the Parmenides—Declaration that he has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different propositions 317

Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not 318

CHAPTER XXVI.

Theætetus.

Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus 319

Question raised by Sokrates—What is Knowledge or Cognition? First answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates 320

Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy—mental obstetric—He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds 321

Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates—He is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge 322

Answer of Theætêtus—Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the *Homo Mensura* laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with

CHAPTER XXVI.—*continued.*

Page

the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except Parmenides 323

Plato here blends together three distinct theories, for the purpose of confuting them: yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition 324

The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only constructive—the interpretation of Plato himself ... ... *ib.*

Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras—*Homo Mensura* 325

Perpetual implication of Subject with Object—Relate and Correlate 327

Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient capacities 328

Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in regard to the intelligible world 330

The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense 331

Object always relative to Subject—Either without the other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistês 335

Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate conjunction with the Herakleitean ... ... *ib.*

Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him 336

Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply, without a comparing subject 337

Relativity twofold—to the comparing Subject — to another Object, besides the one directly described ... ... *ib.*

Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus—yet so as to implicate it with that of Protagoras 338

Agent and Patient—No absolute Ens 339

Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered ... 340

Exposition of the Protagorean

Page

doctrine, as given here by Sokrates is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object 340

Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double potentiality—Subjective and Objective 343

Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par—that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure 345

In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is required 346

Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind ... 347

All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language 349

Argument—That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato's objection 350

Belief on authority is true to the believer himself—The efficacy of authority resides in the believer's own mind 352

Protagorean formula—is false, to those who dissent from it ... 352

Plato's argument—That the wise man alone is a measure—Reply to it 353

Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation and anticipation of the future... 355

The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible... *ib.*

Plato's argument is untenable—That if the Protagorean formula be admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled—The reverse is true—Dialectic recog-

CHAPTER XXVI.—*continued.*

Page

nises the autonomy of the individual mind 356
Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus—Plato assumes infallible authority—sets aside Dialectic 358
Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the measure for all. Counter-proposition to the formula ... ... *ib.*
Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state explicitly the counter-proposition 360
Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula—Most believers insist upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for themselves. Appeal to Abstractions ... ... *ib.*
Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean formula—Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth 363
Plato's examination of the other doctrine—That knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with different Percipients 364
Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense—weighing, measuring, &c. ... *ib.*
Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from different sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference 365
Argument—That sensible Perception does not include memory—Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include memory 367
Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time 368
Sokrates maintains that we do not see *with* our eyes, but that the mind sees *through* the eyes: that the mind often conceives and judges by itself, without the aid of any bodily organ 370
Indication of several judgments

Page

which the mind makes by itself—It perceives Existence, Difference, &c. 371
Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons and computations of the mind respecting them ... ... *ib.*
Examination of this view—Distinction from the views of modern philosophers 372
Different views given by Plato in other dialogues 373
Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition 374
Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible 378
Second definition given by Theætêtus—That Cognition consists in right or true opinion 379
Objection by Sokrates—This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens; or confound together two distinct realities? ... ... *ib.*
Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions 380
Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know 381
He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons turned into it and flying about ... ... *ib.*
Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus—That there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this 382

CHAPTER XXVI.—*continued.*

Page

He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge ... 383

New answer of Theætêtus—Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation ... 384

Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained: compounds alone can be explained ... ... *ib.*

Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable, the compound must be unknowable also 385

Rational explanation may have one of three different meanings. 1. Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings will the definition of Cognition hold ... ... *ib.*

Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included in true opinion 386

Conclusion of the dialogue—Summing up by Sokrates—Value of the result, although purely negative 387

Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato, false persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal ... ... *ib.*

Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds. Value of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own suggestions 388

Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is enslaved to the opinions of auditors 389

The Philosopher is master of his own debates 390

Purpose of Dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search ... 391

Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue *ib.*

Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest occupation of life 393

Contrast between the philosopher and the practical statesman—between Knowledge and Opinion 394

CHAPTER XXVII.

SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS.

Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues 396

Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus 398

Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to that purpose 399

Method of logical Definition and Division 400

Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division ... ... *ib.*

Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed 402

Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of art 403

The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different descending subdivision 404

Also, by a third ... ... *ib.*

The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or discriminating art 405

In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classification 406

CHAPTER XXVII.—*continued.*

Page

The purifier—a species under the genus discriminator—separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge 408

Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil. Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier 409

The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about everything—who palms off falsehood for truth ... ... *ib.*

Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely? 410

He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions 411

The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens ... ... *ib.*

The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various philosophers about Ens 412

Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens 413

Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them ... ... *ib.*

Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof 414

1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia... *ib.*

Argument against the Materialists—Justice must be something, since it may be either present or absent, making sensible difference—But Justice is not a body 415

At least many of them will concede this point, though not all. Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent to potentiality ... 416

Argument against the Idealists—who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses ... ... *ib.*

Holding communion—What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers—or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable 417

Motion and Rest are both of them Entia or Realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a *tertium quid*—distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both? 418

Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens ... *ib.*

Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each other ... ... *ib.*

No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis 419

Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms—inadmissible ... ... *ib.*

Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables ... *ib.*

Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens 420

The Eleate comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms—Motion—Rest—Ens—Same—Different ... ... *ib.*

Form of Diversum pervades all the others 421

Motion is different from Diversum,

CHAPTER XXVII.—*continued.*

Page

or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens—in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens 422

By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens—we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens 423

The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is ... *ib.*

The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject 424

Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment 425

Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb—it must be proposition of *Something*. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject ... ... *ib.*

Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens 426

It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it 427

Logical distribution of Imitators—those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know—of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others ... *ib.*

Last class divided—Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor—Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself—the Sophist *ib.*

Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist 428

These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself ... 428

The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person 429

The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense 430

Universal knowledge—was professed at that time by all philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, &c.... 431

Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man, who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible 433

Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens—No predications except identical ... ... *ib.*

Misconception of the function of the copula in predication ... 434

No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle ... ... *ib.*

Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês—To confute the various schools of thinkers—Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c. 435

Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes 436

Plato's argument against the Materialists ... ... *ib.*

Reply open to the Materialists ... 437

Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him ... *ib.*

Plato argues—That to know, and to be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity ... 438

Plato's reasoning—compared with the points of view of both ... *ib.*

The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative 440

CHAPTER XXVII.—*continued.*

Page

Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus 440

The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains that Ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable ... *ib.*

Plato's reasoning against the Materialists 441

Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens—comprehending not only Objects of Perception, but Objects of Conception besides ... ... *ib.*

Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens—they included only Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato 442

Different definitions of Ens—by Plato — the Materialists, the Idealists 443

Plato's views about Non-Ens examined 444

His review of the select Five Forms 446

Plato's doctrine—That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens ... ... *ib.*

Communion of Non-Ens with proposition — possible and explicable 447

Imperfect analysis of a proposition —Plato does not recognise the predicate 448

Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory—Objections to it 449

Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction 452

Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato—How do we know that one is true, the other false? ... ... *ib.*

Page

Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense 454

Errors of Antisthenes—depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day 455

Doctrine of the Sophistês—contradicts that of other Platonic dialogues ... ... *ib.*

The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrines as Plato himself espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c. ... 460

The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian ... 461

Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false 463

Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task—He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there *are* false propositions ... *ib.*

What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion 465

Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded 466

Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês 467

Recommendation of logical bipartition 468

Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus 469

Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense 470

Province of sensible perception—is not so much narrowed by Plato here as it is in the Theætêtus *ib.*

Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus 471

Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês 473

Variety of method in dialectic research—Diversity of Plato ... *ib.*

CHAPTER XXVIII.

POLITIKUS.

Page

The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês 475

Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard ... ...

Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is—To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable 476

Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of comparison is 477

Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c.... *ib.*

Definition of the Statesman or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing... 478

King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the people—not so any longer ... 479

Distinction of Causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be principal also 481

Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to be founded—Scientific or Unscientific 482

Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the true government 483

Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to know it 484

Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is a second-best ... 485

Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot is the worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a government 486

The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries ... *ib.*

What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them 487

If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy 488

Remarks—Sokratic Ideal—Title to govern mankind derived exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person ... ... *ib.*

Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action ... 489

The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras 490

Points of the Protagorean theory —rests upon common sentiment 491

Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras 492

The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence or punished ... ... *ib.*

Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs 493

CHAPTER XXVIII.—*continued.*

Page

Theory of the Politikus—distinguished three gradations of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst 494

Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference 495

Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration —in the latter to the formation and modification of names ... 497

Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and Charmidês 498

Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search—To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions 500

CHAPTER XXIX.

Kratylus.

Persons and subject of the dialogue Kratylus—Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others 501

Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes—all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws—speaking and naming among the rest 502

The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the lawgiver upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher 503

Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another 505

Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable—essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essense of its Nominatum ... ... *ib.*

Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly... 506

Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns—the Protagorean doctrine—Homo Mensura 507

Objection by Sokrates—That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance 508

Objection unfounded—What the Protagorean theory really affirms—Belief always relative to the believer's mind ... ... *ib.*

Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself—Belief on authority—not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras 509

Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by Sokrates—does not sustain his inference against Protagoras 510

Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections 511

Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men—Grounds of belief and disbelief, different with different men and different ages 512

Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind 513

Facts of sense—some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity... 515

Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions 516

These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists 519

CHAPTER XXIX.—*continued.*

Page

Dissent from this theory—No proof that the Sophists ever proposed etymologies 521

Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature 522

Plato intended his theory as serious, and his exemplifications as admissible guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what he means 525

Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato 527

Continuance of the dialogue—Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and spoiled 529

Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to each... 530

Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance 531

Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in the Herakleitean theory ... 532

But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent—the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge ... ... *ib.*

Changes and transpositions introduced in the name—hard to follow 533

Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis ... ... *ib.*

Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus: who upholds that original thesis without any qualification *ib.*

Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it 535

There are names better and worse—more like, or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way 536

Page

All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it 536

It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names 537

Unchangeable Platonic Forms—opposed to the Herakleitean flux, which is true only respecting sensible particulars ... ... *ib.*

Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names 538

Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists 539

Theory laid down by Sokrates *à priori*, in the first part—Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with facts 540

Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue—he disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine 542

Ideal of the best system of naming—the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them 543

Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those upon social institutions. Artistic, systematic construction—contrasted with unpremeditated unsystematic growth ... ...

Politikus compared with Kratylus

Ideal of Plato—Postulate of the One Wise Man—Badness of all reality... 547

Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions 548

Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject 550

No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues—each is a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument ... *ib.*

CHAPTER XXX.

PHILEBUS.

Page

Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus 552

Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure 553

Enquiry—What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness—correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence ... ... *ib.*

Good—object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals, and plants—all-sufficient—satisfies all desires 554

Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise ... ... *ib.*

Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice ... 555

First Question submitted to Protarchus—Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence—He declines to accept it 556

Second Question — Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer—*No* 557

It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure ... ... *ib.*

Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity—how it is distributed among species and individuals ... ... *ib.*

Active disputes upon this question at the time 558

Order of Nature—Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One—The Finite Many—The Infinite Many 559

Mistake commonly made—To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions ... 560

Illustration from Speech and Music *ib.*

Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing ... 561

Page

It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification 562

At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process 563

Classification — unconscious and conscious 564

Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas ... *ib.*

Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient. 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency 565

Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes—Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth ... ... *ib.*

In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents 566

Intelligence is the regulating principle—Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated 567

Pleasure and Pain must be explained together—Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system—Pleasure from the restoration of it ... ... *ib.*

Pleasure presupposes Pain ... ... *ib.*

Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain 568

A life of intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best .. .. *ib.*

Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein ... 568

Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so 570

Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions,

CHAPTER XXX.—*continued.*

Page

are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him 570

Protarchus disputes this — He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false—Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question 571

No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains—False estimate habitual—These are the false pleasures ... ... *ib.*

Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure 572

Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers—That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the relief from pain 573

Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly ... ... *ib.*

Theory of the pleasure-haters—We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures —These are connected with distempered body and mind ... *ib.*

The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health ... 575

Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge ... ... *ib.*

Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion ... 576

Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence; it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means towards substance — Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good ... *ib.*

Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good 577

Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation ... ... *ib.*

Page

Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan 578

Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity 579

Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth ... ... *ib.*

Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained ... 580

Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two —Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed? ... ... *ib.*

We must include all Cognitions —not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both 581

But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence—especially the intense sexual pleasures 582

What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these, Reason is more akin than Pleasure ... ... *ib.*

Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures 583

Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy 584

Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xeno-

CHAPTER XXX.—*continued.*

Page

phontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine 585
Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics ... *ib.*
Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion) is unnecessary and confusing 586
Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification 587
Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended—yet feebly applied—in this dialogue 588
What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic. Comparison 589
Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently 590
Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests 591
Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question—The alternative which he tenders has no fair application 592
Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared—Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End 593
The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing agency 594
Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value. This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis 595
Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between Pleasure and avoidance of pain 596

Page

The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction—They included both in their acknowledged End 597
Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures—The Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view 598
Different points of view worked out by Plato in different dialogues—Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus—True and False Pleasures 599
Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and Rhetoric 600
Peculiarity of the Philêbus—Plato applies the same principle of classification—true and false—to Cognitions and Pleasures ... 601
Distinction of true and false—not applicable to pleasures 602
Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute—Pleasures which he admits to be true—and why 605
Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon his own admission, against his opponents—the Pleasure-haters, who disallowed pleasures altogether 607
Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure-haters 608
Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics—defect of the Philêbus 611
Directive sovereignty of Measure—how explained and applied in the Protagoras ... ... *ib.*
How explained in Philêbus—no statement to what items it is applied 613
Classification of true and false—how Plato applies it to Cognitions 614
Valuable principles of this classification—difference with other dialogues 615
Close of the Philêbus—Graduated elements of Good 617
Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally 618

PLATO.

CHAPTER XX.

MENON.

THIS dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Menon, a man of noble family, wealth, and political influence, in the Thessalian city of Larissa. He is supposed to have previously frequented, in his native city, the lectures and society of the rhetor Gorgias.[a] The name and general features of Menon are probably borrowed from the Thessalian military officer, who commanded a division of the Ten Thousand Greeks, and whose character Xenophon depicts in the Anabasis: but there is nothing in the Platonic dialogue to mark that meanness and perfidy which the Xenophontic picture indicates. The conversation between Sokrates and Menon is interrupted by two episodes: in the first of these, Sokrates questions an unlettered youth, the slave of Menon: in the second, he is brought into conflict with Anytus, the historical accuser of the historical Sokrates.

Persons of the Dialogue.

The dialogue is begun by Menon, in a manner quite as abrupt as the Hipparchus and Minos:

Menon.—Can you tell me, Sokrates, whether virtue is teachable—or acquirable by exercise—or whether it comes by nature—or in what other manner it comes? *Sokr.*—I cannot answer your question. I am ashamed to say that I do not even know what virtue is: and when I do not know what a thing is, how can I know anything about its attributes or accessories? A man who does not know Menon, cannot tell

Question put whether virtue is teachable?

Sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is.

Surprise of Menon.

[a] Cicero notices Isokrates as having heard Gorgias in Thessaly (Orator. 53, 176).

whether he is handsome, rich, &c., or the contrary. *Menon.* —Certainly not. But is it really true, Sokrates, that you do not know what virtue is? Am I to proclaim this respecting you, when I go home?[b] *Sokr.*—Yes—undoubtedly: and proclaim besides that I have never yet met with any one who *did* know. *Menon.*—What! have you not seen Gorgias at Athens, and did not he appear to you to know? *Sokr.*—I have met him, but I do not quite recollect what he said.[c] We need not consider what he said, since he is not here to answer for himself. But you doubtless recollect, and can tell me, both from yourself, and from him, what virtue is? *Menon.*—There is *no difficulty* in telling you.[d]

Many commentators here speak as if such disclaimer on the part of Sokrates had reference merely to certain impudent pretensions to universal knowledge on the part of the Sophists. But this (as I have before remarked) is a misconception of the Sokratic or Platonic point of view. The matter which Sokrates proclaims that *he* does not know, is, what, not Sophists alone, but every one else also, professes to know well. Sokrates stands alone in avowing that he does not know it, and that he can find no one else who knows. Menon treats the question as one of no difficulty—one on which confessed ignorance was discreditable. "What!" says Menon, "am I really to state respecting you, that you do not know what virtue is?" The man who makes such a confession will be looked upon by his neighbours with surprise and displeasure—not to speak of probable consequences yet worse. He is one whom the multifarious agencies employed by King Nomos (which we shall find described more at length in the Protagoras) have failed to mould into perfect and uninquiring conformity, and he is still in process of examination to form a judgment for himself.

[b] Plato, Menon, p. 71 B-C. *σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ὅ τι ἀρετή οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;*

[c] Plato, Menon, p 71 D. *ἄπεστιν.* Sokrates sets little value upon opinions unless where the person giving them is present to explain and defend; compare what he says about the uselessness of citation from poets, from whom you can ask no questions, Plato, Protagor. p. 347 E.

[d] Plato, Menon, p. 71 E. *Ἀλλ' οὐ*

Menon proceeds to answer that there are many virtues: the virtue of a man—competence to transact the business of the city, and in such business to benefit his friends and injure his enemies: the virtue of a woman—to administer the house well, preserving everything within it, and obeying her husband; the virtue of a child, of an old man, a slave, &c. There is in short a virtue—and its contrary, a vice—belonging to each of us in every work, profession, and age.[e]

Answer of Menon—plurality of virtues, one belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them.

But (replies Sokrates) are they not all the same, *quatenus* virtue? Health, *quatenus* Health, is the same in a man or a woman: is not the case similar with virtue? *Menon.*—Not exactly similar. *Sokr.*—How so? Though there are many diverse virtues, have not all of them one and the same form in common, through the communion of which they *are* virtues? In answer to my question, you ought to declare what this common form is. Thus, both the man who administers the city, and the woman who administers the house, must act both of them with justice and moderation. Through the same qualities, both the one and the other are good. There is thus some common constituent: tell me what it is, according to you and Gorgias? *Menon.*—It is to be competent to exercise command over men.[f] *Sokr.*—But that will not suit for the virtue of a child or a slave. Moreover, must we not superadd the condition, to command justly, and not unjustly? *Menon.*—I think so: justice is virtue. *Sokr.*—Is it virtue —or is it one particular variety of virtue?[g] *Menon.*—How do you mean? *Sokr.*—Just as if I were to say about roundness, that it is not figure, but a particular variety of figure: because there are other figures besides roundness. *Menon.* —Very true: I say too, that there are other virtues besides justice—namely, courage, moderation, wisdom, magnanimity,

[e] Plato, Menon, c. 3, p. 72 A. καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. Though Sokrates disapproves this method of answering—τὸ ἐξαριθμεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς (to use the expression of Aristotle)—yet Aristotle seems to think it better than searching for one general definition. See Politica, i. 13, p. 1260, a. 15-30, where he has the Platonic Menon in his mind.

[f] Plato, Menon, p. 73 D.

[g] Plato, Menon, c. 5, p. 73 E. Πό-

and several others also. *Sokr.*—We are thus still in the same predicament. In looking for one virtue, we have found many; but we cannot find that one form which runs through them all. *Menon.*—I cannot at present tell what that one is.[h] Sokrates proceeds to illustrate his meaning by the analogies of figure and colour. You call *round* a figure, and *square* a figure: you call *white* and *black* both colour, the one as much as the other, though they are unlike and even opposite.[i] Tell me, What is this same common property in both, which makes you call both of them figure—both of them colour? Take this as a preliminary exercise, in order to help you in answering my enquiry about virtue.[k] Menon cannot answer, and Sokrates answers his own question. He gives a general definition, first of figure, next of colour. He first defines figure in a way which implies colour to be known. This is pointed out; and he then admits that in a good definition, suitable to genuine dialectical investigation, nothing should be implied as known, except what the respondent admits himself to know. Figure and colour are both defined suitably to this condition.[l]

Analogous cases cited—figure and colour.

All this preliminary matter seems to be intended for the purpose of getting the question clearly conceived as a general question—of exhibiting and eliminating the narrow and partial conceptions which often unconsciously substitute themselves in the mind, in place of that which ought to be conceived as a generic whole—and of clearing up what is required in a good definition. A generic whole, including various specific portions distinguishable from each other, was at that time little understood by any one. There existed no grammar, nor any rules of logic founded on analysis of the intellectual process. To predicate of the genus what was true only of the species—to predicate as distinctively charac-

Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and distinctions—Neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into

[h] Plato, Menon, c. 6, p. 74 A. οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.

[i] Plato, Menon, p. 74 D.

[k] Plato, Menon, c. 7, pp. 74-75. σοι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπό-

The purpose of practising the respondent is here distinctly announced.

[l] Plato, Menon, p. 75 C-E.

terizing the species, what is true of the whole genus in which it is contained—to lose the integrity of the genus in its separate parcels or fragments[m]—these were errors which men had never yet been expressly taught to avoid. To assign the one common meaning, constituent of or connoted by a generic term, had never yet been put before them as a problem. Such preliminary clearing of the ground is instructive even now, when formal and systematic logic has become more or less familiar: but in the time of Plato, it must have been indispensably required, to arrive at a full conception of any general question.[n]

Menon having been thus made to understand the formal requisites for a definition, gives as his definition of virtue the phrase of some lyric poet—"To delight in, or desire, things beautiful, fine, honourable—and to have the power of getting them." But Sokrates remarks that honourable things are good things, and that every one without exception desires good. No one desires evil except when he mistakes it for good. On this point all men are alike; the distinctive feature of virtue must then consist in the second half of the definition—in the power of acquiring good things, such as health, wealth, money, power, dignities, &c.[o] But the acquisition of these things is not

Definition of virtue given by Menon; Sokrates pulls it to pieces.

[m] Plato, Menon, p. 79 A. δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνύναι ματίζειν τὴν ἀρετήν, &c. ἐμοῦ ν, &c.

[n] These examples of trial, error, and exposure, have great value and reflect high credit on Plato, when we regard them as an intellectual or propædeutic discipline, forcing upon hearers an attention to useful logical distinctions at a time when there existed no systematic grammar or logic. But surely they must appear degraded, as they are presented in the Prolegomena of Stallbaum, and by some other critics. We are there told that Plato's main purpose in this dialogue was to mock and jeer the Sophists and their pupil, and that for this purpose Sokrates is made to employ not his own arguments but arguments borrowed from the Sophists themselves—"ut callidé suam ipsius rationem occultare existimandus sit, quo magis illudat Sophistarum alumnum" (p. 15). "Quæ quidem argumentatio" (that of Sokrates) "admodum cavendum est ne pro Socraticâ vel Platonicâ accipiatur. Est enim prorsus ad mentem Sophistarum aliorumque id genushominum comparata," &c. (p. 16). Compare pp. 12-13 seq.

The Sophists undoubtedly had no distinct consciousness, any more than other persons, of these logical distinctions, which were then for the first time pressed forcibly upon attention.

[o] Plato, Menon, p. 77 B. δοκῶ τοίνυν μοι, ἀρετὴ εἶναι καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι. τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶ

Whoever this lyric poet was, his real meaning is somewhat twisted by Sokrates in order to furnish a basis for ethical criticism, as the song of Simonides is in the Protagoras. A per-

virtuous, unless it be made consistently with justice and moderation: moreover the man who acts justly is virtuous, even though he does not acquire them. It appears then that every agent who acts with justice and moderation is virtuous. But this is nugatory as a definition of virtue: for justice and moderation are only known as parts of virtue, and require to be themselves defined. No man can know what a part of virtue is, unless he knows what virtue itself is.[p] Menon must look for a better definition, including nothing but what is already known or admitted.

Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock—Sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and perplexity and ignorance. I do not know what both.

Menon.—Your conversation, Sokrates, produces the effect of the shock of the torpedo: you stun and confound me: you throw me into inextricable perplexity, so that I can make no answer. I have often discoursed copiously—and, as I thought, effectively—upon virtue; but now you have shown that I do not even know what virtue is. *Sokr.*—If I throw you into perplexity, it is only because I am myself in the ... is, any more than you: and I shall be glad to continue the search for finding it, if you will assist me.

But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it is found it.

Menon.—But how are you to search for that of which you are altogether ignorant? Even if you do find it, how can you ever know that you have found it? *Sokr.*—You are now introducing a troublesome doctrine, laid down by those who are averse to the labour of thought. They tell us that a man cannot search either for what he knows, or for what he does not know. For the former, research is superfluous: for the latter it is unprofitable and purposeless, since the searcher does not know what he is looking for.

son having power, and taking delight in honourable or beautiful things—is a very intelligible Hellenic idéal, as an object of envy and admiration. Compare Protagoras, p. 351 C. *εἴπερ τοῖς καὶ οἷς ζῆν ἡδόμενος.* A poor man may be *φιλόκαλος* as well as a rich man: *φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας*, is the boast of Perikles in the name of the Athenians, Thucyd. ii. 40.

Plato, Menon, c. 11, p. 78.

δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷόν τ' ὑγιαῖνόν τε καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχάς;

Menon. *Οὐκ ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.*

[p] Plato, Menon, c. 12, p. 79.

I do not believe this doctrine (continues Sokrates). Priests, priestesses, and poets (Pindar among them) tell us, that the mind of man is immortal and has existed throughout all past time, in conjunction with successive bodies; alternately abandoning one body, or dying — and taking up new life or reviving in another body. In this perpetual succession of existences, it has seen everything,—both here and in Hades and everywhere else—and has learnt everything. But though thus omniscient, it has forgotten the larger portion of its knowledge. Yet what has been thus forgotten may again be revived. What we call learning, is such revival. It is reminiscence of something which the mind had seen in a former state of existence, and knew, but had forgotten. Since then all the parts of nature are analogous, or cognate—and since the mind has gone through and learnt them all—we cannot wonder that the revival of any one part should put it upon the track of recovering for itself all the rest, both about virtue and about everything else, if a man will only persevere in intent meditation. All research and all learning is thus nothing but reminiscence. In our researches, we are not looking for what we do not know: we are looking for what we do know, but have forgotten. There is therefore ample motive, and ample remuneration, for prosecuting enquiries: and your doctrine which pronounces them to be unprofitable, is incorrect.[q]

Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates. —anterior immortality of the soul— what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten.

Sokrates proceeds to illustrate the position, just laid down, by cross-examining Menon's youthful slave: who, though wholly untaught and having never heard any mention of geometry, is brought by a proper series of questions to give answers out of his own mind, furnishing the solution of a geometrical pro-

Illustration of this theory —knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly

q Plato, Menon, c. 14-15, p. 81.

Ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο. Ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγένους οὔσης καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα, ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμῃ ζητῶν. Τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἔστιν.

untaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon.

blem. The first part of the examination brings him to a perception of the difficulty, and makes him feel a painful perplexity, from which he desires to obtain relief:[r] the second part guides his mind in the efforts necessary for fishing up a solution out of its own pre-existing, but forgotten, stores. True opinions, which he had long had within him without knowing it, are awakened by interrogation, and become cognitions. From the fact that the mind thus possesses the truth of things which it has not acquired in this life, Sokrates infers that it must have gone through a pre-existence of indefinite duration, or must be immortal.[s]

Enquiry taken up—Whether virtue is teachable? without determining what virtue is.

The former topic of enquiry is now resumed: but at the instance of Menon, the question taken up, is not—"What is virtue?" but—"Is virtue teachable or not?" Sokrates, after renewing his objection against the inversion of philosophical order by discussing the second question without having determined the first, enters upon the discussion hypothetically, assuming as a postulate, that nothing can be taught except knowledge. The question then stands thus—"Is virtue knowledge?" If it be, it can be taught: if not, it cannot be taught.[t]

Virtue is knowledge—no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of knowledge.

Sokrates proceeds to prove that virtue is knowledge, or a mode of knowledge. Virtue is good: all good things are profitable. But none of the things accounted good are profitable, unless they be rightly employed; that is, employed with knowledge or intelligence. This is true not only of health, wealth, beauty, strength, power, &c., but also of the mental attributes justice, moderation, courage, quick apprehension, &c. All of these are profitable, and therefore good, if brought into action under knowledge or right intelligence; none of them are profitable or good, without this condition—which is therefore the distinctive constituent of virtue.[u]

[r] Plato, Menon, c. 18, p. 84 C. Οἶει οὖν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ζητεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν τοῦτο ὃ ᾤετο εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσεν ἡγησάμενος μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπόθησε τὸ εἰδέναι; Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. Ὤνητο ἄρα ναρκήσας.

[s] Plato, Menon, c. 21, p. 86. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ μὲν ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη.

[t] Plato, Menon, c. 23, p. 87.

[u] Plato, Menon, c. 25, p. 89.

Virtue therefore, being knowledge or a mode of knowledge, cannot come by nature, but must be teachable.

Yet again there are other contrary reasons (he proceeds) which prove that it cannot be teachable. For if it were so, there would be distinct and assignable teachers and learners of it, and the times and places could be pointed out where it is taught and learnt. We see that this is the case with all arts and professions. But in regard to virtue, there are neither recognised teachers, nor learners, nor years of learning. The Sophists pretend to be teachers of it, but are not:[x] the leading and esteemed citizens of the community do not pretend to be teachers of it, and are indeed incompetent to teach it even to their own sons—as the character of those sons sufficiently proves.[y]

Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can be found.

Here, a new speaker is introduced into the dialogue—Anytus, one of the accusers of Sokrates before the Dikastery. The conversation is carried on for some time between Sokrates and him. Anytus denies altogether that the Sophists are teachers of virtue, and even denounces them with bitter contempt and wrath. But he maintains that the leading and esteemed citizens of the state do really teach it. Anytus however presently breaks off in a tone of displeasure and menace towards Sokrates himself.[z] The conversation is then renewed with Menon, and it is shown that the leading politicians cannot be considered as teachers of virtue, any more than the Sophists. There exist no teachers of it; and therefore we must conclude that it is not teachable.

Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue.

The state of the discussion as it stands now, is represented by two hypothetical syllogisms, as follows:—

[x] Plato, Menon, c. 30, p. 92.

[y] Plato, Menon, c. 36, p. 97. Isokrates (adv. Sophistas, s. 25, p. 401) expressly declares that he does not believe ὃς ἐστι δικαιοσύνη διδακτόν. There is no τέχνη which can teach it, if a man be κακῶς πεφυκώς. But if a man be well-disposed, then education in λόγοι πολιτικοί will serve συμπαρακελεύσασθαί γε καὶ συνασκῆσαι.

For a man to announce himself as a teacher of justice or virtue, was an unpopular and invidious pretension. Isokrates is anxious to guard himself against such unpopularity.

[z] Plato, Menon, c. 34, p. 94 E.

Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown.

1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
   But virtue is knowledge:
   Therefore virtue is teachable.
2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:
   But virtue is not teachable:
   Therefore virtue is not knowledge.

The premisses of each of these two syllogisms contradict the conclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not acquired by teaching, and does not come by nature, how are there any virtuous men?

Sokrates modifies his premisses—knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results—right opinion will do the same.

Sokrates continues his argument: The second premiss of the first syllogism—that virtue is knowledge—is true, but not the whole truth.[a] In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But this assumption will not hold. There is something else besides knowledge, which also guides us to the same useful results. That something is *right opinion*, which is quite different from knowledge. The man who holds right opinions is just as profitable to us, and guides us quite as well to right actions, as if he knew. Right opinions, so long as they stay in the mind, are as good as knowledge, for the purpose of guidance in practice. But the difference is, that they are evanescent and will not stay in the mind: while knowledge is permanent and ineffaceable. They are exalted into knowledge, when bound in the mind by a chain of causal reasoning:[a] that is, by the process of reminiscence, before described.

Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach

Virtue then (continues Sokrates)—that which constitutes the virtuous character and the permanent, trustworthy, useful guide—consists in knowledge. But there is also right opinion, a sort of *quasi-knowledge*, which produces in practice effects as good as knowledge, only that it is not deeply or permanently

[a] Plato, Menon, c. 39, p 98. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλόν τι χρῆμα καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται.

fixed in the mind.[b] It is this right opinion, or *quasi-knowledge*, which esteemed and distinguished citizens possess, and by means of which they render useful service to the city. That they do not possess knowledge, is certain; for if they did, they would be able to teach it to others, and especially to their own sons: and this it has been shown that they cannot do.[c] They deliver true opinions and predictions, and excellent advice, like prophets and oracular ministers, by divine inspiration and possession, without knowledge or wisdom of their own. They are divine and inspired persons, but not wise or knowing.[d]

others—good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods.

And thus (concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally started by Menon—"Whether virtue is teachable?"—is as follows. Virtue in its highest sense, in which it is equivalent to or coincident with knowledge, is teachable: but no such virtue exists. That which exists in the most distinguished citizens under the name of virtue,—or at least producing the results of virtue in practice—is not teachable. Nor does it come by nature, but by special inspiration from the Gods. The best statesmen now existing cannot make any other person like themselves: if any one of them could do this, he would be, in comparison with the rest, like a real thing compared with a shadow.[e]

All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods.

Nevertheless the question which we have just discussed—"How virtue arises or is generated?"—must be regarded as secondary and dependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary and principal question—"What is virtue?"—has been investigated and brought to a solution.[f]

But what virtue itself is, remains unknown.

This last observation is repeated by Sokrates at the end—as it had been stated at the beginning, and in more

Remarks on the dialogue.

[b] Plato, Menon, c. 40, p. 99 A. ᾧ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμόνι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

[c] Plato, Menon, c. 41, p. 99 B. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο τοῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα. διὸ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσιν, ἅτε οὐ δι' ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

[d] Plato, Menon, c. 41, p. 99 D. καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν, ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μέγαλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

[e] Plato, Menon, c. 42, p. 100.

[f] Plato, Menon, c. 42, p. 100 B.

Proper order for examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates.

than one place during the continuance—of the dialogue. In fact, Sokrates seems at first resolved to enforce the natural and necessary priority of the latter question: but is induced by the solicitation of Menon to invert the order.[g]

The propriety of the order marked out, but not pursued, by Sokrates is indisputable. Before you can enquire how virtue is generated or communicated, you must be satisfied that you know what virtue is. You must know the essence of the subject—or those predicates which the word connotes (=the meaning of the term) before you investigate its accidents and antecedents.[h] Menon begins by being satisfied that he knows what virtue is: so satisfied, that he accounts it discreditable for a man not to know: although he is made to answer like one who has never thought upon the subject, and does not even understand the question. Sokrates, on the other hand, not only confesses that he does not himself know, but asserts that he never yet met with a man who did know. One of the most important lessons in this, as in so many other Platonic dialogues, is the mischief of proceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions, without having settled the fundamental words and notions: the false persuasion of knowledge, common to almost every one, respecting these familiar ethical and social ideas. Menon represents the common state of mind. He begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else knows what virtue is: and even when he is proved to be ignorant, he still feels no interest in the fundamental enquiry, but turns aside to his original object of curiosity—"Whether virtue is teachable." Nothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough sifting of deep-seated, long familiarised, notions—*τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν, ὀδυνᾷ.*

Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions, when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled.

[g] Plato, Menon, c. 21, p. 86.

[h] To use the phrase of Plato himself in the Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 11 A, the *οὐσία* must be known before the *πάθη* are sought—*κινδυνεύεις, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ, τι ποτ' ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅ, τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὅ τι δὲ ὂν, οὔπω εἶπες.*

Compare Lachês, p. 190 B, and Gorgias, pp. 448 E, 462 C.

Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon—desire of good alleged to be universally felt—in what sense this is true.

The confession of Sokrates that neither he nor any other person in his experience knows what virtue is—that it must be made a subject of special and deliberate investigation—and that no man can know what justice, or any other part of virtue is, unless he first knows what virtue as a whole is[i]—are matters to be kept in mind also, as contrasting with other portions of the Platonic dialogues, wherein virtue, justice, &c., are tacitly assumed (according to the received habit) as matters known and understood. The contributions which we obtain from the Menon towards finding out the Platonic notion of virtue, are negative rather than positive. The comments of Sokrates upon Menon's first definition include the doctrine often announced in Plato—That no man by nature desires suffering or evil: every man desires good: if he seeks or pursues suffering or evil, he does so merely from error or ignorance, mistaking it for good.[k] This is true, undoubtedly, if we mean what is good or evil for himself: and if by good or evil we mean (according to the doctrine enforced by Sokrates in the Protagoras) the result of items of pleasure and pain, rightly estimated and compared by the Measuring Reason. Every man naturally desires pleasure, and the means of acquiring pleasure, for himself: every man naturally shrinks from pain, or the causes of pain, to himself: every one compares and measures the items of each with more or less wisdom and impartiality. But the proposition is not true, if we mean what is good or evil for others: and if by good we mean (as Sokrates is made to declare in the Gorgias) something apart from pleasure, and by evil something apart from pain (understanding pleasure and pain in their largest sense). A man sometimes desires what is good for others, sometimes what is evil for others, as the case may be. Plato's observation therefore cannot be admitted—That as to the wish or desire, all men are alike: one man is no better than another.[m]

[i] Plato, Menon, c. 12, p. 79 B-C. *τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόριον φῂς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων. . . . οἷόν τινα εἰδέναι μόριον ἀρετῆς ὅ τι ἔστιν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδότα; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.*

[k] Plato, Menon, c. 10, p. 77.

[m] Plato, Menon, c. 11, p. 78. *τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν ὁ ἕτερος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων.*

The second portion of Plato's theory, advanced to explain what virtue is, presents nothing more satisfactory. Virtue is useful or profitable: but neither health, strength, beauty, wealth, power, &c., are profitable, unless rightly used: nor are justice, moderation, courage, quick apprehension, good memory, &c., profitable, unless they are accompanied and guided by knowledge or prudence.[n] Now if by *profitable* we have reference not to the individual agent alone, but to other persons concerned also, the proposition is true, but not instructive or distinct. For what is meant by *right use?* To what ends are the gifts here enumerated to be turned, in order to constitute right use? What again is meant by *knowledge?* knowledge of what?[o] This is a question put by Sokrates in many other dialogues, and necessary to be put here also. Moreover, knowledge is a term which requires to be determined, not merely to some assignable object, but also in its general import, no less than virtue. We shall come presently to an elaborate dialogue (Theætêtus) in which Plato makes many attempts to determine knowledge generally, but ends in a confessed failure. Knowledge must be knowledge *possessed by some one*, and must be knowledge of *something*. What is it, that a man must know, in order that his justice or courage may become profitable? Is it pleasures and pains, with their causes, and the comparative magnitude of each (as Sokrates declares in the Protagoras), in order that he may contribute to diminish the sum of pains, increase that of pleasures, to himself or to the society? If this be what he is required to know, Plato should have said so—or if not, what else—in order that the requirement of knowledge might be made an intelligible condition.

Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine—knowledge of what.

Though the subject of direct debate in the Menon is the same as that in the Protagoras (whether virtue be teachable?) yet the manner of treating this subject is very different in the two. One point of difference between the two has been just noticed. An-

Subject of Menon, same as that of the Protagoras—diversity of handling—Plato is not

[n] Plato, Menon, c. 24, pp. 87-88.

[o] See Republic, vi. p. 505 B, where this question is put, but not answered, respecting φρόνησις.

other difference is, that whereas in Menon the teachability of virtue is assumed to be disproved, because there are no recognised teachers or learners of it—in the Protagoras this argument is produced by Sokrates, but is combated at length (as we shall presently see) by a counter-argument on the part of the Sophists, without any rejoinder from Sokrates. Of this counter-argument no notice is taken in the Menon: although, if it be well-founded, it would have served Anytus no less than Protagoras, as a solution of the difficulties raised by Sokrates. Such diversity of handling and argumentative fertility, are characteristic of the Platonic procedure. I have already remarked, that the establishment of positive conclusions, capable of being severed from their premisses, registered in the memory, and used as principles for deduction—is foreign to the spirit of these Dialogues of Search. To settle a question and finish with it—to get rid of the debate, as if it were a troublesome temporary necessity—is not what Plato desires. His purpose is, to provoke the spirit of enquiry—to stimulate responsive efforts of the mind by a painful shock of exposed ignorance—and to open before it a multiplicity of new roads with varied points of view.

anxious to settle a question and get rid of it.

Nowhere in the Platonic writings is this provocative shock more vividly illustrated than in the Menon, by the simile of the electrical fish: a simile as striking as that of the magnet in Ion.[p] Nowhere, again, is the true character of the Sokratic intellect more clearly enunciated. "You complain, Menon, that I plunge your mind into nothing but doubt, and puzzle, and conscious ignorance. If I do this, it is only because my own mind is already in that same condition.[q] The only way out of it is, through joint dialectical colloquy and search; in which I invite you to accompany me, though I do not know when or where it will end." And then, for the purpose of justifying as well as encouraging such prolonged search, Sokrates proceeds to unfold his remarkable hypothesis—eternal pre-existence, boundless past experience, and omniscience, of the mind—

Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research.

[p] Plato, Menon, p. 80 A. πάρεση ἀλογία. Compare what I have said above about the Ion, chap. xv. p. 462.

[q] Plato, Menon, p. 80 D.

—identity of cognition with recognition, dependent on reminiscence. "Research or enquiry (said some) is fruitless. You must search either for that which you know, or for that which you do not know. The first is superfluous—the second impossible: for if you do not know what a thing is, how are you to be satisfied that the answer which you find is that which you are looking for? How can you distinguish a true solution from another which is untrue, but plausible?

Great question discussed among the Grecian phi-

Here we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for the subsequent three centuries—What is the criterion of truth? Wherein consists the process called verification and proof, of that which is first presented as an hypothesis? This was one of the great problems debated between the Academics, the Stoics, and the Sceptics, until the extinction of the schools of philosophy.[r]

criterion of truth—Wherein consists the process of verification?

None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here

Not one of these schools was satisfied with the very peculiar answer which the Platonic Sokrates here gives to the question. When truth is presented to us (he intimates), we recognise it as an old friend after

[r] Sokrates here calls this problem an ἐριστικὸς λόγος. Stallbaum (in his Prolegom. to the Menon, p. 14) describes as a "quæstiunculam, haud dubié ex sophistarum disciplinâ arreptam." If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of philosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted, if we are to have a body of "reasoned truth" called philosophy.

I dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum (p. 20), though it is adopted both by Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 185) and by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Menon, p. 123), that the Menon was composed by Plato during the lifetime of Sokrates. Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 22; Einleitung zum Menon, pp. 329-330), Ueberweg (Aechth. Plat. Schr. p. 226), and K. F. Hermann, on the other hand, regard the Menon as composed after the death of Sokrates, and on this point I agree with them, though whether it was composed not long after that event (as K. F. Hermann thinks) or thirteen years after it (as Schleiermacher thinks), I see no sufficient grounds for deciding. I incline to the belief that its composition is considerably later than Hermann supposes; the mention of the Theban Ismenias is one among the reasons rendering such later origin probable. Plato probably borrowed from the Xenophontic Anabasis the name, country, and social position of Menon, who may have received teaching from Gorgias, as we know that Proxenus did, Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16. The reader can compare the Einleitung of Schleiermacher (in which he professes to prove that the Menon is a corollary to the Theætêtus and Gorgias, and an immediate antecedent to the Euthydêmus,—that it solves the riddle of the Protagoras—and that it presupposes and refers back to the Phædrus) with

a long absence. We know it by reason of its conformity to our antecedent, pre-natal, experience (in the Phædon, such pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial, intelligible, Ideas, which are not mentioned in the Menon): the soul or mind is immortal, has gone through an indefinite succession of temporary lives prior to the present, and will go through an indefinite succession of temporary lives posterior to the present—"longæ, canitis si cognita, vitæ Mors media est." The mind has thus become omniscient, having seen, heard, and learnt everything, both on earth and in Hades: but such knowledge exists as a confused and unavailable mass, having been buried and forgotten on the commencement of its actual life.

made by Plato—that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience.

Since all nature is in universal kindred, communion, or interdependance, that which we hear or see here, recalls to the memory, by association, portions of our prior forgotten omniscience.[8] It is in this recall or reminiscence that search,

the Einleitung of Steinhart (p. 120 seq.), who contests all these propositions, saying that the Menon is decidedly later than the Euthydêmus, and decidedly earlier than the Theætêtus, Gorgias, and Phædrus; with the opinions of Stallbaum and Hermann, who recognise an order different from that either of Steinhart or Schleiermacher; and with that of Ast, who rejects the Menon altogether as unworthy of Plato. Every one of these dissentient critics has *something* to say for his opinion, while none of them (in my judgment) can make out anything like a conclusive case. The mistake consists in assuming that there must have been a peremptory order and intentional interdependance among the Platonic Dialogues, and next in trying to show by internal evidence what that order was.

[8] The doctrine of communion or interdependance pervading all Nature, with one continuous cosmical soul penetrating everywhere, will be found set forth in the kosmology of the Timæus, pp. 37-42-43. It was held, with various modifications, both by the Pythagoreans and the Stoics. Compare Cicero, Divinat. ii. 14-15; Virgil, Æneid vi. 715 seqq.; Georgic. iv. 220; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. ix. 127; Ekphantus Pythagoreus ap. Stobæum, Tit. 48, vol. ii. p. 320, Gaisford.

The view here taken by Plato, that all nature is cognate and interdependant—ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγένους οὔσης—is very similar to the theory of Leibnitz:—"Ubique per materiam disseminata statuo principia vitalia seu percipientia. Omnia in naturâ sunt analogica" (Leibnitz, Epist. ad Wagnerum, p. 466; Leibn. Opp. Erdmann). Farther, that the human mind by virtue of its interdependance or kindred with all nature, includes a confused omniscience, is also a Leibnitzian view. "Car comme tout est plein (ce qui rend toute la matière liée) et comme dans le plein tout mouvement fait quelqu' effet sur les corps distans à mesure de la distance, de sorte que chaque corps est affecté non seulement par ceux qui le touchent, et se ressent en quelque façon de tout ce qui leur arrive—mais aussi par leur moyen se ressent de ceux qui touchent les prémiers dont il est touché immédiatement. Il s'ensuit que cette communication va à quelque distance

learning, acquisition of knowledge, consists. Teaching and learning are words without meaning: the only process really instructive is that of dialectic debate, which, if indefatigably prosecuted, will dig out the omniscience buried within.[t] So vast is the theory generated in Plato's mind, by his worship of dialectic, respecting that process of search to which more than half of his dialogues are devoted.

Plato's view

In various other dialogues of Plato, the same hypothesis is found repeated. His conception of the immortality of the soul or mind, includes pre-existence as well as post-existence: a perpetual succession of temporary lives, each in a distinct body, each terminated by death, and each followed by renewed life for a time in another body. In fact, the pre-existence of the mind formed the most important part of Plato's theory about immortality: for he employed it as the means of explaining how the mind became possessed of general notions.

que ce soit. Et par consequent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans l'Univers: tellement que celui, qui voit tout, pourroit lire dans chacun ce qui se fait partout et même ce qui s'est fait et se fera, en remarquant dans le présent ce qui est éloigné tant selon les temps que selon les lieux: *σύμπνοια πάντα*, disoit Hippocrate. Mais une âme ne peut lire en elle même que ce qui y est représenté distinctement: elle ne sauroit developper tout d'un coup ses régles, car elles vont à l'infini. Ainsi quoique chaque monade créée représente tout l'Univers, elle représente plus distinctement le corps qui lui est particulièrement affecté, et dont elle fait l'Entéléchie. Et comme ce corps exprime tout l'Univers par la connexion de toute la matière dans le plein, l'âme représente aussi tout l'Univers en représentant ce corps qui lui appartient d'une manière particulière" (Leibnitz, Monadologie, sect. 61-62, No. 88, p. 710; Opp. Leibn. ed. Erdmann).

Again, Leibnitz, in another Dissertation;—"Comme à cause de la plénitude du monde tout est lié, et chaque corps agit sur chaque autre corps, plus ou moins, selon la distance, et en est affecté par la réaction—il s'ensuit que chaque monade est un miroir vivant, ou doué d'action interne, représentatif de l'Univers, suivant son point de vue, et aussi réglé que l'Univers même" (Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, p. 714, ed. Erdmann; also Système Nouveau, p. 128, a. 36).

Leibnitz expresses more than once how much his own metaphysical views agreed with those of Plato. Lettre à M. Bourguet, pp. 723-725. He expresses his belief in the pre-existence of the soul. "Tout ce que je crois pouvoir assurer, est, que l'âme de tout animal a préexisté, et a été dans un corps organique: qui enfin, par beaucoup de changemens, involutions, et évolutions, est devenu l'animal présent" (Lettre à M. Bourguet, p. 731): and in the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence to a certain point. "Il y a quelque chose de solide dans ce que dit Platon de la réminiscence," p. 137, b. 10; also Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, p. 196, b. 28; and Epistol. ad Hanschium, p. 446, a. 12.

See the elaborate account of the philosophy of Leibnitz by Dr. Kuno Fischer—Geschichte de neueren Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 226-232.

[t] Plato, Menon, p. 81 D. *ἀνὴρ τις ἀνδρεῖος ἢ, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν.* Compare also p. 86 B.

As the doctrine is stated in the Menon, it is made applicable to all minds (instead of being confined, as in Phædrus, Phædon, and elsewhere, to a few highly gifted minds, and to commerce with the intelligible substances called Ideas). This appears from the person chosen to illustrate the alleged possibility of stimulating artificial reminiscence: that person is an unlettered youth, taken at hazard from among the numerous slaves of Menon.[u]

Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind—how far correct?

It is true, indeed (as Schleiermacher observes), that the questions put by Sokrates to this youth are in great proportion leading questions, suggesting their own answers. They would not have served their purpose unless they had been such. The illustration here furnished of the Sokratic interrogatory process, is highly interesting, and his theory is in a great degree true.[x] Not all learning, but an important part of learning, consists in reminiscence—not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent life, but of past experience and judgments in this life. Of such experience and judgments every one has travelled through a large course; which has disappeared from his memory, yet not irrevocably. Portions of it may be revived, if new matter be presented to the mind, fitted to excite the recollection of them by the laws of association. By suitable interrogations, a teacher may thus recall to the memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which

[u] Plato, Menon, pp. 82 A, 85 E. *προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολούθων τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὁντινα βούλει, ἵν' ἐν τούτῳ σοι ἐπιδείξωμαι.* Stallbaum says that this allusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of Menon. In my judgment, it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident—the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon—"one among many, which you please."

[x] Plutarch (Fragment. *Περὶ ψυχῆς*). *Εἰ ἀφ' ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἐννοοῦμεν; οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὴ προέγνωστο. Τὸ ἐπιχείρημα Πλατωνικόν. Εἰ προστίθεμεν τὸ ἔλλειπον τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς;—καὶ αὐτὸ Πλατωνικόν.*

Plutarch, in the same fragment, indicates some of the objections made by Bion and Straton against the doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*. How (they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often what is false or absurd? (asked Bion). If such reminiscence exists (asked Straton) how comes it that we require demonstrations to conduct us to knowledge? and how is it that no man can play on the flute or the harp without practice?

Ὅτι Βίων ἠπόρει περὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸ κατ' ἀνάμνησιν, ὡς τὸ ἐναντίον γε, ἢ οὔ; καὶ τί ἡ ἀλογία; Ὅτι Στράτων ἠπόρει, εἰ ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις, πῶς ἄνευ ἀποδείξεων οὐ γιγνόμεθα ἐπιστήμονες; πῶς δὲ οὐδεὶς αὐλητὴς ἢ κιθαριστὴς γέγονεν ἄνευ μελέτης;

have been hitherto forgotten: he may bring into juxtaposition those which have never before been put together in the mind: and he may thus make them elicit instructive comparisons and inferences. He may provoke the pupils to strike out new results for themselves, or to follow, by means of their own stock of knowledge, in the path suggested by the questions. He may farther lead them to perceive the fallacy of erroneous analogies which at first presented themselves as plausible; and to become painfully sensible of embarrassment and perplexing ignorance, before he puts those questions which indicate the way of escape from it. Upon the necessity of producing such painful consciousness of ignorance Plato insists emphatically, as is his custom.[y]

Plato's doctrine about *à priori* reasonings—different from the modern doctrine.

Plato does not intend here to distinguish (as many modern writers distinguish) geometry from other sciences, as if geometry were known *à priori*, and other sciences known *à posteriori* or from experience. He does not suppose that geometrical truths are such that no man can possibly believe the contrary of them; or

[y] Plato, Menon, c. 18, p. 84. The sixteenth Dissertation of Maximus Tyrius presents a rhetorical amplification of this doctrine—πᾶσα μάθησις, ἀνάμνησις—in which he enters fully into the spirit of the Menon and the Phædon—αὐτοδίδακτόν τι χρῆμα ἡ ψυχή—ἡ ψυχῆς εὕρεσις, αὐτογενής τις οὖσα, καὶ αὐτοφυὴς, καὶ ξύμφυτος, τί ἄλλο ἔστιν (c. 6). Compare also Cicero, Tusc. D. i. 24. The doctrine has furnished a theme for very elegant poetry; both in the Consolatio Philosophiæ of Boethius—the piece which ends with

"Ac si Platonis Musa personat verum,
Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur"—

and in Wordsworth—"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting," &c.

On the other hand Aristotle alludes also to the same doctrine and criticises it; but he does not seem (so far as I can understand this brief allusion) to seize exactly Plato's meaning. This is the remark of the Scholiast on Aristotle; and I think it just. It is curious to compare the way in which is handled by Plato in the Menon and Phædon, and by Aristotle in the valuable little tract—Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως (p. 451, b.). Aristotle has his own way of replying to the difficulty raised in the question of Menon, and tries to show that sometimes we *know* in one sense and *do not know* in another. See Aristotel. Analyt. Priora, ii. p. 67, a. 22; Analyt. Posterior. i. p. 71, a. 27; and the Scholia on the former passage, p. 193, b. 21, ed. Brandis.

Sir William Hamilton, in one of the Appendixes to his edition of Reid's Works (Append. D. p. 890 seq.), has given a learned and valuable translation and illustration of the treatise of Aristotle Περὶ Ἀναμνήσεως. I note, however, with some surprise, that while collecting many interesting comments from writers who lived *after* Aristotle, he has not adverted to what was said upon this same subject by Plato, *before* Aristotle. It was the more to be expected that he would do this, since he insists so emphatically upon the complete originality of Aristotle.

that they are different in this respect from the truths of any other science. He here maintains that all the sciences lie equally in the untaught mind,[z] but buried, forgotten, and confused: so as to require the skill of the questioner not merely to recall them into consciousness, but to disentangle truth from error. Far from supposing that the untaught mind has a natural tendency to answer correctly geometrical questions, he treats erroneous answers as springing up more naturally than true answers, and as requiring a process of painful exposure before the mind can be put upon the right track. The questioner, without possessing any knowledge himself (so Plato thinks), can nevertheless exercise an influence at once stimulating, corrective, and directive. He stimulates the action of the associative process, to call up facts, comparisons, and analogies, bearing on the question: he arrests the respondent on a wrong answer, creating within him a painful sense of ignorance and embarrassment: he directs him by his subsequent questions into the path of right answers. His obstetric aid (to use the simile in Plato's Theætêtus), though presupposing the pregnancy of the respondent mind, is indispensable both to forward the childbirth, and to throw away any offspring which may happen to be deformed. In the Theætêtus, the main stress is laid on that part of the dialogue which is performed by the questioner: in the Menon, upon the latent competence and large dead stock of an untaught respondent.

The mind of the slave questioned by Sokrates is discovered to be pregnant. Though he has received no teaching from any professed geometer, he is nevertheless found competent, when subjected to a skilful interrogatory, to arrive at last, through a series of mistakes, at correct answers, determining certain simple problems of geometry. He knows nothing about geometry: nevertheless there exist in his mind true opinions respecting that which he does not know. These opinions are "called up like a dream" by the interrogatories: which, if repeated and diversified, convert the opinions into

[z] Plato, Menon, c. 20, p. 85. οὗτος γὰρ (the untaught slave) ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων.

knowledge, taken up by the respondent out of himself.[a] The opinions are inherited from an antecedent life and born with him, since they have never been taught to him during this life.

It is thus that Plato applies to philosophical theory the doctrine (borrowed from the Pythagoreans) of pre-natal experience and cognitions: which he considers, not as inherent appurtenances of the mind, but as acquisitions made by the mind during various antecedent lives. These ideas (Plato argues) cannot have been acquired during the present life, because the youth has received no special teaching in geometry. But Plato here takes no account of the multiplicity and diversity of experiences gone through, comparisons made, and acquirements lodged, in the mind of a youthful adult however unlettered. He recognises no acquisition of knowledge except through special teaching. So, too, in the Protagoras, we shall find him putting into the mouth of Sokrates the doctrine—That virtue is not taught and cannot be taught, because there were no special masters or times of teaching. But in that dialogue we shall also see Plato furnishing an elaborate reply to this doctrine in the speech of Protagoras; who indicates the multifarious and powerful influences which are perpetually operative, even without special professors, in creating and enforcing ethical sentiment. If Plato had taken pains to study the early life of the untaught slave, with its stock of facts, judgments, comparisons, and inferences suggested by analogy, &c., he might easily have found enough to explain the competence of the slave to answer the questions appearing in the dialogue. And even if enough could not have been found, to afford a direct and specific explanation—we must remember that only a very small proportion of the long series of mental phenomena realised in the infant, the child,

Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience.

[a] Plato, Menon, c. 20, p. 85.

τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἆρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι; καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ αὐτῶν; Οὐκοῦν οὐδενὸς διδάξαντος ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

the youth, ever comes to be remembered or recorded. To assume that the large unknown remainder would be insufficient, if known, to afford the explanation sought, is neither philosophical nor reasonable. This is assumed in every form of the doctrine of innate ideas: and assumed by Plato here without even trying any explanation to dispense with the hypothesis: simply because the youth interrogated had never received any special instruction in geometry.

I have already observed, that though great stress is laid in this dialogue upon the doctrine of opinions and knowledge inherited from an antecedent life—upon the distinction between true opinion and knowledge—and upon the identity of the process of learning with reminiscence—yet nothing is said about universal Ideas or Forms, so much dwelt upon in other dialogues. In the Phædrus and Phædon, it is with these universal Ideas that the mind is affirmed to have had communion during its prior existence, as contrasted with the particulars of sense apprehended during the present life: while in the Menon, the difference pointed out between true opinions and knowledge is something much less marked and decisive. Both the one and the other are said to be, not acquired during this life, but inherited from antecedent life: to be innate, yet unperceived —revived by way of reminiscence and interrogation. True opinions are affirmed to render as much service as knowledge, in reference to practice. There is only this distinction between them—that true opinions are transient, and will not remain in the mind until they are bound in it by causal reasoning, or become knowledge.

Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms.

What Plato meant by this "causal reasoning, or computation of cause," is not clearly explained. But he affirms very unequivocally, first, that the distinction between true opinion and knowledge is one of the few things of which he feels assured[b]—next, with somewhat less confidence, that the distinction con-

What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning—his distinction between knowledge and right opinion.

[b] Plato, Menon, c. 40, p. 98. ὅτι δ' ἐστί τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν· ἀλλ' εἴ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι, ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην, ἓν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὃν οἶδα.

sists only in the greater security which knowledge affords for permanent in-dwelling in the mind. This appears substantially the same distinction as what is laid down in other words towards the close of the dialogue—That those, who have only true opinions and not knowledge, judge rightly without knowing how or why; by an aptitude not their own but supplied to them from without for the occasion, in the nature of inspiration or prophetic *œstrus*. Hence they are unable to teach others, or to transfer this occasional inspiration to any one else. They cannot give account of what they affect to know, nor answer scrutinising questions to test it. This power of answering and administering cross-examination, is Plato's characteristic test of real knowledge—as I have already observed in my sixth chapter.

This distinction compared with modern philosophical views.

To translate the views of Plato into analogous views of a modern philosopher, we may say—That right opinion, as contrasted with knowledge, is a discriminating and acute empirical judgment: inferring only from old particulars to new particulars (without the intermediate help and guarantee of general propositions distinctly enuntiated and interpreted), but selecting for every new case the appropriate analogies out of the past, with which it ought to be compared. Many persons judge in this manner fairly well, and some with extreme success. But let them be ever so successful in practice, they proceed without any conscious method; they are unable to communicate the grounds of their inferences to others: and when they are right, it is only by haphazard—that is (to use Plato's language), through special inspiration vouchsafed to them by the Gods. But when they ascend to knowledge, and come to judge scientifically, they then distribute these particular facts into classes—note the constant sequences as distinguished from the occasional—and draw their inferences in every new case according to such general laws or uniformities of antecedent and consequent. Such uniform and unconditional antecedents are the only causes of which we have cognizance. They admit of being described in the language which Plato here uses (*αἰτίας λογισμῷ*), and they also

serve as reasons for justifying or explaining our inferences to others.[c]

The manner in which Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates before the Dikastery, is introduced into this dialogue, deserves notice. The questions are put to him by Sokrates—"Is virtue teachable? How is Menon to learn virtue, and from whom? Ought he not to do as he would do if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some paid professional man as teacher?" Anytus answers these questions in the affirmative: but asks, where such professional teachers of virtue are to be found. "There are the Sophists," replies Sokrates.

Manifestation.

[c] We have seen that in the Menon Plato denies all διδαχὴ, and recognises nothing but ἀνάμνησις. The doctrine of the Timæus (p. 51 D-E) is very different. He there lays especial stress on the distinction between διδαχὴ and πειθώ—the first belonging to ἐπιστήμη, the second to δόξα. Also in Gorgias, 454, and in Republic, v. pp. 477-479, about δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. In those dialogues the distinction between the two is presented as marked and fundamental, as if δόξα alone was fallible and ἐπιστήμη infallible. In the Menon the distinction appears as important, but not fundamental; the Platonic Ideas or Universals being *not* recognised as constituting a substantive world by themselves. In this respect the Menon is nearer to the truth in describing the difference between ὀρθὴ δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. Mr. J. S. Mill (in the chapter of his System of Logic wherein the true theory of the Syllogism is for the first time expounded) has clearly explained what that difference amounts to. All our inferences are *from* particulars, sometimes *to* new particulars directly and at once (δόξα), sometimes *to* generals in the first instance, and through them *to* new particulars; which latter, or scientific process, is highly valuable as a security for correctness (ἐπιστήμη). "Not only (says Mr. Mill) *may* we reason from particulars to particulars without passing through generals, but we perpetually *do* so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general language. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature. If we have an extensive experience and retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate judgment, which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of communicating to others. Among the higher order of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without being able to give any sufficient account of what they did; and applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with appropriate particulars, and having been accustomed to reason at once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of stating to one's self or others the corresponding general propositions. The cases of men of talent performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous forms of the operations of superior minds. It is a defect in them, and often a source of errors, not to have generalised as they went on; but generalization, though a help, the most important indeed of all helps, is not an essential" (Mill, Syst. of Logic, Book II. ch. iii. pp. 212-213-215, ed. 4). Compare the first chapter of the Metaphysica of Aristotle, p. 980, a. 15, b. 7.

Upon this Anytus breaks out into a burst of angry invective against the Sophists; denouncing them as corruptors of youth, whom none but a madman would consult, and who ought to be banished by public authority.

Why are you so bitter against the Sophists? asks Sokrates. Have any of them ever injured you? *Anyt.*—No: never: I have never been in the company of any one of them, nor would I ever suffer any of my family to be so. *Sokr.*—Then you have no experience whatever about the Sophists? *Anyt.*—None; and I hope that I never may have. *Sokr.*—How then can you know about this matter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever about it? *Anyt.*—Easily. I know what sort of men the Sophists are, whether I have experience of them or not. *Sokr.*—Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus: for how else you can know about them, I do not understand, even on your own statement.[d]

Anytus then declares, that the persons from whom Menon ought to learn virtue are the leading practical politicians; and that any one of them can teach it. But Sokrates puts a series of questions, showing that the leading Athenian politicians, Themistoklês, Periklês, &c., have not been able to teach virtue even to their own sons: *à fortiori* therefore, they cannot teach it to any one else. Anytus treats this series of questions as disparaging and calumnious towards the great men of Athens. He breaks off the conversation abruptly, with an angry warning to Sokrates to be cautious about his language, and to take care of his own safety.

The dialogue is then prosecuted and finished between Sokrates and Menon: and at the close of it, Sokrates says—"Talk to Anytus, and communicate to him that persuasion which you have yourself contracted,[e] in order that he may be more mildly disposed: for, if you persuade him, you will do some good to the Athenians as well as to himself."

The enemy and accuser of Sokrates is here depicted as the

[d] Plato, Menon, c. 30, p. 92.

[e] Plato, Menon, ad fin. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι, πείθε καὶ τὸν ξένον τόνδε Ἄνυτον, ἵνα πραότερος ᾖ· ὡς ἐὰν πείθῃς τοῦτον, ἔστιν ὅτι καὶ Ἀθηναίους ὠνήσεις.

bitter enemy of the Sophists also. And Plato takes pains to exhibit the enmity of Anytus to the Sophists as founded on no facts or experience. Without having seen or ascertained anything about them, Anytus hates them as violently as if he had sustained from them some personal injury: a sentiment which many Platonic critics and many historians of philosophy have inherited from him.[f] Whether the corruption which these Sophists were accused of bringing about in the minds of youth, was intentional or not intentional on their part—how such corruption could have been perpetually continued, while at the same time the eminent Sophists enjoyed long and unabated esteem from the youth themselves and from their relatives—are difficulties which Anytus does not attempt to explain, though they are started here by Sokrates. Indeed we find the same topics employed by Sokrates himself, in his defence before the Dikasts against the same charge.[g] Anytus has confidence in no one except the practical statesmen: and when a question is raised about *their* power to impart their own excellence to others, he presently takes offence against Sokrates also. The same causes which have determined his furious antipathy against the Sophists, make him ready to transfer the like antipathy to Sokrates. He is a man of plain sense, practical habits, and conservative patriotism—who worships what he finds accredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorisers about virtue in general: whether they debated in subtle interrogation and dialectics, like Sokrates—or lectured in eloquent continuous discourse, like Protagoras. He accuses the Sophists, in this dialogue, of corrupting the youth; just as he and Melêtus, before the Dikastery, accused

The enemy of the Sophists—Practical statesmen.

[f] Upon the bitter antipathy here expressed by Anytus against the Sophists, whom nevertheless he admits that he does not at all know, Steinhart remarks as follows:—"Gerade so haben zu allen Zeiten Orthodoxe und Fanatiker aller Arten über ihre Gegner abgeurtheilt, ohne sie zu kennen oder auch nur kennen lernen zu wollen" (Einleit. zum Menon, not. 15, p. 173). Certainly orthodox and fanatical persons often do what is here imputed to them. But Steinhart might have found a still closer parallel with Anytus, in his own criticisms, and in those of many other Platonic critics on the Sophists; the same expressions of bitterness and severity, with the same slender knowledge of the persons upon whom they bear.

[g] Plato, Apol. So. pp. 26 A, 33 D, 34 B.

Sokrates of the same offence. He understands the use of words, to discuss actual business before the assembly or Dikastery; but he hates discourse on the generalities of ethics or philosophy. He is essentially μισόλογος. The point which he condemns in the Sophists, is that which they have in common with Sokrates.

The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen.

In many of the Platonic dialogues, we have the antithesis between Sokrates and the Sophists brought out, as to the different point of view from which the one and the other approached ethical questions. But in this portion of the Menon, we find exhibited the feature of analogy between them, in which both one and the other stood upon ground obnoxious to the merely practical politicians. Far from regarding hatred against the Sophists as a mark of virtue in Anytus, Sokrates deprecates it as unwarranted and as menacing to philosophy in all her manifestations. The last declaration ascribed to Anytus, coupled with the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue, show us that Plato conceives the anti-Sophistic antipathy as being anti-Sokratic also, in its natural consequences. That Sokrates was in common parlance a Sophist, disliked by a large portion of the general public, and ridiculed by Aristophanes, on the same grounds as those whom Plato calls Sophists—is a point which I have noticed elsewhere.

CHAPTER XXI.

PROTAGORAS.

THE dialogue called Protagoras presents a larger assemblage of varied and celebrated characters, with more of dramatic winding, and more frequent breaks and resumptions in the conversation, than any dialogue of Plato—not excepting even Symposion and *Republic*. *It* exhibits Sokrates in controversy with the celebrated *Sophist* Protagoras, in the presence of a distinguished society, most of whom take occasional part in the dialogue. This controversy is preceded by a striking conversation between Sokrates and Hippokrates—a youth of distinguished family, eager to profit by the instructions of Protagoras. The two Sophists Prodikus and Hippias, together with Kallias, Kritias, Alkibiades, Eryximachus, Phædrus, Pausanias, Agathon, the two sons of Periklês (Paralus and Xanthippus), Charmides son of Glaukon, Antimœrus of Mende, a promising pupil of Protagoras, who is in training for the profession of a Sophist—these and others are all present at the meeting, which is held in the house of Kallias.[a] Sokrates himself recounts the whole—both his conversation with Hippokrates and that with Protagoras—to a nameless friend.

Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue.

This dialogue enters upon a larger and more comprehensive ethical theory than anything in the others hitherto noticed. But it contains also a great deal in which we hardly recognise, or at least cannot verify, any distinct purpose, either of search or exposition. Much of it seems to be composed with a literary or poetical view, to enhance the charm or interest of the composition. The personal characteristics of each speaker—the intellectual peculiarities of Prodikus and Hippias—the ardent partisanship of Alkibiades—are brought out as

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 315.

in a real drama. But the great and marked antithesis is that between the Sophist Protagoras and Sokrates—the Hektor and Ajax of the piece: who stand forward in single combat, exchange some serious blows, yet ultimately part as friends.

An introduction of some length impresses upon us forcibly the celebrity of the great Sophist, and the earnest interest excited by his visit to Athens. Hippokrates, a young man of noble family and eager aspirations for improvement, having just learnt the arrival of Protagoras, comes to the house of Sokrates and awakens him before daylight, entreating that Sokrates will introduce him to the new-comer. He is ready to give all that he possesses in order that he may become wise like Protagoras.[b] While they are awaiting a suitable hour for such introduction, Sokrates puts a series of questions to test the force of Hippokrates.[c]

Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to become acquainted with Protagoras.

Sokr.—You are now intending to visit Protagoras, and to pay him for something to be done for you—tell me what manner of man it is that you are going to visit—and what manner of man do you wish to become? If you were going in like manner to pay a fee for instruction to your namesake Hippokrates of Kos, you would tell me that you were going to him as to a physician—and that you wished to qualify yourself for becoming a physician. If you were addressing yourself with the like view to Pheidias or Polykletus, you would go to them as to sculptors, and for the purpose of becoming yourself a sculptor. Now then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me who he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor? *Hipp.*—They call him a Sophist.[d] *Sokr.*—We are going to pay him then as a Sophist? *Hipp.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—And what are you to become by going to him? *Hipp.*—Why, judging from the preceding analogies, I am to become a Sophist. *Sokr.*—But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to the Grecian public as a

Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from Protagoras.

[b] Plato, Protag. pp. 310-311 A.

[c] Plato, Protag. p. 311 B. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειράμενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτων, &c.

[d] Plato, Protagoras, p. 311.

Sophist? *Hipp.*—Yes: if I am to tell you my real opinion.[e] *Sokr.*—Perhaps however you only propose to visit Protagoras, as you visited your schoolmaster and your musical or gymnastical teacher: not for the purpose of entering that career as a professional man, but to acquire such instruction as is suitable for a private citizen and a freeman? *Hipp.*—That is more the instruction which I seek from Protagoras. *Sokr.*—Do you know then what you are going to do? You are consigning your mind to be treated by one whom you call a Sophist: but I shall be surprised if you know what a Sophist is[f]—and if you do not know, neither do you know what it is—good or evil—to which you are consigning your mind. *Hipp.*—I think I *do* know. The Sophist is, as the name implies, one cognizant of matters wise and able.[g] *Sokr.*—That may be said also of painters and carpenters. If we were asked in what special department are painters cognizant of matters wise and able, we should specify that it was in the workmanship of portraits. Answer me the same question about the Sophist. What sort of workmanship does he direct? *Hipp.*—That of forming able speakers.[h] *Sokr.*—Your answer may be correct, but it is not specific enough: for we must still ask, About *what* is it that the Sophist forms able speakers? just as the harp-master makes a man an able

[e] Plato, Protag. p. 312 A. ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰ εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σ

ερ γε ἃ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. Ast (Platon's Leben, p. 78) and other Platonic critics treat this *Sophistomanie* (as they call it) of an Athenian youth as something ludicrous and contemptible: all the more ludicrous because (they say) none of them goes to qualify himself for becoming a Sophist, but would even be ashamed of the title. Yet if we suppose the same question addressed to a young Englishman of rank and fortune (as Hippokrates was at Athens), "Why do you put yourself under the teaching of Dr. at Eton or Professor at Oxford? Do you intend to qualify yourself for becoming a schoolmaster or a professor?" He will laugh at you for the question: if he answers it seriously, he will probably answer as Hippokrates does. But there is nothing at all in the question to imply that the schoolmaster or the professor is a worthless pretender—or the youth foolish, for being anxious to obtain instruction from him; which is the inference that Ast and other Platonic critics desire us to draw about the Athenian Sophists.

[f] Plato, Protag. p. 312 B. ὅ, τι δέ ποτε ὁ εἰ

Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. ὥς περ τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστή- (Quasi sophistes sit—ὁ τῶν ἵστης, Heindorf.) If this supposition of Heindorf be just, we may see in it an illustration of the etymological views of Plato, which I shall notice when I come to the Kratylus.

[h] Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἰ

speaker about harping, at the same time that he teaches him harping. About *what* is it that the Sophist forms able speakers: of course about that which he himself knows?[1] *Hipp.*—Probably. *Sokr.*—What then is that, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his pupil cognizant? *Hipp.*—By Zeus, I cannot give you any farther answer.[k]

Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach.

Sokr.—Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit your mind? If the question were about trusting your body to any one, with the risk whether it should become sound or unsound, you would have thought long, and taken much advice, before you decided. But now, when it is about your mind, which you value more than your body, and upon the good or evil of which all your affairs turn[1]—you are hastening without reflection and without advice, you are ready to pay all the money that you possess or can obtain, with a firm resolution already taken to put yourself at all hazard under Protagoras: whom you do not know—with whom you have never once talked—whom you call a Sophist, without knowing what a Sophist is? *Hipp.*—I must admit the case to be as you say.[m] *Sokr.*—Perhaps the Sophist is a man who brings for sale those transportable commodities, instruction or doctrine, which form the nourishment of the mind. Now the traders in food for the body praise indiscriminately all that they have to sell, though neither they nor their purchasers know whether it is good for the body; unless by chance any one of them be a gymnastic trainer or a physician.[n] So, too, these Sophists, who carry about food for the mind, praise all that they have to sell: but perhaps some of them are ignorant, and assuredly their purchasers are ignorant, whether it be good or bad for the mind: unless by accident any one possess medical knowledge about the mind.

[1] Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. *ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστὴς δεινὸν δή που ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὑπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα—περὶ κιθαρίσεως.*

[k] Plato, Protag. p. 312 D.

[1] Plato, Protag. p. 313 A. *ὁ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεῖ, τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἔστι τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ καλῶς πράττειν χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ ὄντος,* &c.

[m] Plato, Protag. p. 313 C.

[n] Plato, Protag. p. 313 E.

Now if you, Hippokrates, happen to possess such knowledge of what is good or bad for the mind, you may safely purchase doctrine from Protagoras or from any one else:[o] but if not, you are hazarding and putting at stake your dearest interests. The purchase of doctrines is far more dangerous than that of eatables or drinkables. As to these latter, you may carry them away with you in separate vessels, and before you take them into your body you may invoke the *Expert*, to tell you what you may safely eat and drink, and when, and how much. But this cannot be done with doctrines. You cannot carry away *them* in a separate vessel to be tested; you learn them and take them into the mind itself; so that you go away, after having paid your money, actually damaged or actually benefited, as the case may be.[p] We will consider these matters in conjunction with our elders. But first let us go and talk with Protagoras—we can consult the others afterwards.

Such is the preliminary conversation of Sokrates with Hippokrates, before the interview with Protagoras. I have given it (like the introduction to the Lysis) at considerable length, because it is a very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic point of view. It brings to light that false persuasion of knowledge, under which men unconsciously act, especially in what concerns the mind and its treatment. Common fame and celebrity suffice to determine the most vehement aspirations towards a lecturer, in one who has never stopped to reflect or enquire what the lecturer does. The pressure applied by Sokrates in his successive questions, to get beyond vague generalities into definite particulars—the insufficiency, there-

Remarks on the introduction.

False persuasion of knowledge brought to light.

[o] Plato, Protag. p. 313 E. ἐὰν μή τις τύχῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὖ ἰατρικὸς ὢν· εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τι χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὦ φίλτατε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύῃς καὶ κινδυνεύῃς.

[p] Plato, Protag. p. 314 A. σιτία μὲ γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστι συμβουλεύσασθαι παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαΐοντα, ὅ, τι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅ, τι μή, καὶ ὁπόσον, καὶ ὁπότε· μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καταθέντα τὴν τιμήν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα, ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον.

by exposed, of the conceptions with which men usually rest satisfied—exhibit the working of his Elenchus in one of its most instructive ways. The parallel drawn between the body and the mind—the constant precaution taken in the case of the former to consult the professional man and to follow his advice in respect both to discipline and nourishment—are in the same vein of sentiment which we have already followed in other dialogues. Here too, as elsewhere, some similar *Expert*, in reference to the ethical and intellectual training of mind, is desiderated, as still more imperatively necessary. Yet where is he to be found? How is the business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue without him? Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? We shall presently see.

Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras.

Sokrates and Hippokrates proceed to the house of Kallias, and find him walking about in the fore-court with Protagoras, and some of the other company; all of whom are described as treating the Sophist with almost ostentatious respect. Prodikus and Hippias have each their separate hearers, in or adjoining to the court. Sokrates addresses Protagoras.

Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist.

Sokr.—Protagoras, I and Hippokrates here are come to talk to you about something. *Prot.*—Do you wish to talk to me alone, or in presence of the rest? *Sokr.*—To us it is indifferent: but I will tell you what we come about, and you may then determine for yourself. This Hippokrates is a young man of noble family, and fully equal to his contemporaries in capacity. He wishes to become distinguished in the city: and he thinks he shall best attain that object through your society. Consider whether you would like better to talk with him alone, or in presence of the rest.[q] *Prot.*—Your consideration on my behalf, Sokrates, is

[q] Plat. Prot. p. 316.
The motive assigned by Hippokrates, for putting himself under the teaching of Protagoras, is just the same as that which Xenophon assigns to his friend Proxenus for taking lessons and paying fees to the Leontine Gorgias (Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16).

reasonable. A person of my profession must be cautious in his proceedings. I, a foreigner, visit large cities, persuading the youth of best family to frequent my society in preference to that of their kinsmen and all others; in the conviction that I shall do them good. I thus inevitably become exposed to much jealousy and even to hostile conspiracies.[r] The sophistical art is an old one;[s] but its older professors, being afraid of enmity if they proclaimed what they really were, have always disguised themselves under other titles. Some, like Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, called themselves poets: others, Orpheus, Musæus, &c., professed to prescribe religious rites and mysteries: others announced themselves as gymnastic trainers or teachers of music. But I have departed altogether from this policy; which indeed did not succeed in really deceiving any leading men—whom alone it was intended to deceive—and which, when found out, entailed upon its authors the additional disgrace of being considered deceivers. The true caution consists in open dealing; and this is what I have always adopted. I avow myself a Sophist, educating men. I am now advanced in years, old enough to be the father of any of you, and have grown old in the profession: yet during all these years, thank God, I have suffered no harm either from my practice or my title.[t] If therefore you desire to converse with me, it will be far more agreeable to me to converse in presence of all who are now in the house.[u]

[r] The jealousy felt by fathers, mothers, and relatives against a teacher or converser who acquired great influence over their youthful relatives, is alluded to by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology (p. 37 E), and is illustrated by a tragical incident in the Cyropædia of Xenophon, iii. 1. 14-38. Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 52.

[s] Plat. Prot. p. 316 D. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν

[t] Plat. Prot. p. 317 C. ὥστε

[u] Plat. Prot. p. 317 D. In the Menon, the Platonic Sokrates is made to say that Protagoras died at the age of seventy; that he had practised forty years as a Sophist; and that during all that long time he had enjoyed the highest esteem and reputation, even after his death, "down to the present day" (Menon, p. 91 E).

It must be remembered that the speech, of which I have just given an abstract, is delivered not by the historical, real, Protagoras, but by the character named *Protagoras*, depicted by Plato in this dialogue: *i. e.* the speech is composed by Plato himself. I read, therefore, with much surprise, a note of Heindorf (ad p. 316 D), wherein he says about Protagoras: "Callidé in postremis reticet, quod

On hearing this, Sokrates—under the suspicion (he tells us) that Protagoras wanted to show off in the presence of Prodikus and Hippias—proposes to convene all the dispersed guests, and to talk in their hearing. This is accordingly done, and the conversation recommences—Sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had preferred on behalf of Hippokrates.

Protagoras

Sokr.—Hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the city, and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing himself under your instruction. He would gladly learn, Protagoras, what will happen to him, if he comes into intercourse with you.

Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens.

Prot.—Young man, if you come to me, on the day of your first visit, you will go home better than you came, and on the next day the like: each successive day you will make progress for the better.[x] *Sokr.*—Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that: but towards *what*, and about *what*, will he make progress? *Prot.*—Your question is a reasonable one, and I am glad to reply to it. I shall not throw him back—as other Sophists do, with mischievous effect—into the special sciences, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, &c., just after he has completed his course in them. I shall teach him what he really comes to learn: wisdom and good counsel, both respecting his domestic affairs, that he may manage his own family well—and respecting the

addere poterat,

"Protagoras cunningly keeps back, what he might have here added, that people gave him money for his teaching." Heindorf must surely have supposed that he was commenting upon a real speech, delivered by the historical person called Protagoras. Otherwise what can be meant by this charge of "cunning reticence or keeping back?" Protagoras here speaks what Plato puts into his mouth; neither more nor less. What makes the remark of Heindorf the more preposterous is, that in page 328 B the very fact, which Protagoras is here said "cunningly to keep back," appears mentioned by Protagoras; and mentioned in the same spirit of honourable frankness and fair-dealing as that which pervades the discourse which I have just (freely) translated. Indeed nothing can be more marked than the way in which Plato makes Protagoras dwell with emphasis on the frankness and openness of his dealing: nothing can be more at variance with the character which critics give us of the Sophists, as "cheats, who defrauded pupils of their money while teaching them nothing at all, or what they themselves knew to be false."

[x] Plato, Protag. p. 318 A. "Qui ad philosophorum scholas venit, quotidié secum aliquid boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat, aut sanabilior." Seneca, Epistol. 108, p. 530.

affairs of the city, that he may address himself to them most efficaciously, both in speech and act. *Sokr.*—You speak of political or social science. You engage to make men good citizens. *Prot.*—Exactly so.[y]

Sokr.—That is a fine talent indeed, which you possess—if you *do* possess it; for (to speak frankly) I thought that the thing had not been teachable, nor intentionally communicable, by man to man.[z] I will tell you why I think so. The Athenians are universally recognised as intelligent men. Now when our public assembly is convened, if the subject of debate be fortification, ship-building, or any other specialty which they regard as learnable and teachable, they will listen to no one except a professional artist or craftsman.[a] If any non-professional man presumes to advise them on the subject, they refuse to hear him, however rich and well-born he may be. It is thus that they act in matters of any special art;[b] but when the debate turns upon the general administration of the city, they hear every man alike—the brass-worker, leather-cutter, merchant, navigator, rich, poor, well-born, low-born, &c. Against none of them is any exception taken, as in the former case—that he comes to give advice on that which he has not learnt, and on which he has had no master.[c] It is plain that the public generally think it not teachable. Moreover our best and wisest citizens, those who possess civic virtue in the highest measure, cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue, though they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which paid masters can impart. Periklês and others, excellent citi-

Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not.

[y] Plato, Protag. pp. 318-319.
The declaration made by Protagoras—that he will not throw back his pupils into the special arts—is represented by Plato as intended to be an indirect censure on Hippias, then sitting by.

[z] Plato, Protag. p. 319 B. οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι, μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις.

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 319 C. καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως, ὅσα ἡγοῦνται μαθητά τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι. ἐάν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, &c.

[b] Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται.

[c] Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήσσει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν μαθὼν, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι.

zens themselves, have never been able to make any one else excellent, either in or out of their own family. These reasons make me conclude that social or political virtue is not teachable. I shall be glad if you can show me that it is so.[d]

Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe.

Prot.—I will readily show you. But shall I, like an old man addressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe?[e] or shall I go through an expository discourse? The mythe perhaps will be the more acceptable of the two.

Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus.

There was once a time when Gods existed, but neither men nor animals had yet come into existence. At the epoch prescribed by Fate, the Gods fabricated men and animals in the interior of the earth, out of earth, fire, and other ingredients: directing the brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus to fit them out with suitable endowments. Epimetheus, having been allowed by his brother to undertake the task of distributing these endowments, did his work very improvidently, wasted all his gifts upon the inferior animals, and left nothing for man. When Prometheus came to inspect what had been done, he found that other animals were adequately equipped, but that man had no natural provision for clothing, shoeing, bedding, or defence. The only way whereby Prometheus could supply the defect was, by breaking into the common workshop of Athênê and Hephæstus, and stealing from thence their artistic skill, together with fire.[f] Both of these he presented to man, who was thus enabled to construct for himself, by art, all that other animals received from nature, and more besides.

[d] Plato, Protag. pp. 319-320.

[e] Plato, Protag. p. 320 C. *πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω, ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών;*

It is probable that the Sophists often delivered illustrative mythes or fables as a more interesting way of handling social matters before an audience. Such was the memorable fable called the choice of Hêraklês by Prodikus.

[f] Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322. *ἀπορίᾳ οὖν ἐχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεὺς ἤντινα σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὕροι, κλέπτει Ἡφαίστου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί. Τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχε, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Διΐ, &c.*

If the reader will compare this with the doctrine delivered in the Platonic Timæus—that the inferior animals spring from degenerate men—he will perceive the entire variance between the two (Timæus, pp. 91-92).

Still however, mankind did not possess the political or social art; which Zeus kept in his own custody, where Prometheus could not reach it. Accordingly, though mankind could provide for themselves as individuals, yet when they attempted to form themselves into communities, they wronged each other so much, from being destitute of the political or social art, that they were presently forced again into dispersion.[g] The art of war, too, being a part of the political art, which mankind did not possess —they could not get up a common defence against hostile animals: so that the human race would have been presently destroyed, had not Zeus interposed to avert such a consummation. He sent Hermês to mankind, bearing with him Justice and the sense of Shame (or Moderation), as the bonds and ornaments of civic society, coupling men in friendship.[h] Hermês asked Zeus—Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among mankind? Shall I distribute them in the same way as artistic skill is distributed, only to a small number—a few accomplished physicians, navigators, &c., being adequate to supply the wants of the entire community? Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every man? Undoubtedly, to every man (was the command of Zeus). All without exception must be partakers in them. If they are confined exclusively to a few, like artistic or professional skill, no community can exist.[i] Ordain, by

Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants, but could not give them the social art. Mankind are on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society,

[g] Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.

ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην· ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο.

Compare Plato, Republic, i. p. 351 C, p. 352 B, where Sokrates sets forth a similar argument.

[h] Plato, Protagor. p. 322 C.

Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοί, φιλίας συναγωγοί.

[i] Plato, Protag. p. 322 D. εἰς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί. καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; Ἐπὶ πάντας, ἔφη ὁ Ζεύς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν. καὶ νόμον θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν, κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

We see by p. 323 A that σωφροσύνη is employed as substitute or equivalent for αἰδώς: yet still αἰδὼς is the proper word to express Plato's meaning, as it denotes a distinct and positive regard to the feelings of others—a feeling of pain in each man's mind, when he discovers or believes that he is disapproved by his comrades. Hom. Il. O. 561—αἰδὼ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ Ἀλλήλους δ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας.

my authority, that every man, who cannot take a share of his own in justice and the sense of shame, shall be slain, as a nuisance to the community.

This fable will show you therefore, Sokrates (continues Protagoras), that the Athenians have good reason for making the distinction to which you advert. When they are discussing matters of special art, they will hear only the few to whom such matters are known. But when they are taking counsel about social or political virtue, which consists altogether in justice and moderation, they naturally hear every one; since every one is presumed, as a condition of the existence of the commonwealth, to be a partaker therein.[k] Moreover, even though they know a man not to have these virtues in reality, they treat him as insane if he does not proclaim himself to have them, and make profession of virtue: whereas, in the case of the special arts, if a man makes proclamation of his own skill as a physician or musician, they censure or ridicule him.[l]

Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed by all citizens, and taught by all to all.

Nevertheless, though they account this political or social virtue an universal endowment, they are far from thinking that it comes spontaneously or by nature. They conceive it to be generated by care and teaching. For in respect of all those qualities which come by nature or by accident, no one is ever angry with another or blames another for being found wanting. An ugly, dwarfish, or sickly man is looked upon simply with pity, because his defects are such as he cannot help. But when any one manifests injustice or other qualities the opposite of political virtue, then all his neighbours visit him with indignation, censure, and perhaps punishment: implying clearly their belief that this virtue is an acquirement obtained by care and learning.[m] Indeed the whole institution of punishment has no other meaning. It is in itself a proof that men think social virtue to be acquirable and acquired. For no rational man ever punishes malefactors because they *have* done wrong, or

Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment.

[k] Plat. Prot. pp. 322-323. [l] Plato, Protag. p. 323 C.
[m] Plato, Protag. pp. 323-324.

simply with a view to the past:—since what is already done cannot be undone. He punishes with a view to the future, in order that neither the same man, nor others who see him punished, may be again guilty of similar wrong. This opinion plainly implies the belief, that virtue is producible by training, since men punish for the purpose of prevention.[n]

I come now to your remaining argument, Sokrates. You urge that citizens of eminent civil virtue cannot communicate that virtue to their own sons, to whom nevertheless they secure all the accomplishments which masters can teach. Now I have already shown you that civil virtue is the one accomplishment needful,[o] which every man without exception must possess, on pain of punishment or final expulsion, if he be without it. I have shown you moreover that every one believes it to be communicable by teaching and attention. How can you believe then that these excellent fathers teach their sons other things, but do not teach them this, the want of which entails such terrible penalties?

The fact is, they *do* teach it: and that too with great pains.[p] They begin to admonish and lecture their children,

[n] Plato, Protag. p. 324 B, C. *οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος ρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν τον θείη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. καὶ τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων, διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει.*

This clear and striking exposition of the theory of punishment is one of the most memorable passages in Plato, or in any ancient author. And if we are to believe the words which immediately follow, it was the theory universally accepted at that time—*ταύτην οὖν τὴν*

ρούνται καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Compare Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933, where the same doctrine is announced: Seneca, De Irâ, i. 16. "Nam, ut Plato ait, nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Revocari enim præterita non possunt: futura prohibentur." Steinhart (Einleit. zum Protag. p. 423) pronounces a just encomium upon this theory of punishment, which, as he truly observes, combines together the purposes declared in the two modern theories—Reforming and Deterring. He says further, however, that the same theory of punishment reappears in the Gorgias, which I do not think exact. The purpose of punishment, as given in the Gorgias, is simply to cure a distempered patient of a terrible distemper, and thus to confer great benefit on him—but without any allusion to tutelary results as regards society.

[o] Plato, Protag. p. 324 E. *Πότερον ἔστι τι ἓν, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὗ ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν μέλλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γε λύεται ἡ ἀπορία ἣν σὺ ἀπορεῖς.*

[p] Plato, Protag. p. 325 B.

from the earliest years. Father, mother, tutor, nurse, all vie with each other to make the child as good as possible: by constantly telling him on every occasion which arises, This is right—That is wrong—This is honourable—That is mean—This is holy—That is unholy—Do these things, abstain from those.[q] If the child obeys them, it is well: if he do not, they straighten or rectify him, like a crooked piece of wood, by reproof and flogging. Next, they send him to a schoolmaster, who teaches him letters and the harp; but who is enjoined to take still greater pains in watching over his orderly behaviour. Here the youth is put to read, learn by heart, and recite, the compositions of able poets; full of exhortations to excellence and of stirring examples from the good men of past times.[r] On the harp also, he learns the best songs, his conduct is strictly watched, and his emotions are disciplined by the influence of rhythmical and regular measure. While his mind is thus trained to good, he is sent besides to the gymnastic trainer to render his body a suitable instrument for it,[s] and to guard against failure of energy under the obligations of military service. If he be the son of a wealthy man, he is sent to such training sooner, and remains in it longer. As soon as he is released from his masters, the city publicly takes him in hand, compelling him to learn the laws prescribed by old and good lawgivers,[t] to live according to their prescriptions, and to learn both command and obedience, on pain of being punished. Such then being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster virtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? You might much rather wonder if it were not so.[u]

Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c.

How does it happen then, you ask, that excellent men so

q Plato, Protag. p. 325 C. παρ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλὸν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρὸν, &c.

r Plato, Protag. p. 325 E. παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγινώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἔνεισι, πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵν' ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι.

s Plato, Protag. p. 326 B. ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ, &c.

t Plato, Protag. p. 326 D. νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα, &c.

u Plato, Protag. p. 326 E.

frequently have worthless sons, to whom, even with all these precautions, they cannot teach their own virtue? This is not surprising, when you recollect what I have just said—That in regard to social virtue, every man must be a craftsman and producer; there must be no non-professional consumers.[x] All of us are interested in rendering our neighbours just and virtuous, as well as in keeping them so. Accordingly, every one, instead of being jealous, like a professional artist, of seeing his own accomplishments diffused, stands forward zealously in teaching justice and virtue to every one else, and in reproving all short-comers.[y] Every man is a teacher of virtue to others: every man learns his virtue from such general teaching, public and private. The sons of the best men learn it in this way, as well as others. The instruction of their fathers counts for comparatively little, amidst such universal and paramount extraneous influence; so that it depends upon the aptitude and predispositions of the sons themselves, whether they turn out better or worse than others. The son of a superior man will often turn out ill; while the son of a worthless man will prove meritorious. So the case would be, if playing on the flute were the one thing needful for all citizens; if every one taught and enforced flute-playing upon all others, and every one learnt it from the teaching of all others.[z] You would find that the sons of good or bad flute-players would turn out good or bad, not in proportion to the skill of their fathers, but according to their own natural aptitudes. You would find however also, that all of them, even the most unskilful, would be accomplished flute-players, if compared with men absolutely untaught, who had gone through no such social train-

All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own individual aptitude.

[x] Plato, Protag. p. 326 E. ὅτι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν.

It is to be regretted that there is no precise word to translate exactly the useful antithesis between ἰδιώτης and τεχνίτης or δημιουργός.

[y] Plato, Protag. p. 327 A. εἰ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ διεδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων—λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή—διὰ τοῦτο πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα.

[z] Plato, Protag. p. 327 C.

ing. So too, in regard to justice and virtue.[a] The very worst man brought up in your society and its public and private training, would appear to you a craftsman in these endowments, if you compared him with men who had been brought up without education, without laws, without dikasteries, without any general social pressure bearing on them, to enforce virtue: such men as the savages exhibited last year in the comedy of Pherekrates at the Lenæan festival. If you were thrown among such men, you, like the chorus of misanthropes in that play, would look back with regret even upon the worst criminals of the society which you had left, such as Eurybatus and Phrynondas.[b]

Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others.

But now, Sokrates, you are over-nice, because all of us are teachers of virtue, to the best of every man's power; while no particular individual appears to teach it specially and *ex professo*.[c] By the same analogy, if you asked who was the teacher for speaking our vernacular Greek, no one special person could be pointed out:[d] nor would you find out who was the finishing teacher for those sons of craftsmen who learnt the rudiments of their art from their own fathers—while if the son of any non-professional person learns a craft, it is easy to assign the person by whom he was taught.[e] So it is in respect to virtue. All of us teach and enforce virtue to the best of our power; and we ought to be satisfied if there be any one of us ever so little superior to the rest, in the power of teaching it. Of such men I believe myself to be one.[f] I can train a man into an excellent citizen, better than others, and in a manner worthy not only of the fee which I ask, but even of a still greater remuneration, in the judgment of the

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 327 D. ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἀνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μήτε παιδεία μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μήτε ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

[b] Plato, Protag. p. 327 E.

[c] Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντ ς διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἕκαστος καὶ οὐδεὶς σοι φαίνεται.

[d] Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. εἶθ' ὥς περ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τις διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φανείη.

[e] Plato, Protag. p. 328 A.

[f] Plato, Protag. p. 328 B. Ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι ἐς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν. Ὧν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἷς εἶναι, &c.

pupil himself. This is the stipulation which I make with him: when he has completed his course, he is either to pay me the fee which I shall demand—or if he prefers, he may go into a temple, make oath as to his own estimate of the instruction imparted to him, and pay me according to that estimate.[g]

I have thus proved to you, Sokrates—That virtue is teachable—That the Athenians account it to be teachable—That there is nothing wonderful in finding the sons of good men worthless, and the sons of worthless men good. Indeed this is true no less about the special professions, than about the common accomplishment, virtue. The sons of Polyklêtus the statuary, and of many other artists, are nothing as compared with their fathers.[h]

The sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists.

Such is the discourse composed by Plato and attributed to the Platonic Protagoras—showing that virtue is teachable, and intended to remove the difficulties proposed by Sokrates. It is an exposition of some length: and because it is put into the mouth of a Sophist, many commentators presume, as a matter of course, that it must be a manifestation of some worthless quality:[i] that it is either empty verbiage, or ostentatious self-praise, or low-minded immorality. I am unable to perceive in the discourse any of these demerits. I think it is one of the best parts of the Platonic writings, as an exposition of the growth and propagation of common sense—the common, established, ethical and social sentiment, among a community: sentiment neither dictated in the beginning, by any scientific or artistic lawgiver, nor personified in any special guild of craftsmen apart from the remaining community—nor inculcated by any formal professional teachers—

Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself.

[g] Plato, Protag. p. 328 B.

[h] Plato, Protag. p. 328 C.

[i] So Serranus (ad 326 E) who has been followed by many later critics. "Quæstio est, Virtusne doceri possit? Quod instituit demonstrare Sophista, sed ineptissimis argumentis et quæ contra seipsum faciant."

To me this appears the reverse of the truth. But even if it were true, no blame could fall on Protagoras. We should only be warranted in concluding that it suited the scheme of Plato here to make him talk nonsense.

nor tested by analysis—nor verified by comparison with any objective standard: but self-sown and self-asserting, stamped, multiplied, and kept in circulation, by the unpremeditated conspiracy of the general[k] public—the omnipresent agency of King Nomos and his numerous volunteers.

Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art.

In many of the Platonic dialogues, Sokrates is made to dwell upon the fact that there are no recognised professional teachers of virtue; and to ground upon this fact a doubt, whether virtue be really teachable. But the present dialogue is the only one in which the fact is accounted for, and the doubt formally answered. There are neither special teachers, nor professed pupils, nor determinate periods of study, nor definite lessons or stadia, for the acquirement of virtue, as there are for a particular art or craft: the reason being, that in that department every man must of necessity be a practitioner, more or less perfectly: every man has an interest in communicating it to his neighbours: hence every man is constantly both teacher and learner. Herein consists one main and real distinction between virtue and the special arts; an answer to the view most frequently espoused by the Platonic Sokrates, assimilating virtue to a professional craft, which ought to have special teachers, and a special season of apprenticeship, if it is to be acquired at all.

The speech is censured by some critics as prolix. But to

[k] This is what the Platonic Sokrates alludes to in the Phædon and elsewhere. *οἱ τὴν δημοτικήν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν, ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ.* Phædon, p. 82 B; compare the same dialogue, p. 68 C; also Republic, x. p. 512 D. *ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα.*

The account given by Mr. James Mill (Fragment on Mackintosh, p. 259-260) of the manner in which the established morality of a society is transmitted and perpetuated, coincides completely with the discourse of the Platonic Protagoras. The passage is too long to be cited: I give here only the concluding words, which describe the *δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας*—

"In this manner it is that men, in the social state, acquire the habits of moral acting, and certain affections connected with it, before they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which recommend the acts either to praise or blame. Nearly at this point the greater part of them remain: continuing to perform moral acts and to abstain from the contrary, chiefly from the habits which they have acquired, and the authority upon which they originally acted: though it is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing of reason, without perceiving at least in an indistinct and general way, the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one another in one way rather than another."

me it seems full of matter and argument, exceedingly free from superfluous rhetoric. The fable with which it opens presents of course the poetical ornament which belongs to that manner of handling. It is however fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm—in my judgment, it is even superior—to any other fable in Plato.

When the harangue, lecture, or sermon, of Protagoras is concluded, Sokrates both expresses his profound admiration of it, and admits the conclusion—That virtue is teachable—to be made out, as well as it can be made out by any continuous exposition.[1] In fact, the speaker has done all that could be done by Periklês or the best orator of the assembly. He has given a long series of reasonings in support of his own case, without stopping to hear the doubts of opponents. He has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public sentiment, accepting all the established beliefs—appealing to his hearers with all those familiar phrases, round which the most powerful associations are grouped—and taking for granted that justice, virtue, good, evil, &c., are known, indisputable, determinate data, fully understood, and unanimously interpreted. He has shown that the community take great pains, both publicly and privately, to

Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras—he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions.

[1] Plato, Protag. pp. 328-329.

Very different indeed is the sentiment of the principal Platonic commentators. Schleiermacher will not allow the mythus of Protagoras to be counted among the Platonic mythes: he says that it is composed in the style of Protagoras, and perhaps copied from some real composition of that Sophist. He finds in it nothing but a "grobmaterialistiche Denkungsart, die über die sinnliche Erfahrung nicht hinaus philosophirt" (Einleitung zum Protagoras, vol. i. pp. 233-234).

To the like purpose Ast (Plat. Leb. p. 71)—who tells us that what is expressed in the mythus is, "the vulgar and mean sentiment and manner of thought of the Sophist: for it deduces everything, both arts and the social union itself, from human wants and necessity." Apparently these critics, when they treat this as a proof of meanness and vulgarity, have forgotten that the Platonic Sokrates himself does exactly the same thing in the Republic—deriving the entire social union from human necessities (Republ. ii. 369 C).

K. F. Hermann is hardly less severe upon the Protagorean discourse (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 460).

For my part, I take a view altogether opposed to these learned persons. I think the discourse one of the most striking and instructive portions of the Platonic writings: and if I could believe that it was the composition of Protagoras himself, my estimation of him would be considerably raised.

Steinhart pronounces a much more rational and equitable judgment than Ast and Schleiermacher, upon the discourse of Protagoras (Einleitung zum Prot. pp. 422-423).

inculcate and enforce virtue: that is, what *they* believe in and esteem as virtue. But is their belief well founded? Is that which they esteem, really virtue? Do they and their elegant spokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? If so, *how* do they know it, and can they explain it?

One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer.

This is the point upon which Sokrates now brings his Elenchus to bear: his method of short question and answer. We have seen what long continuous speaking can do: we have now to see what short cross-questioning can do. The antithesis between the two is at least one main purpose of Plato—if it be not even *the* purpose (as Schleiermacher supposes it to be)—in this memorable dialogue.

Questions by Sokrates—Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous.

After your copious exposition, Protagoras (says Sokrates), I have only one little doubt remaining, which you will easily explain.[m] You have several times spoken of justice, moderation, holiness, &c., as if they all, taken collectively, made up virtue. Do you mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote distinct parts of it? Or are the three names all equivalent to virtue, different names for one and the same thing? *Prot.*—They are names signifying distinct parts of virtue. *Sokr.*—Are these parts like the parts of the face,—eyes, nose, mouth, ears—each part not only distinct from the rest, but having its own peculiar properties? Or are they like the parts of gold, homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in magnitude? *Prot.*—The former. *Sokr.*—Then some men may possess one part, some another. Or is it necessary that he who possesses one part, should possess all? *Prot.*—By no means necessary. Some men are courageous, but unjust: others are just, but not intelligent. *Sokr.*—Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of virtue? *Prot.*—They are so. Wisdom is the greatest of the parts: but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another: each of them has its own peculiar property.[n]

[m] Plato, Protag. pp. 328 E-329 B. πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἐμποδὼν, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥᾳδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει—σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, &c.

[n] Plato, Protag. pp. 329-330.

Sokr.—Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these parts is. Tell me—is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is some thing: are you of the same opinion?[o] *Prot.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—Now this thing which you call *justice:* is it itself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you say?[p] *Prot.*—I think so too. *Sokr.*—Holiness also is some thing: is the thing called *holiness,* itself holy or unholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should reply—Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness itself be not holy. Would you say the same? *Prot.*—Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—Justice being admitted to be just, and holiness to be holy—do not you think that justice also is holy, and that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part? *Prot.*—I do not altogether admit that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment: if you please, let both of them stand as admitted. *Sokr.*—Not so:[q] I do not want the debate to turn upon an "If you please." You and I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best without "Ifs." *Prot.*—I say then that justice and holiness are indeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point of analogy between white and black,[r] hard and soft, and between many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally. *Sokr.*—Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them? *Prot.*—Not exactly so: but I do

Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, "If you please."

[o] Plato, Protag. p. 330 B. *κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἕκαστον· πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε—ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τί ἐστιν; ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα: ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί;*

[p] Plato, Protag. p. 330 D. *τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον;*

[q] Plato, Protag. p. 331 D. *εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ "εἰ βούλει" τοῦτο καὶ "εἴ σοι δοκεῖ" ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ.*

This passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of Protagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion. The ἀκριβολογία of Sokrates and Plato was not merely unfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men. Protagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions drawn by Sokrates too nice, not worth attending to. Many of the contemporaries of both shared this opinion. One purpose of our dialogue is to bring such antitheses into view.

[r] Plat. Prot. 331 E.

not concur with you when you declare that one is like the other. *Sokr.*—Well then! since you seem to follow with some repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.[s]

Intelligence and moderation identical, because they have the same contrary.

Sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are identical with each other (*σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη*). The proof which he produces, elicited by several questions, is—that both the one and the other are contrary to folly (*ἀφροσύνη*), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have more than one single contrary.[t]

Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.

Sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same thing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:[u] though we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by Protagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the other is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the maxim—that nothing can have more than one single contary—Plato seems to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different senses. Because the term folly (*ἀφροσύνη*) is used sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation (*σωφροσύνη*), sometimes the opposite of intelligence (*σοφία*), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are the same thing.[x] Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of the other point, viz.: That holiness and justice are the same, or as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is assumed to form the proof, viz.:

[s] Plato, Protag. 332 A.

[t] Plato, Protag. p. 332.

[u] Plato, Protag. p. 333 B. *τι ταὐτὸν ὄν.*

[x] Aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as this. One important point (as I have already remarked, vol. i. p. 500) in which he is superior to Plato is, in being far more careful to distinguish the different meanings of the same word—*τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα*. Plato rarely troubles himself to notice such distinction, and seems indeed generally unaware of it. He constantly ridicules Prodikus, who tried to distinguish words apparently synonymous.

That holiness is holy, and that justice is just—is either tautological, or unmeaning; and cannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile, that if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras and not in that of Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an illustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore little has been done to elucidate the important question to which Sokrates addresses himself—What is the extent of analogy between the different virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist?

But though little progress has been made in determining the question mooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify Protagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man, so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very subjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself brought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion which—whether conclusively proved or not—is proved in a manner binding upon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He becomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing reluctance,[y] and is at last so provoked as to break out of the limits imposed upon a respondent.

Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated.

Meanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) and moderation (*σωφροσύνη*) are identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the affirmative, though many people say so. *Sokr.*— It is indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only you consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion itself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the questioner, and

Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry promptitude.

[y] Plato, Protag. pp. 333 B, 335 A.

the respondent along with me, undergo examination at the same time.[a] You answer then (though without adopting the opinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation, or with intelligence: that is that they follow a wise policy in committing injustice. *Prot.*—Be it so. *Sokr.*—You admit too that there exist certain things called good things. Are those things good, which are profitable to mankind? *Prot.*—By Zeus, I call some things good, even though they be not profitable to *men* (replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).[a] *Sokr.*—Do you mean those things which are not profitable to any *man*, or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call these latter *good* also? *Prot.*—Not at all: but there are many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to different animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and heterogeneous.[b]

Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers, as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart.

Protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable length, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the hearers.[c] Upon this Sokrates replies, "I am a man of short memory, and if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you wish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers." *Prot.*—What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? Do you mean shorter than the case requires? *Sokr.*—No, certainly not. *Prot.*—But who is to be judge of the brevity necessary, you or I? *Sokr.*—I have understood that you profess to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech: what I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect me to follow you. *Prot.*—Why, So-

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 333 D. *τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.*

Here again we find Plato drawing special attention to the conditions of dialectic debate.

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 333 E.

[b] Plato, Protag. p. 334 C. *Οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπόν*, &c.

The explanation here given by Protagoras of *good* is the same as that which is given by the historical Sokrates himself in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 8). Things called good are diverse in the highest degree; but they are all called *good* because they all contribute in some way to human security, relief, comfort, or prosperity. To one or other of these ends *good*, in all its multifarious forms, is relative.

[c] Plato, Protag. p. 334 D.

krates, I have carried on many debates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked just as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any reputation at all.

Sokr.—Be it so: in that case I must retire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make long speeches, nor follow them.

Here Sokrates rises to depart; but Kallias, the master of the house, detains him, and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be continued. A promiscuous conversation ensues, in which most persons present take part. Alkibiades, as the champion of Sokrates, gives, what seems really to be the key of the dialogue, when he says—"Sokrates admits that he has no capacity for long speaking, and that he is no match therein for Protagoras. But as to dialectic debate, or administering and resisting cross-examination, I should be surprised if any one were a match for him. If Protagoras admits that on this point he is inferior, Sokrates requires no more: if he does not, let him continue the debate: but he must not lengthen his answers so that hearers lose the thread of the subject."[c]

Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.

This remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan of Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose—if not the main purpose—of Plato in the dialogue. "Sokrates acknowledges the superiority of Protagoras in rhetoric; if Protagoras acknowledges the superiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied." An express *locus standi* is here claimed for dialectic, and a recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground. Protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short speech: but in the last he must recognise a superior.

Claim of a special *locus standi* and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.

Kritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his own) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both parties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be continued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet

Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him

[c] Plato, Prot. pp. 334 E, 335 A-C. [c] Plat. Prot. p. 336 C-D.

on condition that Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the dialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as long as he pleases: when he has finished, I will question him. The Sophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance of those around, to accede to this proposition.[f]

Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.

For the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of Simonides: prefacing it with a remark, that the most important accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master of the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them correctly, and answer all questions respecting them.[g] Sokrates intimates that he knows and admires the song: upon which Protagoras proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other, and asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.[h] The latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikus; who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen Simonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid and ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,[i] with disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the song, but without promise of any result—Sokrates offers to give an exposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment which Protagoras had so emphatically extolled—complete mastery of the works of the poets.[k]

Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed

He then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of which appears to be a sort of counterpart and parody of the first speech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had represented that the sophistical art was ancient:[l] and that the poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium of the name, and

[f] Plat. Prot. pp. 337-338.

[g] Plat. Prot. p. 339 A. ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μετεσχηκότι μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι, περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι.

[h] Plat. Prot. p. 339 C-D.

[i] Plat. Prot. pp. 340-341.

[k] Plat. Prot. p. 342 A. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖραν ὅπως ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν.

[l] Plat. Prot. pp. 316-317.

professed a different avocation with another title. Sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in Krete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not distinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well as male, in those regions, than anywhere else: but that they concealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy them and acquire the like eminence:[m] that they pretended to devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic—a pretence whereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The special characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short and emphatic speech—epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and thoroughly prostrating an opponent.[n] The Seven Wise Men, among whom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme excellence: which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief aphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus acquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him. Having stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going through the song, with exposition and criticism of several different passages.[o] As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias[p] compliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on the same song: which he would willingly deliver: but Alkibiades and the rest beg him to postpone it.

Sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.

No remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance that Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here delivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and more than half as long as the second, which contains a large theory—nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the Simonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced—so violent in distorting the meaning of the poet—so evidently predeter-

[m] Plat. Prot. p. 342.

[n] Plat. Prot. p. 342 E, 343 B-C. Ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακω-

[o] Plat. Prot. pp. 344-347.

[p] Plat. Prot. p. 347.

mined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a lyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince[q]—that if such an exposition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest perversions by the Sophists.[r] It appears as if Plato, intending in this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous speech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras, and short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by Sokrates—having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own accomplishment—has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a pleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par. And if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced comparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans—we must remember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with Protagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the weapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive triumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he seems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a rhetorician.

Moreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of poetical lore (περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸς), he at the same time claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own

[q] Especially his explanation of ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσι (p. 345 B.) Heyne (Opuscula, i. p. 160) remarks upon the strange interpretation given by Sokrates of the Simonidean song. Compare Plato in Lysis, p. 212 E, and in Alkib. ii. p. 147 D. In both these cases, Sokrates cites passages of poetry, assigning to them a sense which their authors plainly did not intend them to bear. Heindorf in his note on the Lysis (l. c.) observes—"Videlicet, ut exeat sententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram, neglecto planè sermonis usu, hanc statuit.—Cujusmodi interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in Alcib. ii. p. 147 D."

See also Heindorf's notes on the Charmidês, p. 163 B—Lachês p. 191, B—and Lysis, p. 214 D.

M. Boeckh observes (ad Pindar. Isthm. v. p. 528) respecting an allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod—

"Num malé intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba Hesiodi? Non credo: sed bene sciens, consulto, alium sensum intulit, suo consilio accommodatum! Simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor Plato Theætet. p. 155 D." Stallbaum in his note on the Theætêtus adopts this remark of Boeckh. Groen van Prinsterer gives a similar opinion. (Prosopographia Platonica, p. 17.)

[r] K. F. Hermann observes (Gesch. der Plat. Philos. p. 460) that Sokrates, in his interpretation of the Simonidean song, shows that he can play the Sophist as well as other people can.

way. He considers the poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things without rational understanding (we have seen this in the Apology and the Ion)—or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth lying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both these views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here represented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are here contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets. Protagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of instruction: and seek to interpret them literally, as an intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or recited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on the contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal distinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own purpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men, and even as inspired men—in whose verses wisdom and virtue *must* be embodied and discoverable [s]—only that they are given in an obscure and enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination of the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of them. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts (*ὑπονοίας*): [t] distinctions of

Sokrates demonstrates the

never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering.

[s] See Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 A-B—Apol. p. 22 B-C: Ion, pp. 533-534.

Compare the distinction drawn in Timæus, p. 72 A-B, between the *μάντις* and the *προφήτης*.

[t] About the *ὑπόνοιαι* ascribed to the poets—see Republic. ii. p. 378 D. Xenoph. Sympos. iii. 6; and F. A. Wolf, Prolegom. Homer, p. clxii.-clxiv.

F. A. Wolf remarks, respecting the various allegorical interpretations of Homer and other Greek poets—

"Sed nec prioribus illis, sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua ipsi crediderunt, sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt, idonea deest excusatio. Ita enim ratio comparata est, ut libris, quos a teneris statim annis cognoscimus, omnes propé nostras nostræque ætatis opiniones subjiciamus: ac si illi jampridem populari usu consecrati sunt, ipsa obstat veneratio, quominus in iis absurda et ridicula inesse credamus. Lenimus ergo atque adeo ornamus interpretando, quicquid proprio sensu non ferendum videtur. Atque ita factum est omni tempore in libris iis, qui pro sacris habiti sunt."

The distinction was similar in character, and even more marked in respect of earnest reciprocal antipathy, between the different schools of the Jews in Alexandria and Palestine about the interpretation of the Pentateuch.

Platonic Metaphysics (between εἶναι and γενέσθαι), and principles of Platonic Ethics (οὐδεὶς ἑκων κακός)—he proceeds to point out passages in which they are to be found, and explains the song conformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning and verbal structure.[u] But though Sokrates accepts, when required, the task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them according to his own point of view—yet he presently lets us see that they are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by himself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted shall be resumed, and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent. "To debate about the compositions of poets," (says Sokrates,) "is to proceed as silly and commonplace men do at their banquets: where they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls. Noble and well educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to interest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so much wine.[x] Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by singers—nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they mean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one to mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any decisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay aside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you wish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent to answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a close."[y]

In spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to re-

1. Those who interpreted literally, κατὰ τὴν ῥητὴν διάνοιαν. 2. Those who set aside the literal interpretation, and explained the text upon a philosophy of their own, above the reach of the vulgar (Eusebius, Præp. Ev. viii. 10). Some admitted both the two interpretations, side by side.

Respecting these allegorizing schools of the Hellenistic Jews, from Aristobulus (150 B.C.) down to Philo—see the learned and valuable work of Gfrörer—*Philo und die Jüdisch. Alexandr. Theosophie*, vol. i. pp. 84-86—ii.

[u] Plat. Prot. p. 345.

[x] Plato, Prot. p. 347 D. πολὺν οἶνον πίνουσιν—a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated by the persistent dialectic of Sokrates, even at the close of the Platonic Symposion, after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of wine.

[y] Plat. Prot. pp. 347-348.

This remark—that the poet may be interpreted in many different ways, and that you cannot produce him in court to declare or defend his own meaning—is highly significant, in regard to the value set by Sokrates on living conversation and dialectic.

sume, and is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced by requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of Sokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the discussion by saying—"Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any other purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in conjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of us together can do more in this way than any one singly.[z]

r this pur-

"We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought, word, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything new by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to whom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it. Moreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose, especially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous yourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done before. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and communicating on these very subjects?"[a]

After this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still farther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the argument as it stood when interrupted.

The interrupted debate is re- Prot-

r.—You, Protagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness, courage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the others, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own. Do you still adhere to that opinion? *Prot.*—I now think

that courage differs mate- from

branches of virtue.

[z] Plato, Prot. p. 348 D.
ἰαλέγεσθαι μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βε
ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ, ἑκάστοτε ταῦτα

The remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the Sokratic frame of mind. The cross-examination which he bestows, is not that of one who himself knows—and who only gets up artificial difficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does. On the contrary, it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled; and that which puzzles him he states to others, and debates with others, as affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and obtaining a solution.

The grand purpose with Sokrates is to bring into clear daylight the difficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or "reasoned truth," and to sift them thoroughly, instead of slurring them over or hiding them.

[a] Plato, Protag. pp. 348-349.

that the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that courage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is, that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly unjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.[b] *Sokr.*—Do you consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and honourable? *Prot.*—I consider it in the highest degree fine and honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.[c]

Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack.

Sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men, forward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not affront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those who know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as horse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their profession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at all (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a dishonourable thing, if *they* were reckoned courageous.[d] Then (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers confidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do so without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence?[e] Protagoras declines to admit this, drawing a distinction somewhat confused:[f] upon which Sokrates approaches the same argument from a different point.

Identity of the pleasurable with the good—of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate.

Sokr.—You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? *Prot.*—No. *Sokr.*—But if he passes his life pleasurably until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? *Prot.*—I think so. *Sokr.*—To live pleasurably therefore is

[b] Plato, Protag. p. 349 D. τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον πάντων τούτων.

[c] Plato, Protag. p. 349 E. κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε. βλον που καλόν, ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.

It is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this, put by Plato into the mouth of Protagoras. They tend to show that Plato did not seek (as many of his commentators do) to depict Protagoras as a corruptor of the public mind.

[d] Plato, Protag. p. 350 B. Αἰσχρὸν μέντ' ἂν, ἔφη, εἴη, ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν.

[e] Plato, Protag. p. 350 C.

[f] Plato, Protag. pp. 350-351.

good: to live disagreeably is evil. *Prot.*—Yes: at least provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.[g] *Sokr.*—What! do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? *Prot.*—That is my opinion. *Sokr.*—But are not all pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good, unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? *Prot.*—To that question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply affirmatively—that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful things evil. I think it safer—with reference not merely to the present answer, but to my manner of life generally—to say, That there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are not good—some painful things which are evil, others which are not evil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.[h] *Sokr.*—You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure *Prot.*—Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—When I ask whether pleasurable things are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable—I ask in other words, whether pleasure itself be not good? *Prot.*—As you observed before, Sokrates,[i] let us examine the question on each side, to see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same.

Sokr.—Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of the question.[k] What is your opinion about knowledge? Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is

[g] Plat. Prot. p. 351 C. Τὸ μὲν ἆρ' ἡδέως ζῆν, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς, κακόν; Εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῷη ἡδόμενος.

[h] Plato, Protag. p. 351 D. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακά, ἔστι δ' ἃ ἔστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθά.

These words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent note, about the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so different from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic commentators.

[i] Plato, Protag. p. 351 E. ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἑκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό.

This is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long before,—ἃ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἑκάστοτε ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι, c. 94, p. 348 D.

[k] Plato, Protag. p. 352 A.

It overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.

Mankind regard knowledge as something neither strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something else—passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear—all or any of which overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?[1] Or do you believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to govern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things are, he will not be overruled by any other motive whatever, so as to do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge—his own intelligence being a sufficient defence to him?[m] *Prot.*—The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others, it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence was the governing element of human affairs.

Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance

Sokr.—You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most men are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what is best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by pain. *Prot.*—Most men think so: incorrectly, in my judgment, as they say many other things besides.[n] *Sokr.*—When they say that a man, being overcome

[1] Plato, Protag. p. 352 C. *πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλως; διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.* Aristotle in the Nikomachean Ethics cites and criticises the opinion of Sokrates, wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge, when really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this passage of the Protagoras. *Ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι [ἀκρατεύεσθαι]. δεινὸν γάρ, ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὃ ἐς φέτο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν, καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα, πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν* (Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24). The same metaphor *περιέλκεται ἐπιστήμη* is again ascribed to Sokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p. 1147, b. 15.

We see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon *the doctrine of Sokrates*, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras; the citation of this particular metaphor establishes the identity.

In another passage of the Nikom. Eth. Aristotle also cites a fact respecting the Sophist Protagoras, which fact is mentioned in the Platonic dialogue Protagoras—respecting the manner in which that Sophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching (Ethic. Nik. ix. 1, 1164, a. 25).

[m] Plato, Protag. p. 352 D. *ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.*

[n] Plato, Protag. pp. 352-353.

by food or drink or other temptations, will do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what ground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and other such things, for the future?[o] Most men would reply, I think, that they called these things evil not on account of the present pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their ulterior consequences—poverty and disease being both of them distressing? *Prot.*—Most men would say this. *Sokr.*—It would be admitted then that these things were evil for no other reason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of pleasure.[p] *Prot.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—Again, when it is said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as gymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no one will say that these things are good because of the immediate suffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of health, wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus, these also are good for no other reason, than because they end in pleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.[q] Or can you indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these matters evil? *Prot.*—No other end can be indicated.

of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures.

Sokr.—It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and avoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good: pain is what you think evil: for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon you pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any other ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil?

Pleasure is the only good—pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future—re-

[o] Plato, Protag. p. 353 C. *πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ τῇ φατε εἶναι; πότερα ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν,—ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει;*

[p] Plato, Protag. p. 353 E. *Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται—δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα, ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ;*

[q] Plato, Protag. p. 354 C. *Ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθά ἐστι δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγὰς καὶ ἀποτροπάς; ἢ ἔχετέ τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὃ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν, ὡς ἀγῶμαι. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακόν;*

solves itself into pleasure and pain.

If there be any other reason, or any other end, tell us what it is.[r] *Prot.*—There is none whatever. *Sokr.*—The case is similar about pains: you call pain good, when it preserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future balance of pleasure. If there be any other end to which you look when you call pain good, tell us what it is. *Prot.*—You speak truly. *Sokr.*—If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic now before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain what is meant by being overcome by pleasure; and that the whole proof hinges upon this point—whether there is any other good than pleasure, or any other evil than pain; and whether it be not sufficient, that we should go through life pleasurably and without pains.[s] If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can be pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the consequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and painful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure: that is, under the overpowering influence of good.[t] How can it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It never can be wrong, except in this case—when the good obtained is of smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent evil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity—greater or less, more or fewer?[u] If an objector tells me that there is a material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and pleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply, Is there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures and the pains, the present

[r] Plato, Protag. p. 354 D. ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

[s] Plato, Protag. p. 354 E. ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις· ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἰ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν—ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ λυπῶν;

[t] Plato, Protag. p. 355 C.

[u] Plato, Protag. p. 356 A. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀξία ἡδονῆ πρὸς λύπην ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω, καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.

and the future, so as to determine the balance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the more and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the less. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the former, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from the act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it. *Prot.*—The objectors could have nothing to say against this.[x]

Sokr.—Well then—I shall tell them farther—you know that the same magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near than when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really less, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of mensuration, or in the apparent impression?[y] Would not the latter lead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice between great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by revealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and security to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of mensuration? *Prot.*—They would acknowledge it. *Sokr.*—Again, If the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd and even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less, whether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in a certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic? *Prot.*—They would concede to you that also. *Sokr.*—Well then, my friends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on the right choice of pleasure and pain—between the more and fewer, greater and less, nearer and farther—does it not come to a simple estimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other words, to mensuration, art, or

Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly—all the security of our lives depends upon it.

[x] Plato, Protag. p. 356 C.

[y] Plato, Protag. p. 356 D. *εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μέγαλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν—τίς ἂν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἆρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη, ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; Ἆρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σώζειν ἂν τέχνην, ἢ ἄλλην;*

science?[z] What kind of art or science it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our argument, enough has been done when we have shown that it *is* science.

To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance.

For when *we* (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing was more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in whatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing else—*you* (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the contrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the instructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our principles, what that mental affection was, which people called, being overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the gravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasures and pains—that is, in the choice of good and evil things—go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or science of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge, is done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure is thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we now address) not believing it to be ignorance, or perhaps unwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore go on doing ill, both privately and publicly.[a]

Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasure or freedom from pain, are honourable.

Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? (All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.) *Sokr.*—You agree then, all three, that the pleasurable is good, and that the painful is evil:[b] for I take no account at present of the verbal distinctions of Prodikus,

[z] Plato, Protag. p. 357 C.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα,—τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω—ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητική, ἀνάγκη δή που τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 357 E.

[b] Plato, Protag. p. 358 A.

ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν.

discriminating between the *pleasurable*, the *delightful*, and the *enjoyable*. If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the honourable deed, good and profitable?[c] (In this, all persons present concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does anything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power to be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than ignorance: to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom. Ignorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived respecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly, no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he believes to be evil: nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon what he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is compelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the greater when he might take the less.[d] (Agreed to by all three.) Farther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other things are open to him, of which he is not afraid: for fear is an expectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to be an evil,—and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)[e]

Sokr.—Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given by Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were tolerably similar: but that courage differed greatly from all of them. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage; yet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and stupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt things which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? *Prot.*—That is impossible, as you have shown just now.

Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible.

[c] Plato, Protag. p. 358 B. αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἆρ' οὐ καλαί; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον, ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὠφέλιμον;

[d] Plato, Protag. p. 358 D. ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδὲ ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὁτὰν τε ἀναγκάσθῃ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον αἱρήσεται, ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον.

[e] Plato, Protag. p. 358 E.

Sokr.—No one will enter upon that which he believes to be terrible,—or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be evil: a man who does so is inferior to himself—and this, as we have agreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both timid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in this respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the same.[f] *Prot.*—How can this be? The things which the timid and the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the latter are willing to go to war, which the former are not. *Sokr.*—Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? *Prot.*—Honourable. *Sokr.*—If it be honourable, it must also be good:[g] for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that all honourable things were good. *Prot.*—You speak truly.[h] I at least always persist in thinking so. *Sokr.*—Which of the two is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an honourable and good thing? *Prot.*—The cowards. *Sokr.*—But if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also pleasurable? *Prot.*—Certainly that has been admitted.[i] *Sokr.*—Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? *Prot.*—We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding admissions. *Sokr.*—What about the courageous man? does not he affront or go at what is more honourable, bettêr, and more pleasurable? *Prot.*—It cannot be denied. *Sokr.*—Courageous men then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are afraid, are honourable and good—not dishonourable or bad: and whose confidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and good?[k] On the contrary,

[f] Plato, Protag. p. 359 D. *ἐπὶ μὲν ἃ δεινὰ ἡγεῖται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἧττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ εὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα. Ὡμολόγει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἃ γε θαῤῥοῦσι πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτῃ γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοί τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.*

[g] Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. *πότερον καλὸν δν ἰέναι (ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον) ἢ αἰσχρόν; Καλὸν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ καλὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας ἀγαθὰς ὡμολογήσαμεν;*

[h] Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. *Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἀεί ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.*

This answer, put into the mouth of Protagoras, affords another proof that Plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many commentators impute.

[i] Plato, Protag. c. 122, p. 360 A. *Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἴπερ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἡδύ; Ὡμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη.*

[k] Plato, Protag. c. 123. *Οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φόβους*

cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? *Prot.*—Agreed. *Sokr.*—When they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a stupid estimate, of terrible things? And is it not in this ignorance, or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible—that cowardice consists? Lastly,[l]—courage being the opposite of cowardice—is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things terrible and things not terrible, that courage consists?

Protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with increasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines altogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.[m] *Sokr.*—Why will you not answer my question, either affirmatively or negatively? *Prot.*—Finish the exposition by yourself. *Sokr.*—I will only ask you one more question. Do you still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely stupid, but extremely courageous? *Prot.*—You seem to be obstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with your wish; I say that according to our previous admissions, it appears to me impossible. *Sokr.*—I have no other motive for questioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth stands respecting virtue—and what virtue is in itself.[n] To determine this, is the way to elucidate the question which you and I first debated at length:—I, affirming that virtue was not teachable—you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation renders both of us

Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras.

φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάῤῥη θαῤῥοῦσιν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ, ἆρ' οὐ καλά; Εἰ δὲ καλὰ, κἀγαθά;

[l] Plato, Protag. c. 123, p. 360 D. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη; Ἡ σοφία ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν, ἀνδρεία ἐστιν, ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθίᾳ;

[m] Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθ' οὔτ' ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν, ἐσίγα τε.

[n] Plato, Protag. pp. 360-361. Οὗτοι ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τί ποτ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή· Οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστ' ἂν κατάδηλον γένοιτ' ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἐκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων, ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ—σὺ δ', ὡς διδακτόν.

ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in everything rather than knowledge:—on which supposition it would be hardly teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up;[o] and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation—First, what Virtue is,—Next, whether it is teachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of my own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted to have you as a coadjutor.[p] *Prot.*—I commend your earnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I think myself not a bad man in other respects; and as to jealousy, I have as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that I admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance—decidedly more than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you became one day illustrious for wisdom.

Such is the end of this long and interesting dialogue.[q] We remark with some surprise that it closes without any mention of Hippokrates, and without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request for admission to the society of Protagoras: though such request had been presented at the beginning, with much emphasis, as the sole motive for the intervention of Sokrates. Upon this point[r] the dialogue is open to the same criticism as

Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates.

[o] Plato, Protag. p. 361 C. *ἐγὼ οὖν πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἅνω κάτω ταραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅ τι ἔστιν.*

[p] Plato, Protag. p. 361 D. *προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντός.*

[q] Most critics treat the Protagoras as a composition of Plato's younger years—what they call his *first period*—before the death of Sokrates. They fix different years, from 407 B.C. (Ast) down to 402 B.C. I do not agree with this view. I can admit no dialogue earlier than 399 B.C.: and I consider the Protagoras to belong to Plato's full maturity.

[r] Plato, Phædrus, p. 264 C. *δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν*, &c.

that which Plato (in the Phædrus) bestows on the discourse of Lysias: requiring that every discourse shall be like a living organism, neither headless nor footless, but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each other.

In our review of this dialogue, we have found first, towards the beginning, an expository discourse from Protagoras, describing the maintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community: next, towards the close, an expository string of interrogatories by Sokrates, destined to establish the identity of Good with Pleasurable, Evil with Painful; and the indispensable supremacy of the calculating or measuring science, as the tutelary guide of human life. Of the first, I speak (like other critics) as the discourse of Protagoras: of the second, as the theory of Sokrates. But I must again remind the reader, that both the one and the other are compositions of Plato: both alike are offspring of his ingenious and productive imagination. Protagoras is not the author of that which appears here under his name: and when we read the disparaging epithets which many critics affix to his discourse, we must recollect that these epithets, if they were well-founded, would have no real application to the historical Protagoras, but only to Plato himself. He has set forth two aspects, distinct and in part opposing, of ethics and politics: and he has provided a worthy champion for each. Philosophy, or "reasoned truth," if it be attainable at all, cannot most certainly be attained without such many-sided handling: still less can that which Plato calls knowledge be attained—or such command of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a Sokratic cross-examination in it.

Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the agoras; the other, under that of Sokrates.

In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[s] we find him proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What virtue really is? upon which there prevails serious confusion of opinions. It was a second question—important, yet still second and presupposing the solution of the first—Whether virtue is teachable?

Order of ethical problems as conceived by Sokrates.

[s] Plato, Protag. p. 361 C.

We noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two questions delivered by Sokrates in the Menon.[t]

Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry.

Now the conception of ethical questions in this order—the reluctance to deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and settled—is one fundamental characteristic of Sokrates. The difference of method, between him and Protagoras, flows from this prior difference between them in fundamental conception. What virtue is, Protagoras neither defines nor analyzes, nor submits to debate. He manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis: he accepts the ground already prepared for him by King Nomos: he thus proceeds as if the first step had been made sure, and takes his departure from hypotheses of which he renders no account—as the Platonic Sokrates complains of the geometers for doing.[u] To Protagoras, social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum, about which no one can mistake: which must be possessed in greater or less measure, by every man as a condition of the existence of society: which every individual has an interest in promoting in all his neighbours: and which every one therefore teaches and enforces upon every one else. It is a matter of common sense or common sentiment, and thus stands in contrast with the special professional accomplishments; which are confined only to a few—and the possessors, teachers, and learners of which are each an assignable section of the society. The parts or branches of virtue are, in like manner, assumed by him as known, in their relations to each other and to the whole. This persuasion of knowledge, without preliminary investigation, he adopts from the general public, with whom he is in communion of senti-

[t] See the last preceding chapter of this volume, p. 10.

Upon this order, necessarily required, of the two questions, Schleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general Einleitung to the works of Plato, p. 26. Eberhard (he says) affirms that the end proposed by Plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble Athenian youth, so as to make them virtuous citizens. Schleiermacher controverts the position of Eberhard; maintaining "that this is far too subordinate a standing-point for philosophy,—besides that it is reasoning in a circle, since philosophy has first to determine what the virtue of a citizen is."

[u] See suprà, vol. i. ch. vi. p. 229, and ch. xv. p. 467, respecting these remarks of Plato on the geometers.

ment. What they accept and enforce as virtue, he accepts and enforces also.

Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony.

Again, the method pursued by Protagoras, is one suitable to a teacher who has jumped over this first step; who assumes virtue, as something fixed in the public sentiments—and addresses himself to those sentiments, ready-made as he finds them. He expands and illustrates them in continuous lectures of some length, which fill both the ears and minds of the listener—"Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna:" he describes their growth, propagation, and working in the community: he gives interesting comments on the poets, eulogising the admired heroes who form the theme of their verses, and enlarging on their admonitions. Moreover, while resting altogether upon the authority of King Nomos, he points out the best jewel in the crown of that potentate; the great social fact of punishment prospective, rationally apportioned, and employed altogether for preventing and deterring—instead of being a mere retrospective impulse, vindictive or retributive for the past. He describes instructively the machinery operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think right: he teaches, in his eloquent expositions and interpretations, the same morality, public and private, that every one else teaches: while he can perform the work of teaching, somewhat more effectively than they. Lastly, his method is essentially showy and popular; intended for numerous assemblies, reproducing the established creeds and sentiments of those assemblies, to their satisfaction and admiration. He is prepared to be met and answered in his own way, by opposing speakers; and he conceives himself more than a match for such rivals. He professes also to possess the art of short conversation or discussion. But in the exercise of this art, he runs almost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of continuous speech: besides that the points which he raises for discussion assume all the fundamental principles, and turn only upon such applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons to be open questions, not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy.

Upon all these points, Sokrates is the formal antithesis of Protagoras. He disclaims altogether the capacities to which that Sophist lays claim. Not only he cannot teach virtue, but he professes not to know what it is, nor whether it be teachable at all. He starts from a different point of view: not considering virtue as a known datum, or as an universal postulate, but assimilating it to a special craft or accomplishment, in which a few practitioners suffice for the entire public: requiring that in this capacity it shall be defined, and its practitioners and teachers pointed out. He has no common ground with Protagoras; for the difficulties which he moots are just such as the common consciousness (and Protagoras along with it) overleaps or supposes to be settled. His first requirement, advanced under the modest guise of a small doubt[x] which Protagoras must certainly be competent to remove, is, to know—What virtue is? What are the separate parts of virtue—justice, moderation, holiness, &c.? What is the relation which they bear to each other and to the whole—virtue? Are they homogeneous, differing only in quantity—or has each of them its own specific essence and peculiarity?[y] Respecting virtue as a whole, we must recollect, Protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently, as of a matter perfectly known. He is now called back as it were to meet an attack in the rear: to answer questions which he had never considered, and which had never even presented themselves to him as questions. At first he replies as if the questions offered no difficulty;[z] sometimes he does not feel their importance, so that it seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the affirmative or negative.[a] But he finds himself brought round, by a series of questions, to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless thinks untrue, and which

Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out.

[x] Plato, Protag. p. 328 E. πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἐμποδὼν, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥᾳδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, &c.

[y] Respecting Ariston of Chios, Diogenes Laertius tells us—Ἀρετὰς δ' οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσῆγεν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν καλουμένην—ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρός τί πως ἔχειν (Diog. La. vii. 161).

[z] Plato, Protag. p. 329 D. Ἀλλὰ ῥᾴδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ἀποκρίνασθαι, &c.

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 331 D. εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὅσιον καὶ ὁσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ "εἰ βούλει" τοῦτο καὶ "εἰ δοκεῖ σοι" ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ.

are certainly unwelcome. Accordingly, he becomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical interrogation; and at length answers with such impatience and prolixity, that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted. Here comes in the break—the remonstrance of Sokrates—and the mediation of the by-standers.

It is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer, and the analytical enquirer and cross-examiner, which the dialogue seems mainly intended to set forth. Protagoras professes to know that which he neither knows, nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom. Upon this false persuasion of knowledge, the Sokratic Elenchus is brought to bear. We are made to see how strange, repugnant, and perplexing, is the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor: how incompetent he is to go through it without confusion: how little he can define his own terms, or determine the limits of those notions on which he is perpetually descanting.

Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner.

It is not that Protagoras is proved to be wrong (I speak now of this early part of the conversation, between chapters 51-62—pp. 329-335) in the substantive ground which he takes. I do not at all believe (as many critics either affirm or imply) that Plato intended all which he composed under the name of Protagoras to be vile perversion of truth, with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions. I do not even believe that Plato intended all those observations, to which the name of Protagoras is prefixed, to be accounted silly—while all that is assigned to Sokrates,[b] is admirable sense and acuteness. It is by no means certain that Plato intended to be understood as himself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to Sokrates: and it is quite certain that he does not always make the Sokrates of one dialogue consistent with the Sokrates of another. For the purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy the exigencies of analysis,

Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction.

[b] Schöne, in his Commentary on the Protagoras, is of opinion that a good part of Plato's own doctrine is given under the name of Protagoras (Ueber den Protag. von Platon, p. 180 seq.)

we need not necessarily suppose that the conclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one. If the respondent be brought, through his own admissions, to a contradiction, this is enough to prove that he did not know the subject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions.

But whatever may have been the intention of Plato, if we look at the fact, we shall find that what he has assigned to Sokrates is not always true, nor what he has given to Protagoras, always false. The positions laid down by the latter—That many men are courageous, but unjust: that various persons are just, without being wise and intelligent: that he who possesses one virtue, does not of necessity possess all: [c]—are not only in conformity with the common opinion, but are quite true, though Sokrates is made to dispute them. Moreover, the arguments employed by Sokrates (including in those arguments the strange propositions that justice is just, and that holiness is holy) are certainly noway conclusive.[d] Though Protagoras, becoming entangled in difficulties, and incapable of maintaining his consistency against an embarrassing cross-examination, is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he professes to know—the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue in itself, nor even shown to be apparently untrue.

Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed elsewhere.

As to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the Platonic commentators ascribe to Protagoras, more is said than the reality justifies. He pretends to know what virtue, justice, moderation, courage, &c.,

The harsh criticism to Protagoras are not

[c] Plato, Protag. c. 51, p. 329 E. Protagoras is here made to affirm that many men are courageous who are neither just, nor temperate, nor virtuous in other respects. Sokrates contradicts the position. But in the Treatise De Legibus (i. p. 630 B), Plato himself says the same thing as Protagoras is here made to say: at least assuming that the Athenian speaker in De Legg. represents the sentiment of Plato himself at the time when he composed that treatise.

[d] Plato, Protag. c. 4, p. 330 C, "Justice is Just," or "Holiness is holy," is indeed either mere tautology, or else an impropriety of speech. Dr. Hutcheson observes on an analogous case:—"None can apply moral attributes to the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities: or call his moral Sense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the power of tasting, sweet or bitter—or the power of seeing, straight or crooked, white or black" (Hutcheson on the Passions, sect i. p. 234).

are, and he is proved not to know. But this is what every one else pretends to know also, and what everybody else teaches as well as he—"*Hæc Janus summus ab imo Perdocet: hæc recinunt juvenes dictata senesque.*" What he pretends to do, beyond the general public, he really can do. He can discourse, learnedly and eloquently, upon these received doctrines and sentiments: he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public in favour of that which he, in common with the public, believes to be good—and against that which he and they believe to be bad: he can thus teach virtue more effectively than others. But whether that, which is received as virtue, be really such—he has never analysed or verified: nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis. Here again he is in harmony with the general public; for they hate, as much as he does, to be dragged back to fundamentals, and forced to explain, defend, revise, or modify, their established sentiments and maxims: which they apply as *principia* for deduction to particular cases, and which they recognise as axioms whereby other things are to be tried, not as liable to be tried themselves. Protagoras is one of the general public, in dislike of, and inaptitude for, analysis and dialectic discussion: while he stands above them in his eloquence and his power of combining, illustrating, and adorning, received doctrines. These are points of superiority, not pretended, but real.

borne out by the s

The aversion of Protagoras for dialectic discussion—after causing an interruption of the ethical argument, and an interlude of comment on the poet Simonides—is at length with difficulty overcome, and the argument is then resumed. The question still continues, What is virtue? What are the five different parts of virtue? Yet it is so far altered that Protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue which Sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical, really are tolerably alike: but he nevertheless contends that courage is very different from all of them; repeating his declaration that many men are courageous, but unjust and stupid at the same time. This position Sokrates undertakes to refute. In doing so, he

Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides.

lays out one of the largest, most distinct, and most positive theories of virtue, which can be found in the Platonic writings.

1 by So-

clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent.

Virtue, according to this theory, consists in a right measurement and choice of pleasures and pains: in deciding correctly, wherever we have an alternative, on which side lies the largest pleasure or the least pain—and choosing the side which presents this balance. To live pleasurably, is pronounced to be good: to live without pleasure or in pain, is evil. Moreover, nothing but pleasure, or comparative mitigation of pain, is good: nothing but pain is evil.[e] Good, is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain: evil, with the greatest pain: meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when looked at along with its consequences and concomitants. The grand determining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge: the knowledge, science, or art, of

[e] The substantial identity of Good with Pleasure, of Evil with Pain, was the doctrine of the historical Sokrates as declared in Xenophon's Memorabilia. See, among other passages, i. 6, 8. Τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μηδὲ ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ, οἴει τι ἄλλο αἰτιώτερον εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἕτερα ἔχ

[illegible]

[illegible]ί; Καὶ μήν τοῦτό γε οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι μηδὲν εὖ πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἡγούμενο[illegible] ἑαυτοῖς, ἢ γεωργίαν [illegible] ὡς εὖ πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται. Οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην [illegible]

ἑαυτόν τε

αὶ φίλους

τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα

Locke says, 'Essay on Human Understanding,' Book ii. ch. 28, "Good or Evil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us—or that which procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good or evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, is that we call reward or punishment."

The formal distinction here taken by Locke between pleasure and that which procures pleasure—both the one and the other being called Good—(the like in regard to pain and evil) is not distinctly stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though he says nothing inconsistent with it: but it is distinctly stated in the Republic, ii. p. 357, where Good is distributed under three heads. 1. That which we desire immediately and for itself—such as Enjoyment, Innocuous pleasure. 2. That which we desire both for itself and for its consequences—health, intelligence, good sight or hearing, &c. 3. That which we do not desire (perhaps even shun) for itself, but which we accept by reason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring greater pleasures.

This discrimination of the varieties of Good, given in the Republic, is quite consistent with what is stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though it is more full and precise. But it is not consistent with what Sokrates says in the Gorgias, where he asserts a radical dissimilarity of nature between ἡδὺ and

correctly measuring the comparative value of different pleasures and pains. Such knowledge (the theory affirms) wherever it is possessed, will be sure to command the whole man, to dictate all his conduct, and to prevail over every temptation of special appetite or aversion. To say that a man who knows on which side the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies, will act against his knowledge—is a mistake. If he acts in this way, it is plain that he does not possess the knowledge, and that he sins through ignorance.

Protagoras agrees with Sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the paramount importance and ascendancy of knowledge: but does not at first agree with him in identifying good with pleasure, and evil with pain. Upon this point, too, he is represented as agreeing in opinion with the Many. He does not admit that to live pleasurably is good, unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things. He thinks it safer, and more consistent with his own whole life, to maintain—That pleasurable things, or painful things, may be either good, or evil, or indifferent, according to the particular case.

Theory.

This doctrine Sokrates takes much pains to refute. He contends that pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, are always good—and painful things, so far forth as painful, always evil. When some pleasures are called evil, that is not on account of anything belonging to the pleasure itself, but because of its ulterior consequences and concomitants, which are painful or distressing in a degree more than countervailing the pleasure. So too, when some pains are pronounced to be good, this is not from any peculiarity in the pain itself, but because of its consequences and concomitants: such pain being required as a condition to the attainment of health, security, wealth, and other pleasures or satisfactions more than counterbalancing. Sokrates challenges opponents to name any other end, with reference to which things are called *good*, except their tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of pleasure: he challenges them to name any other end, with reference to which things are called *evil*, except their tendency to produce pains

Reasoning of Sokrates.

and to intercept or destroy pleasures. In measuring pleasures and pains against each other, there is no other difference to be reckoned except that of greater or less, more or fewer. The difference between near and distant, does indeed obtrude itself upon us as a misleading element. But it is the special task of the "measuring science" to correct this illusion—and to compare pleasures or pains, whether near or distant, according to their real worth: just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in regard to near and distant objects.

Sokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the explanation of courage given by Protagoras. He shows, or tries to show, that courage, like all the other branches of virtue, consists in acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains. No man affronts evil, or the alternative of greater pain, knowing it to be such: no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible enterprise, knowing it to be so: neither the brave nor the timid do this. Both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not terrible, or the least terrible of two alternatives: but they estimate differently what is such. The former go readily to war when required, the latter evade it. Now to go into war when required, is honourable: being honourable, it is good: being honourable and good, it is pleasurable. The brave know this, and enter upon it willingly: the timid not only do not know it, but entertain the contrary opinion, looking upon war as painful and terrible, and therefore keeping aloof. The brave men fear what it is honourable to fear, the cowards what it is dishonourable to fear: the former act upon the knowledge of what is really terrible, the latter are misled by their ignorance of it. Courage is thus, like the other virtues, a case of accurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains, or of good and evil.[f]

Application of that reasoning to the case of courage.

[f] Compare, respecting Courage, a passage in the Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, which is better stated there (though substantially the same opinion) than here in the Protagoras.

The opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence from the funeral oration delivered by Periklês, Thucyd. ii. 43. Ἀλγεινοτέρᾳ ἀνδρὶ γε φρόνημα ἔχοντι ἡ ἐν τῷ τοῦ μαλακισθῆναι κάκωσις, ἢ ὁ ἅμα γιγνό-

Such is the ethical theory which the Platonic Sokrates enunciates in this dialogue, and which Protagoras and the others accept. It is positive and distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato. We shall find that he theorises differently in other dialogues; whether for the better or the worse, will be hereafter seen. He declares here explicitly that pleasure, or happiness, is the end to be pursued; and pain, or misery, the end to be avoided: and that there is no other end, in reference to which things can be called good or evil, except as they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering, on the one side—to entail pain or suffering on the other. He challenges objectors to assign any other end. And thus much is certain—that in those other dialogues where he himself departs from the present doctrine, he has not complied with his own challenge. Nowhere has he specified a different end. In other dialogues, as well as in the Protagoras, Plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art of calculation: but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly what are the items to be calculated.

The theory

logues.

I perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, that pain or suffering is the End to be avoided or lessened as far as possible—and pleasure or happi-

ἀνάλσθητος θάνατος—which Dr. Arnold thus translates in his note. "For more grievous to a man of noble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice, than the unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and hopes for the common welfare."

So again in the Phædon (p. 68) Sokrates describes the courage of the ordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from fear of greater evils (which is the same view as that of Sokrates in the Protagoras), while the philosopher is courageous on a different principle; aspiring only to reason and intelligence, with the pleasures attending it, he welcomes death as releasing his mind from the obstructive companionship of the body.

The fear of disgrace and dishonour, in his own eyes and in those of others, is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds and death in the service of his country. See Plato, Leg. i. pp. 646-647. He is φοβερὸς μετὰ νόμου, μετὰ δίκης, p. 647 E. Such is the way in which both Plato and Thucydides conceive the character of the brave citizen as compared with the coward.

It is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different estimate of prospective pains; the case being one in which pleasure is not concerned. That the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the eyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom, need hardly be remarked. At the same time the sentiments here conceived embrace a wide field of sympathy, comprising the interests, honour, and security, of others as well as of the individual agent.

ness the End to be pursued as far as attainable—by intelligent forethought and comparison: that there is no other intelligible standard of reference, for application of the terms Good and Evil, except the tendency to produce happiness or misery: and that if this standard be rejected, ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion, and becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments, authoritative and self-justifying, prevalent in each community. But the End just mentioned is highly complex, and care must be taken to conceive it in its full comprehension. Herein I conceive the argument of Sokrates (in the Protagoras) to be incomplete. It carries attention only to a part of the truth, keeping out of sight, though not excluding, the remainder. It considers each man as an individual, determining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures and pains: as a prudent, temperate, and courageous agent, but neither as just nor beneficent. It omits to take account of him as member of a society composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with himself. Now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner (such as Plato both professes to be and really is) to study the means of happiness, not simply for the agent himself, but for that agent together with others around him—for the members of the community generally.[g] The Platonic Sokrates says this himself in the Republic: and accordingly, he there treats of other points which are not touched upon by Sokrates in the Protagoras. He proclaims that the happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent with the security, and to a certain extent with the happiness, of others: he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their pleasures and pains from the same causes: common pleasures, and common pains, to all.[h] The doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras requires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important elements. Since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of others, he must be called upon to take

Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential.

[g] Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 420-421, v. p. 466 A.

[h] Plato, Republ. v. pp. 462 A-B-D, 464 A-D. Throughout the first of these passages we see ἀγαθὸν used as the equivalent of ἡδονή, κακὸν as the equivalent of λύπη.

account of its consequences under both aspects, especially where it goes to inflict hurt or privation upon others. Good and evil depend upon that scientific computation and comparison of pleasures and pains which Sokrates in the Protagoras prescribes: but the computation must include, to a certain extent, the pleasures and pains (security and rightful expectations) of others besides the agent himself, implicated in the consequences of his acts.[1]

As to this point, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates not always correct, nor even consistent with himself. This will appear especially when we come to see the account which he gives of Justice in the Republic. In that branch of the Ethical End, a direct regard to the security of others comes into the foreground. For in an act of injustice, the prominent characteristic is that of harm done to others—though that is not the whole, since the security of the agent himself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment of these obligations. It is this primary regard to others, and secondary regard to self, implicated in one complex feeling—which distinguishes justice from prudence. The Platonic Sokrates in the Republic (though his language is not always clear) does not admit this; but considers justice as a branch of prudence, necessary to ensure the happiness of the individual agent himself.

Comparison with the Republic.

Now in the Protagoras, what the Platonic Sokrates dwells upon (in the argument which I have been considering) is prudence, temperance, courage: little or nothing is said about justice: there was therefore the less necessity for insisting on that prominent reference to the security of others (besides the agent himself) which justice involves. If, however, we turn back to the earlier part of the dialogue, to the speech delivered by Protagoras, we see justice brought into the fore-

The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates.

[1] See, especially on this point, the brief but valuable Tract on Utilitarianism (Parker, 1863) by Mr. John Stuart Mill. In page 16 of that work attention is called to the fact, that in Utilitarianism the standard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. So that we cannot with exactness call the doctrine of Sokrates, in his conversation with Protagoras, "the theory of Utilitarianism," as Mr. Mill calls it in page 1.

ground. It is not indeed handled analytically (which is not the manner of that Sophist), nor is it resolved into regard to pleasure and pain, happiness and misery: but it is announced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally necessary from every man towards every other (δίκη—αἰδὼς), distinguishable from those endowments which supply the wants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself. The very existence of the social union requires, that each man should feel a sentiment of duties on his part towards others, and duties on their parts towards him: or (in other words) of rights on his part to have his interests considered by others, and rights on their parts to have their interests considered by him. Unless this sentiment of reciprocity—reciprocal duty and right—exist in the bosom of each individual citizen, or at least in the large majority—no social union could subsist. There are doubtless different degrees of the sentiment: moreover, the rights and duties may be apportioned better or worse, more or less fairly, among the individuals of a society; thus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable. But without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual bosom, even the worst constituted society could not hold together. And it is this sentiment of reciprocity which Protagoras (in the dialogue before us) is introduced as postulating in his declaration, that justice and the sense of shame (unlike to professional aptitudes) must be distributed universally and without exception among all the members of a community. Each man must feel them, in his conduct towards others: each man must also be able to reckon that others will feel the like, in their behaviour towards him.[k]

[k] Professor Bain (in his work on the Emotions and the Will, ch. xv. On the Ethical Emotions, pp. 299-300) has given remarks extremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which Plato has here placed under the name of Protagoras.

"The supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into the two following particulars. First the common end of public security, which is also individual preservation, demands certain precautions which are everywhere very much alike, and can in no case be dispensed with. Some sort of constituted authority to control the individual impulses and protect each man's person and property. The duties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially the same in all societies. They have a pretty uniform character all over the globe. If the sense of the common safety were not sufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some common regulations, society could not exist.

If we thus compare the Ethical End, as implied, though not explicitly laid down, by Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue,—and as laid down by Sokrates in the later part—we shall see that while Sokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and pleasures of the agent himself, Protagoras enlarges it so as to include a direct reference to those of others also, coupled with an expectation of the like reference on the part of others.[1] Sokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating prudence for his own pleasures and pains: while Protagoras proclaims that after this attribute had been obtained by man, and individual wants supplied, still there was a farther element necessary in the calculation—the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted in every one's bosom: without this the human race would have perished. Prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence; but if men are to live and act in social communion, the services as well as the requirements

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It is no proof of the universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral distinctions, but of a certain rational appreciation of what is necessary for the very existence of every human being living in the company of others: Doubtless, if the sad history of the human race had been preserved in all its details, we *should have many examples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception of a social system, or to the restraints imposed by it.* We know enough of the records of anarchy, to see how difficult it is for human nature to comply in full with the social conditions of security; but if this were not complied with at all, the result would be mutual and swift destruction. In the second place, mankind have been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon individual members of societies some observances or restraints of purely *sentimental* origin, having no reference, direct or indirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the safeguards implied in it. Certain things founded in taste, liking, aversion, or fancy, have, in every community known to us, got themselves erected into the dignity of authoritative morality; being (so to speak) terms of communion, and enforced by punishment. In these rules, founded on men's sentiments, likings, aversions, or antipathies, there is nothing common but the fact that some one or other of them are carried to the length of public requirement, and mixed up in one code with the more imperative duties that hold society together."

The postulate of the Platonic Protagoras—that δίκη and αἰδὼς must be felt to a certain extent in each man's bosom, as a condition to the very existence of society—agrees with the first of the two elements here distinguished by Mr. Bain, and does not necessarily go beyond it. But the unsystematic teaching and universal propagandism, which Protagoras describes as the agency whereby virtue is communicated, applies alike to both the two elements distinguished by Mr. Bain: to the factitious exigencies of King Nomos, as well as to his tutelary control. It is this mixed mass that the Sokratic analysis is brought to examine.

[1] Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322.

of each man must be shaped, in a certain measure, with a direct view to the security of others as well as to his own.

In my judgment, the Ethical End, exclusively self-regarding, here laid down by Sokrates, is too narrow. And if we turn to other Platonic dialogues, we shall find Sokrates still represented as proclaiming a self-regarding Ethical End, though not the same as what we read in the Protagoras. In the Gorgias, Republic, Phædon, &c., we shall find him discountenancing the calculation (recommended in the Protagoras) of pleasures and pains against each other, as greater, more certain, durable, &c., and insisting that all shall be estimated according as they bear on the general condition or health of the mind, which he assimilates to the general condition or health of the body. The health of the body, considered as an End to be pursued, is essentially self-regarding: so also is the health of the mind. I shall touch upon this farther when I consider the above-mentioned dialogues: at present, I only remark that they agree with the Sokrates of the Protagoras in assuming a self-regarding Ethical End, though they do not agree with him in describing what that End should be.

Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage.

The application which Sokrates makes (in the Protagoras) of his own assumed Ethical End to the explanation of courage, is certainly confused and unsatisfactory. And indeed, we may farther remark that the general result at which Plato seems to be aiming in this dialogue, viz.: That all the different virtues are at the bottom one and the same, and that he who possesses one of them must also possess the remainder—cannot be made out even upon his own assumptions. Though it be true that all the virtues depend upon correct calculation, yet as each of them applies to a different set of circumstances, and different disturbing and misleading causes, the same man who calculates well under one set of circumstances, may calculate badly under others. The position laid down by Protagoras, that men are often courageous but unjust,—just, but not wise—is noway refuted by Plato. Nor is it even inconsistent with Plato's own theory, though he seems to think it so.

Some of the Platonic commentators maintain,[m] that the doctrine here explicitly laid down and illustrated by Sokrates, viz.: the essential identity of the pleasurable with the good, of the painful with the evil—is to be regarded as not serious, but as taken up in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating Protagoras. Such an hypothesis appears to me untenable: contradicted by the whole tenor of the dialogue. Throughout all the Platonic compositions, there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more serious, and more elaborate, than that by which Sokrates here proves the identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil (p. 351 to end). Protagoras begins by denying it, and is only compelled to accept the conclusion against his own will, by the series of questions which he cannot otherwise answer.[n] Sokrates admits that the bulk of mankind are also opposed to it: but he establishes it with an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the hearers around.[o] The commentators are at liberty to impeach the reasoning as unsound; but to set it aside as mere banter and mockery is preposterous. Assume it even to be intended as mockery—assume that Sokrates is mystifying the hearers, by a string of delusive queries, to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue and silly—how can the mockery fall upon Protagoras, who denies the thesis from the beginning?[p]

Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists.

[m] See Brandis, Geschichte der Griech.-Röm. Philosophie, Part ii. sect. 114, note [3] p. 458; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Protag. pp. 15-33-34.

So too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras, (p. 765). "Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. *Neque affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifesté omnino negatur.* De hoc enim in Gorgiâ Phileboque et alibi," &c.

When a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is surely under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by Sokrates *in the Protagoras*, whether it be consistent or not with the Gorgias and Philêbus. Yet here we find Ficinus misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony with the other two.

[n] This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find Zeller (among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts for the occasion the *Standpunkt* of his enemies (Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. p. 380, ed. 2nd.)

[o] Plato, Protag. p. 358 A.

πασιν ... εἶναι ...

[p] When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by Sokrates as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other Sophists (Proleg. p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with the dialogue, p. 351.

Schleiermacher maintains that this

The irony, if it were irony, would be misplaced and absurd.

Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency.

The commentators resort to this hypothesis, partly because the doctrine in question is one which they disapprove —partly because doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other Platonic dialogues. These are the same two reasons upon which, in other cases, various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine works of Plato. The first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant: we must accept what Plato gives us, whether we assent to it or not.

same thesis (the fundamental identity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether "unsokratic and unplatonic;" that it is handled here by Sokrates in a manner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the argument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and imposed upon by such obvious fallacies (Einleitung zum Protag. p. 230, bottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher says, Einl. zum Gorgias, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities.

Upon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras is intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present must be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at the close, to the thesis as having been proved (Prot. p. 358 A): next, that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or the irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible. The argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as anything which we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive altogether (not only here but also in his Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the Protagoras. To describe the identity between ἡδὺ and ἀγαθὸν as a "scheinbare Voraussetzung" is to depart from the plain meaning of words.

Again, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine (identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil), "not as his own opinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the absurd consequences which many deduced from it—only as the received world-morality, as the opinion of the majority" (Einleit. zum Protag. p. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue, I am at a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates introducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and against that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition from Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether the opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation himself, along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and ultimately brings out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all present.

These forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics cannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis substantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this point, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits the thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue—states that it was really the opinion of the historical Sokrates—and adds that it was also the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic stadium, when the Protagoras (as he thinks) was composed (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp. 462-463).

Most of the critics agree in considering the Protagoras to be one of Plato's earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it to 407 B.C. when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I have already given my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic dialogues were composed before 399 B.C. The Protagoras belongs, in my opinion, to Plato's most perfect and mature period.

The second reason also, I think, proves little. The dialogues are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose: we have no right to require that they shall be all consistent with each other in doctrine, especially when we look to the long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that the elaborate reasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the Protagoras is mere irony, intended to mystify both Protagoras himself and all the by-standers, who accept it as earnest and convincing—appears to me far less reasonable than the admission, that the dialectic pleading ascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that assigned to him in another.

Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue.

Though there is every mark of seriousness, and no mark of irony, in this reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must remember that he does not profess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On the contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and perplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is teachable? remains undecided.

CHAPTER XXII.

GORGIAS.

ARISTOTLE, in one of his lost dialogues, made honourable mention of a Corinthian cultivator, who, on reading the Platonic Gorgias, was smitten with such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields and his vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the tuition of Plato.[a] How much of reality there may be in this anecdote, we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to justify such warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the nature and purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to include a comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline of positive ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three distinct interlocutors—Gorgias, Polus, and Kalliklês; but I must again remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted by Plato himself.[b] It may indeed be considered almost as three distinct dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical Gorgias, a native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of the Grecian rhetors; an elderly man during Plato's youth. He paid visits to different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons in rhetoric to numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious aspirations.[c]

Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias.

[a] Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 356, Dindorf. Ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ Κορίνθιος τῷ Γοργίᾳ ξυγγενόμενος — οὐκ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ Γοργίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ ὃν Πλάτων ἔγραψεν ἐπ' ἐλέγχῳ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ —αὐτίκα ἀφεὶς τὸν ἄγρον καὶ τοὺς ἀμπέλους Πλάτωνι ὑπέθηκε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἐσπείρετο καὶ ἐφυτεύετο· καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὃν τιμᾷ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ.

[b] Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. p. 387, Dindorf. Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς καὶ ὁ Γοργίας καὶ ὁ Πῶλος, πάντα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ Πλάτων, πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ τρέπων τοὺς λόγους; Though Aristeides asks reasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this?—the remarks of Stallbaum and others often imply forgetfulness of it.

[c] Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22) is of opinion that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning from his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C.

I shall not contradict this: but I see

Sokrates and Chærephon are described as intending to come to a rhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as having been accidentally detained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished, with brilliant success. Kalliklês however, the host and friend of Gorgias, promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions put by Sokrates; which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the same time that no one had asked him any new question for many years past. Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? what it is that he teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not receiving a satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of his own: out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing; carried on by Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against Kalliklês. Both these two are represented as voluable speakers, of confident temper, regarding the acquisition of political power and oratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life. Polus had even composed a work on Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone of this dialogue would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from such evidence) that the style of the work was affected, and the temper of the author flippant.

Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês.

Here, as in the other dialogues above noticed, the avowed aim of Sokrates is—first, to exclude long speaking—next, to get the question accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner. Specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which Sokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain by contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the thing defined, or set forth what

Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition.

nothing to prove it. At the same time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in the Ekklesiazusæ alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his Republic (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 20). Putting these two statements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of composition than the Republic, which I hardly think probable. However, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the Ekklesiazusæ makes any allusion to the Republic of Plato. Nor shall I believe, until some evidence is produced, that the Republic was composed at so early a date as 390 B.C.

[d] Plato, Gorg. pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to be carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to the auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455 C.

is accessory and occasional in place of what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to find a definition are always instructive, and must have been especially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had never yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis.

About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias?

Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion.

Gorg.—About words or discourses. *Sokr.*—About what discourses? such as inform sick men how they are to get well? *Gorg.*—No. *Sokr.*—It is not then about all discourses? *Gorg.*—It makes men competent to speak: of course therefore also to think, upon the matters on which they speak.[e] *Sokr.*—But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each with reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference between them and Rhetoric? *Gorg.*—The difference is, that each of these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or performance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are subsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes everything by discourses alone.[f] *Sokr.*—But the same may be said about arithmetic, geometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from Rhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with which Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy. *Gorg.*—The discourses, with which rhetoric is conversant, turn upon the greatest of all human affairs. *Sokr.*—But this too, Gorgias, is indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast, the money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the greatest of all.[g] *Gorg.*—The function of Rhetoric is, to persuade assembled multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth the greatest benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the speaker.[h] *Sokr.*—Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion. Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? *Gorg.*—It is so.

[e] Plato, Gorgias, p 449 E. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧνπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[f] Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B. τῆς ῥητορικῆς . . . . πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστιν . . .

[g] Plat. Gorgias, pp. 451-452.

[h] Plato, Gorgias, p. 452 D. Ὅπερ ἔστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν· καὶ αἴτιον, ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.

Sokr.—But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who produce persuasion? Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every other teacher, produce persuasion? How does the Rhetor differ from them? What mode of persuasion does he bring about? Persuasion about what? *Gorg.*—I reply—it is that persuasion which is brought about in Dikasteries, and other assembled multitudes—and which relates to just and unjust.[1] *Sokr.*—You recognise that to have learnt and to know any matter, is one thing—to believe it, is another: that knowledge and belief are different—knowledge being always true, belief sometimes false? *Gorg.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—We must then distinguish two sorts of persuasion: one carrying with it knowledge—the other belief without knowledge. Which of the two does the Rhetor bring about? *Gorg.*—That which produces belief without knowledge. He can teach nothing. *Sokr.*—Well, then, Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? When the people are deliberating about the choice of generals or physicians, about the construction of docks, about practical questions of any kind—there will be in each case a special man informed and competent to teach or give counsel, while the Rhetor is not competent. Upon what then can the Rhetor advise—upon just and unjust—nothing else?[k]

The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise?

The Rhetor (says Gorgias) or accomplished public speaker, will give advice about all the matters that you name, and others besides. He will persuade the people and carry them along with him, even against the opinion of the special *Expert*. He will talk more persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own business. The power of the Rhetor is thus very great: but he ought to use it, like all other powers, for just and honest purposes; not to abuse it for wrong and oppression. If he does the latter, the misdeed is his own, and not the fault of his teacher, who gave his lessons with a view that they should be turned to proper use. If a man, who has learnt the use of arms,

The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant.

[1] Plato, Gorgias, c. 20-21, p. 454 B. [k] Plato, Gorgias, c. 23-24, p. 455 D.

employs them to commit murder, this abuse ought not to be imputed to his master of arms.[l]

You mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from you, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade the multitude:—that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired an engine of persuasion: so that he will appear, when addressing the ignorant, to know more than those who really do know.[m]

Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates.

Thus far, the conversation is carried on between Sokrates and Gorgias. But the latter is now made to contradict himself—apparently rather than really—for the argument whereby Sokrates reduces him to a contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the Platonic doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may be relied on to act as a just man;[n] in other words, that virtue consists in knowledge.

Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch

Polus now interferes and takes up the conversation: challenging Sokrates to furnish what *he* thinks the proper definition of Rhetoric. Sokrates obeys, in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric (he says) is no art at all, but an empirical knack of catering for the pleasure and favour of hearers; analogous to cookery.[o] It is a talent falling under the general aptitude called Flattery; possessed by some bold spirits, who are forward in divining and adapting themselves to the temper of the public.[p]

[l] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 456-457.

[m] Plato, Gorgias, p. 459 B. Οἰκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἀπάσας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς εὑρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

[n] Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς, δίκαιος. Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates, who falls into it also in the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 2, 20, iii. 9, 5.

[o] Plato, Gorgias, p. 462 C. ἐμπειρία . . . . χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας. In the Philêbus (pp. 55-56) Sokrates treats ἰατρικὴ, differently, as falling short of the idea of τέχνη, and coming much nearer to what is here called ἐμπειρία or στοχαστική. Asklepiades was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling γραμματικὴ by the name of ἐμπειρία instead of τέχνη: see Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615, Bek.

[p] Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. δοκεῖ μοι εἶναί τι ἐπιτήδευμα, τεχνικὸν μὲν οὔ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν.

It is not honourable, but a mean pursuit, like cookery. It is the shadow or false imitation of a branch of the political art.[q] In reference both to the body and the mind, there are two different conditions: one, a condition really and truly good—the other, good only in fallacious appearance, and not so in reality. To produce, and to verify, the really good condition of the body, there are two specially qualified professions, the gymnast or trainer and the physician: in regard to the mind, the function of the trainer is performed by the lawgiving power, that of the physician by the judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating, are both branches of the political art, and when put together make up the whole of it. Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body towards its really best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the same in regard to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a sham counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head *flattery*—taking no account of what is really best, but only of that which is most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick recommending itself to a fallacious esteem.[r] Thus Cosmetic, or Ornamental Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the counterfeit of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately agreeable to the body, without considering whether it be good or wholesome: and does this, moreover, without any truly scientific process of observation or inference, but simply by an empirical process of memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by scientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body, whether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as the counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is *good* for the body, while it really knows only what food is *agreeable*. In like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up the body to a false appear-

under the general head flattery.

[q] Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.

[r] Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν, τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν—ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ· καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι.

ance of that vigour and symmetry, which Gymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically.

The same analogies hold in regard to the mind. Sophistic is the shadow or counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of judging or adjudicating. The lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the mind: the Sophist and the Rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it. This distinction between them (continues Sokrates) is true and real: though it often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by others, confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he deals with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the same manner, is confounded with the judge.[s] The Sophist and the Rhetor, addressing themselves to the present relish of an undiscerning public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the credit of their more severe and farsighted rivals.

Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind—and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure.

This is the definition given by Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the Rhetor. Polus then asks him: You say that Rhetoric is a branch of Flattery: Do you think that good Rhetors are considered as flatterers in their respective cities? *Sokr.*—I do not think that[t] they are considered at all. *Polus.*—How! not considered? Do not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? *Sokr.*—No: if you understand the pos-

Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish.

[s] Plato, Gorgias, p. 465 C. διέστηκε μὲν οὕτω φύσει· ἅτε δὲ ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ, σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ, τι χρήσωνται οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις.

It seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as being confounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the Rhetor with the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion, three lines farther on, to the confusion between the cook and the physician. Heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded are, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to be the meaning of Plato.

[t] Plat. Gorg. p. 466 B. *Polus.* Ἆρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες; *Sokr.* Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

The play on words here—for I see nothing else in it—can be expressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little pertinence; because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had considerable importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little Plato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be seen by what immediately follows—where he compares the Rhetors to Despots; and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill or banish any one whom they choose.

session of power as a good thing for the possessor. *Polus.*—I do understand it so. *Sokr.*—Then I say that the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the very minimum of power. *Polus.*—How can that be? Do not they, like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? *Sokr.*—I admit that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems good to themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or exile upon others: but I say that nevertheless they have no power, because they can do nothing which they really wish.[u]

That which men wish (Sokrates lays down as a general proposition) is to obtain good, and to escape evil. Each separate act which they perform, is performed not with a view to its own special result, but with a view to these constant and paramount ends. Good things, or profitable things (for Sokrates alternates the phrases as equivalent), are wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things. Evil things are the contraries of these.[x] Many things are in themselves neither good nor evil, but may become one or the other, according to circumstances—such as stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or moving, &c. When we do any of these indifferent acts, it is with a view to the pursuit of good, or to the avoidance of evil: we do not wish for the act, we wish for its good or profitable results. We do everything for the sake of good: and if the results are really good or profitable, we accomplish what we wish: if the contrary, not. Now, Despots and Rhetors, when they kill or banish or impoverish any one, do so because they think it will be better for them, or profitable.[y] If it be good for them, they do what they wish: if evil for them, they do the contrary of what they wish—and therefore have no power.

All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power.

[u] Plato, Gorgias, p. 466 C-D. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὃν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅ, τι ἂν δόξῃ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστον εἶναι.*

[x] Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. *Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγιείαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα—κακὰ δέ, τἀναντία τούτων; Ἔγωγε.*

[y] Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B. *ἀποκτίννυμεν, εἴτινα ἀποκτίννυμεν, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἢ μή—ἔνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες—ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτὰ· βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα, οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σὺ, &c.*

To do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen to any one: the evil doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men. The person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied; but much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil doer. If I have a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any one whom I choose: but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of great power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished. The result is not profitable, but hurtful: therefore the act is not good, nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.[a] It is sometimes good to kill, banish, or impoverish—sometimes bad. It is good when you do it justly: bad, when you do it unjustly.[a]

Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia—Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so—Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it.

Polus.—A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of Archelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or miserable? *Sokr.*—I do not know: I have never been in his society. *Polus.*—Cannot you tell without that, whether he is happy or not? *Sokr.*—No, certainly not. *Polus.*—Then you will not call even the Great King happy? *Sokr.*—No: I do not know how he stands in respect to education and justice. *Polus.*—What! does all happiness consist in that? *Sokr.*—I say that it does. I maintain that the good and honourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked, miserable.[b] *Polus.*—Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your doctrine? *Sokr.*—Assuredly, if he is wicked. *Polus.*—Wicked, of course; since he has committed enormous crimes: but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia?[c] *Sokr.*—All the public, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them, will agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do not agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and gain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove my case without calling any other

[a] Plato, Gorgias, p. 469-470.
[a] Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.
[b] Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.
[c] Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.

witness than yourself.[d] Do you think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished? *Polus.*—Certainly not: he would then have been very miserable. *Sokr.*—Here again I differ from you: I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man, is under all circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if afterwards punished, than he would be if unpunished and successful.[e] *Polus.*—How say you? If a man, unjustly conspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture, mutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages inflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children—do you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his enterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority over his city—envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and strangers alike?[f] *Sokr.*—More happy, I shall not say: for in both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on the former supposition.

Sokr.—Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer wrong? *Polus.*—To suffer wrong. *Sokr.*—Which of the two is the most ugly and disgraceful? *Polus.*—To do wrong. *Sokr.*—If more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? *Polus.*—By no means. *Sokr.*—You do not think then that the good—and the fine or honourable—are one and the same; nor the bad—and the ugly or disgraceful? *Polus.*—No: certainly not. *Sokr.*—How is this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some common property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from rendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the spectator who contemplates them?[g] And are not figures, colours, voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the same reason, either for their agree-

Sokrates maintains—
1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong.
2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished.

[d] Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἷς ἂν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ—ἐγὼ δὲ ἐὰν μὴ σὲ, ἕνα ὄντα, μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μάρτυρα εἷς ἂν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους τούτους πάντας χαίρειν ἐᾶς.

[e] Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.

[f] Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.

[g] Plato, Gorg. p. 474 D. ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας;

ableness or their usefulness, or both? *Polus.*—Certainly: your definition of the fine or honourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory. *Sokr.*—Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? *Polus.*—Doubtless.[h] *Sokr.*—If therefore one thing be finer or more honourable than another, this is because it surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other either in pain, or in evil? *Polus.*—Yes.

Sokrates offers proof—Definition of Pulchrum and Turpe—Proof of the first point.

Sokr.—Well then! what did you say about doing wrong and suffering wrong? You said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the two, but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful. Now, if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil? *Polus.*—Undoubtedly. *Sokr.*—Has it a preponderance of pain? Does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer? *Polus.*—Certainly not. *Sokr.*—Then it must have a preponderance of evil? *Polus.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—To do wrong therefore is worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? *Polus.*—It appears so. *Sokr.*—Since therefore it is both worse and more disgraceful, I was right in affirming that neither you, nor I, nor any one else, would choose to do wrong in preference to suffering wrong. *Polus.*—So it seems.[i]

Proof of the second point.

Sokr.—Now let us take the second point—Whether it be the greatest evil for the wrong doer to be punished, or whether it be not a still greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the wrong doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? *Polus.*—I think so. *Sokr.*—

[h] Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 E. Καὶ μὴν τάγε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, οὐ δή που ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔστι τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Pol. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

So. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως.

Pol. Πάνυ γέ· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζει, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

So. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ.

Pol. Ἀνάγκη.

A little farther on βλαβὴ is used as equivalent to κακόν. These words—καλὸν, αἰσχρὸν—(very difficult to translate properly) introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment of spectators, or of an undefined public, not concerned either as agents or sufferers.

[i] Plato, Gorgias, p. 475 C-D.

When a man does anything, must there not be some correlate which suffers; and must it not suffer in a way corresponding to what the doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there must also be something stricken: and if he strikes quickly or violently, there must be something which is stricken quickly or violently. And so, if any one burns or cuts, there must be something burnt or cut. As the agent acts, so the patient suffers. *Polus.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—Now if a man be punished for wrong doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just? *Polus.*—He does. *Sokr.*—You admitted that all just things were honourable: therefore the agent does what is honourable, the patient suffers what is honourable.[j] But if honourable, it must be either agreeable—or good and profitable. In this case, it is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and profitable. The wrong doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is good and is profited. *Polus.*—Yes.[k] *Sokr.*—In what manner is he profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his mind—by being relieved from badness of mind. *Polus.*—Probably. *Sokr.*—Is not this badness of mind the greatest evil? In regard to wealth, the special badness is poverty: in regard to the body, it is weakness, sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard to the mind, it is ignorance, injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not injustice, and other badness of mind, the most disgraceful of the three? *Polus.*—Decidedly. *Sokr.*—If it be most disgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. *Polus.*—How? *Sokr.*—It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest preponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the preponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being unjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being poor and sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil. Mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty, or disease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human evils. *Polus.*—It appears so.[l]

[j] See Aristotle, Rhetoric. i. 9, p. 1366, b. 30, where the contrary of this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.

[k] Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.

[l] Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.

Sokr.—The money-making art is, that which relieves us from poverty: the medical art, from sickness and weakness: the judicial or punitory, from injustice and wickedness of mind. Of these three relieving forces, which is the most honourable? *Polus.*—The last, by far. *Sokr.*—If most honourable, it confers either most pleasure or most profit? *Polus.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—Now, to go through medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a man to undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to become well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is less miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well, than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the man who is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never becomes so; but if a man has become so, the next best course for him is, to undergo punishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst lot of all is, that of him who remains mentally bad, without ever getting rid of badness.[m]

The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which, though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him.

This last, Polus (continues Sokrates), is the condition of Archelaus, and of Despots and Rhetors generally. They possess power which enables them, after they have committed injustice, to guard themselves against being punished: which is just as if a sick man were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being cured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the profit of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have an unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.[n] There is therefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be, to avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to resist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present ourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives have done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves to accuse them, and to invoke

Misery of the Despot, who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished.

[m] Plato, Gorgias, p. 478 D-E.

[n] Plato, Gorgias, p. 479 D-E. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθαρῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρᾷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ.

punishment upon them also.[o] On the other hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take precautions against suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if he has done wrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or deed, not to bring him to punishment, but to prevent him from suffering punishment or making compensation; so that he may live as long as possible in impunity.[p] These are the purposes towards which rhetoric is serviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it seems of no great use.[q]

This dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a representation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous than is usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably copious abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its reasoning.

Argument of Sokrates paradoxical —Doubt expressed by Kallikles whether he means it seriously.

The whole tenor of its assumptions, as well as the conclusions in which it ends, are so repugnant to received opinions, that Polus, even while compelled to assent, treats it as a paradox: while Kallikles, who now takes up the argument, begins by asking from Chærephon —"Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only jesting?"[r] Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He has nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics—and the verdict of philosophy.[s] This however is a matter of little moment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except in so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a matter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning—which at the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as plausible—whether he may agree or disagree with others.

[o] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 480 C, 508 B, *κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ υἱέος καὶ ἑταίρου, ἐὰν τι ἀδικῇ*, &c.

Plato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron as a reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as I have already observed in reviewing the Euthyphron, which see above, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 312.

[p] Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 A. *ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρὸς, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην—ἐάν τε χρυσίον ἡπακὼς ᾖ πολὺ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκηται ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως*, &c.

[q] Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.

[r] Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.

[s] Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.

Plato has ranked the Rhetor in the same category as the Despot: a classification upon which I shall say something presently. But throughout the part of the dialogue just extracted, he treats the original question about Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical question.[t] Every one (argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment of good and for the avoidance of evil. Every one performs each separate act with a view not to its own immediate end, but to one or other of these permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is happy: in so far as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs the evil, he is unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or woman is happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or employed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not thereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs the contrary, evil and misery. The man who does wrong is more miserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all is he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.[u]

Principle laid down by Sokrates—That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery.

Polus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has "waded through slaughter" to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy man both in his own feelings and in those of every one else, envied and admired by the world generally: That to say—Archelaus would have been more happy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his enterprise and had been put to death under cruel torture—is an untenable paradox.

The issue here turns, and the force of Plato's argument rests (assuming Sokrates to speak the real sentiments of Plato) upon the peculiar sense which he gives to the words Good—Evil—Happiness:—different from the

Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good—Evil—Happiness.

[t] I may be told that this comparison is first made by Polus (p. 466 C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from him to comment upon. True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the composition of Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are apt to forget this.

[u] Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect. 126, pp. 257-347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced by Plato, treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and which none but a few men pretending to be wise would proclaim —*ἅπερ ἅπαντες μὲν ἂν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἔλοιντο καὶ βουληθεῖεν, ὀλίγοι δέ τινες τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφῶν, ἐρωτηθέντες οὐκ ἂν φήσαιεν.*

In this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind, though without pronouncing the name.

sense in which they are conceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by Polus. It is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be the most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than any amount of suffering: moreover, that if they could conceive themselves as having been thus guilty, the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would be one of expiatory pain. This, taken as the personal sentiment of Plato, admits of no reply. But when he attempts to convert this subjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all, he fails of success, and misleads himself by equivocal language.

Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the Platonic meaning.

Plato distinguishes two general objects of human desire, and two of human aversion. 1. The immediate, and generally transient, object—Pleasure or the Pleasurable—Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant, ulterior, and more permanent object—Good or the profitable—Evil or the hurtful.—In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil consists happiness. But now comes the important question—In what sense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? What did Plato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind generally? Have mankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer to this question, we must say, that neither Plato, nor mankind generally, are consistent or unanimous in their use of the words: and that Plato sometimes approximates to, sometimes diverges from, the more usual meaning. Plato does not here tell us clearly—what he himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it: we learn only, that Good is a mental perfection——Evil a mental taint—answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this circumstance—That they have no reference either to pleasure or pain. In the vulgar sense, Good stands distinguished from pleasure (or relief from pain), and Evil from pain (or loss of pleasure) as the remote, the causal, the lasting—from the present, the product, the transient. Good and Evil are explained by enumerating all the things

so called, of which enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in this dialogue: elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of Good, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that all men aim at Good, he gives, as examples of good things—Wisdom, Health, Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these, Stupidity, Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course might be much enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the common property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a large portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and avoid the latter:—that the approach which they make to happiness depends, speaking generally, upon the success which attends their exertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent ends: and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to each man's own feelings.

But this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most miserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest of all evils.

Examination of the proof given by Sokrates—Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations—Law and Nature.

Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[x] which of the two is most disgraceful—To do wrong—or to suffer wrong? Polus answers—To do wrong: and this answer is inconsistent with what he had previously said about Archelaus. That prince, though a wrong-doer on the largest scale, has been declared by Polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration: while Sokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all mankind, except himself. To be consistent with such an assertion, Polus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer, when the general question is afterwards put to him: or at least he ought to have said—"Sometimes the one, sometimes the other." But this he is ashamed to do, as we shall find Kallikles intimating at a subsequent stage of the dialogue:[y]

[x] Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.

[y] Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that τὸ ἀδικεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι was an ἄδοξος ὑπόθεσις—one which it was χείρονος ἥδους ἐλέσθαι: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not to defend, Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15.

because of King Nomos, or the established habit of the community—who feel that society rests upon a sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one, and require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with censure in general words, however widely the critical feeling may depart from such censure in particular cases.[z] Polus is forced to make profession of a faith, which neither he nor others (except Sokrates with a few companions) universally or consistently apply. To bring such a force to bear upon the opponent, was one of the known artifices of dialecticians:[a] and Sokrates makes it his point of departure, to prove the unparalleled misery of Archelaus.

He proceeds to define Pulchrum and Turpe (*καλὸν-αἰσχρόν*). When we recollect the Hippias Major, in which dialogue many definitions of Pulchrum were canvassed and all re-

[z] This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration from the third chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, entitled, "Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great, and to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition." He says —"The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments .... They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly—a select, though I am afraid, a small party—who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers—and what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers—of wealth and greatness. .... It is scarce *agreeable to good morals*, or even to good language, perhaps, to say that mere wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We must acknowledge, however, that they *almost constantly obtain it*: and *that they may therefore in a certain sense be considered as the natural objects of it.*"

Now Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of the mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly, power and greatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the last sentence illustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and Kalliklês. Adam Smith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in great power, such as those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship from the vast majority of disinterested spectators: and that therefore they are in a certain sense the *natural objects* of such a sentiment (*κατὰ φύσιν*). But if the question be put to him:—"Whether such proceedings, with such a position, are *worthy of honour*, he is constrained by good morals (*κατὰ νόμον*) to reply in the negative. It is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the small minority, while Polus shares the opinion of the large majority. But what is required by King Nomos must be professed even by dissentients, unless they possess the unbending resolution of Sokrates.

[a] Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he contrasts the opinions which men must make a show of holding, with those which they really do hold—*αἱ φανεραὶ δόξαι—αἱ ἀφανεῖς, ἀποκεκρυμμέναι, δόξαι.*

jected, so that the search ended in total disappointment—we are surprised to see that Sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to himself and Polus: and we are the more surprised, because the definition here admitted without a remark, is in substance one of those shown to be untenable in the Hippias Major.[b] It depends upon the actual argumentative purpose which Plato has in hand, whether he chooses to multiply objections and give them effect—or to ignore them altogether. But the definition which he here proposes, even if assumed as incontestable, fails altogether to sustain the conclusion that he draws from it. He defines Pulchrum to be that which either confers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it, or produces ulterior profit or good—we must presume profit to the spectator, or to him along with others—at any rate it is not said *to whom*. He next defines the ugly and disgraceful (*τὸ αἰσχρὸν*) as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or evil. If then (he argues) to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be either because it is more painful—or because it is more hurtful, more evil (worse). It certainly is not more painful: therefore it must be worse.

The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold.

But worse, for whom? For the spectators, who declare the proceedings of Archelaus to be disgraceful? For the persons who suffer by his proceedings? Or for Archelaus himself? It is the last of the three which Sokrates undertakes to prove: but his definition does not help him to the proof. Turpe is defined to be either what causes immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt—to whom? If we say —to the spectator—the definition will not serve as a ground of inference to the condition of the agent contemplated. If on the other hand, we say—to the agent—the definition so understood becomes inadmissible: as well for other reasons, as because there are a great many Turpia which are not agents at all, and which the definition therefore would not include.

Worse or better—for whom? The argument of Sokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible.

[b] Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 303-304. See above, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 378.

Either therefore the definition given by Sokrates is a bad one —or it will not sustain his conclusion. And thus, on this very important argument, where Sokrates admits that he stands alone, and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly cogent—an argument too where the great cause (so Adam Smith terms it) of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be combated—Sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike far-fetched and irrelevant. What increases our regret is, that the real arguments establishing the turpitude of Archelaus and his acts are obvious enough, if you look for them in the right direction. You discover nothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself: far from presenting any indications of misery, which Sokrates professes to discover, he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they see it. But when you turn to the persons whom he has killed, banished, or ruined—to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted—and to the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful iniquity spread through all societies where they become known—there is no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a reflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man. This argument however is here altogether neglected by Plato. Here, as elsewhere, he looks only at the self-regarding side of Ethics.

Sokrates proceeds next to prove—That the wrong-doer who remains unpunished is more miserable than if he were punished. The wrong-doer (he argues) when punished suffers what is just: but all just things are honourable: therefore he suffers what is honourable. But all honourable things are so called because they are either agreeable, or profitable, or both together. Punishment is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be profitable or good. Accordingly the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good. He is benefited, by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness, which is a worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty. In proportion to the magnitude of this evil, is the value of the relief which removes it, and

Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it.

the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who continues to live under it.[c]

Upon this argument, I make the same remark as upon that immediately preceding. We are not expressly told, whether good, evil, happiness, misery, &c., refer to the agent alone or to others also: but the general tenor implies that the agent alone is meant. And in this sense, Plato does not make out his case. He establishes an arbitrary standard of his own, recognised only by a few followers, and altogether differing from the ordinary standard, to test and compare happiness and misery. The successful criminal, Archelaus himself, far from feeling any such intense misery as Plato describes, is satisfied and proud of his position, which most others also account an object of envy. This is not disputed by Plato himself. And in the face of this fact, it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove, by an elaborate process of deductive reasoning, that Archelaus *must* be miserable. That step of Plato's reasoning, in which he asserts, that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good—is only true if you take in (what Plato omits to mention) the interests of society as well as those of the agent. His punishment is certainly profitable to (conducive to the security and well being of) society: it may possibly be also profitable to himself, but very frequently it is not so. The conclusion brought out by Plato, therefore, while contradicted by the fact, involves also a fallacy in the reasoning process.

If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punishment is considered would be reversed.

Throughout the whole of this dialogue, Plato intimates decidedly how great a paradox the doctrine maintained by Sokrates must appear: how diametrically it was opposed to the opinion not merely of the less informed multitude, but of the wiser and more reflecting citizen—even such a man as Nikias. Indeed it is literally exact—what Plato here puts into the mouth of Kallikles—that if the doctrine here advocated by Sokrates were true, the whole of social life would be turned

[c] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 477-478.

upside down.[d] If, for example, it were true, as Plato contends,—That every man who commits a crime, takes upon him thereby a terrible and lasting distemper, incurable except by the application of punishment, which is the specific remedy in the case—every theory of punishment would, literally speaking, be turned upside down. The great discouragement from crime would then consist in the fear of that formidable distemper with which the criminal was sure to inoculate himself: and punishment, instead of being (as it is now considered, and as Plato himself represents it in the Protagoras) the great discouragement to the commission of crime, would operate in the contrary direction. It would be the means of removing or impairing the great real discouragement to crime: and a wise legislator would hesitate to inflict it. This would be nothing less than a reversal of the most universally accepted political or social precepts (as Kallikles is made to express himself).

It will indeed be at once seen, that the taint or distemper with which Archelaus is supposed to inoculate himself, when he commits signal crime—is a pure fancy or poetical metaphor on the part of Plato himself.[e] A distemper must imply something painful, enfeebling, disabling, to the individual who feels it: there is no other meaning: we cannot recognise a distemper, which does not make itself felt in any way by the distempered person. Plato is misled by his ever-repeated analogy between bodily health and mental health: real, on some points—not real on others. When a man is in bad bodily health, his sensations warn him of it at once. He suffers pain, discomfort, or disabilities, which leave no doubt as to the fact: though he may not know either the

Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper—Material difference between the two—Distemper must be felt by the distempered person.

[d] Plato, Gorg. p. 481 B. (*Kallikles.*) *εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντα τἀναντία πράττομεν, ἢ ἃ δεῖ;*

[e] The disposition of Plato to build argument on a metaphor is often shown. Aristotle remarks it of him in respect to his theory of Ideas; and Aristotle in his Topica gives several precepts in regard to the general tendency—precepts enjoining disputants to be on their guard against it in dialectic discussion (Topica, iv. 123, a. 33. vi. 139-140)—*πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον*, &c.

precise cause, or the appropriate remedy. Conversely, in the absence of any such warnings, and in the presence of certain positive sensations, he knows himself to be in tolerable or good health. If Sokrates and Archelaus were both in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily health, each would be made aware of the fact by analogous evidences. But by what measure are we to determine *when* a man is in a good or bad mental state? By his own feelings? In that case, Archelaus and Sokrates are in a mental state equally good: each is satisfied with his own. By the judgment of by-standers? Archelaus will then be the better of the two: at least his admirers and enviers will outnumber those of Sokrates. By my judgment? If my opinion is asked, I agree with Sokrates: though not on the grounds which he here urges, but on other grounds. Who is to be the ultimate referee?—the interests or security of other persons, who have suffered or are likely to suffer by Archelaus, being by the supposition left out of view?

Polus is now dismissed as vanquished, after having been forced, against his will, to concede—That the doer of wrong is more miserable than the sufferer: That he is more miserable, if unpunished,—less so, if punished: That a triumphant criminal on a great scale, like Archelaus, is the most miserable of men.

Here, then, we commence with Kallikles: who interposes, to take up the debate with Sokrates. Polus (says Kallikles), from deference to the opinions of mankind, has erroneously conceded the point—That it is more disgraceful to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. This is indeed true (continues Kallikles), according to what is just by law or convention, that is, according to the general sentiment of mankind: but it is not true, according to justice by nature, or natural justice. Nature and Law are here opposed.[1] The justice of Nature is, that among men (as among other animals) the strong individual should govern and strip the weak, taking and keeping as much as he can grasp. But this justice

Kallikles begins to argue against Sokrates—he takes a distinction between Just by law and Just by nature—Reply of Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly understood.

[1] Plato, Gorgias, p. 482 E. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος.

will not suit the weak, who are the many, and who defeat it by establishing a different justice—justice according to law—to curb the strong man, and prevent him from having more than his fair share.[g] The many, feeling their own weakness, and thankful if they can only secure a fair and equal division, make laws and turn the current of praise and blame for their own protection, in order to deter the strong man from that encroachment and oppression to which he is disposed. *The just according to law* is thus a tutelary institution, established by the weak to defend themselves against *the just according to nature*. Nature measures right by might, and by nothing else: so that according to the right of nature, suffering wrong is more disgraceful than doing wrong. Hêraklês takes from Geryon his cattle, by the right of nature or of the strongest, without either sale or gift.[h]

But (rejoins Sokrates) the many are by nature stronger than the one; since, as you yourself say, they make and enforce laws to restrain him and defeat his projects. Therefore, since the many are the strongest, the right which they establish is the right of (or by) nature. And the many, as you admit, declare themselves in favour of the answer given by Polus—That to do wrong is more disgraceful than to suffer wrong.[i] Right by nature, and right by institution, sanction it alike.

What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês—rhetor and politician.

Several commentators have contended, that the doctrine which Plato here puts into the mouth of Kalliklês was taught by the Sophists at Athens: who are said to have inculcated on their hearers that true wisdom and morality consisted in acting upon the right of the strongest and taking whatever they could get, without any regard to law or justice. I

[g] Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οἱ τοὺς νόμους τιθέμενοι οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί. Πρὸς αὑτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὑτοῖς σύμφερον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν, ἐκφοβοῦντές τε τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ ταῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν τῶν ἄλλων πλέον ἔχειν. Ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

[h] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-488.

[i] Plato, Gorgias, p. 488 D-E.

have already endeavoured to show, in my History of Greece, that the Sophists cannot be shown to have taught either this doctrine, or any other common doctrine: that one at least among them (Prodikus) taught a doctrine inconsistent with it: and that while all of them agreed in trying to impart rhetorical accomplishments, or the power of handling political, ethical, judicial, matters in a manner suitable for the Athenian public—each had his own way of doing this. Kalliklês is not presented by Plato as a Sophist, but as a Rhetor aspiring to active political influence; and taking a small dose of philosophy, among the preparations for that end.[k] He depreciates the Sophists as much as the philosophers, and in fact rather more.[l] Moreover Plato represents him as adapting himself, with accommodating subservience, to the Athenian public assembly, and saying or unsaying exactly as they manifested their opinion.[m] Now the Athenian public assembly would repudiate indignantly all this pretended right of the strongest, if any orator thought fit to put it forward as overruling established right and law. Any aspiring or subservient orator, such as Kalliklês is described, would know better than to address them in this strain. The language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kalliklês is noway consistent with the attribute which he also ascribes to him—slavish deference to the judgments of the Athenian Dêmos.

Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it.

Kalliklês is made to speak like one who sympathises with the right of the strongest, and who decorates such iniquity with the name and authority of that which he calls Nature. But this only shows the uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority.[n] It may be pleaded in favour of different and opposite theories. Nature prompts the strong man to take from weaker men what will gratify his desires:

[k] Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C, 485.

[l] Plato, Gorgias, p. 520 A.

[m] Plato, Gorgias, p. 481-482.

[n] Aristotle (Sophist. Elen. 12. p. 173, a. 10) makes allusion to this argument of Kalliklês in the Gorgias, and notices it as a frequent point made by disputants in Dialectics—to insist on the contradiction between the Just according to Nature and the Just according to Law: which contradiction (Aristotle says) all the ancients recognised as a real one (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πάντες ᾤοντο συμβαίνειν*). It was doubtless a point on which the Dialectician might find much to say on either side.

Nature also prompts these weaker men to defeat him and protect themselves by the best means in their power. The many are weaker, taken individually—stronger taken collectively: hence they resort to defensive combination, established rules, and collective authority.[o] The right created on one side, and the opposite right created on the other, flow alike from Nature: that is, from propensities and principles natural, and deeply seated, in the human mind. The authority of Nature, considered as an enuntiation of actual and wide-spread facts, may be pleaded for both alike. But a man's sympathy and approbation may go either with the one or the other; and he may choose to stamp that which he approves, with the name of Nature as a personified law-maker. This is what is here done by Kalliklês as Plato exhibits him.[p] He sympathises with, and approves, the power-

[o] In the conversation between Sokrates and Kritobulus, one of the best in Xenophon's Memorabilia (ii. 6, 21), respecting the conditions on which friendship depends, we find Sokrates clearly stating that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity, though different and opposite, nevertheless both exist *by nature*. Ἀλλ' ἔχει μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα: Φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά—δέονταί τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦνται, καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις—τὰ δὲ πολεμικά—τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή, καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος. Ἀλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς, &c.

We read in the speech of Hermokrates the Syracusan, at the congress of Gela in Sicily, when exhorting the Sicilians to unite for the purpose of repelling the ambitious schemes of Athens, Thucyd. iv. 61: Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοεῖσθαι πολλὴ ξυγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις μέμφομαι ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἑτοιμοτέροις οὖσιν. Πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν μὲν τοῦ εἴκοντος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐπιόν. Ὅσοι δὲ γιγνώσκοντες αὐτὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς προσκοποῦμεν, μηδὲ τοῦτό τις πρεσβύτατον ἥκει κρίνας, τὸ κοινῶς φοβερὸν ἅπαντας εὖ θέσθαι, ἁμαρτάνομεν. A like sentiment is pronounced by the Athenian envoys in their debate with the Melians, Thuc. v. 105: ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ, τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς, ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν. Some of the Platonic critics would have us believe that this last-cited sentiment emanates from the corrupt teaching of Athenian Sophists: but Hermokrates the Syracusan had nothing to do with Athenian Sophists.

[p] Respecting the vague and indeterminate phrases—Natural Justice, Natural Right, Law of Nature—see Mr. Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 160, ed. 2nd, and Mr. Maine's Ancient Law, chapters iii., iv.

Among the assertions made about the Athenian Sophists, it is said by some commentators that they denied altogether any Just or Unjust by *nature* —that they recognised no Just or Unjust, except by *law or convention*.

To say that the *Sophists* (speaking of them collectively) either affirmed or denied anything, is, in my judgment, incorrect. Certain persons are alluded to by Plato (Theætêt. 172 B) as adopting partially the doctrine of Prota-

ful individual. Now the greater portion of mankind are, and always have been, governed upon this despotic principle, and

goras (*Homo Mensura*) and as denying altogether the Just by *nature*.

In another Platonic passage (Protagor. 337) which is also cited as contributing to prove that the Sophists denied τὸ δίκαιον φύσει—nothing at all is said about τὸ δίκαιον. Hippias the Sophist is there introduced as endeavouring to appease the angry feeling between Protagoras and Sokrates, by reminding them, "I am of opinion that we all (*i. e.* men of literature and study) are kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by *nature* though not by *law*: for law, the despot of mankind, carries many things by force, contrary to nature." The remark is very appropriate from one who is trying to restore good feeling between literary disputants: and the cosmopolitan character of literature is now so familiar a theme, that I am surprised to find Heindorf (in his note) making it an occasion for throwing the usual censure upon the Sophists, because some of them distinguished Nature from the Laws, and despised the latter in comparison with the former.

Kalliklês here, in the Gorgias, maintains an opinion not only different from, but inconsistent with, the opinion alluded to above in the Theætêtus, 172 B. The persons noticed in the Theætêtus said—There is no Natural Justice: no Justice, except Justice by Law. Kalliklês says—There is a Natural Justice quite distinct from (and which he esteems more than) Justice by Law: he then explains what he believes Natural Justice to be—That the strong man should take what he pleases from the weak.

Though these two opinions are really inconsistent with each other, yet we see Plato in the Leges (x. 889 E, 890 A) alluding to them both as the same creed, held and defended by the same men; whom he denounces with extreme acrimony. Who they were, he does not name; he does not mention σοφισταί, but calls them ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν.

We see, in the third chapter of Mr. Maine's excellent work on Ancient Law, the meaning of these phrases—Natural Justice, Law of Nature. It designated or included "a set of legal principles entitled to supersede the existing laws, on the ground of intrinsic superiority (pp. 45, 53). It denoted an ideal condition of society, supposed to be much better than what actually prevailed. This at least seems to have been the meaning which began to attach to it in the time of Plato and Aristotle. What this ideal perfection of human society was, varied in the minds of different speakers. In each speaker's mind the word and sentiment was much the same, though the objects to which it attached were often different. Empedokles proclaims in solemn and emphatic language, that the Law of Nature peremptorily forbids us to kill any animal. (Aristot. Rhetor. i. 13, 1373 b. 15.) Plato makes out to his own satisfaction, that his Republic is thoroughly in harmony with the Law of Nature; and he insists especially on this harmony, in the very point which even the Platonic critics admit to be wrong—that is, in regard to the training of women and the relations of the sexes (Republic, v. 456 C, 466 D). We learn from Plato himself that the propositions of the Republic were thoroughly adverse to what other persons reverenced as the Law of Nature.

In the notes of Beck and Heindorf on Protagor. p. 337 we read, "Hippias præ cæteris Sophistis contempsit leges, iisque opposuit Naturam. Naturam legibus plures certé Sophistarum opposuisse, easque præ illâ contempsisse, multis veterum locis constat." Now this allegation is more applicable to Plato than to the Sophists. Plato speaks with the most unmeasured contempt of existing communities and their laws: the scheme of his Republic, radically departing from them as it does, shows what he considered as required by the exigencies of human nature. Both the Stoics and the Epikureans extolled what they called the Law of Nature above any laws actually existing.

The other charge made against the Sophists (quite opposite, yet sometimes advanced by the same critics) is, that they recognised no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law: *i. e.* all the actual laws and customs considered

brought up to respect it: while many, even of those who dislike Kalliklês because they regard him as the representative of Athenian democracy (to which however his proclaimed sentiments stand pointedly opposed), when they come across a great man or so-called hero, such as Alexander or Napoleon, applaud the most exorbitant ambition if successful, and if accompanied by military genius and energy—regarding communities as made for little else except to serve as his instruments, subjects, and worshippers. Such are represented as the sympathies of Kalliklês: but those of the Athenians went with the second of the two rights—and mine go with it also. And though the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kalliklês, in describing this second right, abounds in contemptuous rhetoric, proclaiming offensively the individual weakness of the multitude[q]—yet this very fact is at once the most solid and most respectable foundation on which rights and obligations can be based. The establishment of them is indispensable, and is felt as indispensable, to procure security for the community: whereby the strong man whom Kalliklês extols as the favourite of Nature, may be tamed by discipline and censure, so as to accommodate his own behaviour to this equitable arrangement.[r] Plato himself, in his Republic,[s] traces the generation of a city to the fact that each man individually taken is not self-sufficing, but stands in need of many things: it is no less true, that each man stands also in fear of many things, especially of depredations from animals, and depredations from powerful individuals of his own species. In the mythe of Protagoras,[t] we have fears from hostile animals—in the speech here ascribed to Kalliklês, we have fears from hostile strong men—assigned as the

as binding in each different community. This is what Plato ascribes to some persons (Sophists or not) in the Theætêtus, p. 172. But in this sense it is not exact to call Kalliklês (as Heindorf does, Protagor. p. 337) "germanus ille Sophistarum alumnus in Gorgiâ Callicles," nor to affirm (with Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theætet. p. 183) that Plato meant to refute Aristippus under the name of Kalliklês, Aristippus maintaining that there was no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law or Convention.

[q] Plato, Gorgias, c. 85, p. 483 B, c. 103, p. 492 A. *οἱ πολλοί, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀδυναμίαν*, &c.

[r] Plato, Gorgias, c. 86, p. 483 E.

[s] Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B. *ὅτι τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ὤν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής.*

[t] Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.

generating cause, both of political communion and of established rights and obligations to protect it.

Kalliklês now explains, that by *stronger* men, he means better, wiser, braver men. It is they (he says) who ought, according to right by nature, to rule over others and to have larger shares than others. *Sokr.* —Ought they not to rule themselves as well as others:[u] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober and temperate? *Kall.*—No: they would be foolish if they did. The weak multitude must do so; and there grows up accordingly among *them* a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all. But it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this necessity. The right of nature authorises them to have the largest desires, since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the desires. It would be silly if a king's son or a despot were to limit himself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen must be content; and worse than silly if he did not enrich his friends in preference to his enemies. He need not care for that public law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among the many. A full swing of enjoyment, if a man has power to procure and maintain it, is virtue as well as happiness.[x]

Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends the negative.

Sokr.—I think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life, regulated according to present means and circumstances, is better than a life of immoderate indulgence.[y] *Kall.*—The man who has no desires will have no pleasure, and will live like a stone. The more the desires, provided they can all be satisfied, the happier a man will be. *Sokr.*—You mean that a man shall be continually hungry, and continually satisfying his hunger: continually thirsty, and satisfying his thirst; and so forth. *Kall.*—By

Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical?

[u] Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 D.

[x] Plato, Gorgias, c. 103, p. 492 A-C.

[y] Plato, Gorgias, c. 105, p. 493 C. ἐάν πως οἷός τ' ὦ πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου, τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκοῦντως ἐλέσθαι.

having and by satisfying those and all other desires, a man will enjoy happiness. *Sokr.*—Do you mean to include all varieties of desire and satisfaction of desire: such for example as itching and scratching yourself:[z] and other bodily appetites which might be named? *Kall.*—Such things are not fit for discussion. *Sokr.*—It is you who drive me to mention them, by laying down the principle, that men who enjoy, be the enjoyment of what sort it may, are happy; and by not distinguishing what pleasures are good and what are evil. Tell me again, do you think that the pleasurable and the good are identical? Or are there any pleasurable things which are not good?[a] *Kall.*—I think that the pleasurable and the good are the same.

Upon this question the discussion now turns: whether pleasure and good are the same, or whether there are not some pleasures good, others bad. By a string of questions much protracted, but subtle rather than conclusive, Sokrates proves that pleasure is not the same as good—that there are such things as bad pleasures and good pains. And Kalliklês admits that some pleasures are better, others worse.[b] Profitable pleasures are good: hurtful pleasures are bad. Thus the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, if they impart to us health and strength—bad, if they produce sickness and weakness. We ought to choose the good pleasures and pains, and avoid the bad ones. It is not every man who is competent to distinguish what pleasures are good, and what are bad. A scientific and skilful adviser, judging upon general principles, is required to make this distinction.[c]

Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them.

This debate between Sokrates and Kalliklês, respecting the "Quomodo vivendum est,"[d] deserves attention on more

[z] Plato, Gorg. c. 107, p. 494 E.

[a] Plato, Gorg. c. 108, pp. 494-495. ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔγωγε ἐνταῦθα, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀμέθην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; Ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῂς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;

[b] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 496-499.

[c] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 499-500. Ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐλλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον; Τεχνικοῦ.

[d] Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 D. ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται, πῶς βιωτέον, &c.; p. 500 C. ὄντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν.

than one account. In the first place, the relation which Sokrates is here made to declare between the two pairs of general terms, Pleasurable—Good: Painful—Evil: is the direct reverse of that which he both declares and demonstrates in the Protagoras. In that dialogue, the Sophist Protagoras is represented as holding an opinion very like that which is maintained by Sokrates in the Gorgias. But Sokrates (in the Protagoras) refutes him by an elaborate argument; and demonstrates that pleasure and good (also pain and evil) are names for the same fundamental ideas under different circumstances; pleasurable and painful referring only to the sensation of the present moment—while good and evil include, besides, an estimate of its future consequences and accompaniments, both pleasurable and painful, and represent the result of such calculation. In the Gorgias, Sokrates demonstrates the contrary, by an argument equally elaborate but not equally convincing. He impugns a doctrine advocated by Kalliklês, and in impugning it, proclaims a marked antithesis and even repugnance between the pleasurable and the good, the painful and the evil: rejecting the fundamental identity of the two, which he advocates in the Protagoras, as if it were a disgraceful heresy.

Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the Protagoras.

The subject evidently presented itself to Plato in two different ways at different times. Which of the two is earliest, we have no means of deciding. The commentators, who favour generally the view taken in the Gorgias, treat the Protagoras as a juvenile and erroneous production: sometimes, with still less reason, they represent Sokrates as arguing in that dialogue, from the principles of his opponents, not from his own. For my part, without knowing whether the Protagoras or the Gorgias is the earliest, I think the Protagoras an equally finished composition, and I consider that the views which Sokrates is made to propound in it, respecting pleasure and good, are decidedly nearer to the truth.

Views of critics about this contradiction.

That in the list of pleasures there are some which it is proper to avoid,—and in the list of pains, some which it is proper to accept or invite—is a doctrine maintained by

Sokrates alike in both the dialogues. Why? Because some pleasures are good, others bad: some pains bad, others good—says Sokrates in the Gorgias. The same too is said by Sokrates in the Protagoras; but then, he there explains what he means by the appellation. All pleasure (he there says) so far as it goes, is good—all pain is bad. But there are some pleasures which cannot be enjoyed without debarring us from greater pleasures or entailing upon us greater pains: on that ground therefore, such pleasures are bad. So again, there are some pains, the suffering of which is a condition indispensable to our escaping greater pains, or to our enjoying greater pleasures: such pains therefore are good. Thus this apparent exception does not really contradict, but confirms, the general doctrine—That there is no good but the pleasurable, and the elimination of pain—and no evil except the painful, or the privation of pleasure. Good and evil have no reference except to pleasures and pains: but the terms imply, in each particular case, an estimate and comparison of future pleasurable and painful consequences, and express the result of such comparison. "You call enjoyment itself evil" (says Sokrates in the Protagoras),[e] "when it deprives us of greater pleasures or entails upon us greater pains. If you have any other ground, or look to any other end, in calling it evil, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not be able to tell us. So too, you say that pain is a good, when it relieves us from greater pains, or when it is necessary as the antecedent cause of greater pleasures. If you have any other end in view, when you call pain good, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not be able to tell us."[f]

Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates in both dialogues.

[e] Plato, Protagoras, c. 36, p. 354 D. ἐπεὶ, εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε. ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθὸν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξετε.

[f] In a remarkable passage of the De Legibus, Plato denies all essential distinction between Good and Pleasure, and all reality of Good apart from Pleasure (Leg. ii. pp. 662-663). εἰ δ' αὖ τὸν δικαιότατον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἀποφαίνοιτο βίον εἶναι, ζητοῖ που τις ἂν ὁ ἀκούων, οἶμαι, τί ποτ' ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς κρεῖττον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν ὁ νόμος ἐνὸν ἐπαινεῖ; τί γὰρ δὴ δικαίῳ χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς ἀγαθὸν ἂν γένοιτο;

Plato goes on to argue as follows: Even though it were not true, as I affirm it to be, that the life of justice

In the Gorgias, too, Sokrates declares that some pleasures are good, others bad—some pains bad, others good. But here he stops. He does not fulfil the reasonable demand urged by Sokrates in the Protagoras—"If you make such a distinction, explain the ground on which you make it, and the end to which you look." The distinction in the Gorgias stands without any assigned ground or end to rest upon. And this want is the more sensibly felt, when we read in the same dialogue, that—"It is not every man who can distinguish the good pleasures from the bad: a scientific man, proceeding on principle, is needed for the purpose."[g] But upon what criterion is the scientific man to proceed? Of what properties is he to take account, in pronouncing one pleasure to be bad, another good—or one pain to be bad and another good—the estimate of consequences, measured in future pleasures and pains, being by the supposition excluded? No information is given. The problem set to the scientific man is one of which all the quantities are unknown. Now Sokrates in the Protagoras[h] also lays it down, that a scientific or rational calculation must be had, and a mind competent to such calculation must be postulated, to decide which pleasures are bad or fit to be rejected—which pains are good, or proper to be endured. But then he clearly specifies the elements which alone are to be taken into the calculation—viz., the future pleasures and pains accompanying or dependent upon each with the estimate of their comparative magnitude and durability. The theory of this calculation is clear and intelligible: though in many particular cases, the data necessary for making it, and the means of comparing them, may be very imperfectly accessible.

Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias.

is a life of pleasure, and the life of injustice a life of pain—still the lawgiver must proclaim this proposition as a useful falsehood, and compel every one to chime in with it. Otherwise the youth will have no motive to just conduct. For no one will willingly consent to obey any recommendation from which he does not expect more pleasure than pain; *οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν ἔθελοι πείθεσθαι πείττειν τοῦτο δ, τῷ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον ἔπεται* (663 B).

[g] Plato, Gorgias, c. 119, p. 500 A. *Ἆρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἔστι, καὶ ὁποῖα κακά; ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον; Τεχνικοῦ.*

[h] Plato, Protagoras, c. 37, pp. 357 B, 356 E.

According to various ethical theories, which have chiefly obtained currency in modern times, the distinction—between pleasures good or fit to be enjoyed, and pleasures bad or unfit to be enjoyed—is determined for us by a moral sense or intuition: by a simple, peculiar, sentiment of right and wrong, or a conscience, which springs up within us ready-made, and decides on such matters without appeal; so that a man has only to look into his own heart for a solution. We need not take account of this hypothesis, in reviewing Plato's philosophy: for he evidently does not proceed upon it. He expressly affirms, in the Gorgias as well as in the Protagoras, that the question is one requiring science or knowledge to determine it, and upon which none but the man of science or *expert* (τεχνικὸς) is a competent judge.

Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense—not recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues.

Moreover, there is another point common to both the two dialogues deserving of notice. I have already remarked when reviewing the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, that it appears to me seriously defective, inasmuch as it takes into account the pleasures and pains of the agent only, and omits the pleasures and pains of other persons affected by his conduct. But this is not less true respecting the doctrine of Sokrates in the Gorgias: for whatever criterion he may there have in his mind to determine which among our pleasures are bad, it is certainly not this—that the agent in procuring them is obliged to hurt others. For the example which Sokrates cites as specially illustrating the class of bad pleasures—viz.: the pleasure of scratching an itching part of the body[1]—is one in which no others besides the agent are concerned. As in the Protagoras, so in the Gorgias—Plato in laying down his rule of life, admits into the theory only what concerns the agent himself, and makes no direct reference to the happiness of others as affected by the agent's behaviour.

In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons so far as affected by the agent.

[1] The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have reckoned this, among the bad pleasures, because the discomfort and distress of body out of which it arises more than countervail the pleasure.

Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but differing in classification.

There are however various points of analogy between the Protagoras and the Gorgias, which will enable us, after tracing them out, to measure the amount of substantial difference between them; I speak of the reasoning of Sokrates in each. Thus, in the Protagoras,[k] Sokrates ranks health, strength, preservation of the community, wealth, command, &c., under the general head of Good things, but expressly on the ground that they are the producing causes and conditions of pleasures and of exemption from pains: he also ranks sickness and poverty under the head of Evil things, as productive causes of pain and suffering. In the Gorgias also, he numbers wisdom, health, strength, perfection of body, riches, &c., among Good things or profitable things[l]—(which two words he treats as equivalent)—and their contraries as Evil things. Now he does not expressly say here (as in the Protagoras) that these things are *good*, because they are productive causes of pleasure or exemption from pain: but such assumption must evidently be supplied in order to make the reasoning valid. For upon what pretence can any one pronounce strength, health, riches, to be *good*—and helplessness, sickness, poverty, to be *evil*—if no reference be admitted to pleasures and pains? Sokrates in the Gorgias[m] declares that the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, in so far as they impart health and strength to the body—evil, in so far as they produce a contrary effect. Sokrates in the Protagoras reasons in the same way—but with this difference—that he would count the pleasure of the repast itself as one item of good: enhancing the amount of good where the future consequences are beneficial, diminishing the amount of evil where the future consequences are unfavourable: while Sokrates in the Gorgias excludes immediate pleasure from the list of good things, and immediate pain from the list of evil things.

This last exclusion renders the theory in the Gorgias untenable and inconsistent. If present pleasure be not admitted as an item of good so far as it goes—then neither can the

[k] Plato, Protagor. pp. 353 D, 354 A. [l] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467-468-499.
[m] Plato, Gorgias, p. 499 D.

future and consequent aggregates of pleasure, nor the causes of them, be admitted as good. So likewise, if present pain be no evil, future pain cannot be allowed to rank as an evil.[n]

Each of the two dialogues, which I am now comparing, is in truth an independent composition: in each, Sokrates has a distinct argument to combat: and in the latest of the two (whichever that was), no heed is taken of the argumentation in the earlier. In the Protagoras, he exalts the dignity and paramount force of knowledge or prudence: if a man knows how to calculate pleasures and pains, he will be sure to choose the result which involves the greater pleasure or the less pain, on the whole: to say that he is overpowered by immediate pleasure or pain into making a bad choice, is a wrong description—the real fact being, that he is deficient in the proper knowledge how to choose. In the Gorgias, the doctrine assigned to Kalliklês and impugned by Sokrates is something very different. That justice, temperance, self-restraint, are indeed indispensable to the happiness of ordinary men: but if there be any one individual, so immensely superior in force as to trample down and make slaves of the rest, this one man would be a fool if he restrained himself: having the means of gratifying all his appetites, the more appetites he has, the more enjoyments will he have and the greater happiness.[o] Observe—that Kalliklês applies this doctrine only to the one omnipotent despot: to all other members of society, he maintains that self-restraint is essen-

Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the Protagoras.

[n] Compare a passage in the Republic (ii. p. 357) where Sokrates gives (or accepts, as given by Glaukon) a description of Good much more coincident with the Protagoras than with the Gorgias. The common property of all Good is to be desired or loved; and there are three varieties of it—1. That which we desire for itself, and for its own sake, apart from all ulterior consequences, such as innocuous pleasures or enjoyments. 2. That which we desire both for itself and for its ulterior consequences, such as good health, good vision, good sense, &c. 3. That which we do not desire—nay, which we perhaps hate or shun, *per se*: but which we nevertheless desire and invite, in connection with and for the sake of ulterior consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment when we are sick, labour in our trade or profession.

Here Plato admits the immediately pleasurable *per se* as one variety of good, always assuming that it is not countervailed by consequences or accompaniments of a painful character. This is the doctrine of the Protagoras, as distinguished from the Gorgias, where Sokrates sets pleasure in marked opposition to good.

[o] Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 B.

tial. This is the doctrine which Sokrates in the Gorgias undertakes to refute, by denying community of nature between the pleasurable and the good—between the painful and the evil.

To me his refutation appears altogether unsuccessful, and the position upon which he rests it incorrect. The only parts of the refutation really forcible, are those in which he unconsciously relinquishes this position, and slides into the doctrine of the Protagoras. Upon this latter doctrine, a refutation might be grounded: you may show that even an omnipotent despot (regard for the comfort of others being excluded by the hypothesis) will gain by limiting the gratification of his appetites to-day so as not to spoil his appetites of to-morrow. Even in his case, prudential restraint is required, though his motives for it would be much less than in the case of ordinary social men. But Good, as laid down by Plato in the Gorgias, entirely disconnected from pleasure—and Evil, entirely disconnected from pain—have no application to this supposed despot. He has no desire for such Platonic Good—no aversion for such Platonic Evil. His happiness is not diminished by missing the former or incurring the latter. In fact, one of the cardinal principles of Plato's ethical philosophy, which he frequently asserts both in this dialogue and elsewhere,[p]—That every man desires Good, and acts for the sake of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil—becomes untrue, if you conceive Good and Evil according to the Gorgias, as having no reference to pleasure or the avoidance of pain: untrue, not merely in regard to a despot under these exceptional conditions, but in regard to the large majority of social men. They desire to obtain Good and avoid Evil, in the sense of the Protagoras: but not in the sense of the Gorgias.[q] Sokrates himself proclaims in this dialogue: "I and philosophy stand opposed to Kalliklês and the Athenian public. What I desire is, to reason consistently

The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is unsuccessful—it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras.

[p] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467 C, 499 E.

[q] The reasoning of Plato in the Gorgias, respecting this matter, rests upon an equivocal phrase. The Greek phrase *εὖ πράττειν* has two meanings; it means *recte agere*, to act rightly; and it also means *felicem esse*, to be happy. There is a corresponding double sense in *κακῶς πράττειν*. Heindorf has well noticed the fallacious

with myself." That is, to speak the language of Sokrates in the Protagoras—"To me, Sokrates, the consciousness of inconsistency with myself and of an unworthy character, the loss of my own self-esteem and the pungency of my own self-reproach, are the greatest of all pains: greater than those which you, Kalliklês, and the Athenians generally, seek to avoid at all price and urge me also to avoid at all price—poverty, political nullity, exposure to false accusation, &c."[1] The noble scheme of life, here recommended by Sokrates, may be correctly described according to the theory of the Protagoras: without any resort to the paradox of the Gorgias, that Good has no kindred or reference to Pleasure, nor Evil to Pain.

Permanent elements—and transient elements—of human agency—how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues.

Lastly—I will compare the Protagoras and the Gorgias (meaning always, the reasoning of Sokrates in each of them) under one more point of view. How does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent elements, and the transient elements, involved in human agency? What function does each of them assign to the permanent element? The distinction of these two is important in its ethical bearing. The whole life both of the individual and of society consists of successive moments of action or feeling. But each individual (and the society as an aggregate of individuals) has within

reasoning founded by Plato on this double sense. We read in the Gorgias, c. 135, p. 507 B: *ἀνάγκη τὸν σώφρονα, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅσιον, ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον.* Upon which Heindorf remarks, citing a note of Routh, who says, "Vix enim potest credi, Platonem duplici sensu verborum *εὖ πράττειν* ad argumentum probandum abuti voluisse, quæ fallacia esset amphiboliæ." "Non meminerat" (says Heindorf), "vir doctus ceteros in Platone locos, ubi eodem modo ex duplici illâ potestate argumentatio ducitur, cujusmodi plura attulimus ad Charmidem, 42, p. 172 A." Heindorf observes, on the Charmidês l. c.: "Argumenti hujus vim positam apparet in duplici dictionis *εὖ πράττειν* significatu: quum vulgo sit *felicem* *e*, non *recte facere*. Hoc aliaque ejusdem generis sæpius sic ansam præbuerunt sophismatis magis quam justi syllogismi." Heindorf then refers to analogous passages in Plato, Republic. i. p. 354 A; Alcibiad. i. c. 12, p. 116 B, c. 29, p. 134 A. A similar fallacy is found in Aristotle, Politic. vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 17, b. 32—*ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους — ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν.* This fallacy is recognised and properly commented on as a "logisches Wortspiel," by Bernays—in his instructive volume—Die *Dialoge des Aristoteles*, pp. 80-81 (Berlin, 1863).

[1] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 481 D, 482 B.

him embodied and realised an element more or less permanent—an established character, habits, dispositions, intellectual acquirements, &c.—a sort of capital accumulated from the past. This permanent element is of extreme importance. It stands to the transient element in the same relation as the fixed capital of a trader or manufacturer to his annual produce. The whole use and value of the fixed capital, of which the skill and energy of the trader himself make an important part, consists in the amount of produce which it will yield: but at the same time the trader must keep it up in its condition of fixed capital, in order to obtain such amount: he must set apart, and abstain from devoting to immediate enjoyment, as much of the annual produce as will suffice to maintain the fixed capital unimpaired—and more, if he desires to improve his condition. The capital cannot be commuted into interest; yet nevertheless its whole value depends upon, and is measured by, the interest which it yields. Doubtless the mere idea of possessing the capital is pleasurable to the possessor, because he knows that it can and will be profitably employed, so long as he chooses.

In the Protagoras.

Now in the Protagoras, the permanent element is very pointedly distinguished from the transient, and is called Knowledge—the Science or Art of Calculation. Its function also is clearly announced—to take comparative estimate and measurement of the transient elements; which are stated to consist of pleasures and pains, present and future—near and distant—certain and uncertain—faint and strong. To these elements, manifold yet commensurable, the calculation is to apply. "The safety of life" (says Sokrates[a]) "resides in our keeping up this science or art of calculation." No present enjoyment must be admitted, which would impair it: no present pain must be shunned, which is essential to uphold it. Yet the whole of its value resides in its application to the comparison of the pleasures and pains.

In the Gorgias the same two elements are differently described, and less clearly explained. The permanent is termed,

[a] Plato, Protag. p. 357 A. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀφθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, &c.

Order, arrangement, discipline, a lawful, just, and temperate, cast of mind (opposed to the doctrine ascribed to Kallikles, which negatived this element altogether, in the mind of the despot), parallel to health and strength of body: the unordered mind is again the parallel of the corrupt, distempered, helpless body: life is not worth having until this is cured.[t] This corresponds to the knowledge or Calculating Science in the Protagoras; but we cannot understand what its function is, in the Gorgias, because the calculable elements are incompletely enumerated. In the Gorgias.

In the Protagoras, these calculable elements are twofold—immediate pleasures and pains—and future or distant pleasures and pains. Between these two there is intercommunity of nature, so that they are quite commensurable: and the function of the calculating reason is, to make a right estimate of the one against the other.[u] But in the Gorgias, no mention is made of future or distant pleasures and pains: the calculable element is represented only by immediate pleasure or pain—and from thence we pass at once to the permanent calculator—the mind, sound or corrupt. You must abstain from a particular enjoyment, because it will taint the soundness of your mind: this is a pertinent reason (and would be admitted as such by Sokrates in the Protagoras, who instead of sound mind would say, calculating intelligence), but it is neither the ultimate reason (since this soundness of mind is itself valuable with a view to future calculations), nor the only reason: for you must also abstain, if it will bring upon yourself (or upon others) preponderating pains in the particular case—if the future pains would preponderate over the present pleasure. Of this last calculation no notice is taken in the Gorgias: which exhibits only the antithesis (not merely marked but even overdone[x]), between the immediate plea-

[t] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 504 B-C, 506 D-E. Τάξις—κόσμος—ψυχὴ κοσμία ἀμείνων τοῦ ἀκοσμήτου.

[u] There would be also the like intercommunity of nature, if along with the pains and pleasures of the agent himself (which alone are regarded in the calculation of Sokrates in the Protagoras) you admit into the calculation the pleasures and pains of others concerned, and the rules established with a view to both the two together—with a view to the joint interest both of the agent and of others.

[x] Epikurus and his followers assigned the greatest value, in their eth-

sure or pain and the calculating efficacy of mind, but leaves out the true function which gives value to the sound mind as distinguished from the unsound and corrupt. That function consists in its application to particular cases: in right dealing with actual life, as regards the agent himself and others: in ἐνεργεία, as distinguished from ἕξις, to use Aristotelian language.[y] I am far from supposing that this part of the case was absent from Plato's mind. But the theory laid out in the Gorgias (as compared with that in the Protagoras) leaves no room for it: giving exclusive prominence to the other elements, and acknowledging only the present pleasure or pain, to be set against the permanent condition of mind, bad or good as it may be.

Character of the Gorgias generally—discrediting all the actualities of life.

Indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias, than the manner in which Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured, exorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all the actualities of life—all the recreative and elegant arts, including music and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic—all provision for the most essential wants, all protection against particular sufferings and dangers, even all service rendered to another person in the way of relief or of rescue[z]—

ical theory, to the permanent element, or established character of the agent, intellectual and emotional. But great as they reckoned this value to be, they resolved it all into the diminution or mitigation of pains, and, in a certain though inferior degree, the multiplication of pleasures. They did not put it in a separate category of its own, altogether disparate and foreign to pleasures and pains.

See the letter of Epikurus to Menœkeus, Diog. L. x. 128-132; Lucretius, v. 18-45, vi. 12-25; Horat. Epist. i. 2, 48-60.

[y] Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7. The remark of Aristotle in the same treatise i. 5—δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου—might be applied to the theory of the Gorgias. Compare also Ethic. Nik. vii. 3 (vii. 4, p. 1146, b. 31, p. 1147, a. 12).

[z] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501-502-511-512-517-519. ἄνευ γὰρ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν.

This is applied to the provision of food, drink, clothing, bedding, for the hunger, thirst, &c., of the community (p. 517 D), to the saving of life, p. 511 D. The boatman between Ægina and Peiræus (says Plato) brings over his passengers in safety, together with their families and property, preserving them from all the dangers of the sea. The engineer, who constructs good fortifications, preserves from danger and destruction all the citizens with their families and their property (p. 512 B). But neither of these persons takes credit for this service; because both of them know that it is doubtful whether they have done any real service to the persons preserved, since they have not rendered them any better; and that it is even doubtful

all the effective maintenance of public organised force, such as ships, docks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction or relief, and those who confer it, are treated with contempt, and presented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure. And it is in this point of view that various Platonic commentators extol in an especial manner the Gorgias: as recognising an Idea of Good superhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and pains of any human being, and incommensurable with them: an Universal Idea, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon its particulars, is separated from them by an incalculable space, and is discernible only by the Platonic telescope.

We have now established (continues Sokrates) that pleasure is essentially different from good, and pain from evil: also, that to obtain good and avoid evil, a scientific choice

whether they may not have done them an actual mischief. Perhaps these persons may be wicked and corrupt; in that case it is a misfortune to them that their lives should be prolonged, it would be better for them to die. It is under this conviction (says Plato) that the boatman and the engineer, though they do preserve our lives, take to themselves no credit for it.

We shall hardly find any greater rhetorical exaggeration than this, among all the compositions of the rhetors against whom Plato declares war in the Gorgias. Moreover, it is a specimen of the way in which Plato colours and misinterprets the facts of social life, in order to serve the purpose of the argument of the moment. He says truly that when the passage boat from Ægina to Peiræus has reached its destination, the steersman receives his fare and walks about on the shore, without taking any great credit to himself, as if he had performed a brilliant deed or conferred an important service. But how does Plato explain this? By supposing in the steersman's mind feelings which never enter into the mind of a real agent; feelings which are put into words only when a moralist or a satirist is anxious to enforce a sentiment. The service which the steersman performs is not only adequately remunerated, but is, on most days, a regular and easy one, such as every man who has gone through a decent apprenticeship can perform. But suppose an exceptional day—suppose a sudden and terrible storm to supervene on the passage—suppose the boat full of passengers, with every prospect of all on board being drowned—suppose she is only saved by the extraordinary skill, vigilance, and efforts of the steersman. In that case he will, on reaching the land, walk about full of elate self-congratulation and pride: the passengers will encourage this sentiment by expressions of the deepest gratitude; while friends as well as competitors will praise his successful exploit. How many of the passengers there are for whom the preservation of life may be a curse rather than a blessing—is a question which neither they themselves, nor the steersman, nor the public, will ever dream of asking.

is required—while to obtain pleasure and avoid pain, is nothing more than blind imitation or irrational knack. There are some arts and pursuits which aim only at procuring immediate pleasure—others which aim at attaining good or the best:[a] some arts, for a single person,—others for a multitude. Arts and pursuits which aim only at immediate pleasure, either of one or of a multitude, belong to the general head of Flattery. Among them are all the musical, choric, and dithyrambic representations at the festivals—tragedy as well as comedy—also political and judicial rhetoric. None of these arts aim at anything except to gratify the public to whom they are addressed: none of them aim at the permanent good: none seek to better the character of the public. They adapt themselves to the prevalent desires: but whether those desires are such as, if realised, will make the public worse or better, they never enquire.[b]

Argument of Sokrates resumed—multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure.

Sokr.—Do you know any public speakers who aim at anything more than gratifying the public, or who care to make the public better? *Kall.*—There are some who do, and others who do not. *Sokr.*—Which are those who do? and which of them has ever made the public better?[c] *Kall.*—At any rate, former statesmen did so: such as Miltiades, Themistokles, Kimon, Perikles. *Sokr.*—None of them. If they had, you would have seen them devoting themselves systematically and obviously to their one end. As a builder labours to construct a ship or a house, by putting together its various

The Rhetors aim only at flattering the public—even the best past Rhetors have done nothing else—citation of the four great Rhetors by Kallikles.

[a] The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have admitted a twofold distinction of aims, but would have stated the distinction otherwise. Two things (he would say) may be looked at in regard to any course of conduct: first, the immediate pleasure or pain which it yields; secondly, this item, not alone, but combined with all the other pleasures and pains which can be foreseen as its conditions, consequences, or concomitants. To obey the desire of immediate pleasure, or the fear of immediate pain, requires no science: to foresee, estimate, and compare the consequences, requires a scientific calculation often very difficult and complicated—a τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη μετρητική.

Thus we are told not only in what cases the calculation is required, but what are the elements to be taken into the calculation. In the Gorgias, we are not told on what elements the calculation of good and evil is to be based: we are told that there *must be science*, but we learn nothing more.

[b] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 502-503.

[c] Plato, Gorgias, p. 503 C.

parts with order and symmetry—so these statesmen would have laboured to implant order and symmetry in the minds and bodies of the citizens: that is, justice and temperance in their minds, health and strength in their bodies.[d] Unless the statesman can do this, it is fruitless to supply the wants, to fulfil the desires and requirements, to uphold or enlarge the power, of the citizens. This is like supplying ample nourishment to a distempered body: the more such a body takes in, the worse it becomes. The citizens must be treated with refusal of their wishes and with punishment, until their vices are healed, and they become good.[e]

We ought to do (continues Sokrates) what is pleasing for the sake of what is good: not *vice versâ*. But everything becomes good by possessing its appropriate virtue or regulation. The regulation appropriate to the mind is, to be temperate. The temperate man will do what is just—his duty towards men: and what is holy—his duty towards the Gods. He will be just and holy. He will therefore also be courageous: for he will seek only such pleasures as duty permits, and he will endure all such pains as duty requires. Being thus temperate, just, brave, holy, he will be a perfectly good man, doing well and honourably throughout. The man who does well, will be happy: the man who does ill and is wicked, will be miserable.[f] It ought to be our principal aim, both for ourselves individually and for the city, to attain temperance and to keep clear of intemperance: not to let our desires run immoderately (as you, Kallikles, advise), and then seek repletion for them: which is an endless mischief, the life of a pirate. He who pursues this plan can neither be the friend of any other man, nor of the Gods: for he is incapable of communion, and therefore of friendship.[g]

Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the condition of virtue and happiness.

Now, Kallikles (pursues Sokrates), you have reproached me with standing aloof from public life in order to pursue philosophy. You tell me that by not cultivating public

[d] Plato, Gorgias, p. 504 D.
[e] Plato, Gorgias, p, 505 B.
[f] Plato, Gorgias, p. 507 D (with Routh and Heindorf's notes).
[g] Plato, Gorgias, p. 507 E. *κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη.*

speaking and public action, I am at the mercy of any one who chooses to accuse me unjustly and to bring upon me severe penalties. But I tell you, that it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong: and that my first business is, to provide for myself such power and such skill as shall guard me against doing wrong.[h] Next, as to suffering wrong, there is only one way of taking precautions against it. You must yourself rule in the city: or you must be a friend of the ruling power. Like is the friend of like:[i] a cruel despot on the throne will hate and destroy any one who is better than himself, and will despise any one worse than himself. The only person who will have influence is, one of the same dispositions as the despot: not only submitting to him with good will, but praising and blaming the same things as he does—accustomed from youth upwards to share in his preferences and aversions, and assimilated to him as much as possible.[k] Now if the despot be a wrong-doer, he who likens himself to the despot will become a wrong-doer also. And thus, in taking precautions against suffering wrong, he will incur the still greater mischief and corruption of doing wrong, and will be worse off instead of better.

Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force.

Kall.—But if he does not liken himself to the despot, the despot may put him to death, if he chooses? *Sokr.*—Perhaps he may: but it will be death inflicted by a bad man upon a good man.[l] To prolong life is not the foremost consideration, but to decide by rational thought what is the best way of passing that length of life which the Fates allot.[m] Is it my best plan to do as you recommend, and to liken myself as much as possible to

Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for better or for worse.

[h] Plato, Gorgias, p. 509 C. Compare Leges, viii. 829 A, where τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν is described as easy of attainment; τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, as being παγχάλεπον; and both equally necessary πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

[i] Plat. Gorg. 510 B. φίλος—ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. We have already seen this principle discussed and rejected in the Lysis, p. 214. See above, vol. i. ch. xviii. p. 509.

[k] Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C. λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὢν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. Οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. Αὕτη ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ.

[l] Plato, Gorgias, p. 511 B.

[m] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 511 B, 512 E.

the Athenian people—in order that I may become popular and may acquire power in the city? For it will be impossible for you to acquire power in the city, if you dissent from the prevalent political character and practice, be it for the better or for the worse. Even imitation will not be sufficient: you must be, by natural disposition, homogeneous with the Athenians, if you intend to acquire much favour with them. Whoever makes you most like to them, will help you forward most towards becoming an effective statesman and speaker: for every assembly delight in speeches suited to their own dispositions, and reject speeches of an opposite tenor.[n]

Such are the essential conditions of political success and popularity. But I, Kallikles, have already distinguished two schemes of life; one aiming at pleasure, the other aiming at good: one, that of the statesman who studies the felt wants, wishes, and impulses of the people, displaying his genius in providing for them effective satisfaction—the other, the statesman who makes it his chief or sole object to amend the character and disposition of the people. The last scheme is the only one which I approve: and if it be that to which you invite me, we must examine whether either you, Kallikles, or I, have ever yet succeeded in amending or improving the character of any individual privately, before we undertake the task of amending the citizens collectively.[o] None of the past statesmen whom you extol, Miltiades, Kimon, Themistokles, Perikles, has produced any such amendment.[p] Considered as ministers, indeed, they were skilful and effective; better than the present statesmen. They were successful in furnishing satisfaction to the prevalent wants and desires of the citizens: they provided docks, walls, ships, tribute, and other such follies, abundantly:[q] but they did nothing to

Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself—to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction.

[n] Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 A.

καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σε ὡς ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλὴς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει. . . . εἰ δέ σοι οἴει ὀντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινα τοιαύτην, ἢ τίς σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇδε, ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλεύει· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ.

[o] Plato, Gorgias, p. 515 A.

[p] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 516, 517.

[q] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 517, 519.

ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης

amend the character of the people—to transfer the desires of the people from worse things to better things—or to create in them justice and temperance. They thus did no real good by feeding the desires of the people: no more good than would be done by a skilful cook for a sick man, in cooking for him a sumptuous meal before the physician had cured him.

Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this.

I believe myself (continues Sokrates) to be the only man in Athens,—or certainly one among a very few,—who am a true statesman, following out the genuine purposes of the political art.[r] I aim at what is best for the people, not at what is most agreeable. I do not value those captivating accomplishments which tell in the Dikastery. If I am tried, I shall be like a physician arraigned by the confectioner before a jury of children. I shall not be able to refer to any pleasures provided for them by me: pleasures which *they* call benefits, but which I regard as worthless. If any one accuses me of corrupting the youth by making them sceptical, or of libelling the older men in my private and public talk—it will be in vain for me to justify myself by saying the real truth.—Dikasts, I do and say all these things justly, for your real benefit. I shall not be believed when I say this, and I have nothing else to say: so that I do not know what sentence may be passed on me.[s] My only refuge and defence will be, the innocence of my life. As for death, no one except a fool or a coward fears *that:* the real evil, and the greatest of all evils, is to pass into Hades with a corrupt and polluted mind.[t]

Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased persons therein, according to

Sokrates then winds up the dialogue, by reciting a Νέκυια, a mythe or hypothesis about judgment in Hades after death, and rewards and punishments to be apportioned to deceased men, according to their merits during life, by Rhadamanthus and Minos.

λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν.

[r] Plato, Gorgias, p. 521 D.

[s] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 521-522.

[t] Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 E. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρος ἐστι—τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται, &c.

their merits during life—the philosopher, who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be rewarded.

The greatest sufferers by these judgments (he says) will be the kings, despots, and men politically powerful, who have during their lives committed the greatest injustices,—which indeed few of them avoid.[u] The man most likely to fare well and to be rewarded, will be the philosopher, "who has passed through life minding his own business, and not meddling with the affairs of others."[x]

Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates—Rhetorical or dogmatical character of the Gorgias.

"Dicuntur ista magnifice,"[y]—we may exclaim, in Ciceronian words, on reaching the close of the Gorgias. It is pre-eminently solemn and impressive; all the more so, from the emphasis of Sokrates, when proclaiming the isolation in which he stands at Athens, and the contradiction between his ethico-political views and those of his fellow-citizens. In this respect it harmonises with the Apology, the Kriton, Republic, and Leges: in all which, the peculiarity of his ethical points of view stands proclaimed—especially in the Kriton, where he declares that his difference with his opponents is fundamental, and that there can be between them no common ground for debate—nothing but reciprocal contempt.[z]

He merges politics in Ethics—he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community.

The argument of Sokrates in the Gorgias is interesting not merely as extolling the value of ethical self-restraint, but also as considering political phenomena under this point of view: that is, merging politics in ethics. The proper and paramount function of statesmen (we find it eloquently proclaimed) is to serve as spiritual teachers in the community: for the purpose of amending the lives and characters of the citizens, and of converting them from bad dispositions to good. We are admonished that until this is effected, more

[u] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 525-526.

[x] Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C. *φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος, καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ.*

It must be confessed that these terms do not correspond to the life of Sokrates, as he himself describes it in the Platonic Apology. He seems to have fancied that no one was *πολυπράγμων*, except those who spoke habitually in the Ekklesia and the Dikastery.

[y] Cicero, De Finib. iii. 3, 11.

[z] Plato, Kriton, p. 49 D.

is lost than gained by realising the actual wants and wishes of the community, which are disorderly and distempered: like the state of a sick man, who would receive harm and not benefit from a sumptuous banquet.

Idéal of Plato—a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his own.

This is the conception of Plato in the Gorgias, speaking through the person of Sokrates, respecting the ends for which the political magistrate ought to employ his power. The magistrate, as administering law and justice, is to the minds of the community what the trainer and the physician are to their bodies: he produces goodness of mind, as the two latter produce health and strength of body. The Platonic *idéal* is that of a despotic lawgiver and man-trainer, wielding the compulsory force of the secular arm for what he believes to be spiritual improvement. However instructive it is to study the manner in which a mind like that of Plato works out such a purpose in theory, there is no reason for regret that he never had an opportunity of carrying it into practice. The manner in which he always keeps in view the standing mental character, as an object of capital importance to be attended to, and as the analogon of health in the body—deserves all esteem. But when he assumes the sceptre of King Nomos (as in Republic and Leges) to fix by unchangeable authority what shall be the orthodox type of character, and to suppress all the varities of emotion and intellect, except such as will run into a few predetermined moulds—he oversteps all the reasonable aims and boundaries of the political office.

Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health—incomplete analogy—circumstances of difference.

Plato forgets two important points of difference, in that favourite and very instructive analogy which he perpetually reproduces, between mental goodness and bodily health. First, good health and strength of the body (as I have observed already) are states which every man knows when he has got them. Though there is much doubt and dispute about causes, preservative, destructive, and restorative, there is none about the present fact. Every sick man derives from his own sensations an anxiety to get well. But virtue is not a point thus

fixed, undisputed, indubitable: it is differently conceived by different persons, and must first be discovered and settled by a process of enquiry; the Platonic Sokrates himself, in many of the dialogues—after declaring that neither he, nor any one else within his knowledge, knows what it is—tries to find it out without success. Next, the physician, who is the person actively concerned in imparting health and strength, exercises no coercive power over any one: those who consult him have the option whether they will follow the advice given, or not. To put himself upon the same footing with the physician, the political magistrate ought to confine himself to the function of advice; a function highly useful, but in which he will be called upon to meet argumentative opposition, and frequent failure, together with the mortification of leaving those whom he cannot convince, to follow their own mode of life. Here are two material differences, modifying the applicability of that very analogy on which Plato so frequently rests his proof.

In Plato's two imaginary commonwealths, where he is himself despotic lawgiver, there would have been no tolerable existence possible for any one not shaped upon the Platonic spiritual model. But in the Gorgias, Plato (speaking in the person of Sokrates) is called upon to define his plan of life in a free state, where he was merely a private citizen. Sokrates receives from Kallikles the advice, to forego philosophy and to aspire to the influence and celebrity of an active public speaker. His reply is instructive, as revealing the interior workings of every political society. No man (he says) can find favour as an adviser—either of a despot, where there is one, or of a people where there is free government—unless he be in harmony with the sentiments and ideas prevalent, either with the ruling Many or the ruling One. He must be moulded, from youth upwards, on the same spiritual pattern as they are:[a] his

Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter, on important points, should acquire any public influence.

[a] Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C. *ὁμοήθης ἂν, ταὐτὰ ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν τῷ ἄρχοντι —εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ—οὐ μμήτην δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις* (c. 146, p. 513 B).

love and hate, his praise and blame, must turn towards the same things: he must have the same tastes, the same morality, the same *idéal*, as theirs: he must be no imitator, but a chip of the same block. If he be either better than they or worse than they,[b] he will fail in acquiring popularity, and his efforts as a competitor for public influence will be not only abortive, but perhaps dangerous to himself.

Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic.

The reasons which Sokrates gives here (as well as in the Apology, and partly also in the Republic) for not embarking in the competition of political aspirants, are of very general application. He is an innovator in religion; and a dissenter from the received ethics, politics, social sentiment, and estimate of life and conduct.[c] Whoever dissents upon these matters from the governing force (in whatever hands that may happen to reside) has no chance of being listened to as a political counsellor, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes without personal hurt or loss. Whether his dissent be for the better or for the worse, is a matter of little moment: the ruling body always think it worse, and the consequences to the dissenter are the same.

Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric.

Herein consists the real antithesis between Sokrates, Plato, and philosophy, on the one side—Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Demosthenes, and rhetoric, on the other. "You," (says Sokrates to Kalliklês,)[d] "are in love with the Athenian people, and take up or renounce such opinions as they approve or discountenance: I am in love with philosophy, and follow her guidance. You and other active politicians do not wish to have more than a smattering of philosophy; you are afraid of becoming unconsciously corrupted, if you carry it beyond such elementary stage."[e] Each

[b] Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 A. εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

[c] Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 B; Theætêtus, p. 179; Menon, p. 79.

[d] Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 E.

[e] Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C. ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκριβείαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐλαβεῖσθαι ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.

The view here advocated by Kallikles:—That philosophy is good and useful, to be studied up to a certain point in the earlier years of life, in order to qualify persons for effective discharge of the duties of active citizenship, but that it ought not to be

of these orators, discussing political measures before the public assembly, appealed to general maxims borrowed from the received creed of morality, religion, taste, politics, &c. His success depended mainly on the emphasis which his eloquence could lend to such maxims, and on the skill with which he could apply them to the case in hand. But Sokrates could not follow such an example. Anxious in his research after truth, he applied the test of analysis to the prevalent opinions —found them, in his judgment, neither consistent nor rational —constrained many persons to feel this, by an humiliating cross-examination—but became disqualified from addressing, with any chance of assent, the assembled public.

Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen.

That in order to succeed politically, a man must be a genuine believer in the creed of King Nomos or the ruling force—cast in the same spiritual mould—(I here take the word *creed* not as confined to religion, but as embracing the whole of a man's critical *idéal*, on moral or social practice, politics, or taste —the ends which he deems worthy of being aspired to, or proper to be shunned, by himself or others) is laid down by Sokrates as a general position: and with perfect truth. In disposing of the force or influence of government, whoever possesses that force will use it conformably to his own maxims. A man who dissents from these maxims will find no favour in

made the main occupation of mature life, nor be prosecuted up to the pitch of accurate theorising: this view, since Plato here assigns it to Kallikles, is denounced by most of the Platonic critics as if it were low and worthless. Yet it was held by many of the most respectable citizens of antiquity; and the question is, in point of fact, that which has always been in debate, between the life of theoretical speculation and the life of action.

Isokrates urges the same view both in Orat. xv. De Permutatione, sect. 282-287, pp. 485-486, Bekker; and Orat. xii. Panathenaic. sect. 29-32, p. 321, Bekker. *διατρίψαι μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παιδείας ταύτας χρόνον τινα συμβουλεύσαιμ' ἂν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μέντοι περιῖδεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκελετευθεῖσαν ἐπὶ τούτοις*, &c. Cicero quotes a similar opinion put by Ennius the poet into the mouth of Neoptolemus, Tusc. D. ii. 1, 1; Aulus Gell. v. 16—"degustandum ex philosophiâ censet, non in eam ingurgitandum."

Tacitus, in describing the education of Agricola, who was taken by his mother in his earlier years to study at Massilia, says, c. 4:—"Memoriâ teneo, solitum ipsum narrare, se in primâ juventâ studium philosophiæ, *ultra quam concessum Romano et senatori*, hausisse; ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum coercuisset."

I have already cited this last passage, and commented upon the same point, in my notes at the end of the last chapter of my preceding volume—on the Euthydêmus.

the public assembly; nor, probably, if his dissent be grave and wide, will he ever be able to speak out his convictions aloud in it, without incurring dangerous antipathy. But what is to become of such a dissenter[f]—the man who frequents the same porticos with the people, but does not hold the same creed, nor share their judgments respecting social *expetenda* and *fugienda*? How is he to be treated by the government, or by the orthodox majority of society in their individual capacity? Debarred, by the necessity of the case, from influence over the public councils—what latitude of pursuit, profession, or conduct, is to be left to him as a citizen? How far is he to question, or expose, or require to be proved, that which the majority believe without proof? Shall he be required to profess, or to obey, or to refrain from contradicting, religious or ethical doctrines which he has examined and rejected? Shall such requirement be enforced by threat of legal penalties, or of ill-treatment from individuals, which is not less intolerable than legal penalties? What is likely to be his character, if compelled to suppress all declaration of his own creed, and to act and speak as if he were believer in another?

Probable feelings of Plato on this subject. Claim put forward in the Gorgias of an independent *locus standi* for philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by Sokrates.

The questions here suggested must have impressed themselves forcibly on the mind of Plato, when he recollected the fate of Sokrates. In spite of a blameless life, Sokrates had been judicially condemned and executed for publicly questioning received opinions, innovating upon the established religion, and instilling into young persons habits of doubt. To dissent only for the better, afforded no assurance of safety: and Plato knew well that his own dissent from the Athenian public was even wider and more systematic than that of his master. The position and plan of life for an active-minded reasoner, dissenting from the established opinions of the public, could not but be an object of interesting reflection to him.[g] The Gorgias (written, in my judg-

[f] Horat. Epist. i. 1, 70—

"Quod si me populus Romanus forté roget, cur
Non ut porticibus, sic judiciis fruar iisdem,
Nec sequar aut fugiam quæ diligit ipse vel odit:
Olim quod vulpes ægroto cauta leoni
Respondit, referam: Quia me vestigia terrent
Omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum."

[g] I have already referred to the treatise of Mr. John Stuart Mill "On

ment, long after the death of Sokrates, probably after the Platonic school was established) announces the vocation of the philosopher, and claims an open field for speculation, apart from the actualities of politics—for the self-acting reason of the individual doubter and investigator, against the authority of numbers and the pressure of inherited tradition. A formal assertion to this effect, was worthy of the founder of the Academy—the earliest philosophical school at Athens. Yet we may observe that while the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias adopts the life of philosophy, he does not renew that farther demand with which the historical Sokrates had coupled it in his Apology—the liberty of oral and aggressive cross-examination, addressed to individuals personally and indiscriminately [h]—to the *primores populi* as well as to the *populum tributim*. The fate of Sokrates rendered Plato more cautious, and induced him to utter his ethical interrogations and novelties of opinion in no other way except that of lectures to chosen hearers and written dialogue: borrowing the name of Sokrates or some other speaker, and refraining upon system (as his letters[i] tell us that he did) from publishing any doctrines in his own name.

As a man dissenting from received opinions, Sokrates had his path marked out in the field of philosophy or individual speculation. To such a mind as his, the fullest liberty ought to be left, of professing and defending his own opinions, as well as of combating other opinions, accredited or not, which he may consider false or uncertified.[k] The public guidance

Importance of tolerance.

Liberty," where this important topic is discussed in a manner equally profound and enlightened. The coexistence of individual reasoners enquiring and philosophising for themselves, with the fixed opinions of the majority, is one of the main conditions which distinguish a progressive from a stationary community.

[h] Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23-28 E. *τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, &c.*

[i] Plat. Ep. ii. 314 B. K. F. Hermann (Ueber Platon's schriftstellerische Motive, p. 290) treats any such prudential discretion, in respect to the form and mode of putting forward unpopular opinions, as unworthy of Plato, and worthy only of Protagoras and other Sophists. I dissent from this opinion altogether. We know that Protagoras was very circumspect as to form (Timon ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. ix. s. 57); but the passage of Plato cited by Hermann does not prove it.

[k] So Sokrates also says in the Platonic Apology, pp. 31-32. *Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε*

of the state thus falls to one class of minds, the activity of speculative discussion to another: though accident may produce, here and there, a superior individual, comprehensive or dexterous enough to suffice for both. But the main desideratum is that this freedom of discussion should exist: that room shall be made, and encouragement held out, to the claims of individual reason, and to the full publication of all doubts or opinions, be they what they may: that the natural tendency of all ruling force, whether in few or in many hands, to perpetuate their own dogmas by proscribing or silencing all heretics and questioners, may be neutralised as far as possible. The great expansive vigour of the Greek mind—the sympathy felt among the best varieties of Greeks for intellectual superiority in all its forms—and the privilege of free speech (παῤῥησία), on which the democratical citizens of Athens prided themselves—did in fact neutralise very considerably these tendencies in Athens. A greater and more

μὶν οὔτε οἰδενὶ πλήθει καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα ὁμα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεται ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν

The reader will find the speculative individuality of Sokrates illustrated in the sixty-eighth chapter of my History of Greece.

The antithesis of the philosophising or speculative life, against the rhetorical, political, forensic life—which is put so much to the advantage of the former by Plato in the Gorgias, Theætêtus (p. 173, seq.), and elsewhere—was the theme of Cicero's lost dialogue called Hortensius: wherein Hortensius was introduced pleading the cause against philosophy, (see Orelli, Fragm. Ciceron. pp. 479-480), while the other speakers were provided by Cicero with arguments mainly in defence of philosophy, partly also against rhetoric. The competition between the teachers of rhetoric and the teachers of philosophy continued to be not merely animated but bitter, from Plato downward throughout the Ciceronian age. (Cicero, De Oratore, i. 45-46-47-75, &c.

We read in the treatise of Plutarch against the Epikurean Kolôtes, an acrimonious invective against Epikurus and his followers, for recommending a scheme of life such as to withdraw men from active political functions. (Plutarch adv. Kolôt. pp. 1125 C, 1127-1128); the like also in his other treatise, (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi secundum Epicurum.) But Plutarch at the same time speaks as if Epikurus were the only philosopher who had recommended this, and as if all the other philosophers had recommended an active life; nay, he talks of Plato among the philosophers actively engaged in practical reformatory legislation, through Dion and the pupils of the Academy (p. 1126, B, C). Here Plutarch mistakes: the Platonic tendencies were quite different from what he supposes. The Gorgias and Theætêtus enforce upon the philosopher a life quite apart from politics, pursuing his own course, and not meddling with others—φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ (Gorg. 526 C); which is the same advice as Epikurus gave. It is set forth eloquently in the poetry of Lucretius, but it had been set forth previously, not less eloquently, in the rhetoric of Plato.

durable liberty of philosophising was procured for Athens, and through Athens for Greece generally, than had ever been known before in the history of mankind.

This antithesis of the philosophical life to the rhetorical or political, constitutes one of the most interesting features of the Platonic Gorgias. But when we follow the pleadings upon which Plato rests this grand issue, and the line which he draws between the two functions, we find much that is unsatisfactory. Since Plato himself pleads both sides of the case, he is bound in fairness to set forth the case which he attacks (that of rhetoric), as it would be put by competent and honourable advocates—by Perikles, for example, or Demosthenes, or Isokrates, or Quintilian. He does this, to a certain extent, in the first part of the dialogue, carried on by Sokrates with Gorgias. But in the succeeding portions —carried on with Polus and Kalliklês, and occupying three-fourths of the whole—he alters the character of the defence, and merges it in ethical theories which Perikles, had he been the defender, would not only have put aside as misplaced, but disavowed as untrue. Perikles would have listened with mixed surprise and anger, if he had heard any one utter the monstrous assertion which Plato puts into the mouth of Polus —That rhetors, like despots, kill, impoverish, or expel any citizen at their pleasure. Though Perikles was the most powerful of all Athenian rhetors, yet he had to contend all his life against fierce opposition from others, and was even fined during his last years. He would hardly have understood how an Athenian citizen could have made any assertion so completely falsified by all the history of Athens, respecting the omnipotence of the rhetors. Again, if he had heard Kalliklês proclaiming that the strong giant had a natural right to satiate all his desires at the cost of the weaker Many —and that these latter sinned against Nature when they took precautions to prevent him—Perikles would have protested against the proclamation as emphatically as Plato.[m]

Ignoblen ner in wl

[m] Perikles might indeed have referred to his own panegyrical oration in Thucydides, ii. 37.

Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias.

If we suppose Perikles to have undertaken the defence of the rhetorical element at Athens, against the dialectic element represented by Sokrates, he would have accepted it, though not a position of his own choosing, on the footing on which Plato places it in the mouth of Gorgias: "Rhetoric is an engine of persuasion addressed to numerous assembled auditors: it ensures freedom to the city (through the free exercise of such a gift by many competing orators) and political ascendancy or command to the ablest rhetor. It thus confers great power on him who possesses it in the highest measure: but he ought by no means to employ that power for unjust purposes." It is very probable that Perikles might have recommended rhetorical study to Sokrates, as a means of defending himself against unjust accusations, and of acquiring a certain measure of influence on public affairs.[n] But he would have distinguished carefully (as Horace does) between defending yourself against unjust attacks, and making unjust attacks upon others: though the same weapon may suit for both.

Farther, neither Perikles, nor any defender of free speech, would assent to the definition of rhetoric—That it is a branch of the art of flattery, studying the immediately pleasurable,

[n] Horat. Satir. ii. 1, 39—

"Sec hic stilus haud petet ultro
Quemquam animantem; et me veluti custodiet ensis
Vaginâ tectus; quem cur destringere coner,
Tutus ab infestis latronibus? Oh pater et rex
Jupiter! ut pereat positum rubigine telum,
Nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis! At ille
Qui me commôrit (melius non tangere! clamo)
Flebit, et insignis totâ cantabitur urbe."

We need only read the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 9), to see that the historical Sokrates judged of these matters differently from the Platonic Sokrates of the Gorgias. Kriton complained to Sokrates that life was difficult at Athens for a quiet man who wished only to mind his own business (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν); because there were persons who brought unjust actions at law against him, for the purpose of extorting money to buy them off. The Platonic Sokrates of the Gorgias would have replied to him: "Never mind: you are just, and these assailants are unjust: they are by their own conduct entailing upon themselves a terrible distemper, from which, if you leave them unpunished, they will suffer all their lives: they injure themselves more than they injure you." But the historical Sokrates in Xenophon replies in quite another spirit. He advises Kriton to look out for a clever and active friend, to attach this person to his interest by attention and favours, and to trust to him for keeping off the assailants. Accordingly, a poor but energetic man named Archedemus is found, who takes Kriton's part against the assailants, and even brings counter-attacks against them, which force them to leave Kriton alone, and to give money to Archedemus himself. The advice given by the Xenophontic Sokrates to Kriton is the same in principle as the advice given by Kalliklês to the Platonic Sokrates.

and disregarding the good.° This indeed represents Plato's own sentiment, and was true in the sense which the Platonic Sokrates assigns (in the Gorgias, though not in the Protagoras) to the words *good* and *evil*. But it is not true in the sense which the Athenian people and the Athenian public men assigned to those words. Both the one and the other used

The Athenian people recognised a distinction between the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato conceived.

° The reply composed by the rhetor Aristeides to the Gorgias of Plato is well deserving of perusal, though (like all his compositions) it is very prolix and wordy. See Aristeides, Orationes xlv. and xlvi.—Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς, and Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων. In the last of the two orations he defends the four eminent Athenians (Miltiades, Themistoklês, Periklês, Kimon) whom Plato disparages in the Gorgias.

Aristeides insists forcibly on the partial and narrow view here taken by Plato of persuasion, as a working force both for establishing laws and carrying on government. He remarks truly that there are only two forces between which the choice must be made, intimidation and persuasion; that the substitution of persuasion in place of force is the great improvement which has made public and private life worth having (*μόνη βιωτὸν ἡμῖν πεποίηκε τὸν βίον*, Orat. xlv. p. 64, Dindorf); that neither laws could be discussed and passed, nor judicial trial held under them, without *ῥητορικὴ* as the engine of persuasion (pp. 66-67-136); that Plato in attacking Rhetoric had no right to single out despots and violent conspirators as illustrations of it—*εἶτ' ἐλέγχειν μὲν βούλεται τὴν ῥητορικὴν, κατηγορεῖ δὲ τῶν τυράννων καὶ δυναστῶν, τὰ ἄμικτα μιγνὺς—τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι ῥητορικὴ καὶ τυραννὶς τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων κεχωρίσται, ὅσον τὸ πείθειν τοῦ βιάζεσθαι* (p. 99). He impugns the distinction which Plato has drawn between *ἰατρικὴ, γυμναστικὴ, κυβερνητικὴ, νομοθετικὴ*, &c., on the one side, which Plato calls *τέχναι*, arts or sciences, and affirms to rest on scientific principles—and *ῥητορικὴ, μαγειρικὴ*, &c., on the other side, which Plato affirms to be only guess-work or groping, resting on empirical analogies. Aristeides says that *ἰατρικὴ* and *ῥητορικὴ* are in this respect both on a par; that both are partly reducible to rule, but partly also driven by necessity to conjectures and analogies, and the physician not less than the rhetor (pp. 45-48-49); which the Platonic Sokrates himself affirms in another dialogue, Philêbus, p. 56 A.

The most curious part of the argument of Aristeides is where he disputes the prerogative which Plato had claimed for *ἰατρικὴ, γυμναστικὴ*, &c., on the ground of their being arts or reducible to rules. The effects of human art (says Aristeides) are much inferior to those of *θεία μοῖρα* or divine inspiration. Many patients are cured of disease by human art; but many more are cured by the responses and directions of the Delphian oracle, by the suggestion of dreams, and by other varieties of the divine prompting, delivered through the Pythian priestess, a woman altogether ignorant (p. 11). *καίτοι μικρὰ μὲν ἡ πάντας εἰδυῖα λόγους ἰατρικὴ πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Δελφῶν δύναται λύσεις, ὅσαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ νόσων καὶ παθημάτων ἁπάντων ἀνθρωπίνων ἐφάνθησαν.* Patients who are cured in this way by the Gods without medical art, acquire a natural impulse which leads them to the appropriate remedy —*ἐπιθυμία αὐτοὺς ἄγει ἐπὶ τὸ δύνησον* (p. 20). Aristeides says that he can himself depose—from his own personal experience as a sick man seeking cure, and from personal knowledge of many other such—how much more efficacious in healing is aid from the Gods, given in dreams and other ways, than advice from physicians; who might well shudder when they heard the stories which he could tell (pp. 21-22). To undervalue science and art (he says) is the principle from which men start, when they flee to the Gods for help—*τοῦ καταφυγεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς σχεδὸν ἀρχὴ, τὸ τῆς τέχνης ὑπεριδεῖν ἔστιν.*

the words *pleasurable* and *good* as familiarly as Plato, and had sentiments corresponding to both of them. The pleasurable and painful referred to present and temporary causes: the Good and Evil to prospective causes and permanent situations, involving security against indefinite future suffering, combined with love of national dignity and repugnance to degradation, as well as with a strong sense of common interests and common obligations to each other. To provide satisfaction for these common patriotic feelings—to sustain the dignity of the city by effective and even imposing public establishments, against foreign enemies—to protect the individual rights of citizens by an equitable administration of justice—counted in the view of the Athenians as objects *good* and *honourable:* while the efforts and sacrifices necessary for these permanent ends, were, so far as they went, a renunciation of what they would call the *pleasurable.* When, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians, acting on the advice of Perikles, allowed all Attica to be ravaged, and submitted to the distress of cooping the whole population within the long walls, rather than purchase peace by abnegating their Hellenic dignity, independence, and security—they not only renounced much that was pleasurable, but endured great immediate distress, for the sake of what they regarded as a permanent good.[p] Eighty years afterwards, when Demosthenes pointed out to them the growing power and encroachments of the Macedonian Philip, and exhorted them to the efforts requisite for keeping back that formidable enemy, while there was yet time—they could not be wound up to the pitch requisite for affronting so serious an amount of danger and suffering. They had lost that sense of Hellenic dignity, and that association of self-respect with active personal sol-

[p] Nothing can be more at variance with the doctrine which Plato assigns to Kalliklês in the Gorgias, than the three memorable speeches of Perikles in Thucydides, i. 144, ii. 35, ii. 60, seq. All these speeches are penetrated with the deepest sense of that *κοινωνία* and *φιλία* which the Platonic Sokrates extols: not one of them countenances *πλεονεξίαν*, which the Platonic Sokrates forbids (Gorg. 508 E). Τὸ *προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ* (to use the expressive phrase of Thucydides, ii. 53) was a remarkable feature in the character of the Athenians of that day: it was subdued for the moment by the overwhelming misery of pestilence and war combined.

diership and sailorship, which rendered submission to an enemy the most intolerable of all pains, at the time when Perikles had addressed them. They shut their eyes to an impending danger, which ultimately proved their ruin. On both these occasions, we have the *pleasurable* and the *good* brought into contrast in the Athenian mind; in both we have the two most eminent orators of Grecian antiquity enforcing the *good* in opposition to the *pleasurable:* the first successfully, the last vainly, in opposition to other orators.

Lastly, it is not merely the political power of the Athenians that Perikles employs his eloquence to uphold. He dwells also with emphasis on the elegance of taste, on the intellectual force and activity, which warranted him in decorating the city with the title of Preceptress of Hellas.[q] All this belongs, not to the pleasurable as distinguished from the good, but to good (whether immediately pleasurable or not) in its most comprehensive sense, embracing the improvement and refinement of the collective mind. If Perikles, in this remarkable funeral harangue, flattered the sentiments of the people—as he doubtless did—he flattered them by kindling their aspirations towards good. And Plato himself does the same (though less nobly and powerfully), adopting the received framework of Athenian sentiment in his dialogue called Menexenus, which we shall come to in a future chapter.

Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences raised by the Kalliklês of Plato.

The issue, therefore, which Plato here takes against Rhetoric, must stand or fall with the Platonic Idéal of Good and Evil. But when he thus denounces both the general public and the most patriotic rhetors, to ensure exclusive worship for his own Idéal of Good—we may at least require that he shall explain, wherein consists that Good—by what mark it is distinguishable—and on what authority pre-eminence is claimed for it. So far, indeed, we advance by the help of Plato's similes[r]—order, discipline, health and

The Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good. Divergent ideas about virtue.

[q] Thucyd. ii. 41-42. ξυνελών τε | παίδευσιν εἶναι, &c. λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος |

[r] Plat. Gorg. p. 504.

strength of body—that we are called upon to recognise, apart from all particular moments of enjoyment or suffering, of action or quiescence, a certain permanent mental condition and habit—a certain order, regulation, discipline—as an object of high importance to be attained. This (as I have before remarked) is a valuable idea which pervades, in one form or another, all the Hellenic social views, from Sokrates downward, and even before Sokrates; an idea, moreover, which was common to Peripatetics, Stoics, Epikureans. But mental order and discipline is not in itself an end: it may be differently cast, and may subserve many different purposes. The Pythagorean brotherhood was intensely restrictive in its canons. The Spartan system exhibited the strictest order and discipline—an assemblage of principles and habits predetermined by authority and enforced upon all—yet neither Plato nor Aristotle approve of its results. Order and discipline attained full perfection in the armies of Julius Cæsar and the French Emperor Napoleon: in the middle ages, also, several of the monastic orders stood high in respect to finished discipline pervading the whole character: and the Jesuits stood higher than any. Each of these systems has included terms equivalent to justice, temperance, virtue, vice, &c., with sentiments associated therewith, yet very different from what Plato would have approved. The question—What is Virtue?—*Vir bonus est quis?*—will be answered differently in each. The Spartans—when they entrapped (by a delusive pretence of liberation and military decoration) two thousand of their bravest Helot warriors, and took them off by private assassinations,[s]—did not offend against their own idea of virtue, or against the Platonic exigency of Order—Measure—System.

How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato does not advise us.

It is therefore altogether unsatisfactory, when Plato—professing to teach us how to determine scientifically, which pleasures are bad, and which pains are good—refers to a durable mental order and discipline. Of such order there existed historically many varieties; and many more are conceivable, as Plato himself has shown in the Republic and Leges. By what tests is the

[s] Thucydid. iv. 80.

right order to be distinguished from the wrong? If by its results, by *what* results?—calculations for minimising pains, and maximising pleasures, being excluded by the supposition? Here the Sokrates of the Gorgias is at fault. He has not told us by what scientific test the intelligent Expert proceeds in determining what pleasures are bad, and what pains are good. He leaves such determination to the unscientific sentiment of each society and each individual. He has not, in fact, responded to the clear and pertinent challenge thrown out by the Sokrates of the Protagoras.

I think, for these reasons, that the logic of the Gorgias is not at all on a par with its eloquence. But there is one peculiar feature which distinguishes it among all the Platonic dialogues. Nowhere in ancient literature is the title, position, and dignity of individual dissenting opinion, ethical and political—against established ethical and political orthodoxy—so clearly marked out and so boldly asserted. "The Athenians will judge as they think right: none but those speakers who are in harmony with them, have any chance of addressing their public assemblies with effect, and acquiring political influence. I, Sokrates, dissent from them, and have no chance of political influence: but I claim the right of following out, proclaiming, and defending, the conclusions of my own individual reason, until debate satisfies me that I am wrong."

The (upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PHÆDON.

THE Phædon is characterised by Proklus as a dialogue wherein Sokrates unfolds fully his own mental history, and communicates to his admirers the complete range of philosophical cognition.[a] This criticism is partly well founded. The dialogue generally is among the most affirmative and expository in the Platonic list. Sokrates undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, delivers the various reasons which establish the doctrine to his satisfaction, and confutes some dissentient opinions entertained by others. In regard to the exposition, however, we must consider ourselves as listening to Plato under the name of Sokrates: and we find it so conducted as to specify both certain stages through which the mind of Plato had passed, and the logical process which (at that time) appeared to him to carry conviction.

The Phædon is affirmative and expository.

The interest felt by most readers in the Phædon, however, depends, not so much on the argumentative expositions (which Wyttnebach[b] justly pronounces to be obscure and difficult as well as unsatisfactory) as on the personality of the expounding speaker, and

Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic interest which they inspire.

[a] Proklus, in Platon. Republ. p. 392. ἐν Φαίδωνι μὲν γὰρ ὅπου διαφερόντως ὁ Σωκράτης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ζωὴν ἀναπλοῖ, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πλῆθος ἀνοίγει τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ζηλωταῖς, &c. Wyttenbach thinks (note, ad p. 108 E.) that Plato was young when he composed the Phædon. But no sufficient grounds are given for this: and the concluding sentence of the dialogue affords good presumption that it was composed many years after the death of Sokrates —ἦδε ἡ τελευτὴ ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῶν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρὸς, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἂν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου, καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου. The phrase τῶν τότε, which may probably have slipped unconsciously from Plato, implies that Sokrates belonged to the past generation. The beginning of the dialogue undoubtedly shows that Plato intended to place it shortly after the death of Sokrates; but the word τότε at the end is inconsistent with this supposition, and comes out unconsciously as a mark of the real time.

[b] See the Prolegomena prefixed to Wyttenbach's edition of the Phædon, p. xxi. p. 10.

the irresistible pathos of the situation. Sokrates had been condemned to death by the Dikastery on the day after the sacred ship, memorable in connection with the legendary voyage of Theseus to Krete, had been dispatched on her annual mission of religious sacrifice at the island of Delos. The Athenian magistrates considered themselves as precluded from putting any one to death by public authority, during the absence of the ship on this mission. Thirty days elapsed between her departure and her return: during all which interval, Sokrates remained in the prison, yet with full permission to his friends to visit him. They passed most of every day in the enjoyment of his conversation.[c] In the Phædon, we read the last of these conversations, after the sacred vessel had returned, and after the Eleven magistrates had announced to Sokrates that the draught of hemlock would be administered to him before sunset. On communicating this intelligence, the magistrates released Sokrates from the fetters with which he had hitherto been bound. It is shortly after such release that the friends enter the prison to see him for the last time. One of the number, Phædon, recounts to Echekratês not only the conduct and discourse of Sokrates during the closing hours of his life, but also the swallowing of the poison, and the manner of his death.

Simmias and Kebês, the two colloquutors with Sokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates.

More than fifteen friends of the philosopher are noted as present at this last scene: but the only two who take an active part in the debate, are, two young Thebans named Kebês and Simmias.[d] These friends, though deeply attached to Sokrates, and full of sorrow at the irreparable loss impending over them, are represented as overawed and fascinated by his perfect fearlessness, serenity, and dignity.[e] They are ashamed to give vent to their grief, when their master is seen to maintain his ordinary frame of mind, neither disquieted nor dissatis-

[c] Plato, Phædon, pp. 58-59.

It appears that Kriton became bail before the Dikasts, in a certain sum of money, that Sokrates should remain in prison and not escape (Plat. Phædon, p. 115 D; Kriton, 45 B). Kriton would have been obliged to pay this money if Sokrates had accepted his proposition to escape, noticed already in chap. viii.

[d] Plato, Phædon, pp. 59 B, 89 A. τῶν νεανίσκων τοὺς λόγους, &c. p. 89 A.

[e] Plato, Phædon, pp. 58-59.

fied. The fundamental conception of the dialogue is, to represent Sokrates as the same man that he was before his trial: unmoved by the situation—not feeling that any misfortune is about to happen to him—equally delighting in intellectual debate—equally fertile in dialectic invention. So much does he care for debate, and so little for the impending catastrophe, that he persists in a great argumentative effort, notwithstanding the intimation conveyed by Kriton from the gaoler, that if he heated himself with talking, the poison might perhaps be languid in its operation, so that two or three draughts of it would be necessary instead of one.[f] Sokrates even advances the position that death appears to him as a benefit rather than a misfortune, and that every true philosopher ought to prefer death to life, assuming it to supervene without his own act—suicide being forbidden by the Gods. He is represented as "placidus ore, intrepidus verbis; intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens"—to borrow a phrase from Tacitus's striking picture of the last hours of the Emperor Otho.[g] To see him thus undisturbed, and even welcoming his approaching end, somewhat hurts the feelings of his assembled friends, who are in the deepest affliction at the certainty of so soon losing him. Sokrates undertakes to defend himself before them as he had done before the Dikasts; and to show good grounds for his belief, that death is not a misfortune, but a benefit, to the philosopher.[h] Simmias and Kebês, though at first not satisfied with the reasonings, are nevertheless reluctant to produce their doubts, from fear of mortifying him in his last moments: but Sokrates protests against such reluctance as founded on a misconception of his existing frame of mind.[i] He is now the same man as he was before, and he calls upon them to keep up the freedom of debate unimpaired.

Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, ac-

Indeed this freedom of debate and fulness of search—the paramount value of "reasoned truth"—the necessity of keeping up the force of individual reason by constant argumentative exercise—and the right of inde-

[f] Plato, Phædon, p. 63 D.
[g] Tacitus, Hist. ii. 48.
[h] Plato, Phædon, p. 63.
[i] Plato, Phædon, p. 84 D-E.

pendent judgment for hearer as well as speaker— stand emphatically proclaimed in these last words of the dying philosopher. He does not announce the immortality of the soul as a dogma of imperative orthodoxy; which men, whether satisfied with the proofs or not, must believe, or must make profession of believing, on pain of being shunned as a moral pestilence, and disqualified from giving testimony in a court of justice. He sets forth his own conviction, with the grounds on which he adopts it. But he expressly recognises the existence of dissentient opinions: he invites his companions to bring forward every objection: he disclaims all special purpose of impressing his own conclusions upon their minds: nay, he expressly warns them not to be biassed by their personal sympathies, then wound up to the highest pitch, towards himself. He entreats them to preserve themselves from becoming tinged with *misology*, or the hatred of free argumentative discussion: and he ascribes this mental vice to the early habit of easy, uninquiring, implicit belief: since a man thus ready of faith, embracing opinions without any discriminative test, presently finds himself driven to abandon one opinion after another, until at last he mistrusts all opinions, and hates the process of discussing them, laying the blame upon philosophy instead of upon his own intellect.[k]

tive exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner.

"For myself" (says Sokrates) "I fear that in these my last hours I depart from the true spirit of philosophy— like unschooled men, who, when in debate, think, scarcely at all how the real question stands, but care only to make their own views triumphant in the minds of the auditors. Between them and me there is only thus much of difference. I regard it as a matter of secondary consequence, whether my conclusions appear true to my hearers; but I shall do my best to make them appear as much as possible true to

Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their guard against being influenced by his authority —that they shall follow only the convictions of their own reason.

[k] Plato, Phædon, pp. 89 D, 90.

Πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ; Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὃς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅ, τι ἄν τις μείζω κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λογους μισήσας. p. 90 B. ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι, ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγου ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ἂν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ἄν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος, &c.

myself.[1] My calculation is as follows: mark how selfish it is. If my conclusion as to the immortality of the soul is true, I am better off by believing it: If I am in error, and death be the end of me, even then I shall avoid importuning my friends with grief, during these few remaining hours: moreover my error will not continue with me—which would have been a real misfortune—but will be extinguished very shortly. Such is the frame of mind, Simmias and Kebês, with which I approach the debate. Do you follow my advice: take little thought of Sokrates, but take much more thought of the truth. If I appear to you to affirm anything truly, assent to me: but if not, oppose me with all your powers of reasoning: Be on your guard lest, through earnest zeal, I should deceive alike myself and you, and should leave the sting in you, like a bee, at this hour of departure."

Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent.

This is a remarkable passage, as illustrating the spirit and purpose of Platonic dialogues. In my preceding Chapters, I have already shown, that it is no part of the aim of Sokrates to thrust dogmas of his own into other men's minds as articles of faith. But then, most of these Chapters have dwelt upon Dialogues of Search, in which Sokrates has appeared as an interrogator, or enquirer jointly with others: scrutinising their opinions, but disclaiming knowledge or opinions of his own. Here, however, in the Phædon, the case is altogether different. Sokrates is depicted as having not only an affirmative opinion, but even strong conviction, on a subject of great moment: which conviction, moreover, he is especially desirous of preserving unimpaired, during his few remaining hours of life. Yet even here, he manifests no anxiety to get that conviction

[1] Plato, Phædon, p. 91. *Οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἔγω λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι, προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον—ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι πάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γὰρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταιρε—καὶ θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς—εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ξυνομολογήσατε—εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.*

into the minds of his friends, except as a result of their own independent scrutiny and self-working reason. Not only he does not attempt to terrify them into believing, by menace of evil consequences if they do not—but he repudiates pointedly even the gentler machinery of conversion, which might work upon their minds through attachment to himself and reverence for his authority. His devotion is to "reasoned truth:" he challenges his friends to the fullest scrutiny by their own independent reason: he recognises the sentence which they pronounce afterwards as valid *for them*, whether concurrent with himself or adverse. Their reason is for them, what his reason is for him: requiring, both alike (as Sokrates here proclaims), to be stimulated as well as controuled by all-searching debate—but postulating equal liberty of final decision for each one of the debaters. The stress laid by Plato upon the full liberty of dissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate—is one of the most memorable characteristics of the Phædon. When we come to the treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear), we shall find a totally opposite view of sentiment. In the tenth book of that treatise Plato enforces the rigid censorship of an orthodox persecutor, who makes his own reason binding and compulsory on all.

Phædon and Symposion—points of analogy and contrast.

The natural counterpart and antithesis to the Phædon, is found in the Symposion.[m] In both, the personality of Sokrates stands out with peculiar force: in the one, he is in the fulness of life and enjoyment, along with festive comrades—in the other, he is on the verge of approaching death, surrounded by companions in deep affliction. The point common to both, is, the perfect self-command of Sokrates under a diversity of trying circumstances. In the Symposion, we read of him as triumphing over heat, cold, fatigue, danger, amorous temptation, unmeasured potations of wine, &c.:[n] in the Phædon, we discover him rising superior to

[m] Thus far I agree with Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Phædon, p. 9, &c.): though I do not think that he has shown sufficient ground for his theory regarding the Symposion and the Phædon, as jointly intended to depict the character of the philosopher, promised by Plato as a sequel to the Sophist and the Statesman. (Plato, Sophist. p. 217; Politic. p. 257.)

[n] Plato, Symposion, pp. 214 A, 219 D, 220-221-223 D: compare Phædon, p. 116, c. 117. Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) compares on this point his father

the fear of death, and to the contagion of an afflicted company around him. Still, his resolute volition is occasionally overpowered by fits of absorbing meditation, which seize him at moments sudden and unaccountable, and chain him to the spot for a long time. There is moreover, in both dialogues, a streak of eccentricity in his character, which belongs to what Plato calls the philosophical inspiration and madness, rising above the measure of human temperance and prudence.[o] The Phædon depicts in Sokrates the same intense love of philosophy and dialectic debate, as the Symposion and Phædrus: but it makes no allusion to that personal attachment, and passionate admiration of youthful beauty, with which, according to those two dialogues, the mental fermentation of the philosophical aspirant is asserted to begin.[p] Sokrates in the Phædon describes the initial steps whereby he had been led to philosophical study:[q] but the process is one purely intellectual, without reference to personal converse with beloved companions, as a necessity of the case. His discourse is that of a man on the point of death—"abruptis vitæ blandimentis"[r]—and he already looks upon his body, not as furnishing the means of action and as requiring only to be trained by gymnastic discipline (as it appears in the Republic), but as an importunate and depraving companion, of which he is glad to get rid: so that the ethereal substance of the soul may be left to its free expansion and fellowship with the intelligible world, apart from sense and its solicitations.

Antoninus Pius to Sokrates: both were capable of enjoyment as well as of abstinence, without ever losing their self-command. Ἐφαρμόσειε δ' ἂν αὐτῷ (Antoninus P.) τὸ περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους μνημονευόμενον, ὅτι καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἀπολαύειν ἐδύνατο τούτων, ὧν πολλοὶ πρός τε τὰς ἀποχὰς ἀσθενῶς, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἐνδοτικῶς, ἔχουσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἰσχύειν, καὶ ἔτι καρτερεῖν καὶ ἐννήφειν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀνδρὸς ἔστιν ἄρτιον καὶ οὗτ' ἐγγὺς ἂν εὕροι τις ζητῶν, &c. p. 218 B. πάντες γὰρ κεκοινωνήκατε τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας καὶ βακχείας, &c. About the φιλόσοφος μανία, compare Plato, Phædrus, pp. 245-250.

Plato, Phædrus, pp. 251-253. Symposion, pp. 210-211. ὅταν τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, &c.

[o] Plato, Symposion, pp. 174-175-220 C, D. Compare Phædon, pp. 84 C, 95 E.

[p] Plato, Sympos. p. 215 A, p. 221 D. οἷος δὲ οὑτοσὶ γέγονε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ,

[q] Plato, Phædon, p. 96 A. ἐγὼ οὖν σοὶ δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη, &c.

[r] Tacitus, Hist. ii. 53. "Othonis libertus, habere se suprema ejus mandata respondit: ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis."

We have here one peculiarity of the Phædon, whereby it stands distinguished both from the Republic and the Timæus. The antithesis on which it dwells is that of the soul or mind, on one hand—the body on the other. The soul or mind is spoken of as one and indivisible: as if it were an inmate unworthily lodged or imprisoned in the body. It is not distributed into distinct parts, kinds, or varieties: no mention is made of that tripartite distribution which is so much insisted on in the Republic and Timæus:—the rational or intellectual (encephalic) soul, located in the head—the courageous or passionate (thoracic), between the neck and the diaphragm—the appetitive (abdominal), between the diaphragm and the navel. In the Phædon, the soul is noted as the seat of reason, intellect, the love of wisdom or knowledge, exclusively: all that belongs to passion and appetite, is put to account of the body:[s] this is distinctly contrary to the Philêbus, in which dialogue Sokrates affirms that desire or appetite cannot belong to the body, but belong only to the soul. In Phædon, nothing is said about the location of the rational soul, in the head,—nor about the analogy between its rotations in the cranium and the celestial rotations (a doctrine which we read both in the Timæus and in the Republic): on the contrary, the soul is affirmed to have lost, through its conjunction with the body, that wisdom or knowledge which it possessed during its state of pre-existence, while completely apart from the body, and while in commerce with those invisible Ideas to which its own separate nature was cognate.[t] That controul which in the Republic is exercised by the rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls, is in the Phædon exercised (though imperfectly) by the one and only soul over the body.[u] In the Republic and Timæus, the soul is a tripartite aggregate, a community of parts, a compound: in the Phædon, Sokrates asserts it to be uncompounded, making this fact a point in his argument.[x]

Phædon—compared with Republic and Timæus. No recognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body.

[s] Plato, Phædon, p. 66. Compare Plato, Philêbus, p. 35, C-D.

[t] Plato, Phædon, p. 76.

[u] Compare Phædon, p. 94 C-E, with Republic, iv. pp. 439 C, 440 A, 441 E, 442 C.

[x] Plato, Phædon, p. 78. ἀξύνθετον μονοειδὲς, p. 80 B, contrasted with the τρία εἴδη τῆς ψυχῆς, Republic, p. 439. In the abstract given by Alkinous of the Platonic doctrine, we read in cap. 24 ὅτι τριμερής ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰς

Again, in the Phædon, the soul is pronounced to be essentially uniform and incapable of change: as such, it is placed in antithesis with the body, which is perpetually changing: while we read, on the contrary, in the Symposion, that soul and body alike are in a constant and unremitting variation, neither one nor the other ever continuing in the same condition.[y]

Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone.

The difference which I have here noted shows how Plato modified his doctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue. The tripartite soul would have been found inconvenient in the Phædon, where the argument required that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as possible. Assuming passion and appetite to be attributes belonging to the soul, as well as reason—Sokrates will not shake them off when he becomes divorced from the body. He believes and expects that the post-existence of the soul will be, as its pre-existence has been, a rational existence—a life of intellectual contemplation and commerce with the eternal Ideas: in this there is no place for passion and appetite, which grow out of its conjunction with the body. The soul here represents Reason and Intellect, in commerce with their correlates, the objective Entia Rationis: the body represents passion and appetite as well as sense, in implication with their correlates, the objects of sensible perception.[z] Such is the doctrine of the Phædon; but Plato is not always consistent with himself on the point. His ancient as well as his modern commentators are not agreed, whether, when he vindicated the immortality of the soul, he meant to speak of the rational soul only, or of the aggregate soul with its three parts as above described. There are passages which countenance both suppositions.[a] Plato

δυνάμεις, καὶ κατὰ λόγον τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς τόποις ἰδίοις διανενέμηται: in cap. 25 that the ψυχὴ is ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιάλυτος, ἀσκέδαστος.

[y] Plato, Phædon, pp. 79-80; Symposion, pp. 207-208.

[z] This is the same antithesis as we read in Xenophon, ascribed to Cyrus in his dying address to his sons—ὁ ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς νοῦς—τὸ ἄφρον σῶμα, Cyropæd. viii. 7, 20.

[a] Alkinous, Introduct. c. 25. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ λογικαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀθάνατοι ὑπάρχουσι κατὰ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, βεβαιώσαιτ' ἂν τις· εἰ δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλογοι, τοῦτο τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ὑπάρχει. Galen considers Plato as affirming that the two inferior souls are mortal—Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἠθῶν, T. iv. p. 773, Kühn.

This subject is handled in an instructive Dissertation of K. F. Hermann—De Partibus Animæ Immorta-

seems to have leaned sometimes to the one view, sometimes to the other: besides which, the view taken in the Phædon is a third, different from both—viz.: That the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive, are not recognised as existing.

The philosopher (contends Sokrates) ought to rejoice when death comes to sever his soul altogether from his body: because he is, throughout all his life, struggling to sever himself from the passions, appetites, impulses and aspirations, which grow out of the body: and to withdraw himself from the perceptions of the corporeal senses, which teach no truth, and

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libus secundum Platonem—delivered at Göttingen in the winter Session, 1850-1851. He inclines to the belief that Plato intended to represent only the rational soul as immortal, and the other two souls as mortal (p. 9). But the passages which he produces are quite sufficient to show, that Plato sometimes held one language, sometimes the other; and that Galen, who wrote an express treatise (now lost) to prove that Plato was inconsistent with himself in respect to the soul, might have produced good reasons for his opinion. The "inconstantia Platonis" (Cicero Nat. Deor. i. 12) must be admitted here as on other matters. We must take the different arguments and doctrines of Plato as we find them in their respective places. Hermann (p. 4) says about the commentators—"De irrationali animâ alii ancipites hæserunt, alii claris verbis mortalem prædicarunt: quumque Neoplatonicæ sectæ principes, Numenius et Plotinus, non modo brutorum, sed ne plantarum quidem, animas immortalitate privare ausi sunt,—mox insequentes in alia omnia digressi aut plane perire irrationales partes affirmarunt, aut mediâ quâdam viâ ingressi, quamvis corporum fato exemptis, mortalitatem tamen et ipsi tribuêrunt." It appears that the divergence of opinion on this subject began as early as Xenokrates and Speusippus—see Olympiodorus, Scholia in Phædonem, § 175. The large construction adopted by Numenius and Plotinus is completely borne out by a passage in the Phædon, p. 70 E.

I must here remark that Hermann does not note the full extent of discrepancy between the Phædon and Plato's other dialogues, consisting in this—That in the Phædon, Plato suppresses all mention of the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive: insomuch that if we had only the Phædon remaining, we should not have known that he had ever affirmed the triple partition of the soul, or the co-existence of the three souls.

I transcribe an interesting passage from M. Degérando, respecting the belief in different varieties of soul, and partial immortality.

Degérando—Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie. Vol. i. p. 213.

"Les habitans du Thibet, du Gröenland, du nord de l'Amérique, admettent deux âmes: les Caraïbes en admettent trois, dont une, disent-ils, celle qui habite dans la tête, remonte seule au pays des âmes. Les habitans du Gröenland croient d'ailleurs les âmes des hommes semblables au principe de la vie des animaux: ils supposent que les divers individus peuvent changer d'âmes entre eux pendant la vie, et qu'après la vie ces âmes exécutent de grands voyages, avec toutes sortes de fatigues et de périls. Les peuples du Canada se représentent les âmes sous la forme d'ombres errantes: les Patagons, les habitans du Sud de l'Asie, croient entendre leurs voix dans l'écho: et les anciens Ramains eux-mêmes n'étaient pas étrangers à cette opinion. Les Négres s'imaginent que la destinée de l âme après la vie est encore liée à celle du corps, et fondent sur cette idée une foule de pratiques."

lead only to deceit or confusion: He is constantly attempting to do what the body hinders him from doing completely—to prosecute pure mental contemplation, as the only way of arriving at truth: to look at essences or things in themselves, by means of his mind or soul in itself apart from the body.[b] Until his mind be purified from all association with the body, it cannot be brought into contact with pure essence, nor can his aspirations for knowledge be satisfied.[c] Hence his whole life is really a training or approximative practice for death, which alone will enable him to realise such aspirations.[d] Knowledge or wisdom is the only money in which he computes, and which he seeks to receive in payment.[e] He is not courageous or temperate in the ordinary sense: for the courageous man, while holding death to be a great evil, braves it from fear of greater evils—and the temperate man abstains from various pleasures, because they either shut him out from greater pleasures or entail upon him disease and poverty. The philosopher is courageous and temperate, but from a different motive: his philosophy purifies him from all these sensibilities, and makes him indifferent to all the pleasures and pains arising from the body: each of which, in proportion to its intensity, corrupts his perception of truth and falsehood, and misguides him in the search for wisdom or knowledge.[f] While in the body, he feels imprisoned, unable to look for knowledge except through a narrow grating and by the deceptive media of sense. From this durance philosophy partially liberates him,—purifying his mind, like the Orphic or Dionysiac religious mysteries, from the contagion of body[g] and sense: disengaging it, as far as may be during life, from sympathy with the body: and translating it out of the world of sense, uncertainty, and mere opinion, into the invisible

[b] Plato, Phædon, p. 66 E. εἰ λομεν καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλο αὐτοῦ (τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ἀπο- τε καὶ τεθνάναι. P. 67 E, οἱ

[c] Plato, Phædon, p. 67 B. κα- θαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι ἡ οὐ

[d] Plato, Phædon, p. 64. κινδ γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι

[e] Plato, Phædon, p. 69 A. ἀλλ' ἦ εἶνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθὸν, ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι,

[f] Plato, Phædon, pp. 69-83-84.

[g] Plato, Phædon, p. 82 E.

region of truth and knowledge. If such purification has been fully achieved, the mind of the philosopher is at the moment of death thoroughly severed from the body, and passes clean away by itself, into commerce with the intelligible Entities or realities.

On the contrary, the soul or mind of the ordinary man, which has undergone no purification and remains in close implication with the body, cannot get completely separated even at the moment of death, but remains encrusted and weighed down by bodily accompaniments, so as to be unfit for those regions to which mind itself naturally belongs. Such impure minds or souls are the ghosts or shadows which haunt tombs; and which become visible, because they cling to the visible world, and hate the invisible.[h] Not being fit for separate existence, they return in process of time into conjunction with fresh bodies, of different species of men or animals, according to the particular temperament which they carry away with them.[i] The souls of despots, or of violent and rapacious men, will pass into the bodies of wolves or kites: those of the gluttonous and drunkards, into asses and such-like animals. A better fate will be reserved for the just and temperate men, who have been socially and politically virtuous, but simply by habit and disposition, without any philosophy or pure intellect: for their souls will pass into the bodies of other gentle and social animals, such as bees, ants, wasps,[k] &c., or perhaps they may again return into the human form, and may become moderate men. It is the privilege only of him who has undergone the purifying influence of philosophy, and who has spent his life in trying

Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is relieved from all communion with body.

[h] Plato, Phædon, p. 81. ὁ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὄφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν σκοτοειδῆ φάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.

[i] Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-84.

[k] Plato, Phædon, p. 82 A. Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας καὶ νοῦ. Ὅτι τούτους εἰκὸς ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἥπου μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, &c.

to detach himself as much as possible from communion with the body—to be relieved after death from the obligation of fresh embodiment, that his soul may dwell by itself in a region akin to its own separate nature: passing out of the world of sense, of transient phenomena, and of mere opinion, into a distinct world where it will be in full presence of the eternal Ideas, essences, and truth; in companionship with the Gods, and far away from the miseries of humanity.[1]

Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers.

Such is the creed which Sokrates announces to his friends in the Phædon, as supplying good reason for the readiness and satisfaction with which he welcomes death. It is upon the antithesis between soul (or mind) and body, that the main stress is laid. The partnership between the two is represented as the radical cause of mischief: and the only true relief to the soul consists in breaking up the partnership altogether, so as to attain a distinct, disembodied, existence. Conformably to this doctrine, the line is chiefly drawn between the philosopher, and the multitude who are not philosophers—not between good and bad agents, when the good agents are not philosophers. This last distinction is indeed noticed, but is kept subordinate. The unphilosophical man of social goodness is allowed to pass after death into the body of a bee, or an ant, instead of that of a kite or ass;[m] but he does not attain the privilege of dissolving connection altogether with body. Moreover the distinction is one not easily traceable: since Sokrates[n] expressly remarks that the large majority of mankind are middling persons, neither good nor bad in any marked degree. Philosophers stand in a category by themselves: apart from the virtuous citizens, as well as from the middling and the vicious. Their appetites and ambition are indeed deadened, so that they agree with the virtuous in abstaining from injustice: but this is not their characteristic feature. Philosophy is asserted to impart to them a special purification, like that of the Orphic mysteries to the initiated: detaching

[1] Plato, Phædon, pp. 82 B, 83 B, 84 B. Compare p. 114 C. *τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθῃρμένοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον*, &c., p. 115 C.

[m] Plato, Phædon, pp. 81-82.

[n] Plato, Phædon, p. 90 A.

the soul from both the body and the world of sense, except in so far as is indispensable for purposes of life: replunging the soul, as much as possible, in the other world of intelligible essences, real forms or Ideas, which are its own natural kindred and antecedent companions. The process whereby this is accomplished is intellectual rather than ethical. It is the process of learning, or (in the sense of Sokrates) the revival in the mind of those essences or Ideas with which it had been familiar during its anterior and separate life: accompanied by the total abstinence from all other pleasures and temptations.[o] Only by such love of learning, which is identical with philosophy (*φιλόσοφον, φιλομαθὲς*), is the mind rescued from the ignorance and illusions unavoidable in the world of sense.

In thus explaining his own creed, Sokrates announces a full conviction that the soul or mind is immortal, but he has not yet offered any proof of it: and Simmias as well as Kebês declare themselves to stand in need of proof. Both of them however are reluctant to obtrude upon him any doubts. An opportunity is thus provided, that Sokrates may exhibit his undisturbed equanimity—his unimpaired argumentative readiness—his keen anxiety not to relax the grasp of a subject until he had brought it to a satisfactory close—without the least reference to his speedily approaching death. This last-mentioned anxiety is made manifest in a turn of the dialogue, remarkable both for dramatic pathos and for originality.[p] We are thus brought to the more explicit statement of those reasons upon which Sokrates relies.

Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate.

[o] Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-115.—*τὰς (ἡδονὰς) τὰς περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπουδασε*, &c.

These doctrines, laid down by Plato in the Phædon, bear great analogy to the Sanskrit philosophy called *Sankhya*, founded by Kapila, as expounded and criticised in the treatise of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Mémoire sur le Sankhya, Paris, 1852, pp. 273-278)—and the other work, Du Bouddhisme, by the same author (Paris, 1855), pp. 116-137, 187-194, &c.

[p] Plato, Phædon, p. 89 B.C,—the remark made by Sokrates, when stroking down the head and handling the abundant hair of Phædon, in allusion to the cutting off of all this hair, which would be among the acts of mourning performed by Phædon on the morrow, after the death of Sokrates: and the impressive turn given to this remark, in reference to the solution of the problem then in debate.

Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine—That the soul is a sort of harmony—refuted by Sokrates.

If the arguments whereby Sokrates proves the immortality of the soul are neither forcible nor conclusive, not fully satisfying even Simmias[q] to whom they are addressed—the adverse arguments, upon the faith of which the doctrine was denied (as we know it to have been by many philosophers of antiquity) cannot be said to be produced at all. Simmias and Kebês are represented as Sokratic companions, partly Pythagoreans; desirous to find the doctrine true, yet ignorant of the proofs. Both of them are earnest believers in the pre-existence of the soul, and in the objective reality of Ideas or intelligible essences. Simmias however adopts in part the opinion, not very clearly explained, "That the soul is a harmony or mixture:" which opinion Sokrates refutes, partly by some other arguments, partly by pointing out that it is inconsistent with the supposition of the soul as pre-existent to the body, and that Simmias must make his election between the two. Simmias elects without hesitation, in favour of the pre-existence: which he affirms to be demonstrable upon premisses or assumptions perfectly worthy of trust: while the alleged harmony is at best only a probable analogy, not certified by conclusive reasons.[r] Kebês again, while admitting that the soul existed before its conjunction with the present body, and that it is sufficiently durable to last through conjunction with many different bodies—still expresses his apprehension that though durable, it is not eternal. Accordingly, no man can be sure that his present body is not the last with which his soul is destined to be linked; so that immediately on his death, it will pass away into nothing. The opinion of Kebês is remarkable, inasmuch as it shows how constantly the metempsychosis, or transition of the soul from one body to another, was included in all the varieties of ancient speculation on this subject.[s]

[q] Plato, Phædon, p. 107 B.

[r] Plato, Phædon, p. 92.

[s] Plato, Phædon, pp. 86-95. κρᾶσιν καὶ ἁρμονίαν, &c.

"Animam esse harmoniam complures quidem statuerant, sed aliam alii, et diversâ ratione," says Wyttenbach ad Phædon, p. 86. Lucretius as well as Plato impugns the doctrine, iii. 97.

Galen, a great admirer of Plato, though not pretending to determine positively wherein the essence of the soul consists, maintains a doctrine substantially the same as what is here im-

Before replying to Simmias and Kebês, Sokrates is described as hesitating and reflecting for a long time. He then enters into a sketch of[t] his own intellectual history. How far the sketch as it stands depicts the real Sokrates, or Plato himself, or a supposed mind not exactly coincident with either—we cannot be certain: the final stage however must belong to Plato himself.

Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed.

"You compel me" (says Sokrates) "to discuss thoroughly the cause of generation and destruction."[u] I will tell you, if you like, my own successive impressions on these subjects. When young, I was amazingly eager for that kind of knowledge, which people call the investigation of Nature. I thought it matter of pride to know the causes of everything—through what everything is either generated, or destroyed, or continues to exist. I puzzled myself much to discover first of all such matters as these—Is it a certain putrefaction of the Hot and the Cold in the system (as some say), which brings about the nourishment of animals? Is it the blood through which we think—or air, or fire? Or is it neither one nor the other, but the brain, which affords to us sensations of sight, hearing, and smell, out of which memory and opinion are generated: then, by a like process, knowledge is generated out of opinion and memory when permanently fixed?[x] I tried to understand destructions as well as generations, celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena. But I accomplished nothing, and ended by fancying myself utterly unfit for the enquiry. Nay—I even lost all the knowledge of that which I had before believed myself to understand. For example—From what cause does a man

First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he rejected it.

pugned—that it depends upon a certain *κρᾶσις* of the elements and properties in the bodily organism—*Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἠθῶν*, vol. iv. pp. 774-775, 779-782, ed. Kühn. He complains much of the unsatisfactory explanations of Plato on this point.

[t] Plato, Phædon, pp. 96-102.

The following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of thought and argument pursued by Sokrates; not adhering to the exact words, nor even preserving the interlocutory form. I could not have provided room for a literal translation.

[u] Plato, Phædon, p. 96. *Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοὶ δίειμι, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη*, &c.

[x] Plato, Phædon, p. 96 B. *ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης, λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.*

This is the same distinction between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, as that which Sokrates gives in the Menon, though not with full confidence (Menon, pp. 97-98). See suprà, chap. xx. p. 23.

grow? At first, I had looked upon this as evident—that it was through eating and drinking; flesh being thereby added to his flesh, bone to his bone, &c. So too, when a tall and a short man were standing together, it appeared to me that the former was taller than the latter by the head—that ten were more than eight because two were added to them[y]—that a rod of two cubits was greater than a rod of one cubit, because it projected beyond it by a half. Now—I am satisfied that I do not know the cause of any of these matters. I cannot explain why, when one is added to one, such addition makes them two; since in their separated state each was one. In this case, it is approximation or conjunction which is said to make the two: in another case, the opposite cause, *disjunction*, is said also to make two—when one body is bisected.[z] How two opposite causes can produce the same effect—and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two, where there were not two before—I do not understand. In fact, I could not explain to myself, by this method of research, the generation, or destruction, or existence, of anything; and I looked out for some other method.

Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of Anaxagoras.

"It was at this time that I heard a man reading out of a book, which he told me was the work of Anaxagoras, the affirmation that Nous (Reason, Intelligence) was the regulator and cause of all things. I felt great satisfaction in this cause; and I was convinced, that if such were the fact, Reason would ordain everything for the best: so that if I wanted to find out the cause of any generation, or destruction, or existence, I had only to enquire in what manner it was best that such generation or destruction should take place. Thus a man was only required to know, both respecting himself and respecting other things, what was the best: which knowledge, however, implied that he must also know what was worse—the knowledge of the one and of the other going together.[a] I thought I had thus

[y] Plato, Phædon, p. 96 E. *καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργεστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλείονα εἶναι, διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.*

[z] Plato, Phædon, p. 97 B.

[a] Plato, Phædon, p. 97 D. *εἰ οὖν τις βούλεται τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου, ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο*

found a master quite to my taste, who would tell me, first whether the earth was a disk or a sphere, and would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity why it must be so, by showing me how such arrangement was the best: next, if he said that the earth was in the centre, would proceed to show that it was best that the earth should be in the centre. Respecting the Sun, Moon, and Stars, I expected to hear the like explanation of their movements, rotations, and other phenomena: that is, how it was better that each should do and suffer exactly what the facts show. I never imagined that Anaxagoras, while affirming that they were regulated by Reason, would put upon them any other cause than this—that it was best for them to be exactly as they are. I presumed that, when giving account of the cause, both of each severally and all collectively, he would do it by setting forth what was best for each severally and for all in common. Such was my hope, and I would not have sold it for a large price.[b] I took up eagerly the book of Anaxagoras, and read it as quickly as I could, that I might at once come to the knowledge of the better and worse.

"Great indeed was my disappointment when, as I proceeded with the perusal, I discovered that the author never employed Reason at all, nor assigned any causes calculated to regulate things generally: that the causes which he indicated were, air, æther, water, and many other strange agencies. The case seemed to me the same as if any one, while announcing that Sokrates acts in all circumstances by reason, should next attempt to assign the causes of each of my proceedings severally:[c] As if he affirmed, for example,

did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between efficient and co-efficient causes.

ἀσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.

[b] Plato, Phædon, p. 98 B. καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τα οἷός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα τὸ καὶ τὸ

[c] Plato, Phædon, p. 98 C. καὶ μοι δοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ν εἴτις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάνθ' ὅσα λέγειν τὰς αἰτία λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἔνθαδε κάθημαι, ὅτι ξυγκεῖται τὸ σῶμά μου ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστι στερρὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ', &c.

that the cause why I am now sitting here is, that my body is composed of bones and ligaments—that my bones are hard, and are held apart by commissures, and my ligaments such as to contract and relax, clothing the bones along with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together—that when the bones are lifted up at their points of junction, the contraction and relaxation of the ligaments makes me able to bend my limbs—and that this is the reason why I am now seated here in my present crumpled attitude: Or again—as if, concerning the fact of my present conversation with you, he were to point to other causes of a like character—varieties of speech, air, and hearing, with numerous other similar facts—omitting all the while to notice the true causes, viz.,[d]—That inasmuch as the Athenians have deemed it best to condemn me, for that reason I too have deemed it best and most righteous to remain sitting here and to undergo the sentence which they impose. For, by the Dog, these bones and ligaments would have been long ago carried away to Thebes or Megara, by my judgment of what is best—if I had not deemed it more righteous and honourable to stay and affront my imposed sentence, rather than to run away. It is altogether absurd to call such agencies by the name of *causes*. Certainly, if a man affirms that unless I possessed such joints and ligaments and other members as now belong to me, I should not be able to execute what I have determined on, he will state no more than the truth. But to say that these are the causes why I, a rational agent, do what I am now doing, instead of saying that I do it from my choice of what is best—this would be great carelessness of speech: implying that a man cannot see the distinction between that which is the cause in reality, and that without which the cause can never be a cause.[e] It is this last which most men, groping as it were in

[d] Plato, Phædon, p. 98 E. ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι ἐπείδη Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίζεσθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθαδε καθῆσθαι, &c.

[e] Plato, Phædon, p. 99 A. ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντα μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ καὶ ταύτῃ νῷ πράττω, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τι ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον, &c.

the dark, call by a wrong name, as if it were itself the cause. Thus one man affirms that the earth is kept stationary in its place by the rotation of the heaven around it: another contends that the air underneath supports the earth, like a pedestal sustaining a broad kneading-trough: but none of them ever look out for a force such as this—That all these things now occupy that position which it is best that they should occupy. These enquirers set no great value upon this last-mentioned force, believing that they can find some other Atlas stronger, more everlasting, and more capable of holding all things together: they think that the Good and the Becoming have no power of binding or holding together anything.

"Now, it is this sort of cause which I would gladly put myself under any one's teaching to learn. But I could neither find any teacher, nor make any way by myself. Having failed in this quarter, I took the second best course, and struck into a new path in search of causes.[f] Fatigued with studying objects through my eyes and perceptions of sense, I looked out for images or reflections of them, and turned my attention to words or discourses.[g] This comparison is indeed not altogether suitable: for I do not admit that he who investigates things through general words, has recourse to images, more than he who investigates sensible facts: but such, at all events, was the turn which my mind took. Laying down such general assumption or hypothesis as I considered to be the strongest, I accepted as truth whatever squared with it, respecting cause as well as all other matters. In this way I came upon the investigation of another sort of cause.[h]

Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and embraced a third doctrine about cause.

"I now assumed the separate and real existence of Ideas by themselves—The Good in itself or the Self-Good, Self-

[f] Plato, Phædon, p. 99 D. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην, καὶ οὔτ' αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοὶ ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι;

[g] Plato, Phædon, p. 99 E. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω, τρόπον τινα οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις.

[h] Plato, Phædon, p. 100 B. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοὶ ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, &c.

that ten is more than eight by Multitude and through Multitude: so the rod of two cubits is greater than that of one, not by half, but by Greatness. Again, when One is placed alongside of One,—or when one is bisected—I should take care not to affirm, that in the first case the juxtaposition, in the last case the bisection, was the cause why it became two.[m] I proclaim loudly that I know no other cause for its becoming two except participation in the essence of the Dyad. What is to become two, must partake of the Dyad: what is to become one, of the Monad. I leave to wiser men than me these juxtapositions and bisections and other such refinements: I remain entrenched within the safe ground of my own assumption or hypothesis (the reality of these intelligible and eternal Ideas).

"Suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself? I should make no reply to him until I had followed out fully the consequences of it: in order to ascertain whether they were consistent with, or contradictory to, each other. I should, when the proper time came, defend the hypothesis by itself, assuming some other hypothesis yet more universal, such as appeared to me best, until I came to something fully sufficient. But I would not permit myself to confound together the discussion of the hypothesis itself, and the discussion of its consequences.[n] This is a method which cannot lead to truth: though it is much practised by litigious disputants, who care little about truth, and pride themselves upon their ingenuity when they throw all things into confusion."—

Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences.

The exposition here given by Sokrates of successive intellectual tentatives (whether of Sokrates or Plato, or partly

[m] Plato, Phædon, p. 101 C. *τί δαί; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος, τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν ὀχίσιν, οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, καὶ μέγα ἂν βοφῆς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετασχῇ· καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, &c.*

[n] Plato, Phædon, p. 101 E. *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς (τῆς ὑποθέσεως) δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥ τις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα οὐκ ἂν φύροιο, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἑπομένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν;*

one, partly the other), and the reasoning embodied therein, is represented as welcomed with emphatic assent and approbation by all his fellow-dialogists.[o] It deserves attention on many grounds. It illustrates instructively some of the speculative points of view, and speculative transitions, suggesting themselves to an inquisitive intellect of that day.

Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks upon it.

If we are to take that which precedes as a description of the philosophical changes of Plato himself, it differs materially from Aristotle: for no allusion is here made to the intercourse of Plato with Kratylus and other advocates of the doctrines of Herakleitus: which intercourse is mentioned by Aristotle[p] as having greatly influenced the early speculations of Plato. Sokrates describes three different phases of his (or Plato's) speculative point of view: all turning upon different conceptions of what constituted a true Cause. His first belief on the subject was, that which he entertained before he entered on physical and physiological investigations. It seemed natural to him that eating and drinking should be the cause why a young man grew taller: new bone and new flesh was added out of the food. So again, when a tall man appeared standing near to a short man, the former was tall by the head, or because of the head: ten were more than eight, because two were added on: the measure of two cubits was greater than that of one cubit, because it stretched beyond by one half. When one object was added on to another, the addition was the cause why they became two: when one object was bisected, this bisection was the cause why the one became two.

The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon different views as to a true cause.

This was his first conception of a true Cause, which for the time thoroughly satisfied him. But when he came to investigate physiology, he could not follow out the same conception of Cause, so as to apply it to more novel and complicated problems; and he became dissatisfied with it altogether, even in regard to questions on which he had

[o] Plato, Phædon, p. 102 A. Such approbation is peculiarly signified by the intervention of Echekrates.

[p] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, a. 32.

before been convinced. New difficulties suggested themselves to him. How can the two objects, which when separate were each one, be made *two*, by the fact that they are brought together? What alteration has happened in their nature? Then again, how can the very same fact, the change from one to two, be produced by two causes perfectly contrary to each other—in the first case, by juxtaposition—in the last case, by bisection? [q]

Problems and Expectations entertained.

That which is interesting here to note, is the sort of Cause which first gave satisfaction to the speculative mind of Sokrates. In the instance of the growing youth, he notes two distinct facts, the earliest of which is (assuming certain other facts as accompanying conditions) the cause of the latest. But in most of the other instances, the fact is one which does not admit of explanation. Comparisons of eight men with ten men, of a yard with half a yard, of a tall man with a short man, are mental appreciations, beliefs, affirmations, not capable of being further explained or accounted for: if any one disputes your affirmation, you prove it to him, by placing him in a situation to make the comparison for himself, or to go through the computation which establishes the truth of what you affirm. It is not the juxtaposition of eight men which makes them to be eight (they were so just as much when separated by ever so wide an interval): though it may dispose or enable the spectator to count them as eight. We may count the yard measure (whether actually bisected or not), either as one yard, or as two half yards, or as three feet, or thirty-six inches. Whether it be one, or two, or three, depends upon the substantive which we choose to attach to the numeral, or upon the comparison which we make (the unit which we select) on the particular occasion.

With this description of Cause Sokrates grew dissatisfied when he extended his enquiries into physical and physiological problems. Is it the blood, or air, or fire, whereby we think? and such like questions.

[q] Sextus Empiricus embodies this argument of Plato among the difficulties which he starts against the Dogmatists, adv. Mathematicos, x. s. 302-308.

agoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes and co-efficients.

Such enquiries—into the physical conditions of mental phenomena—did really admit of some answer, affirmative, or negative. But Sokrates does not tell us how he proceeded in seeking for an answer: he only says that he failed so completely, as even to be disabused of his supposed antecedent knowledge. He was in this perplexity when he first heard of the doctrine of Anaxagoras. "*Nous* or Reason is the regulator and the cause of all things." Sokrates interpreted this to mean (what it does not appear that Anaxagoras intended to assert)[r] that the Kosmos was an animal or person[s] having mind or Reason analogous to his own: that this Reason was an agent invested with full power and perpetually operative, so as to regulate in the best manner all the phenomena of the Kosmos; and that the general cause to be assigned for everything was one and the same—"It is best thus" requiring that in each particular case you should show *how* it was for the best. Sokrates took the type of Reason from his own volition and movements; supposing that all the agencies in the Kosmos were stimulated or checked by cosmical Reason for her purposes, as he himself put in motion his own bodily members. This conception of Cause, borrowed from the analogy of his own rational volition, appeared to Socrates very captivating, though it had not been his own first conception. But he found that Anaxagoras, though proclaiming the doctrine as a principium or initiatory influence, did not make applications of it in detail: but assigned as causes, in most of the particular cases, those agencies which Sokrates considered to be subordinate and instrumental, as his own muscles were to his own volition. Sokrates will not allow such agencies to be called Causes: he says that they are only co-efficients indispensable to the efficacy of the single and exclusive Cause—Reason. But he tells us himself that most enquirers considered them as Causes; and that Anaxagoras himself produced them as such. Moreover we shall see Plato himself in the Timæus, while he repeats this same distinction between Causes Efficient and

[r] I have given (in chap. i. p. 55 seq.) an abridgment and explanation of what seems to have been the doctrine of Anaxagoras.

[s] Plato, Timæus, p. 30 D. *τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε*, &c.

Causes co-efficient—yet treats these latter as Causes also, though inferior in regularity and precision to the Demiurgic Nous.[t]

In truth, the complaint which Sokrates here raises against Anaxagoras—that he assigned celestial Rotation as the cause of phenomena, in place of a quasi-human Reason—is just the same as that which Aristophanes in the Clouds advances against Sokrates himself.[u]

Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in place of men-

[t] Plato, Timæus, p. 46 C-D. *αἴτια—ξυναίτια—ξυμμεταίτια.* He says that most persons considered the *ξυναίτια* as *αἴτια.* And he himself registers them as such (Timæus, p. 68 E). He there distinguishes the *αἴτια* and *ξυναίτια* as two different sorts of *αἴτια*, the *divine* and the *necessary*, in a remarkable passage: where he tells us that we ought to study the divine causes, with a view to the happiness of life, as far as our nature permits—and the necessary causes for the sake of the divine; for that we cannot in any way apprehend or understand, or get sight of the divine causes alone, without the necessary causes along with them (69 A).

In Timæus, pp. 47-48, we find again *νοῦς* and *ἀνάγκη*, noted as two distinct sorts of causes co-operating to produce the four elements. It is farther remarkable that Necessity is described as "the wandering or irregular description of Cause"—*τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας.* Eros and 'Ανάγκη are, joined as co-operating—in Symposion, pp. 195 C, 197 B.

[u] Aristophan. Nubes, 379-815. *Δῖνος βασιλεύει, τὸν Δί' ἐξεληλακώς.* We find Proklus making this same complaint against Aristotle, "that he deserted theological *principia*, and indulged too much in physical reasonings"—*τῶν μὲν θεολογικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀφιστάμενος, τοῖς δὲ φυσικοῖς λόγοις πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβων* (Proklus ad Timæum, ii. 90 E, p. 212, Schneider). Pascal also expresses the like displeasure against the Cartesian theory of the vortices. Descartes recognised God as having originally established rotatory motion among the atoms, together with an equal, unvarying quantity of motion: these two points being granted, Descartes considered that all cosmical facts and phenomena might be deduced from them.

"Sur la philosophie de Descartes, Pascal était de son sentiment sur l'automate; et n'en était point sur la matière subtile, dont il se moquait fort. Mais il ne pouvait souffrir sa manière d'expliquer la formation de toutes choses; et il disait très souvent,—Je ne puis pardonner à Descartes: il voudrait bien, dans toute sa philosophie, pouvoir se passer de Dieu: mais il n'a pu s'empêcher de lui accorder une chiquenaude pour mettre le monde en mouvement: après cela, il n'a que faire de Dieu." (Pascal, Pensées, ch. xi. p. 237, edition de Louandre, citation from Mademoiselle Périer, Paris, 1854.

Again, Lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics (bk. ii. ch. 19, p. 276), cites these remarks of Plato and Aristotle on the deficiencies of Anaxagoras, and expresses the like censure himself against the cosmical theories of Newton:—"Sir Isaac puts me in mind of an ancient philosopher Anaxagoras, who maintained, as Sir Isaac does, that mind was the cause of all things; but when he came to explain the particular phænomena of nature, instead of having recourse to mind, employed airs and æthers, subtle spirits and fluids, and I know not what—in short, anything rather than mind: a cause which he admitted to exist in the universe; but rather than employ it, had recourse to imaginary causes, of the existence of which he could give no proof. The Tragic poets of old, when they could not otherwise untie the knot of their fable, brought down a god in a machine, who solved all difficulties: but such philosophers as Anaxagoras will not, even when they cannot do better, employ *mind* or divinity. Our philosophers, since Sir Isaac's time, have gone on in the same track, and still, I think, farther."

Lord Monboddo speaks with still

tal. This is the same which Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates.

The comic poet accuses Sokrates of displacing Zeus to make room for Dinos or Rotation. According to the popular religious belief, all or most of the agencies in Nature were personified, or supposed to be carried on by persons—Gods, Goddesses, Dæmons, Nymphs, &c., which army of independent agents were conceived, by some thinkers, as more or less systematised and consolidated under the central authority of the Kosmos itself. The causes of natural phenomena, especially of the grand and terrible phenomena, were supposed agents, conceived after the model of man, and assumed to be endowed with volition, force, affections, antipathies, &c.: some of them visible, such as Helios, Selênê, the Stars; others generally invisible, though showing themselves whenever it specially pleased them.[x] Sokrates, as we see by the Platonic Apology, was believed by his countrymen to deny these animated agencies, and to substitute instead of them inanimate forces, not put in motion by the quasi-human attributes of reason, feeling and volition. The Sokrates in the Platonic Phædon, taken at this second stage of his speculative wanderings, not only disclaims such a doctrine, but protests against it. He recognises no cause except a Nous or Reason borrowed by analogy from that of which he was conscious within himself, choosing what was best for himself in every special situation.[y] He tells us however

greater asperity about the Cartesian theory, making a remark on it similar to what has been above cited from Pascal. (See his Dissertation on the Newtonian Philosophy, Appendix to Ancient Metaphysics, pp. 498-499.)

[x] Plato, Timæus, p. 41 A. *πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοί*, &c.

[y] What Sokrates understands by the theory of Anaxagoras, is evident from his language—Phædon, pp. 98-99. He understands an indwelling cosmical Reason or Intelligence, deliberating and choosing, in each particular conjecture, what was best for the Kosmos; just as his own (Sokrates) Reason deliberated and chose what was best for him (*τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει*), in consequence of the previous determination of the Athenians to condemn and punish him.

This point deserves attention, because it is altogether different from Aristotle's conception of Nous or Reason in the Kosmos: in which he recognises no consciousness, no deliberation, no choice, no reference to any special situation: but a constant, instinctive, undeliberating, movement towards Good as a determining End—*i.e.* towards the reproduction and perpetuation of regular Forms.

Hegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part i. pp. 355, 368-369, 2nd edit.), has given very instructive remarks in the spirit of the Aristotelian Realism, both upon the principle announced by Anaxagoras, and upon the manner in which Anaxagoras is criticised by Sokrates in the Platonic Phædon. Hegel observes:—

"Along with this principle (that of Anaxagoras) there comes in the recognition of an Intelligence, or of a self-

that most of the contemporary philosophers dissented from this point of view. To them, such inanimate agencies were the sole and real causes, in one or other of which they found what they thought a satisfactory explanation.

The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out, either by Sokrates himself, or any one else. Sokrates turns to general words, and adopts the theory of Ideas.

It is however singular, that Sokrates, after he has extolled Anaxagoras for enunciating a grand general cause, and has blamed him only for not making application of it in detail, proceeds to state that neither he himself, nor any one else within his knowledge, could find the way of applying it, any more than Anaxagoras had done. If Anaxagoras had failed, no one else could do better. The facts before Sokrates could not be reconciled, by any way that he could devise, with his assumed principle of rational directing force, or constant optimistic purpose, inherent in the Kosmos. Accordingly he abandoned this track, and entered upon another: seeking a different sort of cause (*τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος*), not by contemplation of things, but by propositions and ratiocinative dis-

determining agency — which was wanting before. Herein we are not to imagine thought, subjectively considered: when thought is spoken of, we are apt to revert to thought as it passes in our consciousness: but here, on the contrary, what is meant is, the Idea, considered altogether objectively, or Intelligence as an effective agent: (N.B. *Intellectum*, or *Cogitatum*—not *Intellectio*, or *Cogitatio*, which would mean the conscious process—see this distinction illustrated by Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 5, p. 219; also Marbach, Gesch. der Philosop. s. 54, 99 not. 2) as we say, that there is reason in the world,—or as we speak of Genera in nature, which are the Universal. The Genus Animal is the essential of the Dog—it is the Dog himself: the laws of Nature are her immanent Essence. Nature is not formed from without, as men construct a table: the table is indeed constructed intelligently, but by an Intelligence extraneous to this wooden material. It is this extraneous form which we are apt to think of as representing Intelligence, when we hear it talked of: but what is really meant is, the Universal—the immanent nature of the object itself. The Νοῦς is not a thinking Being without, which has arranged the world: by such an interpretation the Idea of Anaxagoras would be quite perverted and deprived of all philosophical value. For to suppose an individual, particular Something without, is to descend into the region of phantasms and its dualism: what is called a thinking Being, is not an Idea, but a Subject. Nevertheless, what is really and truly Universal is not for that reason Abstract: its characteristic property, quâ Universal, is to determine in itself, by itself, and for itself, the particular accompaniments. While it carries on this process of change, it maintains itself at the same time as the Universal, always the same; this is a portion of its self-determining efficiency."—What Hegel here adverts to seems identical with that which Dr. Henry More calls an Emanative Cause. (Immortality of the Soul, ch. vi. p. 18) "the notion of a thing possible. An Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very substance of that which is said to be the Cause thereof. That which *emanes*, if I may so speak, is the same in reality with its Emanative Cause."

Respecting the criticism of Sokrates upon Anaxagoras, Hegel has farther acute remarks which are too long to cite (p. 368 seq.)

course. He now assumed as a principle an universal axiom or proposition, from which he proceeds to deduce consequences. The principle thus laid down is, That there exist substantial Ideas—universal Entia. Each of these Ideas communicates or imparts its own nature to the particulars which bear the same name: and such communion or participation is the cause why they are what they are. The cause why various objects are beautiful or great, is, because they partake of the Self-Beautiful or the Self-Great: the cause why they are two or three, is, because they partake of the Dyad or the Triad.

Here then we have a third stage or variety of belief, in the speculative mind of Sokrates, respecting Causes. The self-existent Ideas ("propria Platonis supellex," to use the words of Seneca[z]) are postulated as Causes: and in this belief Sokrates at last finds satisfaction. But these Causative Ideas, or Ideal Causes, though satisfactory to Plato, were accepted by scarcely any one else. They were transformed—seemingly even by Plato himself before his death, into Ideal Numbers, products of the One implicated with Great and Little or the undefined Dyad—and still farther transformed by his successors Speusippus and Xenokrates: they were impugned in every way, and emphatically rejected, by Aristotle.

Vague and unsatisfactory solution to his inquisitive feelings.

The foregoing picture given by Sokrates of the wanderings

[z] Seneca, Epistol.

About this disposition, manifested by many philosophers, and in a particular manner by Plato, to "embrace logical phantoms as real causes," I transcribe a good passage from Malebranche.

"Je me sens encore extrêmement porté à dire que cette colonne est dure *par sa nature;* ou bien que les petits liens dont sont composés les corps durs, sont des atômes, dont les parties ne se peuvent diviser, comme étant les parties *essentielles* et dernières des corps—et qui sont *essentiellement* crochues ou branchues.

"Mais je reconnois franchement, que ce n'est point expliquer la difficulté; et que, quittant les préoccupations et les illusions de mes sens, j'aurais tort de recourir à une forme abstraite, et d' *embrasser un fantôme de logique* pour la cause que je cherche. Je veux dire, que j'aurois tort de conçevoir, comme quelque chose de réel et de distinct, l'idée vague de *nature* et d' *essence,* qui n' exprime que ce que l'on sait: et de prendre ainsi une forme abstraite et universelle, comme une cause physique d'un effet très réel. Car il y a deux choses dont je ne saurais trop défier. La première est, l'impression de mes sens: et l'autre est, la facilité que j'ai de prendre les natures abstraites et les idées générales de logique, pour celles qui sont réelles et particulières: et je me souviens d'avoir été plusieurs fois séduit par ces deux principes d'erreur." (Malebranche—Recherche de la Vérité, vol. iii. l. vi. ch. 8, p. 245, ed. 1772.)

of his mind (*τὰς ἐμὰς πλάνας*) in search of Causes, is interesting, not only in reference to the Platonic age, but also to the process of speculation generally. Almost every one talks of a Cause as a word of the clearest meaning, familiar and understood by all hearers. There are many who represent the Idea of Cause as simple, intuitive, self-originated, universal; one and the same in all minds. These philosophers consider the maxim—that every phenomenon must have a Cause—as self-evident, known *à priori* apart from experience: as something which no one can help believing as soon as it is stated to him.[a] The gropings of Sokrates are among the numerous facts which go to refute such a theory: or at least to show in what sense alone it can be partially admitted. There is no fixed, positive, universal Idea, corresponding to the word Cause. There is a wide divergence, as to the question what a cause really is, between different ages of the same man (exemplified in the case of Sokrates): much more between different philosophers at one time and another. Plato complains of Anaxagoras and other philosophers for assigning as Causes that which did not truly deserve the name: Aristotle also blames the defective conceptions of his predecessors (Plato included) on the same subject. If there be an intuitive idea corresponding to the word Cause, it must be a different intuition in Plato and Aristotle—in Plato himself

[a] Dugald Stewart, Elem. Philos. Hum. Mind, vol. i. ch. 1, sect. 2, pp. 98-99, ed. Hamilton, also note [c] same volume.

"Several modern philosophers (especially Dr. Reid, On the Intell. Powers) have been at pains to illustrate that law of our nature which leads us to refer every change we perceive in the universe to the operation of an efficient cause. This reference is not the result of reasoning, but necessarily accompanies the perception, so as to render it impossible for us to see the change, without feeling a conviction of the operation of some cause by which it is produced; much in the same manner in which we find it impossible to conceive a sensation, without being impressed with a belief of the existence of a sentient being. Hence I conceive it is that when we see two events constantly conjoined, we are led to associate the idea of causation or efficiency with the former, and to refer it to that power or energy by which the change is produced; in consequence of which association we come to consider philosophy as the knowledge of efficient causes, and lose sight of the operation of mind in producing the phenomena of nature. It is by an association somewhat similar that we connect our sensations of colour with the primary qualities of body. A moment's reflection must satisfy any one that the sensation of colour can only reside in a mind. . . . In the same way we are led to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of power, force, energy, causation, which are all attributes of mind, and can exist in a mind only."

at one age and at another age: in other philosophers, different from both and from each other. The word is equivocal—πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, in Aristotelian phrase—men use it familiarly, but vary much in the thing signified. *That* is a Cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to the inquisitive feelings—curiosity, anxious perplexity, speculative embarrassment, of his own mind. Now doubtless these inquisitive feelings are natural and widespread: they are emotions of our nature, which men seek (in some cases) to appease by some satisfactory hypothesis. That answer which affords satisfaction, looked at in one of its aspects, is called Cause; Beginning or Principle—Element—represent other aspects of the same Quæsitum:—

> "Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
> Atque metus omnes et inexorabile Fatum
> Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari,"

is the exclamation of that sentiment of wonder and uneasiness out of which, according to Plato and Aristotle, philosophy springs.[b] But though the appetite or craving is common, in greater or less degree, to most persons—the nourishment calculated to allay it is by no means the same to all. Good (says Aristotle) is that which all men desire:[c] but all men do not agree in their judgment, what Good is. The point of communion between mankind is here emotional rather than intellectual: in the painful feeling of difficulty to be solved, not in the manner of conceiving what the difficulty is, nor in the direction where solution is to be sought, nor in the solution itself when suggested.[d]

[b] Virgil, Georgic ii. 489. Compare Lucretius, vi. 50-65, and the letter of Epikurus to Herodotus, p. 25, ed. Orelli. Plato, Theætêt. p. 155 D. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἄλλη φιλοσοφίας, ἢ αὕτη:—Aristotel. Metaphys. i. p. 982, b. 10-20. διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν ὁ δὲ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν.

[c] Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 1. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν, οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται. Plato, Republ. vi. p. 505 E. Ὁ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἔστιν, &c.

Seneca, Epistol. 118. "Bonum est, quod ad se impetum animi secundum naturam movet."

[d] Aristotle recognises the different nature of the difficulties and problems which present themselves to the speculative mind; he looks back upon the embarrassments of his predecessors as antiquated and even silly, Metaphysic. N. 1089, a. 2. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια τῆς ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐκτροπῆς, μάλιστα δὲ, τὸ ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαϊκῶς, which Alexander of Aphrodisias paraphrases by ἀρχαϊκῶς καὶ εὐηθῶς. Compare A 993, a. 15.

In another passage of the same book,

When Sokrates here tells us that as a young man he felt anxious curiosity to know what the cause of every phenomenon was, it is plain that at this time he did not know what he was looking for: that he proceeded only by successive steps of trial, doubt, discovered error, rejection: and that each trial was adapted to the then existing state of his own mind. The views of Anaxagoras he affirms to have presented themselves to him as a new revelation: he then came to believe that the only true Cause was, a cosmical reason and volition like to that of which he was conscious in himself. Yet he farther tells us, that others did not admit this Cause, but found other causes to satisfy them: that even Anaxagoras did not follow out his own general conception, but recognised Causes quite unconnected with it: lastly, that neither could he (Sokrates) trace out the conception for himself.[e] He was driven to renounce it, and to turn to another sort of Cause—the hypothesis of self-existent Ideas, in which he then acquiesced. And this last hypothesis, again, was ultimately much modified in the mind of Plato himself, as we know from Aristotle. All this shows that the Idea of Cause—far from being one and the same to all, like the feeling of uneasiness which prompts the search for it—is complicated, diverse, relative, and modifiable.

Dissension and perplexity on the question—What is a cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates—no intuition to guide him.

The last among the various revolutions which Sokrates represents himself to have undergone—the transition from designing and volitional agency of the Kosmos conceived as an animated system, to the sovereignty

Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation, causes

Aristotle notes and characterises the emotion experienced by the mind in possessing what is regarded as truth—the mental satisfaction obtained when a difficulty is solved, 1090, a. 38. *Οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες (τὸν ἀριθμὸν), ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ ἀξιώματα, ἀληθῆ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίνει τὴν ψυχήν, εἶναί τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι· ὁμοίως δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά.*

The subjective origin of philosophy—the feelings which prompt to the theorising process, striking out different hypotheses and analogies—are well stated by Adam Smith, 'History of Astronomy,' sect. ii. and iii.

[e] The view of cause, which Sokrates here declares himself to renounce from inability to pursue it, is substantially the same as what he lays down in the Philêbus, pp. 23 D, 27 A, 30 E.

In the Timæus Plato assigns to Timæus the task (to which Sokrates in the Phædon had confessed himself incompetent) of following into detail the schemes and proceedings of the Demiurgic or optimising *Noûs*. But he also assumes the *εἴδη* or Ideas as co-ordinate and essential conditions.

regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation, elaborated in modern times.

of universal Ideas—is analogous to that transition which Auguste Comte considers to be the natural progress of the human mind: to explain phenomena at first by reference to some personal agency, and to pass from this mode of explanation to that by metaphysical abstractions. It is true that these are two distinct modes of conceiving Causation; and that in each of them the human mind, under different states of social and individual instruction, finds satisfaction. But each of the two theories admits of much diversity in the mode of conception. Plato seems to have first given prominence to these metaphysical causes; and Aristotle in this respect follows his example; though he greatly censures the incomplete and erroneous theories of Plato. It is remarkable that both these two philosophers recognised Causes irregular and unpredictable, as well as Causes regular and predictable. Neither of them included even the idea of regularity, as an essential part of the meaning of Cause.[f] Lastly, there has been elaborated in modern times, owing to the great extension of inductive science, another theory of Causation, in which unconditional regularity is the essential constituent: recognising no true Causes ex-

[f] Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics B. I. ch. iv. p. 32. "Plato appears to have been the first of the Ionic school that introduced *formal causes* into natural philosophy. These he called *Ideas*, and made the principles of all things. And the reason why he insists so much upon this kind of cause, and so little upon the other three, is given us by Aristotle in the end of his first book of Metaphysics, viz., that he studied mathematics too much, and instead of using them as the handmaid of philosophy, made them philosophy itself. . . . Plato however in the Phædon says a good deal about final causes; but in the system of natural philosophy which is in the Timæus, he says very little of it."

I have already observed that Plato in the Timæus (48 A) recognises erratic or irregular Causation—ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία. Aristotle recognises Αἰτία among the equivocal words πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα; and he enumerates Τύχη and Αὐτόματον—irregular causes or causes by accident—among them (Physic. ii. 195-198; Metaphys. K. 1065, a.). Schwegler, ad Aristot. Metaphys. vi. 4, 3, "Das Zufällige ist ein nothwendiges Element alles Geschehens." Alexander of Aphrodisias, the best of the Aristotelian commentators, is at pains to defend this view of Τύχη—Causation by accident or irregular.

Proklus, in his Commentary on the Timæus (ii. 80-81, p. 188, Schneider), notices the labour and prolixity with which the commentators before him set out the different varieties of Cause; distinguishing sixty-four according to Plato, and forty-eight according to Aristotle. Proklus adverts also (ad Timæum, iii. p. 176) to an animated controversy raised by Theophrastus against Plato, about Causes and the speculations thereupon.

An enumeration, though very incomplete, of the different meanings assigned to the word Cause, may be seen in Professor Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy, pp. 74-83.

cept the phenomenal causes certified by experience, as interpreted inductively and deductively—the assemblage of phenomenal antecedents, uniform and unconditional, so far as they can be discovered and verified. Certain it is that these are the only causes obtainable by induction and experience; though many persons are not satisfied without looking elsewhere for transcendental or ontological causes of a totally different nature. All these theories imply—what Sokrates announçes in the passage just cited—the deep-seated influence of speculative curiosity, or the thirst for finding the Why of things and events, as a feeling of the human mind: but all of them indicate the discrepant answers with which, in different enquirers, this feeling is satisfied, though under the same equivocal name *Cause*. And it would have been a proceeding worthy of Plato's dialectic, if he had applied to the word Cause the same cross-examining analysis which we have seen him applying to the equally familiar words—Virtue—Courage—Temperance—Friendship, &c. "First, let us settle what a Cause really is: then, and not till then, can we succeed in ulterior enquiries respecting it."[g]

[g] See Sir Will. Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy, Appendix, p. 585. The debates about what was meant in philosophy by the word Cause are certainly older than Plato. We read that it was discussed among the philosophers who frequented the house of Perikles; and that that eminent statesman was ridiculed by his dissolute son Xanthippus for taking part in such useless refinements (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 36). But the Platonic dialogues are the oldest compositions in which any attempts to analyse the meaning of the word are preserved to us.

Αἴτιαι, Ἀρχαὶ, Στοιχεῖα (Aristot. Metaph. Δ.), were the main objects of search with the ancient speculative philosophers. While all of them set to themselves the same problem, each of them hit upon a different solution. That which gave mental satisfaction to one, appeared unsatisfactory and even inadmissible to the rest. The first book of Aristotle's Metaphysica gives an instructive view of this discrepancy. His own analysis of Cause will come before us hereafter. Compare the long discussions on the subject in Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhon. Hypo. iii. 13-30; and adv. Mathemat. ix. 195-250. The discrepancy was so great among the dogmatical philosophers, that he pronounces the reality of the causal sequence to be indeterminable—*ὅσον μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐννοῆσαί τις τὸ αἴτιον δύναιτο, εἴγε πρὸς τῷ διαφώνους καὶ ἀλλοκότους (ἀποδιδόναι) ἐννοίας τοῦ αἰτίου ἔτι καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πεποιήκασιν ἀνεύρετον διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ διαφωνίαν.* Seneca (Epist. 65) blends together the Platonic and the Aristotelian views, when he ascribes to Plato a quintuple variety of Causa.

The quadruple variety of Causation established by Aristotle governed the speculations of philosophers during the middle ages. But since the decline of the Aristotelian philosophy, there are few subjects which have been more keenly debated among metaphysicians than the Idea of Cause. It is one of the principal points of divergence among the different schools of philosophy now existing. A volume, and a very instructive volume, might be filled with the enumeration and contrast of

Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to words—to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of particulars.

There is yet another point which deserves attention in this history given by Sokrates of the transitions of his own mind. His last transition is represented as one from things to words, that is, to general propositions:[h] to the assumption in each case of an universal proposition or hypothesis calculated to fit that case. He does not seem to consider the optimistic doctrine, which he had before vainly endeavoured to follow out, as having been an hypothesis, or universal proposition assumed as true and as a principle from which to deduce consequences. Even if it were so, however, it was one and the same assumption intended to suit all cases: whereas the new doctrine to which he passed included many distinct assumptions, each adapted to a certain number of cases, and not to the rest.[i] He assumed an untold multitude of self-existent Ideas—The Self-Beautiful, Self-Just, Self-Great, Self-Equal, Self-Unequal, &c.—each of them adapted to a certain number of particular cases: the Self-Beautiful was assumed as the cause why all particular things were beautiful—as that, of which all and each of them partakes—and so of the rest.[k] Plato then explains his procedure.

the different theories on the subject. Upon the view which a man takes on this point will depend mainly the scope or purpose which he sets before him in philosophy. Many seek the solution of their problem in transcendental, ontological, extra-phenomenal causes, lying apart from and above the world of fact and experience: Reid and Stewart, while acknowledging the existence of such causes as the true efficient causes, consider them as being out of the reach of human knowledge; others recognise no true cause except personal, quasi-human, voluntary, agency, grounded on the type of human volition. Others, again, with whom my own opinion coincides, following out the analysis of Hume and Brown, understand by causes nothing more than phenomenal antecedents constant and unconditional, ascertainable by experience and induction. See the copious and elaborate chapter on this subject in Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' Book iii. ch. 5, especially as enlarged in the fourth, fifth, and sixth editions of that work, including the criticism on the opposite or volitional theory of Causation; also the work of Professor Bain, 'The Emotions and the Will,' pp. 472-584. The opposite view, in which Causes are treated as something essentially distinct from laws, and as ultra-phenomenal, is set forth by Dr. Whewell, 'Novum Organon Renovatum,' ch. vii. p. 118 seq.

[h] Aristotle (Metaphysic. i. 987, b. 31, Θ. 1050, b. 35) calls the Platonici *οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις*, see the note of Bonitz.

[i] Plato, Phædon, p. 100 A. *ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον ἃ μὲν ἄν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ ξυμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.*

[k] Aristotle controverts this doctrine of Plato in a pointed manner, De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9, p. 335, b. 10, also Metaphys. A. 991, b. 3. The former passage is the most animated in point of expression, where Aristotle says—*ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ*

He first deduced various consequences from this assumed hypothesis, and examined whether all of them were consistent or inconsistent with each other. If he detected inconsistencies (as *e. g.* in the last half of the Parmenidês), we must suppose (though Plato does not expressly say so) that he would reject or modify his fundamental assumption: if he found none, he would retain it. The point would have to be tried by dialectic debate with an opponent: the logical process of inference and counter-inference is here assumed to be trustworthy. But during this debate Plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis, shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself. From the language employed, he seems to have had in view certain disputants known to him, by whom the two were so blended together as to produce much confusion in the reasoning.

But if your opponent impugns the hypothesis itself, how are you to defend it? Plato here tells us: by means of some other hypothesis or assumption, yet more universal than itself. You must ascend upwards in the scale of generality, until you find an assumption suitable and sufficient.[1]

Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality.

We here see where it was that Plato looked for full, indisputable, self-recommending and self-assuring, certainty and truth. Among the most universal propositions. He states the matter here as if we were to provide defence for an hypothesis less universal by ascending to another hypothesis more universal. This is illustrated by what he says in the Timæus—Propositions are cognate with the matter

γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται—which is very true about the Platonic dialogue *Phædon*, &c. But in both the two passages, Aristotle distinctly maintains that the Ideas cannot be *Causes* of anything.

This is another illustration of what I have observed above, that the meaning of the word *Cause* has been always fluctuating and undetermined.

We see that, while Aristotle affirmed that the Ideas could not be Causes of anything, Plato here maintains that they are the only true Causes.

[1] Plato, Phædon, p. 101 E.

which they affirm; those whose affirmation is purely intellectual, comprising only matter of the intelligible world, or of genuine Essence, are solid and inexpugnable: those which take in more or less of the sensible world, which is a mere copy of the intelligible exemplar, become less and less trustworthy—mere probabilities. Here we have the Platonic worship of the most universal propositions, as the only primary and evident truths.[m] But in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic, he delivers a precept somewhat different, requiring the philosopher not to rest in any hypothesis as an ultimatum, but to consider them all as stepping-stones for enabling him to ascend into a higher region, above all hypothesis—to the first principle of everything: and he considers geometrical reasoning as defective because it takes its departure from hypotheses or assumptions of which no account is rendered.[n] In the Republic he thus contemplates an intuition by the mind of some primary, clear, self-evident truth, above all hypotheses or assumptions even the most universal, and transmitting its own certainty to everything which could be logically deduced from it: while in the Phædon, he does not recognise anything higher or more certain than the most universal hypothesis—and he even presents the theory of self-existent Ideas as nothing more than an hypothesis, though a very satisfactory one. In the Republic, Plato has come to imagine the Idea of Good as distinguished from and illuminating all the other Ideas: in the Timæus, it seems personified in the Demiurgus; in the Phædon, that Idea of Good appears to be represented by the Nous or Reason of Anaxagoras. But Sokrates is unable to follow it out, so that it becomes included, without any pre-eminence, among the Ideas gene-

[m] Plato, Timæus, p. 29 B. ὧδε οὖν περί τε εἰκόνος καὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος διοριστέον, ὡς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ὥνπερ εἰσὶν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας. Τοῦ μὲν οὖν μονίμου καὶ βεβαίου καὶ μετὰ νοῦ καταφανοῦς, μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους . . . τούς δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἀπεικασθέντος, ὄντος δὲ εἰκόνος, εἰκότας ἀνὰ λόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας· ὅ, τιπερ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀληθεία.

[n] Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511. τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν.. τὸ ἕτερον τμῆμα τοῦ νοητοῦ, οὗ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμὰς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰὼν, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτὰ καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη. Compare vii. p. 533.

rally: all of them transcendental, co-ordinate, and primary sources of truth to the intelligent mind—yet each of them exercising a causative influence in its own department, and bestowing its own special character on various particulars.

Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this.

It is from the assumption of these Ideas as eternal Essences that Plato undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. One Idea or Form will not admit, but peremptorily excludes, the approach of that other Form which is opposite to it. Greatness will not receive the form of littleness: nor will the greatness which is in any particular subject receive the form of littleness. If the form of littleness be brought to bear, greatness will not stay to receive it, but will either retire or be destroyed. The same is true likewise respecting that which essentially has the form: thus fire has essentially the form of heat, and snow has essentially the form of cold. Accordingly fire, as it will not receive the form of cold, so neither will it receive snow: and snow, as it will not receive the form of heat, so neither will it receive fire. If fire comes, snow will either retire or will be destroyed. The Triad has always the Form of Oddness, and will never receive that of Evenness: the Dyad has always the Form of Evenness, and will never receive that of Oddness—upon the approach of this latter it will either disappear or will be destroyed: moreover the Dyad, while refusing to receive the Form of Oddness, will refuse also to receive that of the Triad, which always embodies that Form—although three is not in direct contrariety with two. If then we are asked, What is that, the presence of which makes a body hot? we need not confine ourselves to the answer—It is the Form of Heat—which, though correct, gives no new information: but we may further say—It is Fire, which involves the Form of Heat. If we are asked, What is that, the presence of which makes a number odd? we shall not say—It is Oddness: but we shall say—It is the Triad or the Pentad—both of which involve Oddness.

The soul always brings life, and is

In like manner, the question being asked, What is that, which, being in the body, will give it life? we must answer—It is the soul. The soul, when it lays hold

essentially living. It cannot receive death; in other words, it is immortal.

of any body, always arrives bringing with it life. Now death is the contrary of life. Accordingly the soul, which always brings with it life, will never receive the contrary of life. In other words, it is deathless or immortal.[o]

The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence—animals as well as man—also the metempsychosis or translation of the soul from one body to another.

Such is the ground upon which Sokrates rests his belief in the immortality of the soul. The doctrine reposes, in Plato's view, upon the assumption of eternal, self-existent, unchangeable, Ideas or Forms:[p] upon the congeniality of nature, and inherent correlation, between these Ideas and the Soul: upon the fact, that the soul knows these Ideas, which knowledge must have been acquired in a prior state of existence: and upon the essential participation of the soul in the Idea of life, so that it cannot be conceived as without life, or as dead.[q] The immortality of the soul is conceived

[o] Plato, Phædon, p. 105 C. Ἀποκρίνου δή, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; ᾧ ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ, τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατασχῇ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; Ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον, ἢ οὐδέν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεί, οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ὁ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή; Ἀθάνατον.

Nemesius, the Christian bishop of Emesa, declares that the proofs given by Plato of the immortality of the soul are knotty and difficult to understand, such as even adepts in philosophical study can hardly follow. His own belief in it he rests upon the inspiration of the Christian Scriptures (Nemesius de Nat. Homin. c. 2, p. 55, ed. 1565).

[p] Plato, Phædon, pp. 76 D-E, 100 B-C. It is remarkable that in the Republic also, Sokrates undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul; and that in doing so he does not make any reference or allusion to the arguments used in the Phædon; but produces another argument totally distinct and novel: an argument which Meiners remarks truly to be quite peculiar to Plato, Republic. xx. pp. 609 E, 611 C; Meiners, Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. ii. p. 780.

[q] Zeller. Geschichte der Griech. Philos. Part ii. p. 267.

"Die Seele ist ihrem Begriffe nach dasjenige, zu dessen Wesen es gehört, zu leben—sie kann also in keinem Augenblicke als nicht lebend gedacht werden: In diesen ontologischen Beweis für die Unsterblichkeit, laufen nicht bloss alle die einzelnen Beweise des Phaedon zusammen, sondern derselbe wird auch schon im Phaedrus vorgetragen," &c. Compare Phædrus, p. 245.

Hegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part ii. pp. 186-187-189, ed. 2) maintains that Plato did not conceive the soul as a separate thing or reality—that he did not mean to affirm, in the literal sense of the words, its separate existence either before or after the present life—that he did not descend to so crude a conception (zu dieser Rohheit herabzusinken) as to represent to himself the soul as a thing, or to enquire into its duration or continuance after the manner of a thing—that Plato understood the soul to exist essentially as the Universal Notion or Idea, the comprehensive aggregate of all other Ideas, in which sense he

as necessary and entire, including not merely post-existence, but also pre-existence. In fact the reference to an anterior time is more essential to Plato's theory than that to a posterior time: because it is employed to explain the cognitions of the mind, and the identity of learning with reminiscence: while Simmias, who even at the close is not without reserve on the subject of the post-existence, proclaims an emphatic adhesion on that of the pre-existence.[r] The proof moreover, being founded in great part on the Idea of Life, embraces everything living, and is common to animals[s] (if not to plants) as well as to men: and the metempsychosis—or transition of souls not merely from one human body to another, but also from the human to the animal body, and *vice versâ*—is a portion of the Platonic creed.

After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal, Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the death of the body. He describes a Νεκυία.

Having completed his demonstration of the immortality of the soul, Sokrates proceeds to give a sketch of the condition and treatment which it experiences after death. The Νεκυία here following is analogous, in general doctrinal scope, to those others which we read in the Republic and in the Gorgias: but all of them are different in particular incidents, illustrative circumstances, and scenery. The sentiment of belief in Plato's mind attaches itself to general doctrines, which appear to him to possess an evidence independent of particulars. When he applies these doctrines to particulars, he makes little distinction between such as are true, or problematical, or fictitious: he varies his mythes at pleasure, provided that they serve the purpose of illustrating his general view. The mythe which we read in the Phædon includes a description of the Earth which to us appears altogether imaginative and poetical: yet it is hardly more so than several other current theories, proposed by various philosophers

affirmed it to be immortal—that the descriptions which Plato gives of its condition, either before life or after death, are to be treated only as poetical metaphors. There is ingenuity in this view of Hegel, and many separate expressions of Plato receive light from it: but it appears to me to refine away too much. Plato had in his own mind and belief both the soul as a particular thing—and the soul as an universal. His language implies sometimes the one sometimes the other.

[r] Plato, Phædon, pp. 92 D, 107 B.

[s] See what Sokrates says about the swans, Phædon, p. 85 A-B.

antecedent and contemporary, respecting Earth and Sea. Aristotle criticises the views expressed in the Phædon, as he criticises those of Demokritus and Empedokles.[t] Each soul of a deceased person is conducted by his Genius to the proper place, and there receives sentence of condemnation to suffering, greater or less according to his conduct in life, in the deep chasm called Tartarus, and in the rivers of mud and fire, Styx, Kokytus, Pyriphlegethon.[u] To those who have passed their lives in learning, and who have detached themselves as much as they possibly could from all pleasures and all pursuits connected with the body—in order to pursue wisdom and virtue—a full reward is given. They are emancipated from the obligation of entering another body, and are allowed to live ever afterwards disembodied in the pure regions of Ideas.[x]

Such, or something like it, Sokrates confidently expects will be the fate awaiting himself.[y] When asked by Kriton, among other questions, how he desired to be buried, he replies with a smile—"You may bury me as you choose, if you can only catch me. But you will not understand me when I tell you, that I, Sokrates, who am now speaking, shall not remain with you after having drunk the poison, but shall depart to some of the enjoyments of the blest. You must not talk about burying or burning Sokrates, as if I were suffering some terrible operation. Such language is inauspicious and depressing

Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body.

[t] Plato, Phædon, pp. 107-111. Olympiodorus pronounces the mythe to be a good imitation of the truth, Republ. x. 620 seq.; Gorgias, p. 520; Aristotle, Meteorol. ii. pp. 355-356. Compare also 356, b. 10, 357, a. 25, where he states and canvasses the doctrines of Demokritus and Empedokles; also 352, a. 35, about the ἀρχαῖοι θεόλογοι. He is rather more severe upon these others than upon Plato. He too considers, like Plato, that the amount of evidence which you ought to require for your belief depends upon the nature of the subject; and that there are various subjects on which you ought to believe on slighter evidence, see Metaphysic. A. 995, a. 2-16; Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, 1094, b. 12-14.

[u] Plato, Phædon, pp. 111-112. Compare Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xiii. 13, and Arnobius adv. Gentes, ii. 14. Arnobius blames Plato for inconsistency in saying that the soul is immortal in its own nature, and yet that it suffers pain after death—"Rem inenodabilem suscipit (Plato) ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, et ex corporali soliditate privatas, puniri eas dicat tamen et doloris afficiat sensu. Quis autem hominum non videt quod sit immortale, quod simplex, nullum posse dolorem admittere: quod autem sentiat dolorem, immortalitatem habere non posse?"

[x] Plato, Phædon, p. 114 C-E. τοῦτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τοπαράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, &c.

[y] Plato, Phædon, p. 115 A.

to our minds. Keep up your courage, and talk only of burying the body of Sokrates: conduct the burial as you think best and most decent." [z]

Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates.

Sokrates then retires with Kriton into an interior chamber to bathe, desiring that the women may be spared the task of washing his body after his decease. Having taken final leave of his wife and children, he returns to his friends as sunset is approaching. We are here made to see the contrast between him and other prisoners under like circumstances. The attendant of the Eleven Magistrates comes to warn him that the hour has come for swallowing the poison: expressing sympathy and regret for the necessity of delivering so painful a message, together with admiration for the equanimity and rational judgment of Sokrates, which he contrasts forcibly with the discontent and wrath of other prisoners under similar circumstances. As he turned away with tears in his eyes, Sokrates exclaimed—"How courteous the man is to me—and has been from the beginning! how generously he now weeps for me! Let us obey him, and let the poison be brought forthwith, if it be prepared: if not, let him prepare it." "Do not hurry" (interposed Kriton): "there is still time, for the sun is not quite set. I have known others who, even after receiving the order, deferred drinking the poison until they had had a good supper and other enjoyments." "It is natural that they should do so" (replied Sokrates). "They think that they are gainers by it: for me, it is natural that I should not do so—for I shall gain nothing but contempt in my own eyes, by thus clinging to life, and saving up when there is nothing left." [a]

Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler.

Kriton accordingly gave orders, and the poison, after a certain interval, was brought in. Sokrates, on asking for directions, was informed, that after having swallowed it, he must walk about until his legs felt heavy: he must then lie down and cover himself up: the

[z] Plato, Phædon, p. 115 C-D. ὡς ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ἀπιὼν εἰς μακάρων δή τινας εὐδαιμονίας.

[a] Plato, Phædon, p. 117 A. γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόντος.

Hesiod. Opp. et Dies, 367. δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδώ.

poison would do its work. He took the cup without any symptom of alarm or change of countenance: then looking at the attendant with his usual full and fixed gaze, he asked whether there was enough to allow of a libation. "We prepare as much as is sufficient" (was the answer), "but no more." "I understand" (said Sokrates): "but at least I may pray, and I must pray, to the Gods, that my change of abode from here to there may be fortunate." He then put the cup to his lips, and drank it off with perfect ease and tranquillity.[b]

His friends, who had hitherto maintained their self-control, were overpowered by emotion on seeing the cup swallowed, and broke out into violent tears and lamentation. No one was unmoved, except Sokrates himself: who gently remonstrated with them, and exhorted them to tranquil resignation: reminding them that nothing but good words was admissible at the hour of death. The friends, ashamed of themselves, found means to repress their tears. Sokrates walked about until he felt heavy in the legs, and then lay down in bed. After some interval, the attendant of the prison came to examine his feet and legs, pinched his foot with force, and enquired whether he felt it. Sokrates replied in the negative. Presently the man pinched his legs with similar result, and showed to the friends in that way that his body was gradually becoming chill and benumbed: adding that as soon as this should get to the heart, he would die.[c] The chill had already reached his belly, when Sokrates uncovered his face, which had been hitherto concealed by the bed-clothes, and spoke

Unbearable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death.

[b] Plato, Phædon, p. 117 C.

[c] Plato, Phædon, p. 118. These details receive interesting confirmation from the remarkable scene described by Valerius Maximus, as witnessed by himself at Julis in the island of Keos, when he accompanied Sextus Pompeius into Asia (Val. M. ii. 6, 8). A Keian lady of rank, ninety years of age, well in health, comfortable, and in full possession of her intelligence, but deeming it prudent (according to the custom in Keos, Strabo, x. p. 486) to retire from life while she had as yet nothing to complain of—took poison, by her own deliberate act, in the presence of her relatives and of Sextus Pompeius, who vainly endeavoured to dissuade her. "Cupido haustu mortiferam traxit potionem, ac sermone significans quasnam subindè partes corporis sui rigor occupâret, cum jam visceribus eum et cordi imminere esset elocuta, filiarum manus ad supremum opprimendorum oculorum officium advocavit. Nostros autem, tametsi novo spectaculo obstupefacti erant, suffusos tamen lacrimis dimisit."

his last words:[d] "Kriton, we owe a cock to Æsculapius: pay the debt without fail." "It shall be done" (answered Kriton); "have you any other injunctions?" Sokrates made no reply, but again covered himself up.[e] After a short interval, he made some movement: the attendant presently uncovered him, and found him dead, with his eyes stiff and fixed. Kriton performed the last duty of closing both his eyes and his mouth.

Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these personal details.

The pathetic details of this scene—arranged with so much dramatic beauty, and lending imperishable interest to the Phædon of Plato—may be regarded as real facts, described from the recollection of an eye-witness, though many years after their occurrence. They present to us the personality of Sokrates in full harmony with that which we read in the Platonic Apology. The tranquil ascendancy of resolute and rational conviction, satisfied with the past, and welcoming instead of fearing the close of life—is exhibited as triumphing in the one case over adverse accusers and judges, in the other case over the unnerving manifestations of afflicted friends.

[d] Plato, Phædon, p. 118. ἤδη οὖν σχεδόν τι ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος (ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γὰρ) εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο, Ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρύονα· ἀλλ' ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.

Cicero, after recovering from a bilious attack, writes to his wife Terentia (Epist. Famil. xiv. 7). "Omnes molestias et solicitudines deposui et ejeci. Quid causæ autem fuerit, postridié intellexi quam à vobis discessi. Χολὴν ἄκρατον noctu ejeci: statim ita sum levatus, ut mihi Deus aliquis medicinam fecisse videatur. Cui quidem Deo, quemadmodum tu soles, pié et casté satisfacies: id est, Apollini et Æsculapio." Compare the rhetor Aristeides, Orat. xlv. pp. 22-23-155, ed. Dindorf. About the habit of sacrificing a cock to Æsculapius, see also a passage in the Ἱερῶν Λόγοι of the rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xxvii. p. 545, ed. Dindorf, at the top of the page). I will add that the five Ἱερῶν Λόγοι of that Rhetor (Oratt. xxiii.-xxvii.) are curious as testifying the multitude of dreams and revelations vouchsafed to him by Æsculapius: also the implicit faith with which he acted upon them in his maladies, and the success which attended the curative prescriptions thus made known to him. Aristeides declares himself to place more confidence in these revelations than in the advice of physicians, and to have often acted on them in preference to such advice (Orat. xlv. pp. 20-22, Dind.).

The direction here given by Sokrates to Kriton (though some critics, even the most recent, see Krische, Lehren der Griechischen Denker, p. 227, interpret it in a mystical sense) is to be understood simply and literally, in my judgment. On what occasion, or for what, he had made the vow of the cock, we are not told. Sokrates was a very religious man, much influenced by prophecies, oracles, dreams, and special revelations (Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-29-33; also Phædon, p. 60).

[e] Euripid. Hippol. 1455.
Κεκᾶρτέρηται τἄμ'· ὄλωλα γάρ, πατέρ.
Κρῦψον δέ μου πρόσωπον ὡς τάχος πέπλοις.

Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the Phædon.

But though the personal incidents of this dialogue are truly Sokratic—the dogmatic emphasis, and the apparatus of argument and hypothesis, are essentially Platonic. In these respects, the dialogue contrasts remarkably with the Apology. When addressing the Dikasts, Sokrates not only makes no profession of dogmatic certainty, but expressly disclaims it. Nay more—he considers that the false persuasion of such dogmatic certainty, universally prevalent among his countrymen, is as pernicious as it is illusory: and that his own superiority over others consists merely in consciousness of his own ignorance, while they are unconscious of theirs.[f] To dissipate such false persuasion of knowledge, by perpetual cross-examination of every one around, is the special mission imposed upon him by the Gods: in which mission, indeed, he has the firmest belief—but it is a belief, like that in his Dæmon or divine sign, depending upon oracles, dreams, and other revelations peculiar to himself, which he does not expect that the Dikasts will admit as genuine evidence.[g] One peculiar example, whereby Sokrates exemplifies the false persuasion of knowledge where men have no real knowledge, is borrowed from the fear of death. No man knows (he says) what death is, not even whether it may not be a signal benefit: yet every man fears it as if he well knew that it was the greatest evil.[h] Death must be one of

[f] Plato, Apol. Sok. pp. 21-29. *καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ ο�ίεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν;*

[g] Plato, Apol. Sok. pp. 21-23, 31 D, 33 C. *ἐμοὶ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντειῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν.* p. 37 E. *ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστι καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ.*

[h] Plato, Apol. S. p. 29 B.

In the Xenophontic Apology of Sokrates, no allusion is made to the immortality of the soul. Sokrates is there described as having shaped his defence under a belief that he had arrived at a term when it was better for him to die than to live, and that prolonged life would only expose him to the unavoidable weaknesses and disabilities of senility. It is a proof of the benevolence of the Gods that he is withdrawn from life at so opportune a moment. This is the explanation which Xenophon gives of the haughty tone of the defence (sects. 6-15-23-27). In the Xenophontic Cyropædia, Cyrus, on his death-bed, addresses earnest exhortations to his two sons: and to give greater force to such exhortations, reminds them that his own soul will still survive and will still exercise a certain authority after his death. He expresses his own belief not only that the soul survives the body, but also that it becomes more rational when disembodied; because—1. Murderers are disturbed by the souls of murdered

two things: either a final extinction—a perpetual and dreamless sleep—or else a transference of the soul to some other place. Sokrates is persuaded that it will be in either case a benefit to him, and that the Gods will take care that he, a good man, shall suffer no evil, either living or dead: the proof of which is, to him, that the divine sign has never interposed any obstruction in regard to his trial and sentence. If (says he) I am transferred to some other abode, among those who have died before me, how delightful will it be to see Homer and Hesiod, Orpheus and Musæus, Agamemnon, Ajax or Palamêdes—and to pass my time in cross-examining each as to his true or false knowledge![i] Lastly, so far as he professes to aim at any positive end, it is the diffusion of political, social, human virtue, as distinguished from acquisitions above the measure of humanity. He tells men that it is not wealth which produces virtue, but virtue which produces wealth and other advantages, both public and private.[k]

Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon compared with the pro-

If from the Apology we turn to the Phædon, we seem to pass, not merely to the same speaker after the interval of one month (the ostensible interval indicated) but to a different speaker and over a long period. We have Plato speaking through the

men. 2. Honours are paid to deceased persons, which practice would not continue, unless the souls of the deceased had efficacy to enforce it. 3. The souls of living men are more rational during sleep than when awake, and sleep affords the nearest analogy to death (viii. 7, 17-21). (Much the same arguments were urged in the dialogues of Aristotle. Bernays, Dialog. Aristot. pp. 23-105.) He however adds, that even if he be mistaken in this point, and if his soul perish with his body, still he conjures his sons, in the name of the Gods, to obey his dying injunctions (s. 22). Again, he says (s. 27), "Invite all the Persians to my tomb, to join with me in satisfaction that I shall now be in safety, so as to suffer no farther harm, whether I am united to the divine element, or perish altogether" (*συνησθησομένους ἐμοί, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ἤδη ἔσομαι, ὡς μηδὲν ἂν ἔτι κακὸν παθεῖν, μήτε ἣν μετὰ τοῦ θείου γένωμαι, μήτε ἣν μηδὲν ἔτι ᾖ*). The view taken here by Cyrus, of death in its analogy with sleep (*ὕπνῳ καὶ θανάτῳ διδυμάοσιν*, Iliad. xvi. 672) as a refuge against impending evil for the future, is much the same as that taken by Sokrates in his Apology. Sokrates is not less proud of his past life, spent in dialectic debate, than Cyrus of his glorious exploits. 'Ο *θάνατος, λιμὴν κακῶν τοῖς δυσδαιμονοῦσιν*, Longinus, de Subl. c. 9, p. 23. Compare also the oration of Julius Cæsar in Sallust, Bell. Catilin. c. 51—"in luctu atque miseriis, mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse: illam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere: ultra neque curæ neque gaudio locum esse."

[i] Plato, Apol. S. pp. 40-41.

[k] Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20 C, 29-30. *λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα, καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.* Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 8-9.

Confession of ignorance which we read in the Apology.

mouth of Sokrates, and Plato too at a much later time.[1] Though the moral character (ἦθος) of Sokrates is fully maintained and even strikingly dramatised—the intellectual personality is altogether transformed. Instead of a speaker who avows his own ignorance, and blames others only for believing themselves to know when they are equally ignorant—we have one who indulges in the widest range of theory and the boldest employment of hypothesis. Plato introduces his own dogmatical and mystical views, leaning in part on the Orphic and Pythagorean creeds.[m] He declares the distinctness of nature, the incompatibility, the forced temporary union and active conflict, between the soul and the body. He includes this in the still wider and more general declaration, which recognises antithesis between the two worlds: the world of Ideas, Forms, Essences, not perceivable but only cogitable, eternal, and unchangeable, with which the soul or mind was in kindred and communion—the world of sense, or of transient and ever changing appearances or phenomena, never arriving at permanent existence, but always coming and going, with which the body was in commerce and harmony. The philosopher, who thirsts only after knowledge and desires to look at things[n] as they are in themselves, with his mind by itself —is represented as desiring, throughout all his life, to loosen as much as possible the implication of his soul with his body, and as rejoicing when the hour of death arrives to divorce them altogether.

Total renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phædon. Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues.

Such total renunciation of the body is put, with dramatic propriety, into the mouth of Sokrates during the last hour of his life. But it would not have been in harmony with the character of Sokrates as other Platonic dialogues present him—in the plentitude of life—manifesting distinguished bodily strength and soldierly efficiency, proclaiming gymnastic training

[1] In reviewing the Apology (supra, vol. i. ch. vii. p. 294) I have already noticed this very material discrepancy, which is insisted upon by Ast as an argument for disallowing the genuineness of the Apology.

[m] Plato, Phædon, pp. 69 C, 70 C, 81 C, 62 B.

[n] Plato, Phædon, p. 66. ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα.

for the body to be co-ordinate with musical training for the mind, and impressed with the most intense admiration for the personal beauty of youth. The human body, which in the Phædon is discredited as a morbid incumbrance corrupting the purity of the soul, is presented to us by Sokrates in the Phædrus as the only sensible object which serves as a mirror and the reflection of the beauty of the ideal world:[o] while the Platonic Timæus proclaims (in language not unsuitable to Locke) that sight, hearing, and speech are the sources of our abstract Ideas, and the generating causes of speculative intellect and philosophy.[p] Of these, and of the world of sense generally, an opposite view was appropriate in the Phædon; where the purpose of Sokrates is to console his distressed friends by showing that death was no misfortune, but relief from a burthen. And Plato has availed himself of this impressive situation,[q] to recommend, with every charm of poetical expression, various characteristic dogmas respecting the essential distinction between Ideas and the intelligible world on one side—Perceptions and the sensible world on the other: respecting the soul, its nature akin to the intelligible world, its pre-existence anterior to its present body, and its continued existence after the death of the latter: respecting the condition of the soul before birth and after death, its transition, in the case of most men, into other bodies, either human or animal, with the condition of suffering penalties commensurate to the wrongs committed in this life: finally, respecting the privilege accorded to the

[o] Plato, Charmidês, p. 155 D. Protagoras, init. Phædrus, p. 250 D, Symposion, pp. 177 C, 210 A.

Æschines, one of the Socratici viri or fellow disciples of Sokrates along with Plato, composed dialogues (of the same general nature as those of Plato) wherein Sokrates was introduced conversing or arguing. Æschines placed in the mouth of Sokrates the most intense expressions of passionate admiration towards the person of Alkibiades. See the Fragments cited by the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat. xlv. pp. 20-23, ed. Dindorf. Aristeides mentions (p. 24) that various persons in his time mistook these expressions ascribed to Sokrates for the real talk of Sokrates himself. Compare also the Symposion of Xenophon, iv. 27.

[p] Plato, Timæus, p. 47, A-D. Consult also the same dialogue, pp. 87-88, where Plato insists on the necessity of co-ordinate attention both to mind and to body, and on the mischiefs of highly developed force in the mind unless it be accompanied by a corresponding development of force in the body.

[q] Compare the description of the last discourse of Pætus Thrasea. Tacitus, Annal. xvi. 34.

souls of such as have passed their lives in intellectual and philosophical occupation, that they shall after death remain for ever disembodied, in direct communion with the world of Ideas.

Plato's argu-

The main part of Plato's argumentation, drawn from the general assumptions of his philosophy, is directed to prove the separate and perpetual existence of the soul, before as well as after the body. These arguments, interesting as specimens of the reasoning which satisfied Plato, do not prove his conclusion.[r] But even if that conclusion were admitted to be proved, the condition of the soul, during such anterior and posterior existence, would be altogether undetermined, and would be left to the free play of sentiment and imagination. There is no subject upon which the poetical genius of Plato has been more abundantly exercised.[s] He has given us two different descriptions of the

yet the mode of pre-existence, and the mode of post-ence, of l,

termined.

[r] Wyttenbach has annexed to his edition of the Phædon an instructive review of the argumentation contained in it respecting the Immortality of the soul. He observes justly—"Videamus jam de Phædone, qui ab omni antiquitate is habitus est liber, in quo rationes immortalitatis animarum gravissimé lu culentissiméque exposita essent. Quæ quidem libro laus et auctoritas conciliata est, non tam firmitate argumentorum, quam eloquentiâ Platonis, &c." (p. 10, Disputat. De Placit. Immort. Anim.). The same feeling, substantially, is expressed by one of the disputants in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, who states that he assented to the reasoning while he was reading the dialogue, but that as soon as he had laid down the book, his assent all slipped away from him. I have already mentioned that Panætius, an extreme admirer of Plato on most points, dissented from him about the immortality of the soul (Cicero, Tusc. Dis. i 11, 24—i. 32, 79), and declared the Phædon to be spurious. Galen also mentions (De Format. Fœtûs, vol. iv. pp. 70c-702. Kühn) that he had written a special treatise (now lost) to prove that the reasonings in the Phædon were self-contradictory; and that he could not satisfy himself, either about the essence of the soul, or whether it was mortal or immortal. Compare his treatise Περὶ Οὐσίας τῶν φυσικῶν δυνάμεων—iv. pp. 762-763—and Περὶ τῶν τῆς Ψυχῆς ἠθῶν, iv. 773. In this last passage, he represents the opinion of Plato to be—That the two inferior souls, the courageous and the appetitive, are mortal, in which he (Galen) agrees, and that the rational soul alone is immortal, of which he (Galen) is not persuaded. Now this view of Plato's opinion is derived from the Republic and Timæus, not from the Phædon, in which last the triple soul is not acknowledged. We may thus partly understand the inconsistencies, which Galen pointed out in his lost Treatise, in the argumentation of the Phædon: wherein one of the proofs presented to establish the immortality of the soul is,—That the soul is inseparably and essentially identified with life, and cannot admit death (p. 105 D). This argument, if good at all, is just as good to prove the immortality of the two inferior souls, as of the superior and rational soul. Galen might therefore remark that it did not consist with the conclusion which he drew from the Timæus and the Republic.

[s] Wyttenbach, l. c. p. 19. "Vidimus de philosophâ hujus loci parte,

state of the soul before its junction with the body (Timæus, and Phædrus), and three different descriptions of its destiny after separation from the body (Republic, Gorgias, Phædon). In all the three, he supposes an adjudication and classification of the departed souls, and a better or worse fate allotted to each according to the estimate which he forms of their merits or demerits during life: but in each of the three, this general idea is carried out by a different machinery. The Hades of Plato is not announced even by himself as anything more than approximation to the truth: but it embodies his own ethical and judicial sentence on the classes of men around him—as the Divina Commedia embodies that of Dante on antecedent individual persons. Plato distributes rewards and penalties in the measure which he conceives to be deserved: he erects his own approbation and disapprobation, his own sympathy and antipathy, into laws of the unknown future state: the Gods, whom he postulates, are imaginary agents introduced to execute the sentences which he dictates. While others, in their conceptions of posthumous existence, assured the happiest fate, sometimes even divinity itself, to great warriors and lawgivers—to devoted friends and patriots like Harmodius and Aristogeiton—to the exquisite beauty of Helen—or to favourites of the Gods like Ganymêdes or Pelops[t]—Plato claims that supreme distinction for the departed philosopher.

The Philosopher, as a recompense for having detached himself during life as much as possible from the body and all its functions, will be admitted after death to existence as a soul pure and simple, unattached to any body. The souls of all other persons, dying with more or less of the taint of the body attached to each of them,[u] and for that reason haunting the tombs in

sopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul, unattached to any body.

quâ demonstratur, Animos esse immortales. Altera pars, quâ ostenditur, qualis sit ille post hanc vitam status, fabulosé et poeticé à Platone tractata est," &c.

[t] Skolion of Kallistratus, Antholog. Græc., p. 155. Isokrates, Encomium Helenæ, Or. x. s. 70-72. Compare the Νέκυια of the Odyssey and that of the Æneid, respecting the heroes—

"Quæ gratia currûm
Armorumque fuit vivis—quæ cura nitentes
Pascere equos—eadem sequitur tellure repostos." (Æn. vi. 654).

[u] Plato, Phædon, p. 81 D. ὁ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ, βαρύνεται

which the bodies are buried, so as to become visible there as ghosts—are made subject, in the Platonic Hades, to penalty and purification suitable to the respective condition of each; after which they become attached to new bodies, sometimes of men, sometimes of other animals. Of this distributive scheme it is not possible to frame any clear idea, nor is Plato consistent with himself except in a few material features. But one feature there is in it which stands conspicuous—the belief in the metempsychosis, or transfer of the same soul from one animal body to another: a belief very widely diffused throughout the ancient world, associated with the immortality of the soul, pervading the Orphic and Pythagorean creeds, and having its root in the Egyptian and Oriental religions.[x]

τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ ἅδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους· καὶ ὄφθη ἄττα ματα οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.

Lactantius—in replying to the arguments of Demokritus, Epikurus, and Dikæarchus against the immortality of the soul—reminded them that any *Magus* would produce visible evidence to refute them; by calling up before them the soul of any deceased person to give information and predict the future—"qui profecto non auderent de animarum interitu mago præsente disserere, qui sciret certis carminibus cieri ab infernis animas et adesse et præbere se videndas et loqui et futura prædicere: et si auderent, re ipsâ et documentis præsentibus vincerentur" (Lactant. Inst. vii. 13). See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 31.

[x] Compare the closing paragraph of the Platonic Timæus: Virgil, Æneid vi. 713, Herodot. ii. 123, Pausanias, iv. 32, 4, Sextus Empiric. adv. Math. ix. 127, with the citation from Empedokles:—

"Tum pater Anchises. Animæ quibus altera fato
Corpora debentur, Lethæi ad fluminis undam
Securos latices et longa oblivia potant."

The general doctrine, upon which the Metempsychosis rests, is set forth by Virgil in the fine lines which follow, 723-751; compare Georgic iv. 218. The souls of men, beasts, birds, and fishes, are all of them detached fragments or portions from the universal soul, mind, or life, ætherial or igneous, which pervades the whole Kosmos. The soul of each individual thus detached to be conjoined with a distinct body, becomes tainted by such communion; after death it is purified by penalties, measured according to the greater or less taint, and becomes then fit to be attached to a new body, yet not until it has drunk the water of Lêthê (Plato, Philêbus, p. 30 A; Timæus, p. 30 B).

The statement of Nemesius is remarkable, that all Greeks who believed the immortality of the soul, believed also in the metempsychosis—Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν πάντες Ἕλληνες, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφηνάμενοι, τὴ μάτωσιν δογματίζουσι (De Naturâ Hominis, cap. ii. p. 50, ed. 1565). Plato accepted the Egyptian and Pythagorean doctrine, continued in the Orphic mysteries (Arnob. adv. Gentes, ii. 16), making no essential distinction between the souls of men and those of animals, and recognising reciprocal interchange from the one to the other. The Platonists adhered to this doctrine fully, down to the third century A.D., including Plotinus, Numenius, and others. But Porphyry, followed by Jamblichus, introduced a modification of this creed, denying the possibility

We are told that one vehement admirer of Plato—the Ambrakiot Kleombrotus—was so profoundly affected and convinced by reading the Phædon, that he immediately terminated his existence by leaping from a high wall; though in other respects well satisfied with life. But the number of persons who derived from it such settled conviction, was certainly not considerable. Neither the doctrine nor the reasonings of Plato were adopted even by the immediate successors in his school: still less by Aristotle and the Peripatetics—or by the Stoics—or by the Epikureans. The Epikureans denied altogether the survivorship of soul over body: Aristotle gives a definition of the soul which involves this same negation, though he admits as credible the

Plato's debated and problematical.

of transition of a human soul into the body of another animal, or of the soul of any other animal into the body of a man,—yet still recognising the transition from one human body to another, and from one animal body to another. (See Alkinous, Introd. in Platon. c. 25.) This subject is well handled in a learned work published in 1712 by a Jesuit of Toulouse, Michel Mourgues. He shows (in opposition to Dacier and others, who interpreted the doctrine in a sense merely spiritual and figurative) that the metempsychosis was a literal belief of the Platonists down to the time of Proklus. "Les quatre Platoniciens qui ont tenu la Transmigration bornée" (*i.e.* from one human body into another human body) "n'ont pas laissé d'admettre la pluralité d'animations ou de vies d'une même âme: et cela sans figure et sans métaphore. Cet article, qui est l'essentiel, n'a jamais trouvé un seul contradicteur dans les sectes qui ont cru l'âme immortelle; ni Porphyre, ni Hiérocles, ni Procle, ni Salluste, n'ont jamais touché à ce point que pour l'approuver. D'où il suit que la réalité de la Métempsychose est indubitable: c'est à dire, qu'il est indubitable que tous les sectateurs de Pythagore et de Platon l'ont soutenue dans un sens très réel quant à la pluralité des vies et d'animations" (Tom. i. p. 525: also Tom. ii. p. 432). M. Cousin and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire are of the same opinion.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire observes, in his Prémier Mémoire sur le Sankhya, p. 416, Paris, 1852.

"Voilà donc la transmigration dans les plus grands dialogues de Platon—le Timée, la République, le Phèdre, le Phèdon. On peut en retrouver la trace manifeste dans d'autres dialogues moins considérables, le Menon et le Politique, par exemple. La transmigration est même positivement indiquée dans le dixième Livre des Lois, où Platon traite avec tant de force et de solennité de la providence et de la justice divines.

"En présence de témoignages si serieux, et de tant de persistance à revenir sur des opinions qui ne varient pas, je crois que tout esprit sensé ne peut que partager l'avis de M. Cousin. Il est impossible que Platon ne se fasse de l'exposition de ces opinions qu'un pur badinage. Il les a répetées, sans les modifier en rien, au milieu des discussions les plus graves et les plus étendues. Ajoutez que ces doctrines tiennent intimément à toutes celles qui sont le fond même du platonisme, et qu'elles s'y entrelacent si étroitement, que les en détacher, c'est le mutiler et l'amoindrir. Le système des Idées ne se comprend pas tout entier sans la réminiscence: et la réminiscence elle même implique necessairement l'existence antérieure de l'âme."

Dr. Henry More, in his 'Treatise on

separate existence of the rational soul, without individuality or personality. The Stoics, while affirming the soul to be material as well as the body, considered it as a detached fragment of the all-pervading cosmical or mundane soul, which was re-absorbed after the death of the individual into the great whole to which it belonged. None of these philosophers were persuaded by the arguments of Plato. The popular orthodoxy, which he often censures harshly, recognised some sort of posthumous existence as a part of its creed; and the uninquiring multitude continued in the teaching and traditions of their youth. But literary and philosophical men, who sought to form some opinion for themselves without altogether rejecting (as the Epikureans rejected) the basis of the current traditions—were in no better condition for deciding the question with the assistance of Plato, than they would have been without him. While the knowledge of the bodily organism, and of mind or soul as embodied therein, received important additions, from Aristotle down to Galen—no new facts either were known or could become known, respecting soul *per se*, considered as pre-existent or post-existent to body. Galen expressly records his dissatisfaction with Plato on this point, though generally among his warmest admirers. Questions of this kind remained always problematical, standing themes for rhetoric or dialectic.[y] Every man could do, though not

the Immortality of the Soul, argues at considerable length in defence of the pre-existence of each soul, as a part of the doctrine. He considers himself to have clearly proved—"That the pre-existence of the soul is an opinion both in itself the most rational that can be maintained, and has had the suffrage of the most renowned philosophers in all ages of the world." Of these last-mentioned philosophers he gives a list, as follows—Moses, on the authority of the Jewish Cabbala—Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Epicharmus, Empedocles, Cebês, Euripides, Plato, Euclid, Philo, Virgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Proclus, Boethius, Psellus, Synesius, Origen, Marsilius Ficinus, &c. See Chapters xii. and xiii. pages 116, 117, 121 of his Treatise. Compare also what he says in Sect. 18 of his Preface General, page xx-xxiv.

[y] Seneca says, Epist. 88. "Innumerabiles sunt quæstiones de animo: unde sit, qualis sit, quando esse incipiat, quamdiu sit; an aliunde aliò transeat, et domicilium mutet, ad alias animalium formas aliasque conjectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat, et emissus evagetur in toto; utrum corpus sit, an non sit: quid sit facturus, quum per nos aliquid facere desierit: quomodo libertate usurus, cum ex hâc exierit caveâ: an obliviscatur priorum et illic nosse incipiat, postquam de corpore abductus in sublime secessit." Compare Lucretius, i. 113.

with the same exuberant eloquence, what Plato had done—and no man could do more. Every man could coin his own hopes and fears, his own æsthetical preferences and repugnances, his own ethical aspiration to distribute rewards and punishments among the characters around him—into affirmative prophecies respecting an unknowable future, where neither verification nor Elenchus were accessible. The state of this discussion throughout the Pagan world bears out the following remark of Lord Macaulay, with which I conclude the present chapter:—

"There are branches of knowledge with respect to which the human mind is in progress. But with theology, the case is very different. As respects natural religion—revelation being for the present altogether out of the question—it is not easy to see that a philosopher of the present day is more favourably situated than Thales or Simonides.—As to the other great question—the question, what becomes of a man after death—we do not see that a highly educated European, left to his unassisted reason, is more likely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one of the many sciences, in which we surpass the Blackfoot Indians, throws the smallest light on the state of the soul after the animal life is extinct. In truth, all the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted, without the help of revelation, to prove the immortality of man—from Plato to Franklin—appear to us to have failed deplorably. Then again, all the great enigmas which perplex the natural theologian are the same in all ages. The genius of a people just emerging from barbarism, is quite sufficient to propound them. The genius of Locke and Clarke is quite unable to solve them.—Natural Theology, then, is not a progressive science." [z]

[z] Lord Macaulay, Review of Ranke's History of the Popes (Critical and Historical Essays, vol. iii. p. 210). Sir Will. Hamilton observes (Lectures on Logic, Lect. 26, p. 55): "Thus Plato, in the Phædon, demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its simplicity: in the Republic, he demonstrates its simplicity from its immortality."

CHAPTER XXIV.

PHÆDRUS—SYMPOSION.

I PUT together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the Phædrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to, another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phædrus is, in both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.

...s of ... Phæ- ... both.

The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense, and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein of sentiment which prevails in modern times, and which recognises passionate love as prevailing only between persons of different sex—it is difficult for us to enter into Plato's eloquent expositions of the feeling as he conceives it. In the Hellenic point of view,[a] upon which Plato builds

Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece.

[a] Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 367) describes this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den antimodernen und anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart." Aristotle composed Θέσεις Ἐρωτικαὶ or Ἐρωτικάς, Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.

Compare the dialogue called Ἐρωτικὸς, among the works of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers, especially Protogenes, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction of Eros—ἀληθινοῦ δὲ Ἔρωτος οὔδ' ὁτιοῦν τῇ γυναικωνιτίδι μέτεστιν, &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)

In the Treatise De Educatione Puerorum (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction proper to be imposed on youth: he is much impressed with the authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Æschines, Kebês, ... δρῶν, οἳ τοὺς ἄῤῥενας ἐ... &c. See the anecdote about Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under Xenophon, in Xenophon, Anabasis, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable passage about Zeno the Stoic, Diog. Laert. vii. 13. Respecting the general subject of παιδεραστία in Greece, there is a valuable Excursus in Bekkers' Charikles, vol. i. pp. 347-377, Excurs. ii. I agree generally with his belief about the practice in Greece, see Cicero, Tusc. Dis. iv. 33, 70.

the attachment of man to woman was regarded as a natural impulse, and as a domestic, social, sentiment; yet as belonging to a common-place rather than to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very young: that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving: that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her husband:[b] that her sphere of duty and exertion was confined to the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those too of the best families and edu-

Bekker quotes abundant authorities, which might be farther multiplied if necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the Xenophontic Symposion, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and Eleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the other—*Ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα νόμιμα, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐπονείδιστα.* We must interpret passages of the classical authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.

If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neæra (which is full of information about Athenian manners), we find the speaker Apollodôrus distributing the relations of men with women in the following manner (p. 1386)—*τὸ γὰρ συνοικεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃς ἂν παιδοποιῆται καὶ εἰσάγῃ εἴς τε τοὺς δημότας καὶ τοὺς φράτορας τοὺς υἱεῖς, καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐκδιδῷ ὡς αὐτοῦ οὔσας τοῖς ἀνδράσι. Τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἑταίρας, ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα ἔχομεν—τὰς δὲ παλλακὰς, τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν θεραπείας τοῦ σώματος—τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας, τοῦ παιδοποιεῖσθαι γνησίως, καὶ τῶν ἔνδον φύλακα πίστην ἔχειν.*

To the same purpose, the speaker in Lysias (*Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἐρατοσθένους φόνου*—sect. 7), describing his wife, says

γὰρ ἦ, καὶ

Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the Platonic vein of sentiment and ideality; neither of them led to any grand results either in war—or political ambition—or philosophical speculation; the three great roads, in one or other of which the Grecian ideality travelled. We know from the Republic that Plato did not appreciate the value of the family life, or the purposes for which men marry, according to the above passage cited from Demosthenes. In this point, Plato differs from Xenophon, who, in his Œconomicus, enlarges much (in the discourse of Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to prudential results and good management of the household; while he illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the story of Pantheia and Abradates (Cyropædia).

[b] See the Œconomicus of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii. 5.

cation, were seen habitually uncovered in the Palæstra and at the public-festival matches; engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form, in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful emotional sympathy, blended with æsthetic sentiment, which in the more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language affords—and are predicated even of Sokrates himself. Far from being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and beneficial; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically denounce and forbid.[c] In their view, it was an idealising passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted attachments which it inspired were

[c] The beginning of the Platonic Charmidês illustrates what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and Lysis, pp. 205-206.

Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikæarchus (companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).

If we pass to the second century after the Christian era, we find some speakers in Athenæus blaming severely the amorous sentiments of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). Athenæus remarks farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses (23-5) on the ἐρωτικὴ of Sokrates, makes the same remark as Athenæus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposion; he farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they assailed him upon so many other points), but had incurred great censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he replies—τοὺς νυνὶ κατηγόρους (23, 6-7). The comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very curious.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the ἐγκώμια on Eros in the Symposion, as "unworthy of serious handling or of Sokrates." (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth., p. 1027.)

But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is Herakleitus—author of the Allegoriæ Homericæ. Herakleitus repels, as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of Homer—which he admits to be full of immorality if literally understood—had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the character of his own writings—ἐβλίφθω δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ὁ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους, ἄνω καὶ κάτω παιδικοὶ καθυβρίζουσιν ἔρωτες, οὐδαμοῦ δὲ οὐχὶ τῆς ἀβρένος ἐπιθυμίας μεστός ἐστιν ὁ ἀνήρ (Hera. All. Hom. c. 4-74 ed. Mehler, Leiden, 1851).

dreaded by the despots, who forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palæstræ.[d]

Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagination with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory—this passion presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the work of philosophy—an impulse at first impetuous and undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving communion and colloquy with an improveable youth. Personal beauty (this is[e] the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phædrus) is the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant representative of itself among concrete objects—the Ideas of Justice and Temperance have none. The contemplation of a beautiful youth, and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the only way of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in its antecedent stage of existence. This was the first stage through which every philosopher must pass; but the emotion of love thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character, of the beloved youth: delighting to recognise and promote in him all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been thus first transferred by association from beauty in the person to beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther generalised; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all beautiful objects, bodies as well as minds. The view would presently be farther enlarged. The like sentiment would be inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in

Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation between the world of Sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual generalisation of the sentiment.

[d] Plato, Sympos. 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which illustrate this feeling, are recounted by Thucydides, vi. 54-57. These two citizens were gratefully recollected and extensively admired by the Athenian public.

[e] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.

administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind would at last be exalted to the contemplation of that which pervades and gives common character to all these particulars—Beauty in the abstract—or the Self-Beautiful—the Idea or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of "the great ocean of the beautiful," was the most glorious privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable only by a few highly gifted minds. But others might make more or less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and happiness.[f]

All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name *Eros* is confined to one special case of this large variety.

Such is Plato's conception of Eros or Love and its object. He represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or aspires to *happiness:* this is the fundamental or primordial law of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or good things, are nothing else but the means to happiness:[g] accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and desires not only full acquisition, but perpetual possession of good. In this wide sense, love belongs to all human beings: every man loves good and happiness, with perpetual possession of them—and nothing else.[h] But different men have different ways of pur-

[f] Plato, Sympos. c. 34-36, pp. 210-211.

Respecting The Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the Hippias Major, p. 757. "Unumquodque è singulis pulchris, *pulchrum hoc* Plato vocat: formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem: speciem et ideam supra omnia, ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.

"Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum ordine infinité decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis discursibus ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam."

[g] Plato, Sympos. c. 30, pp. 204-205. *Φέρε, ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, αὐτῷ. Καὶ τί ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τἀγαθά; Τοῦτ' εὐπορώτερον, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαίμων ἔσται. Κτήσει γὰρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες· Καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι, ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις. Ταύτην δὴ τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον, πότερα κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀεί, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν, δ' ἐγὼ, κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων.*

[h] Plato Sympos. c. 31, p. 206 A. *ὡς οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἔστιν, οὗ ἐρῶσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.*

suing this same object. One man aspires to good or happiness by way of money-getting, another by way of ambition, a third by gymnastics—or music—or philosophy. Still no one of these is said to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is reserved exclusively for one special variety of it—the impulse towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality by generating a new individual to replace himself.[i] In fact even mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and generating its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together, either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going—so likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions, cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.[k] As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual generation of new individuals.

The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings through the copulative and procreative impulse, which so powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as in body. Beauty in another person exercises an attractive force which enables this impulse to be gratified: ugliness on the contrary repels and stifles it. Hence springs the love of beauty—or rather, of procreation in the beautiful—whereby satisfaction is obtained for this restless and

Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus.

[i] Plato, Sympos. c. 32, p. 207 C.

[k] Plato, Sympos. c. 32, pp. 207-208.

impatient agitation.[1] With some, this erotic impulse stimulates the body, attracting them towards women, and inducing them to immortalise themselves by begetting children: with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind, and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products. In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and youthful beauty: but when, along with this beauty of person, there is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous, intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is overwhelming; the bodily sympathy becoming spiritualised and absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring intelligences—poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like Lykurgus and Solon—the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look about for some youth, at once handsome and improveable, in conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings respecting virtue and goodness—new excellences of disposition—and new force of intellectual combination, in both the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong that they can hardly live apart: so anxious are both of them to foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each is respectively conscious in himself.[m]

Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty *in genere*. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all.

Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic impulse rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate and exclusive attachment to one individual person, and fastening upon beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and beautiful minds have in common. The visible charm of beautiful body, though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes to be still farther sunk and undervalued, when the mind has ascended to the contemplation of beauty *in genere*, not merely in bodies and minds, but in laws, institutions, and sciences. This is the highest

[1] Plato, Sympos. c. 31, p. 206 E. ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντί τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἡ πτόησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὠδῖνος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. Ἔστι γὰρ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλὰ—τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ.

[m] Plato, Sympos. c. 33, p. 209.

pitch of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent: but which, when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man's vision be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he will have no eyes for the individual manifestations of it in gold, fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.[n] Herein we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which first shows itself in the form of virtuous attachment to youth.[o]

Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros with several different views of it previously enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades.

It is thus that Plato, in the Symposion, presents Love, or erotic impulse: a passion taking its origin in the physical and mental attributes common to most men, and concentrated at first upon some individual person—but gradually becoming both more intense and more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical generalisation and comes into intimate view of the pure idea of Beauty. The main purpose of the Symposion is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros or Love—which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue and is repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named Diotima[p]—with different views assigned to other speakers. Each of the guests at the Banquet—Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates—engages to deliver a panegyric on Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in

[n] Plato, Symposion, c. 35, p. 211.

[o] Plato, Symposion, c. 35, p. 211 B. *ὅταν δή τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾷν, σχεδὸν ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους*, &c.

[p] Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. *γυναικὸς μαντικῆς Διοτίμας, ἣ ταῦτα τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ποτὲ θυσαμένοις πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσου, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἐδίδαξεν.*

Instead of *γυναικὸς μαντικῆς*, which was the old reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write *γι κῆς*, also 211 D. I cannot but think that *μαντικῆς* is right. There is no pertinence or fit meaning in Μαντινικῆς, whereas the word *μαντικῆς* is in full keeping with what is said about the special religious privileges and revelations of Diotima—that she procured for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Krœsus that Apollo had obtained from the Μοῖραι a postponement of the ruin of the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from them no more (Herodot. i. 91).

the character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates towards Alkibiades himself—his inflexible self-command under the extreme of trial and temptation—the unbounded ascendancy which he had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates—are emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.

Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.

Both Phædrus[q] and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by his inspirations, the noblest self-denial and the most devoted heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent, sensual—and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity—Eros Pandêmus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius[r] or Cœlestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon—the first is medical, physiological, cosmical[s]—the second is comic and imaginative, even to exuberance—the third is poetical or dithyrambic: immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess Diotima.

Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He

Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he indeed a God at all.

[q] Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Leg. iii. 694) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phædrus, is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced phrases (*ἰσόκωλα, ἀντίθετα*), which Aristophanes parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the Thesmophoriazusæ, Athenæus, v. 187 C.

[r] Plato, Sympos. pp. 180-181.

[s] Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a cosmical, all-pervading, procreative impulse, compare Euripides, Frag. Incert. 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (Griech. Trag. p. 737) to the lost drama—the first Hippolytus; also the beautiful invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.

He is one of the numerous intermediate body of Dæmons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as interpreting agents of communication between the two.[t] Eros is the Offspring of Poverty and Resource (Porus).[u] He represents the state of aspiration and striving, with ability and energy, after goodness and beauty, but never actually possessing them: a middle condition, preferable to that of the person who neither knows that he is deficient in them, nor cares to possess them: but inferior to the condition of him who is actually in possession. Eros is always Love of something—in relation to something yet unattained, but desired: Eros is to be distinguished carefully from the object desired.[v] He is the parallel of the philosopher, who is neither ignorant nor wise: not ignorant, because genuine ignorance is unconscious of itself and fancies itself to be knowledge: not wise, because he does not possess wisdom, and is well aware that he does not possess it. He is in the intermediate stage, knowing that he does not possess wisdom, but constantly desiring it and struggling after it. Eros, like philosophy, represents this continual aspiration and advance towards a goal never attained.[x]

describes Eros as not a God but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it.

It is thus that the truly Platonic conception of Love is brought out, materially different from that of the preceding speakers—Love, as a state of conscious want, and of aspiration or endeavour to satisfy that want, by striving after good or happiness—Philosophy as the like intermediate state, in regard to wisdom. And Plato follows out this coalescence

Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher who knows his own ignorance, and thirsts for knowledge.

[t] Plato, Sympos. pp. 202-203.

[u] What Sokrates says here in the Symposion about Eros is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in Phædrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphroditê (Phædrus, pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).

[v] Plato, Symposion, c. 25, pp. 199-200. Ὁ ἔρως, ἔρως ἔστιν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν. Πότερον ὁ ἔρως ἐκείνου οὗ ἔστιν ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὔ; Πάνυ γε. Ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἐνδεὲς ᾖ.

[x] Plato, Sympos. c. 29, p. 204 A. Τίνες οὖν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφοὶ μήτε οἱ ἀμαθεῖς· Οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ὧν αὖ καὶ ὁ ἔρως. Ἔστι γὰρ δὴ τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία, Ἔρως δ' ἔστιν ἔρως περὶ τὸ καλόν ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δὲ ὄντα μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς.

of love and philosophy in the manner which has been briefly sketched above: a vehement impulse towards mental communion with some favoured youth, in the view of producing mental improvement, good, and happiness to both persons concerned: the same impulse afterwards expanding, so as to grasp the good and beautiful in a larger sense, and ultimately to fasten on goodness and beauty in the pure Idea: which is absolute—independent of time, place, circumstances, and all variable elements—moreover the object of the one and supreme science.[y]

Eros as presented in the Phædrus—Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates adverse to Eros—Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros.

I will now compare the Symposion with the Phædrus. In the first half of the Phædrus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure Idea of the Beautiful, are brought into close coalescence with philosophy and dialectic—but they are presented in a different manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Eros in two competing discourses (one cited from Lysias,[z] the other pronounced by Sokrates himself as competitor with Lysias in eloquence) supposed to be addressed to a youth, and intended to convince him that the persuasions of a calm and intelligent friend are more worthy of being listened to than the exaggerated promises and protestations of an impassioned lover, from whom he will receive more injury than benefit: that the inspirations of Eros are a sort of madness, irrational and misguiding as well as capricious and transitory: while the calm and steady friend, unmoved by any passionate inspiration, will show himself worthy of permanent esteem and gratitude.[a] By a sudden revulsion of feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or palinode upon that God.[b]

Eros (he says) is mad, irrational, superseding reason and prudence in the individual mind.[c] This is true: yet still Eros

[y] Plato, Symposion, c. 34-35, pp. 210-211.

[z] Plato, Phædrus, c. 11-21, p. 230 seq.

[a] Plato, Phædrus, c. 29, p. 237 seq.

[b] Eros, in the Phædrus, is pronounced to be a God, son of Aphroditê (c. 44, p. 242 E); in the Symposion he is not a God but a Dæmon, offspring of Porus and Penia, and attendant on Aphroditê, according to Diotima and Sokrates (c. 28-29, p. 203).

[c] Plato, Phædrus, c. 110, pp. 265-266. τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἔν τι κοινῇ

exercises a beneficent and improving influence. Not all madness is bad. Some varieties of it are bad, but others are good. Some arise from human malady, others from the inspirations of the Gods: both of them supersede human reason and the orthodoxy of established custom[d]—but the former substitute what is worse, the latter what is better. The greatest blessings enjoyed by man arise from madness, when it is imparted by divine inspiration. And it is so imparted in four different phases and by four different Gods, Apollo infuses the prophetic madness—Dionysus, the ritual or religious—The Muses, the poetical—and Eros, the erotic.[e] This last sort of madness greatly transcends the sober reason and concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by mankind generally.[f] The inspired and exalted lover deserves every preference over the unimpassioned friend.

Panegyric—Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than sobriety.

Plato then illustrates, by a highly poetical and imaginative mythe, the growth and working of love in the soul. All soul or mind is essentially self-moving, and the cause of motion to other things. It is therefore immortal, without beginning or end: the universal or cosmic soul, as well as the individual souls of Gods and men.[g] Each soul may be compared to a chariot with a winged pair of horses. In the divine soul, both the horses are excellent, with perfect wings: in the human soul, one only of them is good, the

Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its prenatal condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas.

εἶδος—τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἓν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος. Compare c. 26, p. 236 A.

[d] Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. Μανίας δέ γε εἴδη δύο· τὴν μέν, ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ, ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. Compare 249 D.

[e] Plato, Phædrus, c. 47, p. 244 A. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἁπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης.

Compare Plutarch, Ἐρωτικὸς, c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.

[f] Plato, Phædrus, c. 50, p. 245 A. μηδέ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβείτω, δεδιττόμενος ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον:—c. 83, p. 256 E. ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης, σωφροσύνῃ θνητῇ κεκραμένη, θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετὴν τῇ φίλῃ ψυχῇ ἐντεκοῦσα, &c.

[g] Plato, Phædrus, c. 52-53-54, pp. 245-246. Compare Krische, De Platonis Phædro, pp. 49-50 (Göttingen, 1848).

Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a μυθικός τις ὕμνος (Phædr. c. 108, p. 265 D).

other is violent and rebellious, often disobedient to the charioteer, and with feeble or half-grown wings.[h] The Gods, by means of their wings, are enabled to ascend up to the summit of the celestial firmament—to place themselves upon the outer circumference or back of the heaven—and thus to be carried round along with the rotation of the celestial sphere round the Earth. In the course of this rotation they contemplate the pure essences and Ideas, truth and reality without either form or figure or colour: they enjoy the vision of the Absolute—Justice, Temperance, Beauty, Science. The human souls, with their defective wings, try to accompany the Gods; some attaching themselves to one God, some to another, in this ascent. But many of them fail in the object, being thrown back upon earth in consequence of their defective equipment, and the unruly character of one of the horses: some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and incomplete.

Operation of such prenatal experience upon the intellectual faculties of man—Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable—Reminiscence.

Those souls which have not seen Truth or general Ideas at all, can never be joined with the body of a man, but only with that of some inferior animal. It is essential that some glimpse of truth should have been obtained, in order to qualify the soul for the condition of man:[i] for the mind of man must possess within itself the capacity of comparing and combining particular sensations, so as to rise to one general conception brought together by reason.[k] This is brought about by the process of reminiscence; whereby it recalls those pure, true, and beautiful Ideas which it had partially seen during its prior extra-corporeal existence in

[h] The reader will recollect Homer, Iliad. xvi. 152, where the chariot and horses of Patroklus are described, when he is about to attack the Trojans; the mortal horse Pedasus is harnessed to it alongside of the two immortal horses Xanthus and Balius.

[i] Plato, Phædrus, c. 63, pp. 249-250. *πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα—ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἦλθεν εἰς τόδε τὸ ζῷον· ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκείνα οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀπάσῃ, &c.*

[k] Plato, Phædrus, c. 62, p. 249. *Οὐ γὰρ ἥ γε μή ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον. Τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως.*

companionship with the Gods. The rudimentary faculty of thus reviving these general Conceptions—the visions of a prior state of existence—belongs to all men, distinguishing them from other animals: but in most men the visions have been transient, and the power of reviving them is faint and dormant. It is only some few philosophers, whose minds, having been effectively winged in their primitive state for ascent to the super-celestial regions, have enjoyed such a full contemplation of the divine Ideas as to be able to recall them with facility and success, during the subsequent corporeal existence. To the reminiscence of the philosopher, these Ideas present themselves with such brilliancy and fascination, that he forgets all other pursuits and interests. Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind, whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.

Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas.

It is by the aspect of visible beauty, as embodied in distinguished youth, that this faculty of reminiscence is first kindled in minds capable of the effort. It is only the embodiment of beauty, acting as it does powerfully upon the most intellectual of our senses, which has sufficient force to kindle up the first act or stage of reminiscence in the mind, leading ultimately to the revival of the Idea of Beauty. The embodiments of justice, wisdom, temperance, &c., in particular men, do not strike forcibly on the senses, nor approximate sufficiently to the original Idea, to effect the first stroke of reminiscence in an unprepared mind. It is only the visible manifestation of beauty, which strikes with sufficient shock at once on the senses and the intellect, to recall in the mind an adumbration of the primitive Idea of Beauty. The shock thus received, first develops the reminiscent faculty in minds apt and predisposed to it, and causes the undeveloped wings of the soul to begin growing. It is a passion of violent and absorbing character; which may indeed take a sensual turn, by the misconduct of the unruly horse in the team, producing in that case nothing but corruption and mischief—but which may also take a virtuous, sentimental, imaginative

turn, and becomes in that case the most powerful stimulus towards mental improvement in both the two attached friends. When thus refined and spiritualised, it can find its satisfaction only in philosophical communion, in the generation of wisdom and virtue; as well as in the complete cultivation of that reminiscent power, which vivifies in the mind remembrance of Forms or Ideas seen in a prior existence. To attain such perfection, is given to few; but a greater or less approximation may be made to it. And it is the only way of developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind; which must spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine madness or erotic inspiration.[1]

Such is the general tenor of the dialogue Phædrus, in its first half: which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the source and mainspring of exalted virtue—as the only avenue to philosophy—as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the teaching of Law and Custom. In the Symposion, the first of these contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed. In the Phædrus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety: that the temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line, some madmen being worse than he, but others better: that madness springing from human distemper is worse, but that when it springs from divine inspiration, it is in an equal degree better, than sobriety: that the philosophical *œstrus*, and the reminiscence of the eternal Ideas (considered by Plato as the only true and real Entia), is inconsistent with that which is esteemed as sobriety: and is generated only by special inoculation from Eros or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is little marked in the Symposion. But on the other hand, the

[1] Plato, Phædrus, c. 81, p. 256 C. γαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωοὔτε θεία μανία δυνατὴ πορίσαι -c. 50. ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται.

The long and highly poetical mythe, of which I have given some of the leading points, occupies from c. 51 to c. 83 of the dialogue. It is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, and requires the reader to keep before him the palæstræ of Athens, as described in the Lysis, Erastæ, and Charmidês of Plato—visited both by men like Sokrates and by men like Kritias (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 29).

Symposion (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition of the lessons of Diotima) insists much more upon the generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the Phædrus, we still remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two individuals—an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active intelligence and exalted moods of conduct: in the Symposion, such intercourse is assimilated explicitly to copulation with procreative consequences, but it is represented as the first stage of a passion which becomes more and more expanded and comprehensive: dropping all restriction to any single individual, and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits and institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty in its largest sense.

Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious

The picture here presented by Plato, of the beneficent and elevating influence of Eros Philosophus, is repeated by Sokrates as a revelation made to him by the prophetess Diotima. It was much taken to heart by the Neo-Platonists.[m] It is a striking manifestation of the Platonic characteristics: transition from amorous impulse to religious and philosophical mysticism—implication of poetical fancy with the con-

[m] Porphyry, Vit. Plotini, 23.

Plato's way of combining, in these two dialogues—so as to pass by an easy thread of association from one to the other—subjects which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the turn of imagination, as between different persons and ages. The following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. "Au reste, quand même nous serions mieux renseignés sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantôt célèbre l'absorption de l'âme dans l'essence de Dieu, tantôt chante le vin et l'amour, sans grossièreté, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idée de symbolisme — et qui généralement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux manières de sentir, qui nous paraissent si différentes, sans s' apercevoir lui-même qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherché la solution de cette difficulté dans une interprétation mystique de toutes ses poésies; mais les textes s' y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont voulu l'expliquer en supposant une hypocrisie de l'auteur, qui lui aurait fait mêler une certaine dose de piété mystique, à ses vers plus légers, pour les faire passer: mais ce calcul parait étranger à la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de l'énigme dans l'état général des esprits et de la culture de son temps: et la difficulté pour nous est seulement de nous représenter assez vivement l'état des esprits en Perse à cette époque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exerçait depuis des siècles sur toutes les classes cultivées de la nation."—Mohl (Rapport Annuel à la Société Asiatique, 1861, p. 89.)

philosophising process—surrender of the mind to metaphor and analogy, which is real up to a certain point, but is forcibly stretched and exaggerated to serve the theorising purpose of the moment. Now we may observe, that the worship of youthful masculine beauty, and the belief that contemplation of such a face and form was an operative cause, not only raising the admiration but also quickening the intelligence of the adult spectator, and serving as a provocative to instructive dialogue—together with a decided attempt to exalt the spiritual side of this influence and depreciate the sensual—both these are common to Plato with Sokrates and Xenophon. But what is peculiar to Plato is, that he treats this merely as an initial point to spring from, and soars at once into the region of abstractions, until he gets clear of all particulars and concomitants, leaving nothing except Beauty Absolute—*τὸ Καλὸν*—*τὸ αὐτὸ-καλὸν*—the "full sea of the beautiful." Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates) could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably have failed and dropped him: as we read in the Phædrus respecting the unprepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the Gods. Plato alone is the true Dædalus equal to this flight, borne up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar[n]—according to the comparison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.

theory.

Various remarks may be made in comparing this exposition of Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the Phædrus and Phædon.

First, in the Phædrus and Phædon (also in the Timæus and elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,—are brought into the foreground; so as to furnish a basis for that doctrine of reminiscence, which is one of the peculiar characteristics of Plato. The Form or Idea, when once disengaged from the appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to be recognised by the mind and welcomed as an

Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter.

[n] Dionys. Hal. De Admirab. Vi Dicendi in Demosthene, p. 972, Reiske.

old acquaintance. But in the Symposion, no such doctrine is found. The mind is described as rising by gradual steps from the concrete and particular to the abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons from smaller groups of particulars to larger; until at length one and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions, correlating with the Forms or Concepta without. The fundamental postulate here is, not that of pre-existence, but that of in-dwelling conceptions.

Secondly, in the Phædrus and Phædon, the soul is declared to be immortal, *à parte post* as well as *à parte ante*. But in the Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.[o] The soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation—by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and feelings—by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others.

Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion.

Thirdly, in Phædrus, Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas—a world or aggregate of such Entia Rationis[p]—among which Beauty is one, but only one. It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into contemplation and cognition of these Forms generally. But in the Symposion, the Form of Beauty (τὸ καλὸν) is presented singly and exclusively—as if the communion with this one Form were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy.

Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion.

Fourthly, The Phædrus and Symposion have, both of them in common, the theory of Eros as the indispensable, initiatory stimulus to philosophy. The spectacle of a beautiful youth

[o] Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.

[p] Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recognises Forms of δίκαιον, καλὸν, αἰσχρὸν, as well as Forms of δίκαιον, ἀγαθὸν, καλόν, &c.

is considered necessary to set light to various elements in the mind, which would otherwise remain dormant and never burn: it enables the pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has within and to put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the Phædon, Theætêtus, Sophistês, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked for any such function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme for generating and developing the philosophic capacity: but Eros plays no part in it. In the Theætêtus, the young man so named is announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened, and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it: the service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric patent, and a marvellous faculty of cross-examination. Yet instead of any auxiliary stimulus arising from personal beauty, the personal ugliness of both persons in the dialogue is emphatically signified.

Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy—Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere.

I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposion, partly of the Phædrus along with it—to illustrate the varying points of view which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the numerous Platonic dialogues.

In the strange scene with which the Symposion is wound up, the main purpose of the dialogue is still farther worked out. The spirit and ethical character of Eros Philosophus, after having been depicted in general terms by Diotima, are specially exemplified in the personal history of Sokrates, as recounted and appreciated by Alkibiades. That handsome, high-born, and insolent youth, being in a complete state of intoxication, breaks in unexpectedly upon the company, all of whom are as yet sober: he enacts the part of a drunken man both in speech and action, which is described with a vivacity that would do credit to any dramatist. His presence is the signal for beginning to drink hard, and he especially challenges Sokrates to drink off, after him, as much wine as will fill the large water-vessel serving as cooler; which challenge Sokrates forthwith accepts and executes, without being the least affected by it. Alkibiades

Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion—Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths.

instead of following the example of the others by delivering an encomium on Eros, undertakes to deliver one upon Sokrates. He proceeds to depict Sokrates as the votary of Eros Philosophus, wrapped up in the contemplation of beautiful youths, and employing his whole time in colloquy with them —yet as never losing his own self-command, even while acquiring a magical ascendency over these companions.[q] The abnormal exterior of Sokrates, resembling that of a Satyr, though concealing the image of a God within—the eccentric pungency of his conversation, blending banter with seriousness, homely illustrations with impressive principles—has exercised an influence at once fascinating, subjugating, humiliating. The impudent Alkibiades has been made to feel painfully his own unworthiness, even while receiving every mark of admiration from others. He has become enthusiastically devoted to Sokrates, whom he has sought to attach to himself, and to lay under obligation, by tempting offers of every kind. The details of these offers are given with a fulness which cannot be translated to modern readers, and which even then required to be excused as the revelations of a drunken man. They present one of the boldest fictions in the Greek language—if we look at them in conjunction with the real character of Alkibiades as an historical person.[r] Sokrates is found proof against every variety of temptation, however seductive to Grecian feeling. In his case, Eros Philosophus maintains his dignity as exclusively pure, sentimental, and spiritual: while Alkibiades retires more humiliated than ever. We are given to understand that the like

[q] Plato, Sympos. p. 216 C-D.

[r] Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, respecting the historical Alkibiades and his character, Thucyd. vi. 15, Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, Antisthenes, apud Athenæum, xii. 534.

The invention of Plato goes beyond that of those ingenious men who recounted how Phrynê and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome the continence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7; and the saying of Lais, *ὡς οὐκ ἀπ' ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀνδριάντος*, Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the description given by Alkibiades—as the maximum of testimony to the "invicta continentia" of Sokrates—with the testimony to the surpassing beauty of Helen, borne by such witnesses as the Trojan *δημογέροντες* and Priam himself (Hom. Iliad iii. 156). One of the speakers in Athenæus censures severely this portion of the Platonic Symposion, xi. 506 C, 508 D, v. 187 D. Porphyry (in his life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that the rhetor Diophanes delivered an apology for Alkibiades, in the presence of Plotinus; who was much displeased, and directed Porphyry to compose a reply.

offers had been made to Sokrates by many other handsome youths also—especially by Charmides and Euthydemus—all of them being treated with the same quiet and repellant indifference.[s] Sokrates had kept on the vantage-ground as regards all:—and was regarded by all with the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.

Perfect self-command of Sokrates—proof against every sort of trial.

Not merely upon this point but upon others also, Alkibiades recounts anecdotes of the perfect self-mastery of Sokrates: in endurance of cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue—in contempt of the dangers of war, in bravery on the day of battle—even in the power of bearing more wine than any one else, without being intoxicated, whenever the occasion was such as to require him to drink: though he never drank much willingly. While all his emotions are thus described as under the full controul of Reason and Eros Philosophus—his special gift and privilege was that of conversation—not less eccentric in manner, than potent, soul-subduing,[t] and provocative in its effects.

Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion—Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process.

After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the close of the banquet is described by the primary narrator. He himself, with Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers, continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While Phædrus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His competency to bear the maximum of

[s] Plato, Symp. p. 222 B.

In the Hieron of Xenophon (xi. 11), (a conversation between the despot Hieron and the poet Simonides) the poet, exhorting Hieron to govern his subjects in a mild, beneficent, and careful spirit, expatiates upon the popularity and warm affection which he will thereby attract to himself from them. Of this affection one manifestation will be (he says) as follows:—*ὥστε οὐ μόνον φιλοῖο ἂν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρῷο, ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς οὐ πειρᾷ ν, ἀλλὰ πειρώμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀνέχεσθαι ἂν σε δέοι*, &c.

These words illustrate the adventure described by Alkibiades in the Platonic Symposion.

Herakleides of Pontus, Dikæarchus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus, all composed treatises Περὶ Ἔρωτος, especially *περὶ παιδικῶν ἐρώτων* (Athenæ. xiii. 602-603).

[t] Plato, Sympos. pp. 221-222.

Alkibiades recites acts of distinguished courage performed by Sokrates, at the siege of Potidæ as well as at the battle of Delium.

About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokrates upon his companions, compare Sympos. p. 173 C-D.

In the Xenophontic Apology (s. 18), Sokrates adverts to the undisturbed equanimity which he had shown during the long blockade of Athens after the battle of Ægospotami, while others were bewailing the famine and other miseries.

wine without being disturbed by it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance of the challenge of Alkibiades, swallowed the contents of the wine cooler, he nevertheless continues all the night to drink wine in large bowls, along with the rest. All the while, however, he goes on debating his ordinary topics, even though no one is sufficiently sober to attend to him. His companions successively fall asleep, and at daybreak he finds himself the only person sober,[u] except Aristodemus (the narrator of the whole scene) who has recently waked after a long sleep. Sokrates quits the house of Agathon, with unclouded senses and undiminished activity—bathes—and then visits the gymnasium at the Lykeion; where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.[v]

The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposion, forms a natural contrast and complement to the picture of him in the Phædon; though the conjecture of Schleiermacher[x] —that the two together are intended to make up the Philosophus, or third member of the trilogy promised in the Sophistês—is ingenious rather than convincing. The Phædon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation with his friends, immediately before his death; the Symposion

Symposion and Phædon —each is the antithesis and complement of the other.

[u] In Sympos. p. 176 B, Sokrates is recognised as δυνατώτατος πίνειν, above all the rest: no one can be compared with him. In the two first books of the Treatise De Legibus, we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in the Symposion) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato discusses the subject of strong potations (μέθη) at great length; indeed he seems to fear that his readers will think he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He considers it of great advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose of measuring the reason and self-command of different men, and of determining how much wine is sufficient to overthrow it, in each different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues) in each case, without any danger or harm; and you can thus escape the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency. Plato insists upon the χρεία τῆς μέθης, as a genuine test, to be seriously employed for the purpose of testing men's reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the Republic, too (iii. p. 413 E), the φύλακες are required to be tested, in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation, as well as pain and danger.

Among the titles of the lost treatises of Theophrastus, we find one Περὶ Μέθης (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the compliments that the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his father—That he was, like Sokrates, equally competent both to partake of, and to abstain from, the most seductive enjoyments, without ever losing his calmness and self-mastery.

[v] Plato, Sympos. p. 223.

[x] Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 359 seq.

presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness: in both situations, we find the same attributes manifested—perfect equanimity and self-command, proof against every variety of disturbing agency—whether tempting or terrible—absorbing interest in philosophical dialectic. The first of these two elements, if it stood alone, would be virtuous sobriety, yet not passing beyond the limit of mortal virtue: the last of the two superadds a higher element, which Plato conceives to transcend the limit of mortal virtue, and to depend upon divine inspiration or madness.[y]

Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon.

The Symposion of Plato affords also an interesting subject of comparison with that of his contemporary Xenophon, as to points of agreement as well as of difference.[z] Xenophon states in the beginning that he intends to describe what passed in a scene where he himself was present; because he is of opinion that the proceedings of excellent men, in hours of amusement, are not less worthy of being recorded than those of their serious hours. Both Plato and Xenophon take for their main subject a festive banquet, destined to celebrate the success of a young man in

[y] Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 C-E. *σωφροσύνη θνητὴ—ἐρωτικὴ μανία: σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη—θεία μανία.* Compare p. 244 B.

[z] Pontianus, one of the speakers in Athenæus (xi. 504), touches upon some points of this comparison, with a view of illustrating the real or supposed enmity between Plato and Xenophon; an enmity not in itself improbable, yet not sufficiently proved.

Athenæus had before him the Symposion of Epikurus (not preserved) as well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle (xv. 674); and we learn from him some of its distinctive points. Masurius (the speaker in Athenæus, v. init.) while he recognises in the Symposia of Xenophon and Plato a dramatic variety of characters and smartness—finds fault with both, but especially with Plato, for levity, rudeness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, &c. The talk was almost entirely upon love and joviality. In the Symposion of Epikurus, on the contrary, nothing was said about these topics; the guests were fewer, the conversation was grave and dull, upon dry topics of science, such as the atomic theory (*προφήτας ἀτόμων*, v. 3, 187 B. 177 B. *Ἐπίκουρος δὲ συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων μόνον πεποίηται*), and even upon bodily ailments, such as indigestion or fever (187 C). The philosophers present were made by Epikurus to carry on their debate in so friendly a spirit, that the critic calls them "flatterers praising each other;" while he terms the Platonic guests "sneerers insulting each other" (*μυκτηριστῶν ἀλλήλους τωθαζόντων*, 182 A), though this is much more true about the Xenophontic Symposion than about the Platonic. He remarks farther that the Symposion of Epikurus included no libation or offering to the Gods (179 D).

It is curious to note these peculiarities in the compositions (now lost) of a philosopher like Epikurus, whom many historians of philosophy represent as thinking about nothing but convivial and sexual pleasure.

a competitive struggle. In Plato, the success is one of mind and genius—Agathon has gained the prize of tragedy: in Xenophon, it is one of bodily force and skill—Autolykus victor in the pankration. The Symposion of Xenophon differs from that of Plato, in the same manner as the Memorabilia of Xenophon generally differ from the Sokratic dialogues of Plato—that is, by approaching much nearer to common life and reality. It describes a banquet such as was likely enough to take place, with the usual accompaniments—a professional jester, and a Syracusan ballet-master who brings with him a dancing-girl, a girl to play on the flute and harp, and a handsome youth. These artists contribute to the amusement of the company by music, dancing, throwing up balls and catching them again, jumping into and out of a circle of swords. All this would have occurred at an ordinary banquet: here, it is accompanied and followed by remarks of pleasantry, buffoonery and taunt, interchanged between the guests. Nearly all the guests take part, more or less: but Sokrates is made the prominent figure throughout. He repudiates the offer of scented unguents: but he recommends the drinking of wine, though moderately, and in small cups. The whole company are understood to be somewhat elevated with wine, but not one of them becomes intoxicated. Sokrates not only talks as much fun as the rest, but even sings, and speaks of learning to dance, jesting on his own corpulence.[a] Most part of the scene is broad farce, in the manner, though not with all the humour, of Aristophanes.[b] The number and variety of the persons present is considerable, greater than in most of the Aristophanic plays. Kallias, Lykon, Autolykus, Sokrates, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, Nikeratus, Kritobulus, have each his own peculiarity: and a certain amount of vivacity and amusement arises from the way in which each of them is required, at the challenge of Sokrates, to declare on what it is that he most prides himself. Sokrates himself carries the

[a] Xenophon, Sympos. vii. 1, ii. 18-19. *προγάστωρ*, &c.

[b] The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of Antisthenes respecting the bad temper of Xanthippê, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements of the *ὀρχηστρίς* by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also iii. 11.

burlesque farther than any of them; pretending to be equal in personal beauty to Kritobulus, and priding himself upon the function of a pander, which he professes to exercise. Antisthenes, however, is offended, when Sokrates fastens upon him a similar function; but the latter softens the meaning of the term so as to appease him. In general, each guest is made to take pride in something the direct reverse of that which really belongs to him; and to defend his thesis in a strain of humorous parody. Antisthenes, for example, boasts of his wealth.[c] The Syracusan ballet-master is described as jealous of Sokrates, and as addressing to him some remarks of offensive rudeness; which Sokrates turns off, and even begins to sing, for the purpose of preventing confusion and ill-temper from spreading among the company:[d] while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.

Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion.

Though the Xenophontic Symposion is declared to be an alternate mixture of banter and seriousness,[e] yet the only long serious argument or lecture delivered is that by Sokrates; in which he pronounces a professed panegyric upon Eros, but at the same time pointedly distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the former—selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.[f]

The Xenophontic Symposion closes with a pantomimic scene of Dionysus and Ariadnê as lovers represented (at the instance of Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his

[c] Xen. Symp. c. 4-5.

[d] Xen. Symp. vi. Αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ παροινία οὕτω κατεσβέσθη, vii. 1-5.

Epiktêtus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates — his patience and power of soothing angry men (ii. 12-14).

[e] Xen. Symp. iv. 28. ἀναμὶξ ἔσκωψάν τε καὶ ἐσπούδασαν, viii. 41.

[f] Xen. Symp. viii. 24. The argument against the sensual is enforced with so much warmth that Sokrates is made to advert to the fact of his being elate with wine—ὃ τε γὰρ οἶνος συνεπαίρει, καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ σύνοικος ἐμοὶ ἔρως κεντρίζει εἰς τὸν ἀντίπαλον ἔρωτα αὐτοῦ παῤῥησιάζεσθαι.

The contrast between the customs of the Thebans and Eleians, and those of the Lacedæmonians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep. Laced. ii. 13. Plato puts (Symp. 182) a like contrast into the mouth of Pausanias, assimilating the customs of Athens in this respect to those of Sparta. The comparison between Plato and Xenophon is here curious; we see how much more copious and inventive is the reasoning of Plato.

staff. This is described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates himself departs with Lykon and Kallias, to be present at the exercise of Autolykus.[g]

We see thus that the Platonic Symposion is much more ideal, and departs farther from common practice and sentiment, than the Xenophontic. It discards all the common accessories of a banquet (musical or dancing artists), and throws the guests altogether upon their own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. If we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima—we shall appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic imagination, as compared with the more restricted range and common-place practical sense of Xenophon.[h] All the Platonic speakers are accomplished persons—a man of letters, a physician, two successful poets, a prophetess: the Xenophontic personages, except Sokrates and Antisthenes, are persons of ordinary capacity. The Platonic Symposion, after presenting Eros in five different points of view, gives pre-eminence and emphasis to a sixth, in which Eros is regarded as the privileged minister and conductor to the mysteries of philosophy, both the lowest and the highest: the Xenophontic Symposion dwells upon one view only of Eros (developed by Sokrates) and cites Kallias as example of it, making no mention of philosophy. The Platonic Symposion exalts Sokrates, as the representative of Eros Philosophus, to a pinnacle of elevation which places him above human fears and weaknesses[i]—coupled however with that eccentricity which makes the vulgar regard a philosopher as out of his mind: the Xenophontic Symposion pre-

Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the Xenophontic.

[g] Xen. Symp. viii. 5, ix. 7. The close of the Xenophontic Symposion is, to a great degree, in harmony with modern sentiment, though what is there expressed would probably be left to be understood. The Platonic Symposion departs altogether from that sentiment.

[h] The difference between the two coincides very much with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Phædrus—*θεία μανία* as contrasted with *σωφροσύνη θνητὴ* (p. 256 E). Compare Athenæus, v. 187 B.

[i] Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 E. *νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλοὺς—αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος.*

sents him only as a cheerful, amiable companion, advising temperance, yet enjoying a convivial hour, and contributing more than any one else to the general hilarity.

Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between the same subject as handled by these two eminent contemporaries, both of them companions, and admirers of Sokrates: and each handling it in his own manner.[k]

Second half of the Phædrus—passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise.

I have already stated that the first half of the Phædrus differs materially from the second; and that its three discourses on the subject of Eros (the first two depreciating Eros, the third being an effusion of highflown and poetical panegyric on the same theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction with the Symposion. The second half of the Phædrus passes into a different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a rhetorical composition: examining the

[k] Which of these two Symposia was latest in date of composition we cannot determine with certainty: though it seems certain that the latest of the two was not composed in imitation of the earliest.

From the allusion to the διοίκισις of Mantineia (p. 193 A) we know that the Platonic Symposion must have been composed after 385 B.C.: there is great probability also, though not full certainty, that it was composed during the time whan Mantineia was still an aggregate of separate villages and not a town—that is, between 385-370 B.C., in which latter year Mantineia was re-established as a city. The Xenophontic Symposion affords no mark of date of composition; Xenophon reports it as having been himself present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an opinion supported by Pausanias ὁ Ἀγάθωνος τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐραστής, who discourses in the Platonic Symposion; and several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the Platonic Symposion. I think this opinion improbable. It would require us to suppose that Xenophon is inaccurate, since the opinion which he ascribes to Pausanias is not delivered by Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by Phædrus. Athenæus (v. 216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but he does not mention that it *is* delivered by Phædrus. He remarks that there was no known written composition of Pausanias himself: and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the Platonic Symposion, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenæus wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the Platonic Symposion cannot have really occurred at the time to which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant: the speeches are doubtless all composed by Plato. If Athenæus was anxious to prove anachronism against Plato, I am surprised that he did not notice that of the διοίκισις of Mantineia mentioned in a conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of Sokrates, who died in 399 B.C.

I incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended to apply to the Symposion of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion to Pausanias, Plato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable. I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the Platonic Symposion is earliest. Compare the Præf. of Schneider to the former, pp. 140-143.

principles upon which the teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either is founded, or ought to be founded: and estimating the efficacy of written discourse generally, as a means of working upon or instructing other minds.

I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phædrus) severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses, for fear of being called Sophists.[l] To write discourses (replies Sokrates) is noway discreditable: the real question is, whether he writes them well.[m] And the same question is the only one proper to be asked about other writers on all subjects—public or private, in prose or in verse. How to speak *well*, and how to write *well*—is the problem.[n] Is there any art or systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object *well?* Or does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor describe to others?

Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word.

Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill?

[l] Plato, Phædrus, p. 257 C.

[m] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D. The two appellations—λογογράφος and σοφιστής—are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just as they stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 417. It is plain that both appellations acquired their discreditable import mainly from the collateral circumstance that the persons so denominated took money for their compositions or teaching. The λογογράφος wrote for pay, and on behalf of any client who could pay him. In the strict etymological sense, neither of the two terms would imply any reproach.

Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of the reproachful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term λογογράφος only in this etymological, literal sense, omitting to notice the collateral association which really gave point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker. This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phædrus, we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all, he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a philosophical estimate of the value of writing as a means of instruction.

Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in comparing the λογογράφος to the proposer of a law or decree. "Igitur, quum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset, ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ, &c., Plato aliter longé quam vulgo acciperetur, neque sine calumniâ quâdam, interpretatus est" (ad p. 258).

[n] Plato, Phædrus, p. 259 E. ὑπὲρ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅπῃ μή, σκεπτέον.—c. 89, p. 258 E. τίς ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν.

Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?

First let us ask—When an orator addresses himself to a listening crowd upon the common themes—Good and Evil, Just and Unjust—is it necessary that he should know what is really and truly good and evil, just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, that it is enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate himself, if he wishes to persuade.[o]

Theory of Sokrates—That all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth

He may persuade the people under these circumstances (replies Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be to their misfortune and to his own. He ought to know the real truth—not merely what the public whom he addresses believe to be the truth—respecting just and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be no genuine art of speaking, which is not founded upon knowledge of the truth, and upon adequate philosophical comprehension of the subject-matter.[p] The rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of rhetoric, when they confine it to public harangues addressed to the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric embraces all guidance of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good, presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as being both like and unlike—both one and many—both in motion and at rest: in either case the art (if there be any art) and its principles are the same. You ought to assimilate every thing to every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real likeness,

[o] Plato, Phædrus, p. 260 A.

[p] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 260-261.

deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed off as the other: if there be little likeness, deception will be difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.[q]

Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define.

Sokrates then compares the oration of Lysias with his own two orations (the first depreciating, the second extolling, Eros) in the point of view of art; to see how far they are artistically constructed. Among the matters of discourse, there are some on which all men are agreed, and on which therefore the speaker may assume established unanimity in his audience: there are others on which great dissension and discord prevail. Among the latter (the topics of dissension), questions about just and unjust, good and evil, stand foremost:[r] it is upon these that deception is most easy, and rhetorical skill most efficacious. Accordingly, an orator should begin by understanding to which of these two categories the topic which he handles belongs: If it belongs to the second category (those liable to dissension) he ought, at the outset, to define what he himself means by it, and what he intends the audience to understand. Now Eros is a topic on which great dissension prevails. It ought therefore to have been defined at the commencement of the discourse. This Sokrates in his discourse has done: but Lysias has omitted to do it, and has assumed Eros to be obviously and unanimously apprehended by every one. Besides, the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang together by any thread of necessary connection, as they ought to do if the discourse were put together according to rule.[s]

Logical processes—Definition and Division—both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates.

Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the process of *logical definition* exemplified in the case of Eros—but also the process of *logical division*, in the case of Madness or Irrationality. This last extensive genus was divided first into two species—Madness, from human distemper—Mad-

[q] Plato, Phædrus, p. 262.

[r] Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad. i. p. 109.

[s] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-265.

ness, from divine inspiration, carrying a man out of the customary orthodoxy.[t] Next, this last species was again divided into four branches or sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration—the prophetic, emanating from Apollo—the ritual or mystic, from Dionysus—the poetic, from the Muses—the amatory, from Eros and Aphroditê.[u] Now both these processes, *definition* and *division*, are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in words as the definition. He ought also to perform the counter-process: to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to the joints) but into legitimate species:[x] each founded on some positive and assignable characteristic. "It is these divisions and combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature—I follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician."[y]

This is Dialectic (replies Phædrus); but it is not Rhetoric, as Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.

[t] Plato, Phædr. p. 265 A. *ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων.*

[u] Plato, Phædrus, p. 265.

[x] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266.

εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵν' ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ.

τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδὲν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον.

Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. "Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam. Dividi enim illam, non concidi, utile est."

[y] Plato, Phædrus, p. 266.

Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστὴς, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκὸς ὁρᾷν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾷν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε· καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς.

What else is there worth having (says Sokrates), which these professors teach? The order and distribution of a discourse: first, the exordium, then recital, proof, second proof, refutation, recapitulation at the close: advice how to introduce maxims or similes: receipts for moving the anger or compassion of the dikasts. Such teaching doubtless enables a speaker to produce considerable effect upon popular assemblies:[z] but it is not the art of rhetoric. It is an assemblage of preliminary accomplishments, necessary before a man can acquire the art: but it is not the art itself. You must know when, how far, in what cases, and towards what persons, to employ these accomplishments:[a] otherwise you have not learnt the art of rhetoric. You may just as well consider yourself a physician because you know how to bring about vomit and purging—or a musician, because you know how to wind up or unwind the chords of your lyre. These teachers mistake the preliminaries or antecedents of the art, for the art itself. It is in the right, measured, seasonable, combination and application of these preliminaries, in different doses adapted to each special matter and audience—that the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to acquire for himself.[b]

View of Sokrates—That there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic—The rhetorical teaching is empty and useless.

The true art of rhetoric (continues Sokrates) embraces a larger range than these teachers imagine. It deals with mind, as the medical researches of Hippokrates deal with body—as a generic total with all its species and varieties, and as essentially relative to the totality of external circumstances. First, Hippokrates investigates how far the body is, in every particular man, simple, homogeneous, uniform: and how far it is complex, heterogeneous, multiform, in the diversity of individuals. If it be one and the same, or in so far as it is one and the same, he examines what are its properties in relation to

What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be—Analogy of Hippokrates and the medical Art.

[z] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 267-268.

[a] Plato, Phædrus, p. 268. ἐρέσθαι εἰ προσεπίσταται καὶ οὑστίνας δεῖ καὶ ὅποτε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὁπόσου;

[b] Plato, Phædrus, p. 269.

each particular substance acting upon it or acted upon by it. In so far as it is multiform and various, he examines and compares each of the different varieties, in the same manner, to ascertain its properties in relation to every substance.[c] It is in this way that Hippokrates discovers the nature or essence of the human body, distinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.

Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case.

Now the true rhetor ought to deal with the human mind in like manner. His task is to work persuasion in the minds of certain men by means of discourse. He has therefore, first, to ascertain how far all mind is one and the same, and what are the affections belonging to it universally in relation to other things: next, to distinguish the different varieties of minds, together with the properties, susceptibilities, and active aptitudes, of each: carrying the subdivision down until he comes to a variety no longer admitting division.[d] He must then proceed to distinguish the different varieties of discourse, noting the effects which each is calculated to produce or to hinder, and the different ways in which it is likely to impress different minds.[e] Such and such men are persuadeable by such and such discourses—or the contrary. Having framed these two general classifications, the rhetor must on each particular occasion acquire a rapid tact in discerning to which class of minds the persons whom he is about to address belong: and therefore

[c] Plato, Phædrus, p. 270.

Ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως; Πρῶτον μέν, ἁπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν, οὗ περὶ βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν; ἔπειτα δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ἁπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρῶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐὰν δὲ πλείω εἴδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενος, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

[d] Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 B. ὁρισάμενος δὲ πάλιν κατ' εἴδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστήθη.

[e] Plato, Phædrus, p. 271. Πρῶτον, πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές· τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.

Δεύτερον, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.

Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, δίειμι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων οἷα οὖσα ὑφ' οἵων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.

what class of discourses will be likely to operate on them persuasively.[f] He must farther know those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors insist; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit within which each can be safely employed.[g]

Nothing less than this assemblage of acquirements (says Sokrates) will suffice to constitute a real artist, either in speaking or writing. Arduous and fatiguing indeed the acquisition is: but there is no easier road. And those who tell us that the rhetor need not know what is really true, but only what his audience will believe to be true—must be reminded that this belief, on the part of the audience, arises from the likeness of that which they believe, to the real truth. Accordingly, he who knows the real truth will be cleverest in suggesting apparent or quasi-truth adapted to their feelings. If a man is bent on becoming an artist in rhetoric, he must go through the process here marked out: yet undoubtedly the process is so laborious, that rhetoric, when he has acquired it, is no adequate reward. We ought to learn how to speak and act in a way agreeable to the Gods, and this is worth all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.[h]

The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour.

We have now determined what goes to constitute genuine art, in speaking or in writing. But how far is writing, even when art is applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? or indeed of having art applied to it at all? Sokrates answers himself—Only to a small degree. Writing will impart amusement and satisfaction for the moment:

Question about Writing—as an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little—Reasons why.—Writing may remind the

[f] Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 E. δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἑπακολουθεῖν, &c.

[g] Plato, Phædrus, p. 272. ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη πάντ' ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον ἢ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἑκάστων τε ὅσ' ἂν εἴδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἔστιν ἡ τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ' οὔ.

[h] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274.

reader of what he already knows.

it will remind the reader of something which he knew before, if he really did know. But in respect to anything which he did not know before, it will neither teach nor persuade him: it may produce in him an impression or fancy that he is wiser than he was before, but such impression is illusory, and at best only transient. Writing is like painting—one and the same to all readers, whether young or old, well or ill informed. It cannot adapt itself to the different state of mind of different persons, as we have declared that every finished speaker ought to do. It cannot answer questions, supply deficiencies, reply to objections, rectify misunderstanding. It is defenceless against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles the memory, implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the reality.[i]

Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are necessary.

Any writer therefore, in prose or verse—Homer, Solon, or Lysias—who imagines that he can by a ready-made composition, however carefully turned,[k] *if simply heard or read without cross-examination or oral comment,* produce any serious and permanent effect in persuading or teaching, beyond a temporary gratification—falls into a disgraceful error. If he intends to accomplish anything serious, he must be competent to originate spoken discourse more effective than the written. The written word is but a mere phantom or ghost of the spoken word: which latter is the only legitimate offspring of the teacher, springing fresh and living out of his mind, and engraving itself profoundly on the mind of the hearer.[l] The speaker must know, with discriminative comprehension, and in logical subdivision, both the matter on which he discourses, and the minds of the particular hearers to

[i] Plato, Phædrus, p. 275.

ταὐτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι (οἱ γεγραμμένοι)· δόξαις μέν ἂν ὡς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρῃ τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἓν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί. Ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γε καὶ μή.

[k] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 277-278. ὡς οἱ βαψῳδούμενοι (λόγοι) ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἕνεκα ἐλέχθησαν, &c.

[l] Plato, Phædrus, p. 276.

ἄλλον ὁρῶμεν λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀμείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται; Ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμῦναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σεγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα κα ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἴδωλον ἄν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως, &c. c. 143 p. 278 A.

whom he addresses himself. He will thus be able to adapt the order, the distribution, the manner of presenting his subject, to the apprehension of the particular hearers and the exigencies of the particular moment. He will submit to cross-examination,[m] remove difficulties, and furnish all additional explanations which the case requires. By this process he will not indeed produce that immediate, though flashy and evanescent, impression of suddenly acquired knowledge, which arises from the perusal of what is written. He will sow seed which for a long time appears buried under ground; but which, after such interval, springs up and ripens into complete and lasting fruit.[n] By repeated dialectic debate, he will both familiarise to his own mind and propagate in his fellow-dialogists, full knowledge; together with all the manifold reasonings bearing on the subject, and with the power also of turning it on many different sides, of repelling objections and clearing up obscurities. It is not from writing, but from dialectic debate, artistically diversified and adequately prolonged, that full and deep teaching proceeds; prolific in its own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to all.[o]

This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the criticisms on Lysias in the Phædrus, is farther illustrated by the praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Isokrates occupied that which Plato in Euthydêmus calls "the border country between philosophy and politics." Many critics declare (and I think with probable reason [p]) that Isokrates is the person intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the Euthydêmus. In the Phædrus, Isokrates is described as the intimate friend of Sokrates, still young; and is pronounced already superior in every way to Lysias—likely to become superior in future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished—and destined

[m] Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 C. εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἢ τἀληθὲς ἔχει συνέθηκε ταῦτα (τὰ συγγράμματα) καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδεῖξαι, &c.

[n] Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A.

[o] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 276-277.

[p] See above, vol. i. ch. xix. p. 560.

probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.[q]

When we consider that the Phædrus was pretty sure to bring upon Plato a good deal of enmity—since it attacked, by name, both Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated—we can understand how Plato became disposed to lighten this amount of enmity by a compliment paid to Isokrates. This latter rhetor, a few years older than Plato, was the son of opulent parents at Athens, and received a good education; but when his family became impoverished by the disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war, he established himself as a teacher of rhetoric at Chios: after some time, however, he returned to Athens, and followed the same profession there. He engaged himself also, like Lysias, in composing discourses for pleaders before the dikastery[r] and for speakers in the assembly; by which practice he acquired both fortune and reputation. Later in life, he relinquished these harangues destined for real persons on real occasions, and confined himself to the composition of discourses (intended, not for contentious debate, but for the pleasure and instruction of hearers) on general questions—social, political, and philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he composed the Phædrus, had satisfaction in contrasting him favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying

[q] Plato, Phædr. p. 279 A.

[r] Dionys. H. De Isocrate Judicium, p. 576. δεσμὰς πάνυ πολλὰς δικανικῶν λόγων περιφέρεσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βιβλιοπωλῶν Ἀριστοτέλης, &c.

Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. pp. 837-838.

The Athenian Polykrates had been forced, by loss of property, to quit Athens and undertake the work of a Sophist in Cyprus. Isokrates expresses much sympathy for him: it was a misfortune like what had happened to himself (Orat. xi. Busiris 1). Compare De Permutation. Or. xv. s. 172.

The assertion made by Isol that he did not compose political and judicial orations, to be spoken by individuals for real causes and public discussions—may be true comparatively, and with reference to a certain period of his life. But it is only to be received subject to much reserve and qualification. Even out of the twenty-one orations of Isokrates which we possess, the last five are composed to be spoken by pleaders before the dikastery. They are such discourses as the logographers, Lysias among the rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.

that he would make yet greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato composed the Euthydêmus, his feeling was different.[s] In the Phædrus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior: in the Euthydêmus, he is compared with philosophers as well as with rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy generally: Plato then declares him to be a presumptuous half-bred, and extols against him even the very philosopher whom he himself had just been caricaturing. To apply a Platonic simile, the most beautiful ape is ugly compared with man—the most beautiful man is an ape compared with the Gods:[t] the same intermediate position between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isokrates.

From the pen of Isokrates also, we find various passages apparently directed against the viri Socratici including Plato (though without his name): depreciating,[u] as idle and worthless, new political theories, analytical discussions on the principles of ethics, and dialectic subtleties: maintaining that the word philosophy was erroneously interpreted and defined by many contemporaries, in a sense too much withdrawn from practical results: and affirming that his own teaching was calculated to impart genuine philosophy. During the last half of Plato's life, his school and that of Isokrates were the most celebrated among all that existed at Athens. There was competition between them, gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement during the last ten years of Plato's life, when his scholar Aristotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school of rhetoric in opposition to him.[x] Kephisodôrus, a pupil of Isokrates,

[s] Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306. I am inclined to agree with Ueberweg in thinking that the Euthydêmus is later than the Phædrus—Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, pp. 256-259-265.

[t] Plato, Hipp. Major, p. 289.

[u] Isokrates, Orat. x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); Orat. v. (Philipp.) 12; Or. xiii. (Sophist.) 9-24; Orat. xv. (Permut.) sect. 285-290. φιλοσοφίαν μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν προσαγορεύειν τὴν μηδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μήτε πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μήτε πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ὠφελοῦσαν—τὴν καλουμένην ὑπό τινων φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί, &c.

[x] Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141; Orator. 19, 62; Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr, Aristotelia, i. p. 63 seq., ii. p. 44 seq. Schroeder's Quæstiones Isocrateæ

retaliated; publishing against Aristotle, as well as against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of Isokrates, commented unfavourably upon Plato in his writings: and other writers who did the same may probably have belonged to the Isokratean school.[y]

The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer.

This is the true philosopher (continues Sokrates)—the man who alone is competent to teach truth about the just, good, and honourable.[z] He who merely writes, must not delude himself with the belief, that upon these important topics his composition can impart any clear or lasting instruction. To mistake fancy for reality hereupon, is equally disgraceful, whether the mistake be made by few or by many persons. If indeed the writer can explain to others orally the matters written—if he can answer all questions, solve difficulties, and supply the deficiencies, of each several reader—in that case he is something far more and better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if he can do no more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a poet, or nomographer, or logographer.[a]

Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher.

In this latter class stands Lysias. I expect (concludes Sokrates) something better from Isokrates, who gives promise of aspiring one day to genuine philosophy.[b]

(Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's work, Isokrates und Plato, are instructive in regard to these two contemporary luminaries of the intellectual world at Athens. But, unfortunately, we can make out few ascertainable facts. When I read the Oration De Permut., Or. XV. (composed by Isokrates about fifteen years before his own death, and about five years before the death of Plato, near 353 B.C.), I am impressed with the belief that many of his complaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism refer to the Platonic school of that day, Aristotle being one of its members. See sections 48-90-276, and seq. He certainly means the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when he talks of *οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις, οὓς ἀντιλογικοὺς καλοῦσιν—οἱ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας σπουδάζοντες*—those who are powerful in contentious dialectic, and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which others call *ἀδολεσχία* and *μικρολογία* (280)—those who exhorted hearers to virtue about which others knew nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he complains of the *περιττολόγιαι* of the ancient Sophists, Empedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus, &c., we cannot but suppose that he had in his mind the Timæus of Plato also, though he avoids mention of the name.

[y] Athenæus, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 757.

[z] Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 D-E.

[a] Plato, Phædr. pp. 278-279.

[b] Respecting the manner in which

I have already observed that I dissent from the hypothesis of Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the Phædrus either as positively the earliest, or at least among the earliest, of the Platonic dialogues, composed several years before the death of Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other critics, who refer it to a much later period of Plato's life: though I see no sufficient evidence to determine more exactly either its date or its place in the chronological series of dialogues. The views opened in the second half of the dialogue, on the theory of rhetoric and on the efficacy of written compositions as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable.

Date of the Phædrus—not an early dialogue.

The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly admired at the time by his friends, Phædrus among them) is contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates (supposed to be improvised on the occasion); next with a second pleading of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and intended as a recantation. These three discourses are criticised from the rhetorical point of view,[c] and are made the handle for introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that ever emanated from Plato.

Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses—His theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.

The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his questions. But in the Phædrus we find Plato (under the name of Sokrates) assuming as the basis of his theory, that an expositor shall be found who *knows* what is really and truly just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable—distinct from, and independent of, the established beliefs on these subjects, traditional among his neighbours

His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured—it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed.

Plato speaks of Isokrates in the Phædrus, see what I have already observed upon the Euthydêmus, vol. i. ch. xix. pp. 561-562.

[c] Plato, Phædrus, p. 235 A.

and fellow-citizens:[d] assuming (to express the same thing in other words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated, and removed.

The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.

The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical definition and division: that is, he must be able to gather up many separate fragmentary particulars into one general notion, clearly identified and embodied in a definition: and he must be farther able to subdivide such a general notion into its constituent specific notions, each marked by some distinct characteristic feature.[e] This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable in matters small or great.[f]

Thus far we are in Dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by way of classifying and declassifying: in which it is assumed that the expositor will find minds unoccupied and unprejudiced, ready to welcome the truth when he lays it before them. But there are many topics on which men's minds are, in the common and natural course of things, both pre-occupied and dissentient with each other. This is especially the case with Justice, Goodness, the Honourable, &c.[g] It is one of the first requisites for the expositor to be able to discriminate this class of topics, where error and discordance grow up naturally among those whom he addresses. It is here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be undeceived—contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides: such disputes belong to the province of Rhetoric.

The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-

The Rhetor is one who does not teach (according to the logical process previously described), but persuades; guiding the mind by discourse to or from various opinions or sentiments.[h] Now if this is to

[d] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, 262 B.

[e] Plato, Phædr. p. 266.

[f] Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A. That truth upon matters small and contemptible deserves to be sought out and proved as much as upon matters great and sublime, is a doctrine affirmed in the Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês, Sophist. pp. 218 E, 227 A, Politik. 266 D, Parmenid. 130 E.

[g] Plato, Phædr. p. 263 A.

[h] Plato, Phædr. p. 261 A. ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, &c.

be done *by art* and methodically—that is, upon principle or system explicable and defensible—it presupposes (according to Plato) a knowledge of truth, and can only be performed by the logical expositor. For when men are deceived, it is only because they mistake what is like truth for truth itself: when they are undeceived, it is because they are made to perceive that what they believe to be truth is only an apparent likeness thereof. Such resemblances are strong or faint, differing by many gradations. Now no one can detect, or bring into account, or compare, these shades of resemblance, except he who knows the truth to which they all ultimately refer. It is through the slight differences that deception is operated. To deceive a man, you must carry him gradually away from the truth by transitional stages, each resembling that which immediately precedes, though the last in the series will hardly at all resemble the first: to undeceive him (or to avoid being deceived yourself), you must conduct him back by the counter-process from error to truth, by a series of transitional resemblances tending in that direction. You cannot do this like an artist (on system and by predetermination), unless you know what the truth is.[1] By any one who does not know, the process will be performed without art, or at hap-hazard.

occupied—guiding them methodically from error to truth.

The Rhetor—being assumed as already knowing the truth—if he wishes to make persuasion an art, must proceed in the following manner:—He must distribute the multiplicity of individual minds into distinct classes, each marked by its characteristic features of differences, emotional and intellectual. He must also distribute the manifold modes of discourse into distinct classes, each marked in like manner. Each of these modes of discourse is well adapted to persuade some classes of mind—badly adapted to persuade other classes: for such adaptation or non-adaptation there exists a rational necessity,[k] which the Rhetor must examine

He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case.

[1] Plato, Phædr., pp. 262 A-D, 273 D.

[k] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 270 E. 271 B-D. *Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη, καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, διείσι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων οἷα οὖσα ὑφ' οἵων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.*

and ascertain, informing himself which modes of discourse are adapted to each different class of mind. Having mastered this general question, he must, whenever he is about to speak, be able to distinguish, by rapid perception,[1] to which class of minds the hearer or hearers whom he is addressing belong: and accordingly, which mode of discourse is adapted to their particular case. Moreover, he must also seize, in the case before him, the seasonable moment and the appropriate limit, for the use of each mode of discourse. Unless the Rhetor is capable of fulfilling all these exigencies, without failing in any one point, his Rhetoric is not entitled to be called an Art. He requires, in order to be an artist in persuading the mind, as great an assemblage of varied capacities as Hippokrates declares to be necessary for a physician, the artist for curing or preserving the body.[m]

The total, thus summed up by Plato, of what is necessary to constitute an Art of Rhetoric, is striking and comprehensive. It is indeed an *idéal*, not merely unattainable by reason of its magnitude, but also including impracticable conditions. He begins by postulating a perfectly wise man, who knows all truth on the most important social subjects; on which his countrymen hold erroneous beliefs, just as sincerely as *he* holds his true beliefs. But Plato has already told us, in the Gorgias, that such a person will not be listened to: that in order to address auditors with effect, the rhetor must be in genuine harmony of belief and character with them, not dissenting from them either for the better or the worse: nay that the true philosopher (so we read in one of the most impressive portions of the Republic) not only has no chance of guiding the public mind, but incurs public obloquy, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes persecution.[n] The dissenter will never be allowed to be the guide of a body of orthodox believers; and is even likely enough, unless he

the public.

[1] Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 E. δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε ἑπακολουθεῖν, ᾗ εἰδέναι πω πλέον αὐτῶν ὧν τότε ἤκουε λόγων ξυνών.

[m] Plato, Phædr. p. 270 C.

[n] Plato, Gorg. p. 513 B, see supra, ch. xxii.; Republic, vi. pp. 495-496.

be prudent, to become their victim. He may be permitted to lecture or discuss, in the gardens of the Academy, with a few chosen friends, and to write eloquent dialogues: but if he embodies his views in motions before the public assembly, he will find only strenuous opposition, or something worse. This view, which is powerfully set forth by Sokrates both in the Gorgias and Republic, is founded on a just appreciation of human societies: and it is moreover the basis of the Sokratic procedure—That the first step to be taken is to disabuse men's minds of their false persuasion of knowledge—to make them conscious of ignorance—and thus to open their minds for the reception of truth. But if this be the fact, we must set aside as impracticable the postulate advanced by Sokrates here in the Phædrus—of a perfectly wise man as the employer of rhetorical artifices. Moreover I do not agree with what Sokrates is here made to lay down as the philosophy of Error:—that it derives its power of misleading from resemblance to truth. This is the case to a certain extent: but it is very incomplete as an account of the generating causes of error.

The other course.

But the other portion of Plato's sum total of what is necessary to an Art of Rhetoric, is not open to the same objection. It involves no incompatible conditions: and we can say nothing against it, except that it requires a breadth and logical command of scientific data, far greater than there is the smallest chance of attaining. That Art is an assemblage of processes, directed to a definite end, and prescribed by rules which themselves rest upon scientific data—we find first announced in the works of Plato.[o] A vast amount of scien-

[o] I repeat the citation from the Phædrus, one of the most striking passages in Plato, pp. 271 D, 261 A.

ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει. ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα· ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε γίγνονται. τούτων δὲ δὴ διῃρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε αἰτίαν ἐς τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς, &c.

The relation of Art to Science is thus perspicuously stated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the concluding chapter of his System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book vi. ch. xi. p. 521, ed. 4th).

"The relation in which rules of Art stand to doctrines of Science may be thus characterised. The Art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines

tific research, both inductive and deductive, is here assumed as an indispensable foundation—and even as a portion—of what he calls the Art of Rhetoric: first, a science of psychology, complete both in its principles and details: next, an exhaustive catalogue and classification of the various modes of operative speech, with their respective impression upon each different class of minds. So prodigious a measure of scientific requirement has never yet been filled up: of course, therefore, no one has ever put together a body of precepts commensurate with it. Aristotle, following partially the large conceptions of his master, has given a comprehensive view of many among the theoretical postulates of Rhetoric; and has partially enumerated the varieties both of persuadable auditors, and of persuasive means available to the speaker for guiding them. Cicero, Dionysius of Halikarnassus, Quintilian, have furnished valuable contributions towards this last category of data, but not much towards the first: being all of them defective in breadth of pyschological theory. Nor has Plato himself done anything to work out his conception in detail or to provide suitable rules for it. We read it only as an impressive sketch—a grand but unattainable *idéal*—"qualem nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum."

Indeed it seems that Plato himself regarded it as unattainable—and as only worth aiming at for the purpose of pleasing the Gods, not with any view to practical benefit, arising from either speech or action among mankind.[p] This is a point to be considered, when we compare his views on Rhetoric with those of

Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical teachers—Usefulness of these teachers for

the end, and hands it over to the Science. The Science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to Art with a theorem of the combinations of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premisses therefore that Art supplies, is, the original major premiss, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premisses Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable; and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept."

[p] Plato, Phædr. pp. 273-274. ἦν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς ἡ &c.

Lysias and the other rhetors, whom he here judges unfavourably and even contemptuously. The work of speech and action among mankind, which Plato sets aside as unworthy of attention, was the express object of solicitude to Lysias, Isokrates, and rhetors generally: that which they practised efficaciously themselves, and which they desired to assist, cultivate, and improve in others: that which Perikles, in his funeral oration preserved by Thucydides, represents as the pride of the Athenian people collectively[q]—combination of full freedom of preliminary contentious debate, with energy in executing the resolution which might be ultimately adopted. These rhetors, by the example of their composed speeches as well as by their teaching, did much to impart to young men the power of expressing themselves with fluency and effect before auditors, either in the assembly or in the dikastery: as Sokrates here fully admits.[r] Towards this purpose it was useful to analyse the constituent parts of a discourse, and to give an appropriate name to each part. Accordingly, all the rhetorical teachers (Quintilian included) continued such analysis, though differing more or less in their way of performing it, until the extinction of Pagan civilisation. Young men were taught to learn by heart regular discourses,[s]—to compose the like for themselves—to understand the difference between such as were well or ill composed—and to acquire a command of oratorical means for moving or convincing the hearer. All this instruction had a practical value: though Plato, both here and elsewhere, treats it as worthless. A citizen who stood mute and embarrassed, unable to argue a case with some propriety before an audience, felt himself helpless and defective in one of the characteristic privileges of a Greek and a freeman: while one who could perform the process well, acquired much esteem and influence.[t] The Pla-

an accomplished man.

[q] Thucyd. ii. 39-40-41.

[r] Plato, Phædrus, p. 268 A.

[s] See what is said by Aristotle about ἡ Γοργίου πραγματεία in the last chapter of De Sophisticis Elenchis.

[t] I have illustrated this point in my History of Greece, by the example of Xenophon in his command of the Cyreian army during its retreat. His democratical education, and his powers of public speaking, were of the greatest service not only in procuring influence to himself, but also in conducting the army through its many perils and difficulties.

See Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 1, 3, p.

tonic Sokrates in the Gorgias consoles the speechless men by saying—What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous? Such consolation failed to satisfy: as it would fail to satisfy the sick, the lame, or the blind.

The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners.

The teaching of these rhetors thus contributed to the security, dignity, and usefulness of the citizens, by arming them for public speech and action. But it was essentially practical, or empirical: it had little system, and was founded upon a narrow theory. Upon these points Plato in the Phædrus attacks them. He sets little value upon the accomplishments arming men for speech and action (λεκτικοὺς καὶ πρακτικοὺς εἶναι)—and he will not allow such teaching to be called an Art. He explains, in opposition to them, what he himself conceived the Art of Rhetoric to be, in the comprehensive way which I have above described.

But if the conception of the Art, as entertained by the Rhetors, is too narrow—that of Plato, on the other hand, is too wide.

First, it includes the whole basis of science or theory on which the Art rests: it is a Philosophy of Rhetoric, expounded by a theorist—rather than an Art of Rhetoric, taught to learners by a master. To teach the observance of certain rules or precepts is one thing: to set forth the reasons upon which those rules are founded, is another—highly important indeed, and proper to be known by the teacher; yet not necessarily communicated, or even communicable, to all learners. Quintilian, in his Institutio Rhetorica, gives both:—an ample theory, as well as an ample development of rules, of his professional teaching. But he would not have thought himself obliged to give this ample theory to all learners. With many, he would have been satisfied to make them understand the rules, and to exercise them in the ready observance thereof.

Plato includes, in his conception of Art, the application thereof to new particulars.

Secondly, Plato, in defining the Art of Rhetoric, includes not only its foundation of science (which, though intimately connected with it, ought not to be considered as a constituent part), but also the application of it to particular cases; which application lies beyond

the province both of science and of art, and cannot be reduced to any rule. "The Rhetor" (says Plato) "must teach his pupils, not merely to observe the rules whereby persuasion is operated, but also to know the particular persons to whom those rules are to be applied—on what occasions—within what limits—at what peculiar moments, &c.[u] Unless the Rhetor can teach thus much, his pretended art is no art at all: all his other teaching is of no value." Now this is an amount of exigence which can never be realised. Neither art nor science can communicate that which Plato here requires. The rules of art, together with many different hypothetical applications thereof, may be learnt: when the scientific explanation of the rules is superadded, the learner will be assisted farther towards fresh applications: but after both these have been learnt, the new cases which will arise can never be specially foreseen. The proper way of applying the general precepts to each case must be suggested by conjecture adapted to the circumstances, under the corrections of past experience.[x] It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing deserves the name of art[y] except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand: then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases, the analogy of the medical art, which he here instructively invokes, would be against him on this point.

lar cases—This can never be taught by rule.

While therefore Plato's view of the science or theory of

[u] Plato, Phædr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.

[x] What Longinus says about critical skill is applicable here also—πολλῆς ἔστι πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα. Isokrates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290-312-316) has some good remarks about the impossibility of ἐπιστήμη respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts τέχνη, which he states to depend upon reason and foreknowledge, in opposition to ἐμπειρία and τριβή, which he considers as dependant on the φύσις στοχαστική. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to particular cases, the φύσις στοχαστική is the best that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of τέχνη given in the Gorgias is open to the same remark as that which we find in the Phædrus. Plato, in another passage of the Phædrus, speaks of the necessity that φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, and μελέτη, shall concur to make an accomplished orator. This is very true; and Lysias, Isokrates, and all the other rhetors whom Plato satirises, would have concurred in it. In his description of τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, and in the estimate which he gives of all that it comprises, he leaves no outlying ground for μελέτη. Compare Xenophon. Memor. iii. 1, 11; also Isokrates contra Sophistas, s. 16; and a good passage of Dionysius Halik. De Compos. Verborum, in which that rhetor remarks that καιρὸς or opportunity neither has been nor can be reduced to art and rule.

[y] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 464-465.

Rhetoric is far more comprehensive and philosophical than anything given by the rhetorical teachers — he has not made good his charge against them, that what they taught as an art of Rhetoric was useless and illusory. The charge can only be sustained if we grant—what appears to have been Plato's own feeling—that the social and political life of the Athenians was a dirty and corrupt business, unworthy of a virtuous man to meddle with. This is the argument of Sokrates (in the Gorgias,[2] the other great anti-rhetorical dialogue), proclaiming himself to stand alone and aloof, an isolated, free-thinking dissenter. As representing his sincere conviction, and interpreting Plato's plan of life, this argument deserves honourable recognition. But we must remember that Lysias and the rhetorical teachers repudiated such a point of view. They aimed at assisting and strengthening others to perform their parts, not in speculative debate on philosophy, but in active citizenship; and they succeeded in this object to a great degree. The rhetorical ability of Lysias personally is attested not merely by the superlative encomium on him assigned to Phædrus,[3] but also by his great celebrity—by the frequent demand for his services as a logographer or composer of discourses for others—by the number of his discourses preserved and studied after his death. He, and a fair proportion of the other rhetors named in the Phædrus, performed well the useful work which they undertook.

Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out.

When Plato selects, out of the very numerous discourses before him composed by Lysias, one hardly intended for any real auditors—neither deliberative, nor judicial, nor panegyrical, but an ingenious erotic paradox for a private circle of friends—this is no fair specimen of the author. Moreover Plato criticises it as if it were a philosophical exposition instead of an oratorical pleading. He complains that Lysias does not begin his discourse by defining—but neither do Demosthenes and other great orators proceed in that manner. He affirms that there is no organic structure, or necessary sequence, in the

Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle.

[2] Plato, Gorg. 521 D.

[3] Plato, Phædr. p. 228 A.

discourse, and that the sentences of it might be read in an inverted order:[b]—and this remark is to a certain extent well-founded. In respect to the skilful marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, so as to give best effect to the whole, Dionysius of Halikarnassus[c] declares Lysias to be inferior to some other orators—while ascribing to him marked oratorical superiority on various other points. Yet Plato, in specifying his objections against the erotic discourse of Lysias, does not show that it offends against the sound general principle which he himself lays down respecting the art of persuasion—That the topics insisted on by the persuader shall be adapted to the feelings and dispositions of the persuadend. Far from violating this principle, Lysias kept it in view, and employed it to the best of his power—as we may see not merely by his remaining orations, but also by the testimonies of the critics:[d] though he did not go through the large preliminary work of scientific classification, both of different minds and different persuasive apparatus, which Plato considers essential to a thorough comprehension and mastery of the principle.

The first discourse assigned by Plato to Sokrates professes to be placed in competition with the discourse of Lysias, and to aim at the same object. But in reality it aims at a different object: it gives the dissuasive arguments, but omits the persuasive—as Phædrus is made to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared with the discourse of Lysias. Still more may this be said respecting the second discourse of Sokrates: which is of a character and purpose so totally

No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus.

[b] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-264.

[c] Dionysius (Judic. De Lysiâ, pp. 487-493) gives an elaborate criticism on the πραγματικὸς χαρακτὴρ of Lysias. The special excellence of Lysias (according to this critic) lay in his judicial orations, which were highly persuasive and plausible: the manner of presenting thoughts was ingenious and adapted to the auditors: the narration of facts and details, especially, was performed with unrivalled skill. But as to the marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, Dionysius considers Lysias as inferior to some other orators—and still more inferior in respect to δεινότης and to strong emotional effects.

[d] Dionys. Hal. (Ars Rhetor. p. 381) notices the severe exigencies which Plato here imposes upon the Rhetor, remarking that scarcely any rhetorical discourse could be produced which came up to them. The defect did not belong to Lysias alone, but to all other rhetors also—ὅπου γὰρ καὶ Λυσίαν ἐλέγχει, πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ῥητορικὴν ἔοικεν ἐλέγχειν. Demosthenes almost alone (in the opinion of Dionysius) contrived to avoid the fault, because he imitated Plato.

disparate, that no fair comparison can be taken between it and the ostensible competitor. The mixture of philosophy, mysticism, and dithyrambic poetry, which this second discourse of Sokrates presents, was considered by a rhetorical judge like Dionysius as altogether inconsistent with the scope and purpose of reasonable discourse.[e] In the Menexenus, Plato has brought himself again into competition with Lysias, and there the competition is fairer:[f] for Plato has there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the Phædrus, and has composed a funeral discourse upon the received type; which Lysias and other orators before him had followed, from Perikles downward. But in the Phædrus, Plato criticises Lysias upon principles which are a medley between philosophy and rhetoric. Lysias, in defending himself, might have taken the same ground as we find Sokrates himself taking in the Euthydêmus. "Philosophy and Politics are two distinct walks, requiring different aptitudes, and having each its own practitioners. A man may take whichever he pleases; but he must not arrogate to himself superiority by an untoward attempt to join the two together."[g]

Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant.

Another important subject is also treated in the Phædrus. Sokrates delivers views both original and characteristic, respecting the efficacy of continuous discourse—either written to be read, or spoken to be heard without cross-examination—as a means of instruction. They are re-stated—in a manner substantially the same, though with some variety and fulness of illustration—in Plato's seventh Epistle[h] to the surviving friends of Dion. I have already touched upon these views in my fourth Chapter, on the Platonic Dialogues generally, and have pointed out how much Plato understood to be involved in what he termed *knowledge*. No man (in his view) could be said to know, who was not competent to sustain successfully, and to apply successfully, a Sokratic cross-examination. Now knowledge, involving such a competency, certainly can-

[e] See the Epistol. of Dionys. H. to Cneius Pompey—De Platone—pp. 755-765.

[f] Plato, Menexen. p. 237 seq. Stallbaum, Comm. in Menexenum, pp. 10-11.

[g] Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306 A-C.

[h] Plato, Epistol. vii. pp. 341-344.

not be communicated by any writing, or by any fixed and unchangeable array of words, whether written or spoken. You must familiarise learners with the subject on many different sides, and in relation to many different points of view, each presenting more or less chance of error or confusion. Moreover, you must apply a different treatment to each mind, and to the same mind at different stages: no two are exactly alike, and the treatment adapted for one will be unsuitable for the other. While it is impossible, for these reasons, to employ any set forms of words, it will be found that the process of reading or listening leaves the reader or listener comparatively passive: there is nothing to stir the depths of the mind, or to evolve the inherent forces and dormant capacities. Dialectic conversation is the only process which can adapt itself with infinite variety to each particular case and moment—and which stimulates fresh mental efforts ever renewed on the part of each respondent and each questioner. Knowledge—being a slow result generated by this stimulating operation, when skilfully conducted, long continued, and much diversified—is not infused into, but evolved out of, the mind. It consists in a revival of those unchangeable Ideas or Forms, with which the mind during its state of eternal pre-existence had had communion. There are only a few privileged minds, however, that have had sufficient communion therewith to render such revival possible: accordingly, none but these few can ever rise to knowledge.[1]

Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know—or as an elegant pastime.

Though knowledge cannot be first communicated by written matters, yet if it has been once communicated and subsequently forgotten, it may be revived by written matters. Writing has thus a real, though secondary, usefulness, as a memorandum. And Plato doubtless accounted written dialogues the most useful of all written compositions, because they imitated portions of that long oral process whereby alone knowledge had been originally generated. His dialogues were

[1] Schleiermacher, in his Introduction to the Phædrus, justly characterises this doctrine as genuine Sokratism—"die ächt Sokratische erhabene Verachtung alles Schreibens und alles rednerischen Redens," p. 70.

reports of the conversations purporting to have been held by Sokrates with others.

Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised.

It is an excellent feature in the didactic theories of Plato, that they distinguish so pointedly between the passive and active conditions of the intellect; and that they postulate as indispensable, an habitual and cultivated mental activity, worked up by slow, long-continued, colloquy. To read or hear, and then to commit to memory, are in his view elegant recreations, but nothing more. But while, on this point, Plato's didactic theories deserve admiration, we must remark on the other hand that they are pitched so high as to exceed human force, and to overpass all possibility of being realised.[k] They mark out an *idéal*, which no person ever attained, either then or since—like the Platonic theory of rhetoric. To be master of any subject, in the extent and perfection required for sustaining and administering a Sokratic cross-examination—is a condition which scarce any one can ever fulfil: certainly no one, except upon a small range of subjects. Assuredly, Plato himself never fulfilled it.

No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy.

Such a cross-examination involved the mastery of all the openings for doubt, difficulty, deception, or refutation, bearing on the subject: openings which a man is to profit by, if assailant—to keep guarded, if defendant. Now when we survey the Greek negative philosophy, as it appears in Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus Empiricus—and when we recollect that between the second and the third of these names, there appeared three other philosophers equally or more formidable in the same vein, all whose arguments have perished (Arkesilaus, Karneades, Ænesidêmus)—we shall see that no man has ever been known competent both to strike and parry with these weapons, in a manner so skilful and ready as to amount to knowledge in the Platonic sense. But in so far as such knowledge is attainable or approachable, Plato is

[k] A remark made by Sextus Empiricus (upon another doctrine which he is discussing) may be applied to this view of Plato—τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὅτι τῷ διομαλισμῷ τῶν πράξεων καταλαμβάνομεν τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, ὑπερφθεγγομένων ἐστὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, καὶ εὐχομένων μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθῆ λεγόντων (Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 244).

right in saying that it cannot be attained except by long dialectic practice. Reading books, and hearing lectures, are undoubtedly valuable aids, but insufficient by themselves. Modern times recede from it even more than ancient. Regulated oral dialectic has become unknown; the logical and metaphysical difficulties—which negative philosophy required to be solved before it would allow any farther progress—are now little heeded, amidst the multiplicity of observed facts, and theories adapted to and commensurate with those facts. This change in the character of philosophy is doubtless a great improvement. It is found that by acquiescing provisionally in the *axiomata media*, and by applying at every step the controul of verification, now rendered possible by the multitude of ascertained facts—the sciences may march safely onward: notwithstanding that the logical and metaphysical difficulties, the puzzles (*ἀπορίαι*) involved in *philosophia prima* and its very high abstractions, are left behind unsolved and indeterminate. But though the modern course of philosophy is preferable to the ancient, it is not for that reason to be considered as satisfactory. These metaphysical difficulties are not diminished either in force or relevancy, because modern writers choose to leave them unnoticed. Plato and Aristotle were quite right in propounding them as problems, the solution of which was indispensable to the exigencies and consistent schematism of the theorising intelligence, as well as to any complete discrimination between sufficient and insufficient evidence. Such they still remain, overlooked yet not defunct.

Now all these questions would be solved by the *idéal* philosopher whom Plato in the Phædrus conceives as possessing knowledge: a person who shall be at once a negative Sokrates in excogitating and enforcing all the difficulties—and an affirmative match for Sokrates, as respondent in solving them: a person competent to apply this process to all the indefinite variety of individual minds, under the inspirations of the moment. This is a magnificent *idéal*. Plato affirms truly, that those teachers who taught rhetoric and

Plato's *idéal* philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here.

philosophy by writing, could never produce such a pupil: and that even the Sokratic dialectic training, though indispensable and far more efficacious, would fail in doing so, unless in those few cases where it was favoured by very superior capacity—understood by him as superhuman, and as a remnant from the pre-existing commerce of the soul with the world of Forms or Ideas. The foundation therefore of the whole scheme rests upon Plato's hypothesis of an antecedent life of the soul, proclaimed by Sokrates here in his second or panegyrical discourse on Eros. The rhetorical teachers, with whom he here compares himself and whom he despises as aiming at low practical ends—might at any rate reply that they avoided losing themselves in such unmeasured and unwarranted hypotheses.

Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus.

One remark yet remains to be made upon the doctrine here set forth by Plato: that no teaching is possible by means of continuous discourse spoken or written —none, except through prolonged and varied oral dialectic.[1] To this doctrine Plato does not constantly conform in his practice: he departs from it on various important occasions. In the Timæus, Sokrates calls upon the philosopher so named for an exposition on the deepest and most mysterious cosmical subjects. Timæus delivers the exposition in a continuous harangue, without a word of remark or question addressed by any of the auditors: while at the beginning of the Kritias (the next succeeding dialogue) Sokrates greatly commends what Timæus had spoken. The Kritias itself too (though unfinished) is given in the form of continuous exposition. Now, as the Timæus is more abstruse than any other Platonic writing, we cannot imagine that

[1] The historical Sokrates would not allow his oral dialectic process to be called teaching. He expressly says "I have never been the teacher of any one" (Plat. Apol. So. pp. 33 A, 19 E): and he disclaimed the possession of knowledge. Aristotle too considers teaching as a presentation of truths, ready made and supposed to be known, by the teacher to learners, who are bound to believe them, δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα. The Platonic Sokrates, in the Phædrus and Symposion, differs from both: he recognises no teaching except the perpetual generation of new thoughts and feelings, by means of stimulating dialectic colloquy, and the revival in the mind thereby of the experience of an antecedent life, during which some communion has been enjoyed with the world of Ideas or Forms.

Plato, at the time when he composed it, thought so meanly about continuous exposition, as a vehicle of instruction, as we find him declaring in the Phædrus. I point this out, because it illustrates my opinion that the different dialogues of Plato represent very different, sometimes even opposite, points of view: and that it is a mistake to treat them as parts of one preconceived and methodical system.

Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind—Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute—Extreme of specialising adaptations to individuals and occasions.

Plato is usually extolled by his admirers, as the champion of the Absolute—of unchangeable forms, immutable truth, objective necessity cogent and binding on every one. He is praised for having refuted Protagoras; who can find no standard beyond the individual recognition and belief, of his own mind or that of some one else. There is no doubt that Plato often talks in that strain: but the method followed in his dialogues, and the general principles of method which he lays down, here as well as elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. Of this the Phædrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of generality, it proclaims the extreme of specialty. The objection which the Sokrates of the Phædrus advances against the didactic efficacy of written discourse, is founded on the fact, that it is the same to all readers—that it takes no cognizance of the differences of individual minds nor of the same mind at different times. Sokrates claims for dialectic debate the valuable privilege, that it is constant action and re-action between two individual minds—an appeal by the inherent force and actual condition of each, to the like elements in the other—an ever shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated to the measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers and at the moment. The individuality of each mind—both questioner and respondent—is here kept in view as the governing condition of the process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by the same interrogation. The questioner cannot advance a step except by the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief; he defends by his own suggestions; he yields to the pressure of contradiction and

inconsistency, *when he feels them*, and not before. Each dialogist is (to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to himself of truth and falsehood, according as he himself believes it. Assent or dissent, whichever it may be, springs only from the free working of the individual mind, in its actual condition then and there. It is to the individual mind alone, that appeal is made, and this is what Protagoras asks for.

We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two extreme opposite tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must recognise them both: but they can never be reconciled: sometimes he obeys and follows the one, sometimes the other.

If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose upon every one something which he called "Absolute Truth," one and the same alike imperative upon all—he would best proclaim it by preaching or writing. To modify this "Absolute," according to the varieties of the persons addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute and excellence. If you pretend to deal with an Absolute, you must turn away your eyes from all diversity of apprehending intellects and believing subjects.

CHAPTER XXV.

PARMENIDES.

IN the dialogues immediately preceding—Phædon, Phædrus, Symposion—we have seen Sokrates manifesting his usual dialectic, which never fails him: but we have also seen him indulging in a very unusual vein of positive affirmation and declaration. He has unfolded many novelties about the states of pre-existence and post-existence: he has familiarised us with Ideas, Forms, Essences, eternal and unchangeable, as the causes of all the facts and particularities of nature: he has recognised the inspired variety of madness, as being more worthy of trust than sober, uninspired intelligence: he has recounted, with the faith of a communicant fresh from the mysteries, revelations made to him by the prophetess Diotima,—respecting the successive stages of exaltation whereby gifted intelligences, under the stimulus of Eros Philosophus, ascend into communion with the great sea of Beauty. All this is set forth with as much charm as Plato's eloquence can bestow. But after all, it is not the true character of Sokrates:—I mean, the Sokrates of the Apology, whose mission it is to make war against the chronic malady of the human mind—false persuasion of knowledge, without the reality. It is, on the contrary, Sokrates himself infected with the same chronic malady which he combats in others, and requiring medicine against it as much as others. Such is the exact character in which Sokrates appears in the Parmenides: which dialogue I shall now proceed to review.

Character of dialogues immediately preceding—much transcendental assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides.

The Parmenides announces its own purpose as intended to repress premature forwardness of affirmation, in a young philosophical aspirant: who, with meritorious eagerness in the search for truth, and with his eyes

Sokrates is the juvenile defendant—Parmenides the veteran

censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant.

turned in the right direction to look for it—has nevertheless not fully estimated the obstructions besetting his path, nor exercised himself in the efforts necessary to overcome them. By a curious transposition, or perhaps from deference on Plato's part to the Hellenic sentiment of Nemesis,—Sokrates, who in most Platonic dialogues stands forward as the privileged censor and victorious opponent, is here the juvenile defendant under censorship by a superior. It is the veteran Parmenides of Elea who, while commending the speculative impulse and promise of Sokrates, impresses upon him at the same time that the theory which he had advanced—the self-existence, the separate and substantive nature, of Ideas—stands exposed to many grave objections, which he (Sokrates) has not considered and cannot meet. So far, Parmenides performs towards Sokrates the same process of cross-examining refutation as Sokrates himself applies to Theætêtus and other young men elsewhere. But we find in this dialogue something ulterior and even peculiar. Having warned Sokrates that his intellectual training has not yet been carried to a point commensurate with the earnestness of his aspirations—Parmenides proceeds to describe to him what exercises he ought to go through, in order to guard himself against premature assertion or hasty partiality. Moreover, Parmenides not only indicates in general terms what ought to be done, but illustrates it by giving a specimen of such exercise, on a topic chosen by himself.

Passing over the dramatic introduction[a] whereby the per-

[a] This dramatic introduction is extremely complicated. The whole dialogue, from beginning to end, is recounted by Kephalus of Klazomenæ; who heard it from the Athenian Antiphon—who himself had heard it from Pythodôrus, a friend of Zeno, present when the conversation was held. A string of circumstances are narrated by Kephalus, to explain how he came to wish to hear it, and to find out Antiphon. Plato appears anxious to throw the event back as far as possible into the past, in order to justify the bringing Sokrates into personal communication with Parmenides: for some unfriendly critics tried to make out that the two could not possibly have conversed on philosophy (Athenæus, xi. 505). Plato declares the ages of the persons with remarkable exactness: Parmenides was 65, completely grey-headed, but of noble mien: Zeno about 40, tall and graceful: Sokrates very young. (Plat. Parmen. p. 127 B.C.)

It required some invention in Plato to provide a narrator, suitable for recounting events so long antecedent as the young period of Sokrates.

sonages discoursing are brought together, we find Sokrates, Parmenides, and the Eleatic Zeno (the disciple of Parmenides), engaged in the main dialogue. When Parmenides begins his illustrative exercise, a person named Aristotle (afterwards one of the Thirty oligarchs at Athens), still younger than Sokrates, is made to serve as respondent.

Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides.

Sokrates is one among various auditors, who are assembled to hear Zeno reading aloud a treatise of his own composition, intended to answer and retort upon the opponents of his preceptor Parmenides.

The main doctrine of the real Parmenides was, "That Ens, the absolute, real, self-existent, was One and not many:" which doctrine was impugned and derided by various opponents, deducing from it absurd conclusions. Zeno defended his master by showing that the opposite doctrine (—"That Ens, the absolute, self-existent universe, is Many—") led to conclusions absurd in an equal or greater degree. If the Absolute Ens were Many, the Many would be both like and unlike: but they cannot have incompatible and contradictory attributes: therefore Absolute Ens is not Many. Ens, as Parmenides conceived it, was essentially homogeneous and unchangeable: even assuming it to be Many, all its parts must be homogeneous, so that what was predicable of one must be predicable of all; it might be all alike, or all unlike: but it could not be both. Those who maintained the plurality of Ens, did so on the ground of apparent severalty, likeness, and unlikeness, in the sensible world. But Zeno, while admitting these phenomena in the sensible world, as *relative to us*, apparent, and subject to the varieties of individual estimation—denied their applicability to absolute and self-existent Ens.[b] Since absolute Ens or Entia are Many (said the opponents of Parmenides), they will be both like and unlike: and thus we can explain the phenomena of the sensible world. The absolute (replied Zeno) cannot be both like and unlike;

Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in which his partisan Zeno defended him.

[b] I have already given a short account of the Zenonian Dialectic, ch. ii. p. 97 seq.

therefore it cannot be many. We must recollect that both Parmenides and Zeno renounced all attempt to explain the sensible world by the absolute and purely intelligible Ens. They treated the two as radically distinct and unconnected. The one was absolute, eternal, unchangeable, homogeneous, apprehended only by reason. The other was relative, temporary, variable, heterogeneous; a world of individual and subjective opinion, upon which no absolute truth, no pure objectivity, could be reached.

Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of Ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them.

Sokrates, depicted here as a young man, impugns this doctrine of Zeno: and maintains that the two worlds, though naturally disjoined, were not incommunicable. He advances the Platonic theory of Ideas: that is, an intelligible world of many separate self-existent Forms or Ideas, apprehended by reason only—and a sensible world of particular objects, each participating in one or more of these Forms or Ideas. "What you say" (he remarks to Zeno), "is true of the world of Forms or Ideas: the Form of Likeness *per se* can never be unlike, nor can the Form of Unlikeness be ever like. But in regard to the sensible world, there is nothing to hinder you and me, and other objects which rank and are numbered as separate individuals, from participating both in the Form of likeness and in the Form of unlikeness.[c] In so far as I, an individual object, participate in the Form of Likeness, I am properly called like; in so far as I participate in the Form of Unlikeness, I am called unlike. So about One and Many, Great and Little, and so forth: I, the same individual, may participate in many different and opposite Forms, and may derive from them different and opposite denominations. I am one and many—like and unlike—great and little—all at the same time. But no such combination is possible between the Forms themselves, self-existent and opposite: the Form of Likeness cannot become unlike, nor *vice versâ*. The Forms themselves stand permanently apart, incapable of fusion or

[c] Plato, Parmenides, p. 129 A. οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδός τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον; τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν, μεταλαμβάνειν

coalescence with each other: but different and even opposite Forms may lend themselves to participation and partnership in the same sensible individual object."[d]

Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates.

Parmenides and Zeno are represented as listening with surprise and interest to this language of Sokrates, recognising two distinct worlds: one, of invisible but intelligible Forms,—the other that of sensible objects, participating in these Forms. "Your ardour for philosophy" (observes Parmenides to Sokrates), "is admirable. Is this distinction your own?"[e]

Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas.

Plato now puts into the mouth of Parmenides—the advocate of One absolute and unchangeable Ens, separated by an impassable gulf from the sensible world of transitory and variable appearances or phenomena—objections against what is called the Platonic theory of Ideas: that is, the theory of an intelligible world, comprising an indefinite number of distinct intelligible and unchangeable Forms—in partial relation and communication with another world of sensible objects, each of which participates in one or more of these Forms. We thus have the Absolute One pitted against the Absolute Many.

What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No.

What number and variety of these intelligible Forms do you recognise—(asks Parmenides)? Likeness and Unlikeness—One and Many—Just, Beautiful, Good, &c.—are all these Forms absolute and existent *per se?* *Sokr.*—Certainly they are. *Parm.*—Do you farther recognise an absolute and self-existent Form of Man, apart from us and all other individuals?—or a Form of fire, water, and the like? *Sokr.*—I do not well know how to answer:—I have often been embarrassed with the question. *Parm.*—Farther, do there exist distinct intelligible Forms of hair, mud, dirt, and all the other mean and contemptible objects of sense which we see around? *Sokr.*—No—certainly—no such Forms as these exist. Such objects are as we see them, and nothing beyond:

[d] Plato, Parmenid. pp. 129-130.

[e] Plato, Parmenid. p. 130 A. Ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· καὶ μοι εἰπὲ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα;

it would be too absurd to suppose Forms of such like things.[f] Nevertheless there are times when I have misgivings on the point; and when I suspect that there must be Forms of them as well as of the others. When such reflections cross my mind, I shrink from the absurdity of the doctrine, and try to confine my attention to Forms like those which you mentioned first.

Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the philosopher.

Parm.—You are still young, Sokrates:—you still defer to the common sentiments of mankind. But the time will come when philosophy will take stronger hold of you, and will teach you that no object in nature is mean or contemptible in her view.[g]

Remarks upon this—Contrast between emotional and scientific classification.

This remark deserves attention. Plato points out the radical distinction, and frequent antipathy between classifications constructed by science, and those which grow up spontaneously under the associating influence of a common emotion. What he calls "the opinions of men,"—in other words, the associations naturally working in an untaught and unlettered mind—bring together the ideas of objects according as they suggest a like emotion—veneration, love, fear, antipathy, contempt, laughter, &c.[h] As things which inspire like emotions are thrown into the same category and receive the same denomination, so the opposite proceeding inspires great repugnance, when things creating antipathetic emotions are forced into the same category. A large proportion of objects in nature come to be regarded as unworthy of any serious attention, and fit only to serve for discharging on them our laughter, contempt, or antipathy.

[f] Plato, Parmenid. c. 9, p. 130 D. Οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε, ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἦ ἄτοπον.

Alexander, who opposes the doctrine of the Platonists about Ideas, treats it as understood that they did not recognise Ideas of worms, gnats, and such like animals, Schol. ad. Aristot. Metaphys. A. 991 a. p. 575, a. 30 Brandis.

[g] Plato, Parmenid. c. 10, p. 130 E. Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, καὶ οὔπω σοῦ ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

[h] Plato himself, however, occasionally appeals πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δόξας, and becomes ἀτεχνῶς δημήγορος, when it suits his argument, see Gorgias, 494 C.

The investigation of the structure and manifestations of insects is one of the marked features which Aristophanes ridicules in Sokrates: moreover the same poet also brings odium on the philosopher for alleged study of astronomy and meteorology—the heavenly bodies being as it were at the opposite emotional pole, objects of such reverential admiration and worship, that it was impious to watch or investigate them, or calculate their proceedings beforehand.[i] The extent to which anatomy and physiology were shut out from study in antiquity, and have continued to be partially so even in modern times, is well known. And the proportion of phenomena is both great and important, connected with the social relations, which are excluded both from formal registration and from scientific review; kept away from all rational analysis either of causes or remedies, because of the strong repugnances connected with them. This emotional view of nature is here noted by Plato as conflicting with the scientific. No object (he says) is mean in the eyes of philosophy. He remarks to the same effect in the Sophistês and Politikus, and the remark is illustrated by the classifying processes there exhibited:[k] mean objects and esteemed objects being placed side by side.

[i] Aristophan. Nubes, 145-170-1490.

τί γὰρ μαθόντ' ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς ὑβρί-
ζετον,
καὶ τῆς

Compare Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 11-13, iv. 7, 6-7. Plutarch, Perikles, 23; also the second chapter of the first Book of Macrobius, about the discredit which is supposed to be thrown upon grand and solemn subjects by a plain and naked exposition. "Inimicam esse naturæ nudam expositionem sui."

[k] Plato, Sophist. p. 227 B, Politik. p. 266 D, also Theætêt. p. 174 D.

Both the Platonic Sokrates, and the Xenophontic Sokrates, frequently illustrate the education of men by comparison with the bringing up of young animals as well as with the training of horses: they also compare the educator of young men with the trainer of young horses. Indeed this comparison occurs so frequently, that it excites much displeasure among various modern critics (Forchhammer, Köchly, Socher, &c.), who seem to consider it as unseemly and inconsistent with "the dignity of human nature." The frequent allusions made by Plato to the homely arts and professions are noted by his interlocutors as tiresome.

See Plato, Apolog. Sokr. p. 20 A ὦ Καλλία, εἰ μὲν τὼ υἱὼ σου πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, &c.

The zoological works of Aristotle exhibit a memorable example of scientific intelligence, overcoming all the contempt and disgust usually associated with minute and repulsive organisms. To Plato, it would be repugnant to arrange in the same class the wolf and the dog. See Sophist. p. 231 A.

Parmenides now produces various objections against the Platonic variety of dualism: the two distinct but partially inter-communicating worlds—one, of separate, permanent, unchangeable, Forms or Ideas—the other, of individual objects, transient and variable; participating in, and receiving denomination from, these Forms.

Objections of Parmenides—How can objects participate in the Ideas? Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof.

1. How (asks Parmenides) can such participation take place? Is the entire Form in each individual object? No: for one and the same Form cannot be at the same time in many distant objects. A part of it therefore must be in one object; another part in another. But this assumes that the Form is divisible—or is not essentially One. Equality is in all equal objects: but how can a part of the Form equality, less than the whole, make objects equal? Again, littleness is in all little objects: that is, a part of the Form littleness is in each. But the Form littleness cannot have parts; because, if it had, the entire Form would be greater than any of its parts,—and the Form littleness cannot be greater than anything. Moreover, if one part of littleness were added to other parts, the sum of the two would be less, and not greater, than either of the factors. It is plain that none of these Forms can be divisible, or can have parts. Objects therefore cannot participate in the Form by parts or piecemeal. But neither can each object possess the entire Form. Accordingly, since there remains no third possibility, objects cannot participate in the forms at all.[1]

Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which

2. Parmenides now passes to a second argument. The reason why you assume that each one of these Forms exists, is—That when you contemplate many similar objects, one and the same ideal phantom or Concept is suggested by all.[m] Thus, when you see many *great* objects, one common impression of *great-*

[1] Plato, Parmenid. p. 131. A similar argument, showing the impossibility of such *μέθεξις*, appears in Sextus Empiric. adv. Arithmeticos, sect. 11-20, p. 334 Fab., p. 724 Bek.

[m] Plato, Parmen. p. 132. Οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι. Ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μέγαλά σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι.

ness arises from all. Hence you conclude that The Great, or the Form of Greatness, exists as One. But if you take this Form of Greatness, and consider it in comparison with each or all the great individual objects, it will have in common with them something that makes it great. You must therefore search for some higher Form, which represents what belongs in common both to the Form of Greatness and to individual great objects. And this higher Form again, when compared with the rest, will have something in common which must be represented by a Form yet higher: so that there will be an infinite series of Forms, ascending higher and higher, of which you will never reach the topmost.[n]

must be represented by a higher Idea —and so on *ad infinitum*.

3. Perhaps (suggests Sokrates) each of these Forms is a Conception of the mind and nothing beyond: the Form is not competent to exist out of the mind.[o] How? (replies Parmenides.) There cannot be in

Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind and nothing more? Impossible.

[n] Plato, Parmen. p. 132 A. See this process, of comparing the Form with particular objects denominated after the Form, described in a different metaphysical language by Mr. John Stuart Mill, System of Logic, book iv. ch. 2, sect. 3. "As the general conception is itself obtained by a comparison of particular phenomena, so, when obtained, the mode in which we apply it to other phenomena is again by comparison. We compare phenomena with each other to get the conception; and we then compare those and other phenomena *with* the conception. We get the conception of an animal by comparing different animals, and when we afterwards see a creature resembling an animal, we compare it with our general conception of an animal: and if it agrees with our general conception, we include it in the class. The conception becomes the type of comparison. We may perhaps find that no considerable number of other objects agree with this first general conception: and that we must drop the conception, and beginning again with a different individual case, proceed by fresh comparisons to a different general conception" (pp. 194-195 ed. 5).

The comparison, which the argument of the Platonic Parmenides assumes to be instituted, between τὸ εἶδος and τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ, is denied by Proklus; who says that there can be no comparison, nor any κοινωνὴς, except between τὰ ὁμοταγῆ: and that the Form is not ὁμοταγὲς with its participant particulars. (Proklus ad Parmenidem, p. 125, p. 684 ed. Stallbaum.)

This argument of Parmenides is the memorable argument known under the name of ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. Against the Platonic εἴδη considered as χωριστὰ, it is a forcible argument. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 15 seq., where it is numbered among οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων. We find from the Scholion of Alexander (p. 566 Brandis), that it was advanced in several different ways by Aristotle, in his work Περὶ Ἰδεῶν: by his scholar Eudemus ἐν τοῖς περὶ Λέξεως: and by a contemporary σοφιστὴς named Polyxenus, as well as by other Sophists.

[o] Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 B. μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τοῦτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς; Τί οὖν, φάναι, ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν. Ἀλλὰ τινός; Ναί. Ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; Ὄντος. Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; Ναί.

Aristotle (Topic. ii. 113 a. 25) indicates one way of meeting this argument, if advanced by any adversary in dialectic debate—εἰ τὰς ἰδέας ἐν ἡμῖν ἔφησεν εἶναι.

the mind any Conception, which is a Conception of nothing. Every Conception must be of something really existing: in this case, it is a Conception of some one thing, which you conceive as belonging in common to each and all the objects considered. The Something thus conceived as perpetually One and the same in all, is, the Form. Besides, if you think that individual objects participate in the Forms, and that these Forms are Conceptions of the mind,—you must suppose, either that all objects are made up of Conceptions, and are therefore themselves Concipients: or else that these Forms, though Conceptions, are incapable of conceiving. Neither one nor the other is admissible.[p]

The Ideas are types or exemplaria, and objects partake of them by being likened to them? Impossible.

4. Probably the case stands thus (says Sokrates). These Forms are constants and fixtures in nature, as models or patterns. Particular objects are copies or likenesses of them: and the participation of such objects in the Form consists in being made like to it.[q] In that case (replies Parmenides), the Form must itself be like to the objects which have been made like to it. Comparing the Form with the objects, that in which they resemble must itself be a Form: and thus you will have a higher Form above the first Form—and so upwards in the ascending line. This follows necessarily from the hypothesis that the Form is like the objects. The participation of objects in the Form, therefore, cannot consist in being likened to it.[r]

If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only what is relative to ourselves.

5. Here are grave difficulties (continues Parmenides) opposed to this doctrine of yours, affirming the existence of self-existent, substantive, unchangeable, yet participated, Forms. But difficulties still graver remain behind. Such Forms as you describe cannot be cog-

[p] Plato, Parmen. p. 132 D. οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τἆλλα φῂς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν—ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον.

The word ἀνόητα here is used in its ordinary sense, in which it is the negation, not of νοητός but of νοητικός. There is a similar confusion, Plato, Phædon, p. 80 B. Proklus (pp. 699-701, Stall.) is prolix but very obscure.

[q] Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 991, a. 20) characterises this way of presenting the Platonic Ideas as mere κενολογία and poetical metaphor. See also the remarkable Scholion of Alexander, pp. 574-575, Brandis.

[r] Plato, Parmenid. pp. 132-133.

This is again a repetition, though differently presented, of the same argument—ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος—enuntiated p. 132 A.

nizable by us: at least it is hard to show how they can be cognizable. Being self-existent and substantive, they are not *in us:* such of them as are relative, have their relation with each other, not with those particular objects among us, which are called *great, little*, and so forth, from being supposed to be similar to or participant in the forms, and bearing names the same as those of the Forms. Thus, for example, if I, an individual man, am in the relation of master, I bear that relation to another individual man who is my servant, not to servantship in general (*i. e.* the Form of servantship, the *Servus per se*). My servant again, bears the relation of servant to me, an individual man as master,—not to mastership in general (*i. e.* to the Form of mastership, the *Dominus per se*). Both terms of the relation are individual objects. On the other hand, the Forms also bear relation to each other. The Form of servantship (*Servus per se*), stands in relation to the Form of mastership (*Dominus per se*). Neither of them correlates with an individual object. The two terms of the relation must be homogeneous, each of them a Form.[s]

Individuals are relative to Individuals. Ideas relative to Ideas.

Now apply this to the case of cognition. The Form of Cognition correlates exclusively with the Form of Truth: the Form of each special Cognition, geometrical, or medical, or other, correlates with the Form of Geometry or Medicine. But Cognition as we possess it, correlates only with Truth relatively to us: also, each special Cognition of ours has its special correlating Truth, relatively to us.[t] Now the Forms are not in or with us, but apart from us: the Form of Cognition is not our Cognition, the Form of Truth is not our Truth. Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which *we* do not possess: we cannot

Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess.

[s] Plato, Parmenid. p. 133 E.

[t] Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 A. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀληθεία, αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;—Ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἀληθείας ἂν εἴη; καὶ αὖ ἑκάστη ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἑκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη σύμβαινοι εἶναι;

Aristotle (Topica, vi. p. 147, a. 6) adverts to this as an argument against the theory of Ideas, but without alluding to the Parmenidês; indeed he puts the argument in a different way—τὸ δ' εἶδος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, οἷον αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ ἡδέος, καὶ αὐτὴ βούλησις αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Aristotle argues that there is no place in this doctrine for the φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, which nevertheless men often wish for, and he remarks, in the Nikom. Ethics, i. 4. 1096 b. 33—that the αὐτὸ-ἀγαθὸν is neither πρακτὸν nor κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ.

therefore know Forms. We have our own cognition, whereby we know what is relative to us; but we know nothing more. Forms, which are not relative to us, lie out of our knowledge. *Bonum per se*, *Pulchrum per se*, and the other self-existent Forms or Ideas, are to us altogether unknowable.[u]

Form of Cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us.

6. Again, if there be a real self-existent Form of Cognition, apart from that which we or others possess—it must doubtless be far superior in accuracy and perfection to that which we possess.[x] The Form of Beauty and the other Forms, must be in like manner superior to that which is found under the same name in individual objects. This perfect Form of Cognition must therefore belong to the Gods, if it belong to any one. But if so, the Gods must have a Form of Truth, the proper object of their Form of Cognition. They cannot know the truth relatively to us, which belongs to *our* cognition—any more than we can know the more perfect truth belonging to them. So too about other Forms. The perfect Form of mastership belongs to the Gods, correlating with its proper Form of servantship. *Their* mastership does not correlate with individual objects like us: in other words, they are not our masters, nor are we their servants. *Their* cognition, again, does not correlate with individual objects like us: in other words, they do not know us, nor do we know them. In like manner, we in our capacity of masters are not masters of them—we as cognizant beings know nothing of them or of that which they know. They can in no way correlate with us, nor can we correlate with them.[y]

Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not

Here are some of the objections, Sokrates (concludes Parmenides), which beset your doctrine, that there exist substantive, self-standing, Forms of Ideas, each respectively definable. Many farther objections might

[u] Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 C. Ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

[x] An argument very similar is urged by Aristotle (Metaph. Θ. 1051, a. 1) εἰ ἄρα τινες εἰσὶ φύσεις τοιαῦται ἢ οὐσίαι οἵας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ἰδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστῆμον ἄν τι εἴη ἡ αὐτοεπιστήμη καὶ κινούμενον ἡ κίνησις.

[y] Plato, Parmen. p. 135 A. Ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων, &c.

also be urged.[1] So that a man may reasonably maintain, either that none such exist—or that, granting their existence, they are essentially unknowable by us. He must put forth great ingenuity to satisfy himself of the affirmative; and still more wonderful ingenuity to find arguments for the satisfaction of others, respecting this question.

admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion.

Nevertheless, on the other side (continues Parmenides), unless we admit the existence of such Forms or Ideas—substantive, eternal, unchangeable, definable—philosophy and dialectic discussion are impossible.[2]

Here then, Parmenides entangles himself and his auditors in the perplexing dilemma, that philosophical and dialectic speculation is impossible, unless these Forms or Ideas, together with the participation of sensible objects in them, be granted; while at the same time this cannot be granted, until objections, which appear at first sight unanswerable, have been disposed of.

Dilemma put by Parmenides—Acuteness of his objections.

The acuteness with which these objections are enforced, is remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic writings. Moreover the objections point directly against that doctrine which Plato in other dialogues most emphatically insists upon, and which Aristotle both announces and combats as characteristic of Plato—the doctrine of separate, self-existent, absolute, Forms or Ideas. They are addressed

[1] Plato, Parmenidês, p. 134 D-E. Οὔκουν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὖτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων (i.e. τῶν θεῶν) ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν· ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ, οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ (sc. οἱ θεοί) κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσιν οὔτε γιγνώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες. Ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη (Sokrates) θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀπωστερήσειε τοῦ εἰδέναι.

The inference here drawn by Parmenides supplies the first mention of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be formally condemned by theological councils. M. Renan tells us—"En 1269, Etienne Tempier, évêque de Paris, ayant rassemblé le conseil des maîtres en théologie, condamna, de concert avec eux, treize propositions qui ne sont presque toutes que les axiomes familiers de l'averroisme: Quod intellectus hominum est unus et idem numero. Quod mundus est æternus. Quod nunquam fuit primus homo. *Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia*," &c. (Renan, Averroes, p. 213).

[2] Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 B.

moreover to Sokrates, the chief exponent of that doctrine here as well as in other dialogues. And he is depicted as unable to meet them.

The doctrine which Plato attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues.

It is true that Sokrates is here introduced as juvenile and untrained; or at least as imperfectly trained. And accordingly, Stallbaum with others think, that this is the reason of his inability to meet the objections: which (they tell us), though ingenious and plausible, yet having no application to the genuine Platonic doctrine about Ideas, might easily have been answered if Plato had thought fit, and are answered in other dialogues.[b] But to me it appears, that the doctrine which is challenged in the Parmenidês is the genuine Platonic doctrine about Ideas, as enuntiated by Plato in the Republic, Phædon, Philêbus, Timæus, and elsewhere—though a very different doctrine is announced in the Sophistês. Objections are here made against it in the Parmenidês. In what other dialogue has Plato answered them? and what proof can be furnished that he was able to answer them? There are indeed many other dialogues in which a real world of Ideas absolute and unchangeable, is affirmed strenuously and eloquently, with various consequences and accompaniments traced to it: but there are none in which the Parmenidean objections are elucidated, or even recited. In the Phædon, Phædrus, Timæus, Symposion, &c., and elsewhere, Sokrates is made to talk confidently about the existence and even about the cognoscibility of these Ideas; just as if no such objections as those which we read in the Parmenidês could be produced.[c] In these other dialogues, Plato accepts im-

[b] Stallbaum, Prolegom. pp. 52-286-332.

[c] According to Stallbaum (Prolegg. pp. 277-337) the Parmenidês is the only dialogue in which Plato has discussed, with philosophical exactness, the theory of Ideas; in all the other dialogues he handles it in a popular and superficial manner. There is truth in this—indeed more truth (I think) than Stallbaum himself supposed: otherwise he would hardly have said that the objections in the Parmenidês could easily have been answered, if Plato had chosen.

Stallbaum tells us, not only respecting Socher but respecting Schleiermacher (pp. 324-332), "Parmenidem omnino non intellexit." In my judgment, Socher understands the dialogue better than Stallbaum, when he (Socher) says, that the objections in the first half bear against the genuine Platonic Ideas; though I do not agree with his inference about the spuriousness of the dialogue.

plicitly one horn of the Parmenidean dilemma; but without explaining to us upon what grounds he allows himself to neglect the other.

Socher has so much difficulty in conceiving that Plato can have advanced such forcible objections against a doctrine, which nevertheless in other Platonic dialogues is proclaimed as true and important,—that he declares the Parmenidês (together with the Sophistês and Politikus) not to be genuine, but to have been composed by some unknown Megaric contemporary. To pass over the improbability that any unknown author should have been capable of composing works of so much ability as these—Socher's decision about spuriousness is founded upon an estimate of Plato's philosophical character, which I think incorrect. Socher expects (or at least reasons as if he expected) to find in Plato a preconceived system and a scheme of conclusions to which everything is made subservient.

The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês.

In most philosophers, doubtless, this is what we do find. Each starts with some favourite conclusions, which he believes to be true, and which he supports by all the arguments in their favour, as far as his power goes. If he mentions the arguments against them, he usually answers the weak, slurs over or sneers at the strong: at any rate, he takes every precaution that these counter arguments shall appear unimportant in the eyes of his readers. His purpose is, like that of a speaker in the public assembly, to obtain assent and belief: whether the hearers understand the question or not, is a matter of comparative indifference: at any rate, they must be induced to embrace his conclusion. Unless he thus foregoes the character of an impartial judge, to take up that of an earnest advocate; unless he bends the whole force of his mind to the establishment of the given conclusion—he becomes suspected as deficient in faith or sincerity, and loses much in persuasive power. For an earnest belief, expressed with eloquence and feeling, is commonly more persuasive than any logic.

Philosophers each of a positive system of his own.

Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search.

Now whether this exclusive devotion to the affirmative side of certain questions be the true spirit of philosophy or not, it is certainly not the spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search; wherein he conceives the work of philosophy in a totally different manner. He does not begin by stating, even to himself, a certain conclusion at which he has arrived, and then proceed to prove that conclusion to others. The search or debate (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) has greater importance in his eyes than the conclusion: nay, in a large proportion of his dialogues, there is no conclusion at all: we see something disproved, but nothing proved. The negative element has with him a value and importance of its own, apart from the affirmative. He is anxious to set forth what can be said against a given conclusion; even though not prepared to establish anything in its place.

The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural.

Such negative element, manifested as it is in so many of the Platonic dialogues, has its extreme manifestation in the Parmenidês. When we see it here applied to a doctrine which Plato in other dialogues insists upon as truth, we must call to mind (what sincere believers are apt to forget) that a case may always be made out against truth as well as in its favour: and that its privilege as a certified portion of "reasoned truth," rests upon no better title than the superiority of the latter case over the former. It is for testing the two cases—for determining where the superiority lies—and for graduating its amount—that the process of philosophising is called for, and that improvements in the method thereof become desirable. That Plato should, in one of his many diversified dialogues, apply this test to a doctrine which, in other dialogues, he holds out as true—is noway inconsistent with the general spirit of these compositions. Each of his dialogues has its own point of view, worked out on that particular occasion; what is common to them all, is the process of philosophising applied in various ways to the same general topics.

Those who, like Socher, deny Plato's authorship of the

Parmenidês, on the ground of what is urged therein against the theory of Ideas, must suppose, either that he did not know that a negative case could be made out against that theory; or that knowing it, he refrained from undertaking the duty.[d] Neither supposition is consistent with what we know both of his negative ingenuity, and of his multifarious manner of handling.

Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas.

The negative case, made out in the Parmenidês against the theory of Ideas, is indeed most powerful. The hypothesis of the Ideal World is unequivocally affirmed by Sokrates, with its four principal characteristics. 1. Complete essential separation from the world of sense. 2. Absolute self-existence. 3. Plurality of constituent items, several contrary to each other. 4. Unchangeable sameness and unity of each and all of them.—Here we have full satisfaction given to the Platonic sentiment, which often delights in soaring above the world of sense, and sometimes (see Phædon) in heaping contemptuous metaphors upon it. But unfortunately Sokrates cannot disengage himself from this world of sense: he is obliged to maintain that it partakes of, or is determined by, these extra-sensible Forms or Ideas. Here commence the series of difficulties and contradictions brought out by the Elenchus of Parmenides. Are all sensible objects, even such as are vulgar, repulsive, and contemptible, represented in this higher world? The Platonic sentiment shrinks from the admission: the Platonic sense of analogy hesitates to deny it. Then again, how can both assertions be true—first that the

[d] Plato, Philêbus, p. 14, where the distinction taken coincides accurately enough with that which we read in Plato, Parmen. p. 129 A-D.

Strümpell thinks that the Parmenidês was composed at a time of Plato's life when he had become sensible of the difficulties and contradictions attaching to his doctrine of self-existent Forms or Ideas, and when he was looking about for some way of extrication from them; which way he afterwards thought that he found in that approximation to Pythagorism—that exchange of Ideas for Ideal numbers, &c.—which we find imputed to him by Aristotle (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. sect. 96, 3). This is not impossible; but I find no sufficient ground for affirming it. Nor can I see how the doctrine which Aristotle ascribes to Plato about the Ideas (that they are generated by two στοιχεῖα or elements, τὸ ἕν along with τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν) affords any escape from the difficulties started in the Parmenidês.

Strümpell considers the dialogue Parmenidês to have been composed "ganz ausdrücklich zur dialektischen Uebung," ib. s. 96, 2, p. 128.

two worlds are essentially separate, next, that the one participates in, and derives its essence from, the other? How (to use Aristotelian language[e]) can the essence be separated from that of which it is the essence? How can the Form, essentially One, belong at once to a multitude of particulars?

Two points deserve notice in this debate respecting the doctrine of Ideas:—

Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura.

1. Parmenides shows, and Sokrates does not deny, that these Forms or Ideas described as absolute, self-existent, unchangeable, must of necessity be unknown and unknowable to us.[f] Whatever we do know, or can know, is relative to us;—to our actual cognition, or to our cognitive power. If you declare an object to be absolute, you declare it to be neither known nor knowable by us: if it be announced as known or knowable by us, it is thereby implied at the same time not to be absolute. If these Forms or Objects called absolute are known, they can be known only by an absolute Subject, or the Form of a cognizant Subject: that is, by God or the Gods. Even thus, to call them *absolute* is a misnomer: they are relative to the Subject, and the Subject is relative to them.

The opinion here advanced by the Platonic Parmenides asserts, in other words, what is equivalent to the memorable dictum of Protagoras—"Man is the measure of all things—of things existent, that they do exist—and of things non-existent, that they do not exist." This dictum affirms universal relativity, and nothing else: though Plato, as we shall see in the elaborate argument against it delivered by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, mixed it up with another doctrine altogether distinct and independent—the doctrine that knowledge is sensi-

[e] Aristot. Metaphys. A. 991, b. 1. ἀδύνατον, χωρὶς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὗ ἡ οὐσία.

[f] Plato, Parmen. 133 B. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκεσθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη—ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἀγνωστα αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζων εἶναι.—p. 134 A. ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἀληθείας ἂν εἴη; καὶ αὖ ἑκάστη ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἑκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη ξύμβαινοι εἶναι;—p. 134 C. ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν ἔστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

ble perception.[g] Parmenides here argues that if these Forms or Ideas are known by us, they can be known only as relative to us: and that if they be not relative to us, they cannot be known by us at all. Such relativity belongs as much to the world of Conception, as to the world of Perception. And it is remarkable that Plato admits this essential relativity not merely here, but also in the Sophistês: in which latter dialogue he denies the Forms or Ideas to be absolute existences, on the special ground that they are known:—and on the farther ground that what is known must act upon the knowing mind, and must be acted upon thereby, *i. e.* must be relative. He there defines the existent to be, that which has power to act upon something else, or to be acted upon by something else. Such relativeness he declares to constitute *existence*:[h] defining existence to mean potentiality.

2. The second point which deserves notice in this portion of the Parmenidês, is the answer of Sokrates (when embarrassed by some of the questions of the Eleatic veteran)—"That these Forms or Ideas are conceptions of the mind, and have no existence out of the mind." This answer gives us the purely Subjective, or negation of Object: instead of the purely Objective (Absolute), or negation of Subject.[i] Here we have what Porphyry calls the deepest question of philosophy[k] explicitly raised: and, as far as we know, for the first time. Are the Forms or Ideas mere conceptions of the mind and nothing more? or are they external, separate, self-existent realities? The opinion which Sokrates had first given de-

Answer of Sokrates—That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind. Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped.

[g] I shall discuss this in the coming chapter upon the Theætêtus.

[h] Plato, Sophistês, pp. 248-249.

This reasoning is put into the mouth of the Eleatic Stranger, the principal person in that dialogue.

[i] Plato, Parmen. p. 132 A-B.

The doctrine, that τοιότητες were ψιλαὶ ἔννοιαι, having no existence without the mind, was held by Antisthenes as well as by the Eretrian sect of philosophers, contemporary with Plato and shortly after him. Simplikius, Schol. ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68, a. 30, Brandis. See, respecting Antisthenes, the third volume of the present work.

[k] See the beginning of Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle. βαθυτάτης οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης &c.—περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν, εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν, εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται, &c. Simplikius (in Schol. ad Aristot. Categ. p. 68, a. 28, ed. Brandis) alludes to the Eretrian philosophers and Theopompus, who considered τὰς ποιότητας as ψιλὰς μόνας ἐννοίας διακενῶς λεγομένας κατ' ἀδιαμίας ὑποστάσεως, οἷον &c.

clared the latter: that which he now gives declares the former. He passes from the pure Objective (*i. e.* without Subject) to the pure Subjective (*i. e.* without Object). Parmenides, in his reply, points out that there cannot be a conception of nothing: that if there be Conceptio, there must be *Conceptum aliquid*:[1] and that this Conceptum or Concept is what is common to a great many distinct similar Percepta.

This reply, though scanty and undeveloped, is in my judgment both valid, as it negatives the Subject pure and simple, and affirms that to every conception in the mind, there must correspond a Concept out of (or rather along with) the mind (the one correlating with or implying the other)—and correct as far as it goes, in declaring what that Concept is. Such Concept is, or may be, the Form. Parmenides does not show that it is not so. He proceeds to impugn, by a second argument, the assertion of Sokrates—that the form is a Con-

[1] Compare Republic, v. p. 476 B. *ὁ γιγνώσκων γιγνώσκει τι, ἢ οὐδέν; Γιγνώσκει τί*, &c.

The following passage in the learned work of Cudworth bears on the portion of the Parmenidês which we are now considering. Cudworth, Treatise of Immutable Morality, pp. 243-245.

"But if any one demand here, where this *ἀκίνητος οὐσία*, these immutable Entities do exist? I answer, first, that as they are considered formally, they do not exist properly in the Individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted upon the Understanding—which some have taken to be Aristotle's opinion—because no Individual Material thing is either Universal or Immutable. Because they perish not together with them, it is a certain argument that they exist independently of them. Neither, in the next place, do they exist somewhere else apart from the Individual Sensibles, and without the mind; which is an opinion that Aristotle justly condemns, but either unjustly or unskilfully attributes to Plato. Wherefore these Intelligible Ideas or Essences of Things, those Forms by which we understand all Things, exist nowhere but in the mind itself; for it was very well determined long ago by Socrates, in Plato's Parmenidês, that these things are nothing else but Noemata. These Species or Ideas are nothing else but Noemata or Notions that exist nowhere but in the Soul itself.

"And yet notwithstanding, though these Things exist only in the Mind, they are not therefore mere Figments of the Understanding.

"It is evident that though the Mind thinks of these Things at pleasure, yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the Mind, but have certain determinate immutable Natures of their own, which are independent on the Mind, and which are blown (quære *not blown*) into Nothing at the pleasure of the same Being that arbitrarily made them."

It is an inadvertence on the part of Cudworth to cite this passage of the Parmenidês as authenticating Plato's opinion that Forms or Ideas existed only in the mind. Certainly Sokrates is here made to express that opinion, among others; but the opinion is refuted by Parmenides and dropped by Sokrates. But the very different opinion, which Cudworth accuses Aristotle of *wrongly* attributing to Plato, is repeated by Sokrates in the Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, and never refuted.

ception *wholly within* the mind: he goes on to argue that individual things (which are *out* of the mind) cannot participate in these Forms (which are asserted to be altogether *in* the mind): because, if that were admitted, either every such thing must be a Concipient, or must run into the contradiction of being a *Conceptio non concipiens*.[m] Now this argument may refute the affirmation of Sokrates literally taken, that the Form is a Conception entirely belonging to the mind, and having nothing Objective corresponding to it—but does not refute the doctrine that the Form is a Concept correlating with the mind—or out of the mind as well as in it. In this as in other Concepts, the subjective point of view preponderates over the objective, though Object is not altogether eliminated: just as, in the particular external things, the objective point of view predominates, though Subject cannot be altogether dismissed. Neither Subject nor Object can ever entirely disappear: the one is the inseparable correlative and complement of the other: but sometimes the subjective point of view may preponderate, sometimes the objective. Such preponderance (or logical priority), either of the one or the other, may be implied or connoted by the denomination given. Though the special connotation of the name creates an illusion which makes the preponderant point of view seem to be all, and magnifies the Relatum so as to eclipse and extinguish the Correlatum—yet such preponderance, or logical priority, is all that is really meant when the Concepts are said to be "*in the mind*"—and the Percepts (Percepta, things perceived) to be "*out of the mind:*" for both Concepts and Percepts are "*of the mind*, or *relative to the mind*."[n]

[m] On this point the argument in the dialogue itself, as stated by Parmenides, is not clear to follow. Strümpell remarks on the terms employed by Plato. "Der Umstand, dass die Ausdrücke εἶδος und ἰδέα nicht sowie λόγος den Unterschied, zwischen Begriff und dem durch diesen begriffenen Realen, hervortreten lassen—sondern, weil dieselben bald im subjektiven Sinne den Begriff, bald im objektiven Sinne das Reale bezeichnen—bald in der einen bald in der andern Bedeutung zu nehmen sind—kann leicht eine Verwechselung und Unklarheit in der Auffassung veranlassen," &c. (Gesch. der Gr. Philos. s. 90, p. 115).

[n] This preponderance of the Objective point of view, though without altogether eliminating the Subjective, includes all that is true in the assertion of Aristotle, that the *Perceptum* is prior to the *Percipient*—the *Percipiendum* prior to the *Perceptionis Capax*. He assimilates the former to a *Movens*, the latter to a *Motum*. But he declares

Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times to the present day—Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it.

The question—What is the real and precise meaning attached to abstract and general words?—has been debated down to this day, and is still under debate. It seems to have first derived its importance, if not its origin, from Sokrates, who began the practice of inviting persons to define the familiar generalities of ethics and politics, and then tested by cross-examination the definitions given by men who thought that common sense would enable any one to define.[o] But I see no ground for believing that Sokrates ever put to himself the question—Whether that which an abstract term denotes is a mental conception, or a separate and self-existent reality. That question was raised by Plato, and first stands clearly brought to view here in the Parmenidês.

If we follow up the opinion here delivered by the Platonic Sokrates, together with the first correction added to it by Parmenides, amounting to this—That the Form is a Conception of the mind with its corresponding Concept: if, besides, we dismiss the doctrine held by Plato, that the Form is a separate self-existent unchangeable Ens (ἓν παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ): there will then be no greater difficulty in understanding how it can be partaken by, or be at once in, many distinct particulars, than in understanding (what is at bottom the same question) how one and the same attribute can belong at once to many different objects: how hardness or smoothness can be at once in an indefinite number of hard and smooth bodies dispersed everywhere.[p] The object and the attribute are both

that he means not a priority in time or real existence, but simply a *priority in nature* or *logical priority;* and he also declares the two to be relatives or reciproca. The Prius is relative to the Posterius, as the Posterius is relative to the Prius.—Metaphys. Γ. 1010, b. 35-38. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως· τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τῷ κινουμένου φύσει πρότερόν ἐστιν· κἂν εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, οὐδὲν ἧττον.

See respecting the πρότερον φύσει, Aristot. Categor. p. 12, b. 5-15, and Metaphys. Δ. 1018, b. 12—ἁπλῶς καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερον.

[o] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 3, M. 1078, b. 18-32.

[p] That "the attribute is in its subject," is explained by Aristotle only by saying That it is *in* its subject, not as a part in the whole, yet as that which cannot exist apart from its subject (Categor. 1. a. 3c—3. a. 30). Compare Hobbes, Comput. or Logic, iii. 3, viii. 3. Respecting the number of different modes τοῦ ἓν τινι εἶναι, see Aristot. Physic. iii. p. 210, a. 18 seq., with the Scholia, p. 373 Brandis, and p. 446, 10 Brand. The commentators made out, variously, nine, eleven, sixteen distinct τρόπους τοῦ ἓν τινι εἶναι. In the language of Aristotle, *genus*, *species*, εἶδος, and even *differentia* are not ἐν

of them relative to the same percipient and concipient mind: we may perceive or conceive many objects as distinct individuals—we may also conceive them all as resembling in a particular manner, making abstraction of the individuality of each: both these are psychological facts, and the latter of the two is what we mean when we say, that all of them possess or participate in one and the same attribute. The concrete term, and its corresponding abstract, stand for the same facts of sense differently conceived. Now the word *one*, when applied to the attribute, has a different meaning from *one* when applied to an individual object. Plato speaks sometimes elsewhere as if he felt this diversity of meaning: not however in the Parmenidês, though there is great demand for it. But Aristotle (in this respect far superior) takes much pains to point out that *Unum Ens*—and the preposition *In* (to be *in* anything)—are among the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, having several different meanings derived from one primary or radical by diverse and distant ramifications.[q] The important

ὑποκειμένῳ, but are predicated καθ' ὑποκειμένου (see Cat. p. 3, a. 20). The *proprium* and *accidens* alone are ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. Here is a difference between his language and that of Plato, according to whom τὸ εἶδος is ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πολλῶν (Parmenid. 131 A.) But we remark in that same dialogue, that when Parmenides questions Sokrates whether he recognizes εἴδη αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, he first asks whether Sokrates admits δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό, καὶ καλοῦ, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων. Sokrates answers without hesitation, *Yes*. Then Parmenides proceeds to ask, Do you recognize an εἶδος of man, separate and apart from all of us individual men?—or an εἶδος of fire, water, and such like? Here Sokrates hesitates: he will neither admit nor deny it (130 D). The first list, which Sokrates at once accepts, is of what Aristotle would call *accidents*: the second, which Sokrates doubts about, is of what Aristotle would call *second substances*. We thus see that the conception of a self-existent εἶδος realised itself most easily and distinctly to the mind of Plato in the case of *accidents*. He would, therefore, naturally conceive τὰ εἴδη as being ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, agreeing substantially, though not in terms, with Aristotle. It is in the case of accidents or attributes that abstract names are most usually invented; and it is the abstract name, or the neuter adjective used as its equivalent, which suggests the belief in an εἶδος.

[q] Aristotel. Metaphys. Δ. 1015-1016, i. 1052, a. 30 seq. τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἓν ἢ συνεχὲς ἢ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ, ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος εἷς ᾖ· τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἡ νόησις μία, &c.

About abstract names, or the names of attributes, see Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' i. 2, 4, p. 30, edit. 5th. "When only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated by the name—as visibleness, tangibleness, equality, &c.—though it denotes an attribute of many different objects, the attribute itself is always considered as *one*, not as *many*." Compare, also, on this point, p. 153, and a note added by Mr. Mill to the fifth edition, p. 203, in reply to Mr. Herbert Spencer. The *oneness* of the attribute, in different subjects, is not conceded by every one. Mr. Spencer thinks that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in Subject A, and another attribute, though exactly like it, in Subject B (Principles of Psycho-

logical distinction between *Unum numero* and *Unum specie* (or *genere*, &c.) belongs first to Aristotle.[r]

Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded.

Plato has not followed out the hint which he has here put into the mouth of Sokrates in the Parmenidês—That the Ideas or Forms are conceptions existing only in the mind. Though the opinion thus stated is not strictly correct and is so pointed out by himself), as falling back too exclusively on the subjective—yet if followed out, it might have served to modify the too objective and absolute character which in most dialogues (though not in the Sophistês) he ascribes to his Forms or Ideas: laying stress upon them as objects—and as objects not of sensible perception—but overlooking or disallowing the fact of their being relative to the concipient mind. The bent of Plato's philosophy was to dwell upon these Forms, and to bring them into harmonious conjunction with each other: he neither took pains, nor expected, to make them fit on to the world of sense. With Aristotle, on the contrary, this last-mentioned purpose is kept very generally in view. Amidst all the extreme abstractions which he handles, he reverts often to the comparison of them with sensible particulars: indeed Substantia Prima was by him, for the first time in the history of philosophy, brought down to designate the concrete particular object of sense: in Plato's Phædon, Republic, &c., the only Substances are the Forms or Ideas.

Parmenides now continues the debate. He has already fastened upon Sokrates several difficult problems: he now proposes a new one, different and worse.

logy, p. 126 seq.) Mr. Mill's view appears the correct one; but the distinction (pointed out by Archbishop Whately) between *undistinguishable likeness* and *positive identity*, becomes in these cases imperceptible or forgotten.

Aristotle, however, in the beginning of the Categories ranks ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ as ἄτομον καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ (pp. 1, 6, 8), which I do not understand; and it seems opposed to another passage, pp. 3, 6, 15.

The argument between two such able thinkers as Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer, illustrates forcibly the extreme nicety of this question respecting the One and the Many, under certain supposable circumstances. We cannot be surprised that it puzzled the dialecticians of the Platonic Aristotelian age, who fastened by preference on points of metaphysical difficulty.

[r] See interesting remarks on the application of this logical distinction in Galen, De Methodo Medendi, Book iii. vol. x. p. 130 seq. Aristotle and Theophrastus both dwelt upon it.

Which way are we to turn then, if these Forms be beyond our knowledge? I do not see my way (says Sokrates) out of the perplexity. The fact is, Sokrates (replies Parmenides), you have been too forward in producing your doctrine of Ideas, without a sufficient preliminary exercise and enquiry. Your love of philosophical research is highly praiseworthy: but you must employ your youth in exercising and improving yourself, through that continued philosophical discourse which the vulgar call *useless prosing:* otherwise you will never attain truth.[s] You are however right in bestowing your attention, not on the objects of sense, but on those objects which we can best grasp in discussion, and which we presume to exist as Forms.[t]

monishes Sokrates that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise.

What sort of exercise must I go through? asks Sokrates. Zeno (replies Parmenides) has already given you a good specimen of it in his treatise, when he followed out the consequences flowing from the assumption—"That the self-existent and absolute Ens is plural." When you are trying to find out the truth on any question, you must assume provisionally, first the affirmative and then the negative, and you must then follow out patiently the consequences deducible from one hypothesis as well as from the other. If you are enquiring about the Form of Likeness, whether it exists or does not exist, you must assume successively both one and the other;[u] marking the deductions which follow, both with reference to the thing directly assumed, and with reference to other things also. You must do the like if you are investigating other Forms—Unlikeness, Motion, and Rest, or even Existence and Non-Existence. But you must not be content with following out only one side of the hypothesis:

What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the consequences of each.

[s] Plato, Parmen. p. 135 C. Πρὼ γὰρ, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν—καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καί γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια.

[t] Plato, Parmen. p. 135 E.

[u] Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 A. καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ, εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται, καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.

you must examine both sides with equal care and impartiality. This is the only sort of preparatory exercise which will qualify you for completely seeing through the truth.[x]

Impossible to do this before a numerous audience —Parmenides is intreated to give a specimen— After much solicitation he agrees.

You propose to me, Parmenides (remarks Sokrates), a work of awful magnitude. At any rate, show me an example of it yourself, that I may know better how to begin.—Parmenides at first declines, on the ground of his old age: but Zeno and the others urge him, so that he at length consents.—The process will be tedious (observes Zeno); and I would not ask it from Parmenides unless among an audience small and select as we are here. Before any numerous audience, it would be an unseemly performance for a veteran like him. For most people are not aware that, without such discursive survey and travelling over the whole field, we cannot possibly attain truth or acquire intelligence.[y]

Parmenides elects his own theory of the *Unum*, as the topic for exhibition —Aristoteles becomes respondent.

It is especially on this ground—the small number and select character of the auditors—that Parmenides suffers himself to be persuaded to undertake what he calls "amusing ourselves with a laborious pastime."[z] He selects, as the subject of his dialectical exhibition, his own doctrine respecting the One. He proceeds to trace out the consequences which flow, first, from assuming the affirmative thesis, *Unum Est:* next, from assuming the negative thesis, or the Antithesis, *Unum non Est.* The consequences are to be deduced from each hypothesis, not only as regards *Unum* itself, but as regards *Cætera*, or other things besides *Unum.* The youngest man of the party, Aristoteles, undertakes the duty of respondent.

[x] Plato, Parmen. p. 136 B.

[y] Plato, Parmen. p. 136 D. *εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν.* Hobbes remarks (Computatio sive Logica, i. 3, 12): "Learners ought to go through logical exercises silently and by themselves: for it will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such language publicly." Proklus tells us, that the difficulty of the *γυμνασία*, here set out by the Platonic Parmenides, is so prodigious, that no one after Plato employed it. (Prok. ad Parmen. p. 801, Stallb.)

[z] Plato, Parmen. p. 137 A. *δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ, ὁ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν—ἢ βούλεσθε ἐπειδὴ-περ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν,* &c.

The remaining portion of the dialogue, half of the whole, is occupied with nine distinct deductions or demonstrations given by Parmenides. The first five start from the assumption, *Unum Est:* the last four from the assumption, *Unum non Est.* The three first draw out the deductions from *Unum Est,* in reference to *Unum:* the fourth and fifth draw out the consequences from the same premiss, in reference to *Cætera.* Again, the sixth and seventh start from *Unum non Est,* to trace what follows in regard to *Unum:* the eighth and ninth adopt the same hypothesis, and reason it out in reference to *Cætera.*

Exhibition of Parmenides —Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from *Unum est*— next from *Unum non est.*

Of these demonstrations, one characteristic feature is, that they are presented in antagonising pairs or Antinomies: except the third, which professes to mediate between the first and second, though only by introducing new difficulties. We have four distinct Antinomies: the first and second, the fourth and fifth, the sixth and seventh, the eighth and ninth, stand respectively in emphatic contradiction with each other. Moreover, to take the demonstrations separately—the first, fifth, seventh, ninth, end in conclusions purely negative: the other four end in double and contradictory conclusions. The purpose is formally proclaimed, of showing that the same premisses, ingeniously handled, can be made to yield these contradictory results.[a] No attempt is made to reconcile the contradictions, except partially by means of the third, in reference to the two preceding. In regard to the fourth and fifth, sixth and seventh, eighth and ninth, no hint is given that they can be, or afterwards will be, reconciled. The dialogue concludes abruptly at the end of the ninth demonstration, with these words: "We thus see that—whether Unum exists or does not exist—Unum and Cætera both are, and are not, all things in every way—both appear, and do not appear, all things in every way—each in relation to itself, and each in relation to the other."[b] Here is an unqualified and even startling an-

The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation.

[a] See the connecting words between the first and second demonstration, pp. 142 A. 159. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῶμεν ὡς φανερὰ, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἂν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς, ἢ οὕτω μόνον; also p. 163 B.

[b] Plato, Parmen. ad fin. Εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτο τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἂν εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ

nouncement of double and contradictory conclusions, obtained from the same premisses both affirmative and negative: an announcement delivered too as the fulfilment of the purpose of Parmenides. Nothing is said at the end to intimate how the demonstrations are received by Sokrates, nor what lesson they are expected to administer to him: not a word of assent, or dissent, or surprise, or acknowledgment in any way, from the assembled company, though all of them had joined in entreating Parmenides, and had expressed the greatest anxiety to hear his dialectic exhibition. Those who think that an abrupt close, or an abrupt exordium, is sufficient reason for declaring a dialogue not to be the work of Plato (as Platonic critics often argue), are of course consistent in disallowing the Parmenides. For my part, I do not agree in the opinion. I take Plato as I find him, and I perceive both here and in the Protagoras and elsewhere, that he did not always think it incumbent upon him to adapt the end of his dialogues to the beginning. This may be called a defect, but I do not feel called upon to make out that Plato's writings are free from defects; and to acknowledge nothing as his work unless I can show it to be faultless.

Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies and the dialogue generally.

The demonstrations or Antinomies in the last half of the Parmenides are characterised by K. F. Hermann and others as a masterpiece of speculative acuteness. Yet if these same demonstrations, constructed with care and labour for the purpose of proving that the same premisses will conduct to double and contradictory conclusions, had come down to us from antiquity under the name either of the Megaric Eukleides, or Protagoras, or Gorgias—many of the Platonic critics would probably have said of them (what is now said of the sceptical treatise remaining to us under the name of Gorgias) that they were poor productions worthy of such Sophists, who are declared to have made a trade of perverting truth. Certainly the conclusions of the demonstrations are specimens of that "Both and Neither," which Plato (in the Euthydemus[c]) puts into

τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.

[c] Plato, Euthydem. p. 300 C. *Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα στιγῇ ἢ λέγει; Οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφότερα,*

the mouth of the Sophist Dionysodorus as an answer of slashing defiance—and of that intentional evolution of contradictions which Plato occasionally discountenances, both in the Euthydemus and elsewhere.[d] And we know from Proklus[e] that there were critics in ancient times, who depreciated various parts of the Parmenides as sophistical. Proklus himself denies the charge with some warmth. He as well as the principal Neo-Platonists between 200-530 A.D. (especially his predecessors and instructors at Athens, Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Plutarchus) admired the Parmenides as a splendid effort of philosophical genius in its most exalted range, inspired so as to become cognizant of superhuman persons and agencies. They all agreed so far as to discover in the dialogue a sublime vein of mystic theology and symbolism: but along with this general agreement, there was much discrepancy in their interpretation of particular parts and passages. The commentary of Proklus attests the existence of such debates, reporting his own dissent from the interpretations sanctioned by his venerated masters, Plutarchus and Syrianus. That commentary, in spite of its prolixity, is curious to read as a specimen of the fifth century A.D., in one of its most eminent representatives. Proklus discovers a string of theological symbols and a mystical meaning throughout the whole dialogue: not merely in the acute argumentation which characterises its middle part, but also in the perplexing antinomies of its close, and even in the dramatic details of places, persons, and incidents, with which it begins.[f]

ἔφη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· εὖ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἕξεις ὅ, τι χρῇ.

[d] Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B. εἶτ' ὅς τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκὼς χαίρει, τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἕλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασίν.— Also p. 259 D. Τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῇ γέ πῃ, καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν, καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τἀναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὔτος ἀληθινὸς, ἅρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὤν.

[e] Proklus, ad Platon. Parmen. p. 953, ed. Stallb.; compare p. 976 in the last book of the commentary, probably composed by Damaskius. K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platon. Philos. p. 507.

[f] This commentary is annexed to Stallbaum's edition of the Parmenides. Compare also the opinion of Marinus (disciple and biographer of Proklus) about the Parmenides—Suidas v. Μαρῖνος. Jamblichus declared that Plato's entire theory of philosophy was embodied in the two dialogues, Parmenides and Timæus: in the Parmenides, all the intelligible or universal Entia were deduced from τὸ ἓν: in the Timæus, all cosmical realities were deduced from the Demiurgus. Proklus ad Timæum, p. 5 A, p. 10 Schneider. Alkinous, in his Introduction to the

The various explanations of it given by more recent commentators may be seen enumerated in the learned Prolegomena of Stallbaum,[g] who has also set forth his own views at considerable length. And the prodigious opposition between the views of Proklus (followed by Ficinus in the fifteenth century), who extols the Parmenides as including in mystic phraseology sublime religious truths—and those of the modern Tiedemann, who despises them as foolish subtleties and cannot read them with patience—is quite sufficient to inspire a reasonable Platonic critic with genuine diffidence.

Platonic Dialogues (c. 6, p. 159, in the Appendix Platonica attached to K. F. Hermann's edition of Plato) quotes several examples of syllogistic reasoning from the Parmenides, and affirms that the ten categories of Aristotle are exhibited therein.

Plotinus (Ennead. v. 1, 8) gives a brief summary of what he understood to be contained in the Antinomies of the Platonic Parmenides; but the interpretation departs widely from the original.

I transcribe a few sentences from the argument of Ficinus, to show what different meanings may be discovered in the same words by different critics. (Ficini Argum. in Plat. Parmen. p. 756.) "Cum Plato per omnes ejus dialogos totius sapientiæ semina sparserit, in libris De Republicâ cuncta moralis philosophiæ instituta collegit, omnem naturalium rerum scientiam in Timæo, universam in Parmenide complexus est Theologiam. Cumque in aliis longo intervallo cæteros philosophos antecesserit, in hoc tandem seipsum superasse videtur. Hic enim divus Plato de ipso Uno subtilissimé disputat: quemadmodum Ipsum Unum rerum omnium principium est, super omnia, omniaque ab illo: quo pacto ipsum extra omnia sit et in omnibus: omniaque ex illo, per illud, atque ad illud. Ad hujus, quod super essentiam est, Unius intelligentiam gradatim ascendit. In iis quæ fluunt et sensibus subjiciuntur et sensibilia nominantur: In iis etiam quæ semper eadem sunt et sensibilia nuncupantur, non sensibus amplius sed solâ mente percipienda: Nec in iis tantum, verum etiam supra sensum et sensibilia, intellectumque et intelligibilia:—ipsum Unum existit. —Illud insuper advertendum est, quod in hoc dialogo cum dicitur *Unum*, Pythagoreorum more quæque substantia a materiâ penitus absoluta significari potest: ut Deus, Mens, Anima. Cum vero dicitur Aliud et Alia, tam materia, quam illa quæ in materiâ fiunt, intelligere licet."

The Prolegomena, prefixed by Thomson to his edition of the Parmenides, interpret the dialogue in the same general way as Proklus and Ficinus: they suppose that by Unum is understood Summus Deus, and they discover in the concluding Antinomies theological demonstrations of the unity, simplicity, and other attributes of God. Thomson observes, very justly, that the Parmenides is one of the most difficult dialogues in Plato (Prolegom. iv.-x.) But in my judgment, his mode of exposition, far from smoothing the difficulties, adds new ones greater than those in the text.

[g] Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Parmen. ii. 1, pp. 244-265, compare K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, pp. 507-668-670.

To the works which he has there enumerated, may be added the Dissertation by Dr. Kuno Fischer, Stuttgart, 1851, De Parmenide Platonico, and that of Zeller, Platonische Studien, p. 169 seqq.

Kuno Fischer (pp. 102-103) after Hegel (Gesch. der Griech. Phil. i. p. 202), and some of the followers of Hegel, extol the Parmenides as a masterpiece of dialectics, though they complain that "der philosophirende Pöbel" misunderstand it, and treat it as obscure. Werder, Logik, pp. 92-176, Berlin, 1841. Carl Beck, Platon's Philosophie im Abriss ihrer genetischen Entwickelung, p. 75, Reutlingen, 1852. Marbach, Geschichte der Griech. Philosoph. sect. 96, pp. 210-211.

In so far as these different expositions profess, each in its own way, to detect a positive dogmatical result or purpose in the Parmenides,[h] none of them carry conviction to my

[h] I agree with Schleiermacher, in considering that the purpose of the Parmenides is nothing beyond γυμνασία, or exercise in the method and perplexities of philosophising (Einl. p. 83): but I do not agree with him, when he says (pp. 90-105) that the objections urged by Parmenides (in the middle of the dialogue) against the separate substantiality of Forms or Ideas, though noway answered in the dialogue itself, are sufficiently answered in other dialogues (which he considers later in time), especially in the Sophistes (though, according to Brandis, Handb. Ph. p. 241, the Sophistes is earlier than the Parmenides). Zeller, on the other hand, denies that these objections are at all answered in the Sophistes; but he maintains that the second part of the Parmenides itself clears up the difficulties propounded in the first part. After an elaborate analysis (in the Platonisch. Studien, pp. 168-178) of the Antinomies or contradictory Demonstrations in the concluding part of the dialogue, Zeller affirms the purpose of them to be "die richtige Ansicht von den Ideen als der Einheit in dem Mannichfaltigen der Erscheinung dialektisch zu begründen, die Ideenlehre möglichen Einwürfen und Missverständnissen gegenüber dialektisch zu begründen" (pp. 180-182). This solution has found favour with some subsequent commentators. See Susemihl, Die genetische Entwickelung der Platon. Philosophie, pp. 341-353; Heinrich Stein, Vorgeschichte und System des Platonismus, pp. 217-220.

To me it appears (what Zeller himself remarks in p. 188, upon the discovery of Schleiermacher that the objections started in the Parmenides are answered in the Sophistes) that it requires all the acuteness of so able a writer as Zeller to detect any such result as that which he here extracts from the Parmenidean Antinomies—from what Aristeides calls (Or. xlvii. p. 430) "the One and Many, the multiplied twists and doublings, of this divine dialogue." I confess that I am unable to perceive therein what Zeller has either found or elicited. Objections and misunderstandings (Einwürfe und Missverständnisse) far from being obviated or corrected, are accumulated from the beginning to the end of these Antinomies, and are summed up in a formidable total by the final sentence of the dialogue. Moreover, none of these objections which Parmenides had advanced in the earlier part of the dialogue are at all noticed, much less answered, in the concluding Antinomies.

The general view taken by Zeller of the Platonic Parmenides, is repeated by him in his Geschichte der Griech. Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 394-415-429, ed. 2nd. In the first place, I do not think that he sets forth exactly (see p. 415) the reasoning as we read it in Plato; but even if that were exactly set forth, still what we read in Plato is nothing but an assemblage of difficulties and contradictions. These are indeed suggestive, and such as a profound critic may meditate with care, until he finds himself put upon a train of thought conducting him to conclusions sound and tenable in his judgment. But the explanations, sufficient or not, belong after all not to Plato but to the critic himself. Other critics may attach, and have attached, totally different explanations to the same difficulties. I see no adequate evidence to bring home any one of them to Plato; or to prove (what is the main point to be determined) that any one of them was present to his mind when he composed the dialogue.

Schwegler also gives an account of what he affirms to be the purpose and meaning of the Parmenides—"The positive meaning of the antinomies contained in it can only be obtained by inferences which Plato does not himself expressly enunciate, but leaves to the reader to draw" (Geschichte der Philosophie im Umriss, sect. 14, 4 c. pp. 52-53, ed. 5).

A learned man like Schwegler, who both knows the views of other philosophers, and has himself reflected on philosophy, may perhaps find affirmative meaning in the Parmenides; just as Sokrates, in the Platonic Protagoras,

mind, any more than the mystical interpretations which we read in Proklus. If Plato had any such purpose, he makes no intimation of it, directly or indirectly. On the contrary, he announces another purpose not only different, but contrary. The veteran Parmenides, while praising the ardour of speculative research displayed by Sokrates, at the same time reproves gently but distinctly, the confident forwardness of two such immature youths as Sokrates and Aristotle in laying down positive doctrines without the preliminary exercise indispensable for testing them.[1] Parmenides appears from the beginning to the end of the dialogue as a propounder of doubts and objections, not as a doctrinal teacher. He seeks to restrain the haste of Sokrates—to make him ashamed of premature affirmation and the false persuasion of knowledge—to force upon him a keen sense of real difficulties which have escaped his notice. To this end, a specimen is given of the

No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising.

finds his own ethical doctrine in the song of the poet Simonides. But I venture to say that no contemporary reader of Plato could have found such a meaning in the Parmenides; and that if Plato intended to communicate such a meaning, the whole structure of the dialogue would be only an elaborate puzzle calculated to prevent nearly all readers from reaching it.

By assigning the leadership of the dialogue to Parmenides (Schwegler says) Plato intends to signify that the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is coincident with the doctrine of Parmenides, and is only a further development thereof. How can this be signified, when the discourse assigned to Parmenides consists of a string of objections against the doctrine of Ideas, concluding with an intimation that there are other objections, yet stronger, remaining behind?

The fundamental thought of the Parmenides (says Schwegler) is, that the One is not conceivable in complete abstraction from the Many, nor the Many in complete abstraction from the One,—that each reciprocally supposes and serves as condition to the other. Not so: for if we follow the argumentation of Parmenides (p. 131 E), we shall see that what he principally insists upon, is the entire impossibility of any connection or participation between the One and the Many—there is an impassable gulf between them.

Is the discussion of τὸ ἕν (in the closing Antinomies) intended as an example of dialectic investigation—or is it *per se* the special object of the dialogue? This last is clearly the truth (says Schwegler), "otherwise the dialogue would end without result, and its two portions would be without any internal connection." Not so; for if we read the dialogue, we find Parmenides clearly proclaiming and singling out τὸ ἕν as only one among a great many different notions, each of which must be made the subject of a bilateral hypothesis, to be followed out into its consequences on both sides (p. 136 A). Moreover, I think that the "internal connection" between the first and the last half of the dialogue, consists in the application of this dialectic method, and in nothing else. If the dialogue ends without result, this is true of many other Platonic dialogues. The student is brought face to face with logical difficulties, and has to find out the solution for himself; or perhaps to find out that no solution can be obtained.

[1] Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 C.

exercise required. It is certainly well calculated to produce the effect intended—of hampering, perplexing, and putting to shame, the affirmative rashness of a novice in philosophy. It exhibits a tangled skein of ingenious contradiction, which the novice must somehow bring into order, before he is in condition to proclaim any positive dogma. If it answers this purpose, it does all that Parmenides promises. Sokrates is warned against attaching himself exclusively to one side of an hypothesis, and neglecting the opposite: against surrendering himself to some pre-conception, traditional, or self-originated, and familiarising his mind with its consequences, while no pains are taken to study the consequences of the negative side, and bring them into comparison. It is this one-sided mental activity, and premature finality of assertion, which Parmenides seek to correct. Whether the corrective exercises which he prescribes are the best for the purpose, may be contested: but assuredly the malady which he seeks to correct is deeply rooted in our human nature, and is combated by Sokrates himself, though by other means, in several of the Platonic dialogues. It is a rare mental endowment to study both sides of a question, and suspend decision until the consequences of each are fully known.

Such, in my judgment, is the drift of the contradictory demonstrations here put into the mouth of Parmenides respecting Unum and Cætera. Thus far at least, we are perfectly safe: for we are conforming strictly to the language of Plato himself in the dialogue: We have no proof that he meant anything more. Those who presume that he must have had some ulterior dogmatical purpose, place themselves upon hypothetical ground: but when they go farther and attempt to set forth what this purpose was, they show their ingenuity only by bringing out what they themselves have dropped in. The number of discordant hypotheses attests[k]

This negative purpose announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared.

[k] Proklus ad Platon. Parmen. i. pp. 482-485, ed. Stallb.; compare pp. 497-498-788-791, where Proklus is himself copious upon the subject of exercise in dialectic method.

Stallbaum, after reciting many different hypothetical interpretations from those interpreters who had preceded him, says (Prolegg. p. 265), "En lustravimus tandem varias interpretum de

the difficulty of the problem. I agree with those early Platonic commentators (mentioned and opposed by Proklus) who could see no other purpose in these demonstrations than that of dialectical exercise. In this view Schleiermacher, Ast, Strümpell, and others mainly concur: the two former however annexing to it a farther hypothesis—which I think improbable—that the dialogue has come to us incomplete; having once contained at the end (or having been originally destined to contain, though the intention may never have been realised) an appendix elucidating the perplexities of the demonstrations.[1] This would have been inconsistent with the purpose declared by Parmenides: who, far from desiring to facilitate the onward march of Sokrates by clearing up difficulties, admonishes him that he is advancing too rapidly, and seeks to keep him back by giving him a heap of manifest contradictions to disentangle. Plato conceives the training for philosophy or for the highest exercise of intellectual force, to be not less laborious than that which was required for the bodily perfections of an Olympic athlete. The student must not be helped out of difficulties at once: he must work his own way slowly out of them.

That the demonstrations include assumption both unwarranted and contradictory, mingled with sophistical subtlety

hoc libro opiniones. Quid igitur? verusne fui, quum suprà dicerem, tantam fuisse hominum eruditorum in eo explicando fluctuationem atque dissensionem, ut quamvis plurimi de eo disputaverint, tamen ferè alius aliter judicaverit? Nimirum his omnibus cognitis, facilè alicui in mentem veniat Terentianum illud — *Fecisti propè, multo sim quam dudum incertior.*"

Brandis (Handbuch Gr. Röm. Philos. s. 105, pp. 257-258) cannot bring himself to believe that dialectical exercise was the only purpose with which Plato composed the Parmenides. He then proceeds to state what Plato's ulterior purpose was, but in such very vague language, that I hardly understand what he means, much less can I find it in the Antinomies themselves. He has some clearer language, p. 241, where he treats these Antinomies as preparatory ἀπορίαι.

[1] Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 239-244; Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Parmen. pp. 94-99; Strümpell, Geschichte der Theoretischen Philosophie der Griechen, sect. 96, pp. 128-129.

I do not agree with Socher's conclusion, that the Parmenides is not a Platonic composition. But I think he is quite right in saying that the dialogue as it now stands performs all that Parmenides promises, and leaves no ground for contending that it is an unfinished fragment (Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 286), so far as philosophical speculation is concerned. The dialogue as a dramatic or literary composition undoubtedly lacks a proper close; it is ἄτρους or κολοβὸς (Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 8), sinning against the strict exigence which Plato in the Phædrus applies to the discourse of Lysias.

(in the modern sense of the words), is admitted by most of the commentators: and I think that the real amount of it is greater than they admit. How far Plato was himself aware of this, I will not undertake to say. Perhaps he was not. The reasonings which have passed for sublime and profound in the estimation of so many readers, may well have appeared the same to their author. I have already remarked that Plato's ratiocinative force is much greater on the negative side than on the positive: more ingenious in suggesting logical difficulties than sagacious in solving them. Impressed, as Sokrates had been before him, with the duty of combating the false persuasion of knowledge, or premature and untested belief,—he undertook to set forth the pleadings of negation in the most forcible manner. Many of his dialogues manifest this tendency, but the Parmenides more than any other. That dialogue is a collection of unexplained ἀπορίαι (such as those enumerated in the second book of Aristotle's Metaphysica) brought against a doctrine which yet Plato declares to be the indispensable condition of all reasoning. It concludes with a string of demonstrations by which contradictory conclusions (Both and Neither) are successively proved, and which appear like a *reductio ad absurdum* of all demonstration. But at the time when Plato composed the dialogue, I think it not improbable that these difficulties and contradictions appeared even to himself unanswerable: in other words, that he did not himself see any answers and explanations of them. He had tied a knot so complicated, that he could not himself untie it. I speak of the state of Plato's mind when he wrote the Parmenides. At the dates of other dialogues (whether earlier or later), he wrote under different points of view; but no key to the Parmenides does he ever furnish.

The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or ἀπορίαι.

If however we suppose that Plato must have had the key present to his own mind, he might still think it right to employ, in such a dialogue, reasonings recognised by himself as defective. It is the task imposed upon Sokrates to find out and expose these defective links. There is no better way of illustrating how universal is the malady of human intelligence—unexamined

Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant.

belief and over-confident affirmation—as it stands proclaimed to be in the Platonic Apology. Sokrates is exhibited in the Parmenides as placed under the screw of the Elenchus, and no more able than others to extricate himself from it, when it is applied by Parmenides: though he bears up successfully against Zeno, and attracts to himself respectful compliments, even from the aged dialectician who tests him. After the Elenchus applied to himself, Sokrates receives a farther lesson from the "Neither and Both" demonstrations addressed by Parmenides to the still younger Aristotle. Sokrates will thus be driven, with his indefatigable ardour for speculative research to work at the problem—to devote to it those seasons of concentrated meditation, which sometimes exhibited him fixed for hours in the same place and almost in the same attitude[m]—until he can extricate himself from such difficulties and contradictions. But that he shall not extricate himself without arduous mental effort, is the express intention of Parmenides: just as the Xenophontic Sokrates proceeds with the youthful Euthydemus—and the Platonic Sokrates with Lysis, Theætetus, and others. Plausible subtlety was not unsuitable for such a lesson.[n] Moreover, in the Parmenides, Plato proclaims explicitly that the essential condition of the lesson is to be strictly private: that a process so roundabout and tortuous cannot be appreciated by ordinary persons, and would be unseemly before an audience.[o] He selects as respondent the youngest person in the company, one still younger than Sokrates: because (he says) such a person will reply with artless simplicity, to each question as

[m] Plato, Symposion, p. 220 C-D; compare pp. 174-175.

In the dialogue Parmenides (p. 130 E), Parmenides himself is introduced as predicting that the youthful Sokrates will become more and more absorbed in philosophy as he advances in years.

Proklus observes in his commentary on the dialogue—*ὁ γὰρ Σωκράτης ἄγαται τὰς ἀπορίας*, &c. (L. v. p. 252).

[n] Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, ad fin.

[o] Plato, Parmenides, c. 21, pp. 136 C, 137 A. Hobbes remarks (Computatio sive Logica, Part I. ch. iii. s. 12), "Learners ought to go through logical exercises silently and by themselves: for it will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such language publicly."

Proklus tells us that the difficulty of the *γυμνασία* here enjoined by the Platonic Parmenides is so prodigious, that no one after Plato employed it (Prokl. ad Parmenid. p. 306, p. 801, Stallb.).

εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι. ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν.

the question may strike him—not carrying his mind forward to the ulterior questions for which his reply may furnish the handle—not afraid of being entangled in puzzling inconsistencies—not solicitous to baffle the purpose of the interrogator.[p] All this betokens the plan of the dialogue—to bring to light all those difficulties which do not present themselves except to a keen-sighted enquirer.

The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many other Antinomies.

We must remark farther, that the two hypotheses here handled at length by Parmenides are presented by him only as examples of a dialectical process which he enjoins the lover of truth to apply equally to many other hypotheses.[q] As he shows that in the case of Unum, each of the two assumptions (Unum est—Unum non est) can be traced through different threads of deductive reasoning so as to bring out double and contradictory results—Both and Neither: so also in the case of those other assumptions which remain to be tested afterwards in like manner, antinomies of the same character may be expected: antinomies apparent at least, if not real—which must be formally propounded and dealt with, before we can trust ourselves as having attained reasoned truth. Hence we see that, negative and puzzling as the dialogue called Parmenides is, even now—it would be far more puzzling if all that it prescribes in general terms had been executed in detail. While it holds out, in the face of an aspirant in philosophy, the necessity of giving equal presumptive value to the affirmative and negative sides of each hypothesis, and deducing with equal care, the consequences of both—it warns him at the same time of the contradictions in which he will thereby become involved. These contradictions are presented in the most glaring manner: but we must recollect a striking passage in the Republic, where Plato declares that to confront the aspirant with manifest contra-

[p] Plato, Parmenides, p. 137 B; compare Sophistes, p. 217 D.

To understand the force of this remark of Parmenides, we should contrast it with the precepts given by Aristotle in the Topica for dialectic debate; precepts teaching the questioner how to puzzle, and the respondent how to avoid being puzzled. Such precautions are advised to the respondent by Aristotle, not merely in the Topica but also in the Analytica—*χρὴ δ' ὅπερ φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινομένους, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν*, Analyt. Priora, ii. p. 66, a. 33.

[q] Plato, Parmenid. c. 20, p. 136 B.

dictions, is the best way of provoking him to intellectual effort in the higher regions of speculation.[r]

These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers.

I shall have occasion, when I touch upon the other *viri Socratici*, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Plato, to give some account of the Zenonian and Megaric dialecticians, and of their sophisms or logical puzzles, which attracted so much attention from speculative men, in the fourth and third centuries B.C. These Megarics, like the Sophists, generally receive very harsh epithets from the historian of philosophy. They took the negative side, impugned affirmative dogmas, insisted on doubts and difficulties, and started problems troublesome to solve. I shall try to show, that such disputants, far from deserving all the censure which has been poured upon them, presented one indispensable condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory.[s] Their sophisms were challenges to the logician, indicating various forms of error and confusion, against which a theory of reasoning, in order to be sufficient, was required to guard. And the demonstrations given by Plato in the latter half of the Parmenides are challenges of the same kind: only more ingenious, elaborate, and effective, than any of those (so far as we know them) proposed by the Megarics—by Zeno, or Eukleides, or Diodorus Kronus. The Platonic Parmenides here shows, that in regard to a particular question, those who believe the affirmative, those who believe the negative, and those who believe neither—can all furnish good reasons for their respective conclusions. In each case he gives the proof confidently as being good: and whether unimpeachable or not, it is certainly very ingenious and subtle. Such demonstrations are in the spirit of Sextus Empiricus, who rests his

[r] Plato, Republic, vii. p. 524 E, and indeed the whole passage, pp. 523-524.

[s] Among the commentators on the Categories of Aristotle, there were several whose principal object it was to propound all the most grave and troublesome difficulties which they could think of. Simplikius does not commend the style of these men, but he expresses his gratitude to them for the pains which they had taken in the exposition of the negative case, and for the stimulus and opportunity which they had thus administered to the work of affirmative exposition (Simplikius, Schol. ad Categ. Aristot. p. 40, a. 22-30; Schol. Brandis). David the Armenian, in his Scholia on the Categories (p. 27, b. 42, Brandis), defends the Topica of Aristotle as having been composed *γυμνασίας χάριν, ἵνα θλιβομένη ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα ἐπιχειρημάτων ἀπογεννήσῃ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας φῶς.*

theory of scepticism upon the general fact, that there are opposite and contradictory conclusions, both of them supported by evidence equally good: the affirmative no more worthy of belief than the negative.[t] Zeno (or as Plato calls him, the Eleatic Palamêdes[u]) did not profess any systematic theory of scepticism; but he could prove, by ingenious and varied dialectic, both the thesis and the antithesis on several points of philosophy, by reasons which few, if any, among his hearers could answer. In like manner the Platonic Parmenides enuntiates his contradictory demonstrations as real logical problems, which must exercise the sagacity and hold back the forward impulse of an eager philosophical aspirant. Even if this dilemma respecting Unum Est and Unum non Est, be solved, Parmenides intimates that he has others in reserve: so that either no tenable positive result will ever be attained—or at least it will not be attained until after such an amount of sagacity and patient exercise as Sokrates himself declares to be hardly practicable.[x] Herein we may see the germ and premisses of that theory which was afterwards formally proclaimed by Ænesidemus and the professed Sceptics: the same holding back (ἐποχή), and protest against precipitation in dogmatising,[y] which these latter converted into a formula and vindicated as a system.

In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result.

Schleiermacher has justly observed,[z] that in order to understand properly the dialectic manœuvres of the Parmenides, we ought to have had before us the works of that philosopher himself, of Zeno, Melissus, Gorgias, and other sceptical reasoners of the age immediately preceding—which have unfortunately perished. Some reference to these, must probably have been present to Plato in the composition of this dialogue.[a] At the same time, if we accept the

[t] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. i. 8-12. Ἔστι δ' ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἱονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐρχόμεθα, διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχὴν τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν—ἰσοσθένειαν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ὡς μηδὲν μηδενὸς προκεῖσθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς πιστότερον—συστάσεως δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀρχὴ μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικεῖσθαι.

[u] Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 D.

[x] Plato, Parmen. p. 136 C-D.

[y] Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. 20-212. τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν—τὴν δογματικὴν προπέτειαν.

[z] Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Parmen. pp. 97-99.

[a] Indeed, the second demonstration, among the nine given by Parmenides

dialogue as being (what it declares itself to be) a string of objections and dialectical problems, we shall take care not to look for any other sort of merit than what such a composition requires and admits. If the objections are forcible, the problems ingenious and perplexing, the purpose of the author is satisfied. To search in the dialogue for some positive result, not indeed directly enuntiated but discoverable by groping and diving—would be to expect a species of fruit inconsistent with the nature of the tree. *Ζητῶν εὑρήσεις οὐ ῥόδον ἀλλὰ βάτον.*

Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c.

It may indeed be useful for the critic to perform for himself the process which Parmenides intended Sokrates to perform; and to analyse these subtleties with a view to measure their bearing upon the work of dogmatic theorising. We see double and contradictory conclusions elicited, in four separate Antinomies, from the same hypothesis, by distinct chains of interrogatory deduction; each question being sufficiently plausible to obtain the acquiescence of the respondent. The two assumptions successively laid down by Parmenides as *principia* for deduction—*Si Unum est*—*Si Unum non est*—convey the very minimum of determinate meaning. Indeed both words are essentially indeterminate. Both Unum and Ens are declared by Aristotle to be not univocal or generic words,[b] though at the same time not absolutely equivocal: but words bearing

(pp. 143 A, 155 C), coincides to a great degree with the conclusion which Zeno is represented as having maintained in his published dissertation (p. 127 E); and shows that the difficulties and contradictions belong to the world of invisible Ideas, as well as to that of sensible particulars, which Sokrates had called in question (p. 129 C-E).

The Aristotelian treatise (whether by Aristotle, Theophrastus, or any other author)—De Zenone, Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgiâ—affords some curious comparisons with the Parmenides of Plato, Aristotel. p. 974 seq. Bekk., also Fragmenta Philosophorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, pp. 273-309.

[b] Aristot. Metaphys. iv. 1015-1017, ix. 1052, a. 15; Analyt. Poster. ii. p. 92, b. 14. *τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί. οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὄν.*—Topica, iv. p. 127, a. 28. *πλείω γὰρ τὰ πᾶσιν ἐπόμενα· οἷον τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν πᾶσιν ἑπομένων ἔστιν*, Physica, i. p. 185, b. 6.

Simplikius noted it as one among the differences between Plato and Aristotle—That Plato admitted Unum as having only one meaning, not being aware of the diversity of meanings which it bore; while Aristotle expressly pointed it out as a *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον. Παρμενίδης γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὂν φησὶ, Πλάτων δὲ τὸ ἓν μοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀμφότερα πολλαχῶς* (Schol. ad Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 320, b. 3, Brandis). Aristotle farther remarks that Plato considered *τὸ γένος* as *ἓν ἀριθμῷ*, and that this was an error; we ought rather to say that Plato did not clearly discriminate *ἓν ἀριθμῷ*

several distinct transitional meanings, derived either from each other, or from some common root, by an analogy more or less remote. Aristotle characterises in like manner all the most indeterminate predicates, which are not included in any one distinct category among the ten, but are made available to predication sometimes in one category, sometimes in another: such as Ens, Unum, Idem, Diversum, Contrarium, &c. Now in the Platonic Parmenides, the two first among these words are taken to form the proposition assumed as fundamental datum, and the remaining three are much employed in the demonstration: yet Plato neither notices nor discriminates their multifarious and fluctuating significations. Such contrast will be understood when we recollect that the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides is, to propound difficulties; while that of Aristotle is, not merely to propound, but also to assist in clearing them up.

In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is made to bear very different meanings.

Certainly, in Demonstrations 1 and 2 (as well as 4 and 5), the foundation assumed is in words the same proposition—*Si Unum est:* but we shall find this same proposition used in two very different senses. In the first Demonstration, the proposition is equivalent to *Si Unum est Unum:*[c] in the second, to *Si Unum est Ens*, or *Si Unum existit.* In the first the proposition is identical and the verb *est* serves only as copula: in the second, the verb *est* is not merely a copula but implies Ens as a predicate, and affirms existence. We might have imagined that the identical proposition—*Unum est Unum*—since it really affirms nothing—would have been barren of all consequences: and so indeed it is barren of all affirmative consequences. But Plato obtains for it one first step

from ἓν εἴδει (Aristot. Topic. vi. 143, b. 30).

Simplikius farther remarks, that it was Aristotle who first rendered to Logic the important service of bringing out clearly and emphatically the idea of τὸ ὁμώνυμον—the same word with several meanings either totally distinct and disparate, or ramifying in different directions from the same root, so that there came to be little or no affinity between many of them. It was Aristotle who first classified and named these distinctions (συνώνυμον — ὁμώνυμον, and the intermediate κατ' ἀναλογίαν), though they had been partially noticed by Plato and even by Sokrates. ἕως οὐ πάμπαν ἐκδηλον ἦν τε ἤρξατο τούτου ἢ μᾶλλον ἐκείνου Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 323, b. 25, Brandis.

[c] Plato, Parmen. pp. 137 C, 142 B.

in the way of negative predicates—*Si Unum est Unum, Unum non est Multa:* and from hence he proceeds, by a series of gentle transitions ingeniously managed, to many other negative predications respecting the subject *Unum.* Since it is not Multa, it can have no parts, nor can it be a whole: it has neither beginning, middle, nor end: it has no boundary, or it is boundless: it has no figure, it is neither straight nor circular: it has therefore no place, being neither in itself, nor in anything else: it is neither in motion nor at rest: it is neither the same with anything else, nor the same with itself: it is neither different from anything else, nor different from itself:[d] it is neither like, nor unlike, to itself, nor to anything else: it is neither equal, nor unequal, to itself nor to anything else: it is neither older nor younger, nor of equal age, either with itself or with anything else: it exists therefore not in time, nor has it any participation with time: it neither has been nor will be, nor is: it does not exist in any way: it does not even exist so as to be Unum: you can neither name it, nor reason upon it, nor know it, nor perceive it, nor opine about it.

First Demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions. *Reductio ab Absurdum* of the assumption—Unum non Multa.

All these are impossibilities (concludes Plato). We must therefore go back upon the fundamental principle from which we took our departure, in order to see whether we shall not obtain, on a second trial, any different result.[e]

Here then is a piece of dialectic, put together with ingenuity, showing that everything can be denied, and that nothing can be affirmed of the subject—Unum. All this follows, if you concede the first step, that Unum is not Multa. If Unum be said to have any other attribute except that of being Unum, it would become at once Multa. It cannot even be declared to be either the same with itself, or different from anything else; because Idem and Diversum are distinct natures from Unum, and if added to it would convert it into Multa.[f] Nay it cannot even be affirmed to be itself: it

[d] This part of the argument is the extreme of dialectic subtlety, p. 139 C-D-E.

[e] Plato, Parmen. p. 142 A.

[f] This is the main point of Demonstration 1, and is stated pp. 139 D, 140 A compared with p. 137 C.

cannot be named or enunciated: if all predicates are denied, the subject is denied along with them: the subject is nothing but the sum total of its predicates—and when they are all withdrawn, no subject remains. As far as I can understand the bearing of this self-contradictory demonstration, it appears a *reductio ad absurdum* of the proposition—*Unum is not Multa.* Now *Unum which is not Multa* designates the Αὐτὸ-Ἕν or Unum Ideale; which Plato himself affirmed, and which Aristotle impugned.[g] If this be what is meant, the dialogue Parmenides would present here, as in other places, a statement of difficulties understood by Plato as attaching to his own doctrines.

Parmenides now proceeds to his second demonstration: professing to take up again the same hypothesis— *Si Unum est*—from which he had started in the first[h]—but in reality taking up a different hypothesis under the same words. In the first hypothesis, *Si Unum est*, was equivalent to, *Si Unum est Unum:* nothing besides *Unum* being taken into the reasoning, and *est* serving merely as copula. In the second, *Si Unum est*, is equivalent to *Si Unum est Ens*, or exists: so that instead of the isolated *Unum*, we have now *Unum Ens.*[i] Here is a duality consisting of *Unum and Ens:* which two are considered as separate or separable factors, coalescing to form the whole *Unum Ens*, each of them being a part thereof. But each of these parts is again dual, containing both *Unum and Ens:* so that each

Second Demonstration.

[g] Aristot. Metaph. A. 987, b. 20, 992, a. 8, B. 1001, a. 27, i. 1053, b. 18. Some ancient expositors thought that the purpose of Plato in the Parmenides was to demonstrate this Αὐτὸ-Ἕν, see Schol. ad Aristot. Metaph. p. 786, a. 10, Brandis.

It is not easy to find any common bearing between the demonstrations given in this dialogue respecting Ἕν and Πολλὰ—and the observations which Plato makes in the Philêbus upon Ἕν and Πολλὰ. Would he mean to include the demonstrations which we read in the Parmenides, in the category of what he calls in Philêbus "childish, easy, and irrational debates on that vexed question?" (Plato, Philêbus, p. 14 D). Hardly; for they are at any rate most elaborate as well as ingenious and suggestive. Yet neither do they suit the description which he gives in Philêbus of the genuine, serious, and difficult debates on the same question.

[h] Plato, Parmen. c. 32, p. 142 A.

[i] This shifting of the real hypothesis, though the terms remain unchanged, is admitted by implication a little afterwards, p. 142 B. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τί χρὴ

part may be again divided into lesser parts, each of them alike dual: and so on ad infinitum. *Unum Ens* thus contains an infinite number of parts, or is *Multa*.[k] But even *Unum* itself (Parmenides argues) if we consider it separately from *Ens* in which it participates, is not *Unum* alone, but *Multa* also. For it is different from *Ens*, and *Ens* is different from it. *Unum* therefore is not merely *Unum* but also *Diversum*: *Ens* also is not merely *Ens* but *Diversum*. Now when we speak of *Unum* and *Ens*—of *Unum* and *Diversum*—or of *Ens* and *Diversum*—we in each case speak of two distinct things, each of which is *Unum*. Since each is *Unum*, the two things become three—*Ens*, *Diversum*, *Unum*—*Unum*, *Diversum*, *Unum*—*Unum* being here taken twice. We thus arrive at two and three—twice and thrice—odd and even—in short, number, with its full extension and properties. Unum therefore is both Unum and Multa—both Totum and Partes—both finite and infinite in multitude.[l]

It ends in demonstrating *Both*, of that which the first Demonstration had demonstrated *Neither*.

Parmenides proceeds to show that Unum has beginning, middle, and end—together with some figure, straight or curved: and that it is both in itself, and in other things: that it is always both in motion and at rest:[m] that it is both the same with itself and different from itself—both the same with Cætera, and different from Cætera:[n] both like to itself, and unlike to itself—both like to Cætera, and unlike to Cætera:[o] that

[k] Plato, Parmen. pp. 142-143. This is exactly what Sokrates in the early part of the dialogue (p. 129 B-D) had pronounced to be utterly inadmissible, viz.: That ὃ ἔστιν ἓν should be πολλὰ —that ὃ ἔστιν ὅμοιον should be ἀνόμοιον. The essential characteristic of the Platonic Idea is here denied. However, it appears to me that Plato here reasons upon two contradictory assumptions; first, that *Unum Ens* is a total composed of two parts separately assignable—*Unum* and *Ens*; next, that *Unum* is not assignable separately from *Ens*, nor *Ens* from *Unum*. Proceeding upon the first, he declares *Unum Ens* to be divisible: proceeding upon the second, he declares that the division must be carried on ad infinitum, because you can never reach either the separate *Ens* or the separate *Unum*. But these two assumptions cannot be admitted both together. Plato must make his election; either he takes the first, in which case the total Unum Ens is divisible, and its two factors Unum and Ens, can be assigned separately; or he takes the second, in which case *Unum* and *Ens* cannot be assigned separately—are not distinguishable factors,—so that *Unum Ens* instead of being infinitely divisible, is not divisible at all.

The reasoning as it now stands is, in my judgment, fallacious.

[l] Plato, Parmen. pp. 144 A-E, 145 A.

[m] Plato, Parmen. p. 146 A-B.

[n] Plato, Parmen. pp. 146-147 C.

[o] Plato, Parmen. p. 148 A-D.

it both touches, and does not touch, both itself and Cætera:[p] that it is both equal, greater, and less, in number, as compared with itself and as compared with Cætera:[q] that it is both older than itself, younger than itself, and of the same age with itself—both older than Cætera, younger than Cætera, and of the same age as Cætera—also that it is not older nor younger either than itself or than Cætera:[r] that it grows both older and younger than itself, and than Cætera.[s] Lastly, Unum was, is, and will be; it has been, is, and will be generated: it has had, has now, and will have, attributes and predicates: it can be named, and can be the object of perception, conception, opinion, reasoning, and cognition.[t]

Here Parmenides finishes the long Demonstratio Secunda, which completes the first Antinomy. The last conclusion of all, with which it winds up, is the antithesis of that with which the first Demonstration wound up: affirming (what the conclusion of the first had denied) that Unum is thinkable, perceivable, nameable, knowable. Comparing the second Demonstration with the first, we see—That the first, taking its initial step, with a negative proposition, carries us through a series of conclusions every one of which is negative (like those of the second figure of the Aristotelian syllogism): —That whereas the conclusions professedly established in the first Demonstration are all in *Neither* (Unum is neither in itself nor in anything else—neither at rest nor in motion —neither the same with itself nor different from itself, &c.), the conclusions of the second Demonstration are all in *Both* (Unum is both in motion and at rest, both in itself and in other things, both the same with itself and different from itself):—That in this manner, while the first Demonstration denies both of two opposite propositions, the second affirms them both.

Such a result has an air of startling paradox. We find it

[p] Plato, Parmen. p. 149 A-D.
[q] Plato, Parmen. pp. 150-151 D.
[r] Plato, Parmen. pp. 152-153-154 A.
[s] Plato, Parmen. pp. 154 B, 155 C. *κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα, τὸ ἓν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων.*
[t] Plato, Parmen. p. 155 C-D.

shown, respecting various pairs of contradictory propositions, first, that both are false—next, that both are true. This offends doubly against the logical canon, which declares, that of two contradictory propositions, one must be true, the other must be false. We must remember, that in the Platonic age, there existed no systematic logic—no analysis or classification of propositions—no recognised distinction between such as were contrary, and such as were contradictory. The Platonic Parmenides deals with propositions which are, to appearance at least, contradictory: and we are brought, by two different roads, first to the rejection of both, next to the admission of both.[u]

Startling

No logical canon had then been laid down.

How can this be possible? How can these four propositions all be true—*Unum est Unum—Unum est Multa—Unum non est Unum—Unum non est Multa?* Plato suggests a way out of the difficulty, in that which he gives as Demonstration 3. It has been shown that Unum "partakes of time"—was, is, and will be. The propositions are all true, but true at different times: one at this time, another at that time.[x] Unum acquires and loses existence, essence, and other attributes: *now*, it exists and is Unum—*before*, it did not exist and was not Unum: so too it is alternately like and unlike, in motion and at rest. But how is such alternation or change intelligible? At each

and II.

[u] Prantl (in his Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. s. 3, pp. 70-71-73) maintains, if I rightly understand him, not only that Plato did not adopt the *principium identitatis et contradictionis* as the basis of his reasonings, but that one of Plato's express objects was to demonstrate the contrary of it partly in the Philêbus, but especially in the Parmenides:—

"Eine arge Täuschung ist es, zu glauben, dass das principium identitatis et contradictionis oberstes logisches Princip des Plato sei . . Es ist gerade eine Hauptaufgabe welche sich Plato stellen musste, die Coexistenz der Gegensätze nachzuweisen, wie diess bekanntlich im Philebus und *besonders im Parmenides* geschieht."

According to this view, the Antinomies in the Parmenides are all of them good proofs, and the conclusions of all of them, summed up as they are in the final sentence of the dialogue, constitute an addition to the positive knowledge of Sokrates. I confess that this to me is unintelligible. I understand these Antinomies as ἀπορίαι to be cleared up, but in no other character.

Prantl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begründung der Ideenlehre im Parmenides," &c. This is the same language as that used by Zeller, upon which I have already remarked.

[x] This is a distinction analogous to that which Plato points out in the Sophistes (pp. 242-243) between the theories of Herakleitus and Empedoklês.

time, whether present or past, it must be either in motion or at rest: at no time, neither present nor past, can it be *neither* in motion *nor* at rest. It cannot, while in motion, change to rest—nor, while at rest, change to motion. No time can be assigned for the change: neither the present, nor the past, nor the future: how then can the change occur at all?[y]

To this question the Platonic Parmenides finds an answer in what he calls the *Sudden* or the *Instantaneous:* an anomalous nature which lies out of, or apart from, the course of time, being neither past, present, nor future. That which changes, changes at once and suddenly: at an instant when it is neither in motion nor at rest. This *Suddenly* is a halt or break in the flow of time:[z] an extra-temporal condition, in which the subject has no existence, no attributes—though it revives again forthwith clothed with its new attributes: a point of total negation or annihilation, during which the subject with all its attributes disappears. At this interval (the *Suddenly*) all predicates may be truly denied, but none can be truly affirmed.[a] Unum is neither at rest, nor in motion—neither like nor unlike—neither the same with itself nor different from itself—neither Unum nor Multa. Both predicates and Subject vanish. Thus all the negations of the first Demonstration are justified. Immediately before the *Suddenly*, or point of change, Unum was in motion—immediately after the

Plato's imaginary time.

[y] Plato, Parmen. p. 156.

Plato, Parmen. p. 156 E. ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, ἐν οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κινουμένου μεταβάλλει ἑ ἑστάναι, καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθ καὶ τὸ ἓν δή, εἴπερ ἕστηκέ τε κ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ ἄλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης με καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ σταίη.

φύσις ἄτοπός τις—may be compared to an infinitesimal; analogous to what is recognised in the theory of the differential calculus.

[a] This appears to be an illustration of the doctrine which Lassalle ascribes to Herakleitus; perpetual implication of negativity and positivity—des Nichtseins mit dem Sein; perpetual absorption of each particular into the universal; and perpetual reappearance as an opposite particular. See the two elaborate volumes of Lassalle upon Herakleitus, especially i. p. 358, ii. p. 258. He scarcely however takes notice of the Platonic Parmenides.

Some of the Stoics considered τὸ νῦν as μηδὲν—and nothing in time to be real except τὸ παρῳχηκὸς and τὸ μέλλον (Plutarch, De Commun. Notitiis contra Stoicos, p. 1081 D).

change, it is at rest: immediately before, it was like—equal—the same with itself—Unum, &c.—immediately after, it is unlike—unequal—different from itself—Multa, &c. And thus the double and contradictory affirmative predications, of which the second Demonstration is composed, are in their turn made good, as successive in time. This discovery of the extra-temporal point *Suddenly*, enables Parmenides to uphold both the double negative of the first Demonstration, and the double affirmative of the second.

The theory here laid down in the third Demonstration respecting this extra-temporal point—the *Suddenly*—deserves all the more attention, because it applies not merely to the first and second Demonstration which precede it, but also to the fourth and fifth, the sixth and seventh, the eighth and ninth, which follow it. I have already observed, that the first and second Demonstration form a corresponding pair, branching off from the same root or hypothetical proposition (at least the same in terms), respecting the subject *Unum;* and destined to prove, one the Neither, the other the Both, of several different predicates. So also the fourth and fifth form a pair, applying to the subject *Cætera;* and destined to prove, that from the same hypothetical root—*Si Unum est*—we can deduce the Neither as well as the Both, of various predicates of Cætera. When we pass on to the four last Demonstrations, we find that in all four, the hypothesis *Si Unum non est* is substituted for that of *Si Unum est:* but the parallel couples, with the corresponding purpose, are still kept up. The sixth and seventh apply to the subject *Unum*, and demonstrate respecting that subject (proceeding from the hypothesis *Si Unum non est*) first the *Both*, then the *Neither* of various predicates: the eighth and ninth arrive at the same result, respecting the subject *Cætera*. And a sentence at the close sums up in few words the result of all the four pairs (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, that is, of all the Demonstrations excepting the third)—the Neither and the Both respecting all of them.

Review of

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To understand these nine Demonstrations properly, there-

fore, we ought to consider eight among them (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9) as four Antinomies, or couples establishing dialectic contradictions; and the third as a mediator between the couples—announced as if it reconciled the contradictions of the first Antinomy, and capable of being adapted, in the same character with certain modifications, to the second, third, and fourth Antinomy. Whether it reconciles them successfully—in other words, whether the third Demonstration will itself hold good—is a different question. It will be found to involve the singular and paradoxical (Plato's own phrase) doctrine of the extra-temporal *Suddenly*—conceiving Time as a Discretum and not a Continuum. This doctrine is intended by Plato here as a means of rendering the fact of change logically conceivable and explicable. He first states briefly the difficulty (which we know to have been largely insisted on by Diodorus Kronus and other Megarics) of logically explaining the fact of change—and then enunciates this doctrine as the solution. We plainly see that it did not satisfy others—for the puzzle continued to be a puzzle long after—and that it did not even satisfy Plato, except at the time when he composed the Parmenides—since neither the doctrine itself (the extra-temporal break or transition) nor the very peculiar phrase in which it is embodied (*τὸ ἐξαίφνης, ἄτοπός τις φύσις*) occur in any of his other dialogues. If the doctrine were really tenable, it would have been of use in dialectic, and as such, would have been called in to remove the theoretical difficulties raised among dialectical disputants, respecting time and motion. Yet Plato does not again advert to it, either in Sophistes or Timæus, in both of which there is special demand for it.[b] Aristotle, while he adopts a doctrine like it (yet without employing the peculiar phrase *τὸ ἐξαίφνης*) to explain qualitative change, does not admit the same either

The third Demonstration is mediatorial, but not satisfactory—The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour.

[b] Steinhart represents this idea of *τὸ ἐξαίφνης*—the extra-temporal break or zero of transition—as an important progress made by Plato, compared with the Theætêtus, because it breaks down the absoluten Gegensatz between Sein and Werden, Ruhe and Bewegung (Einleitung zum Parmen. p. 309).

Surely, if Plato had considered it a progress, we should have seen the same idea repeated in various other dialogues—which is not the case.

as to quantitative change, or as to local motion, or as to generation and destruction.[c] The doctrine served the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides, as ingenious, original, and provocative to intellectual effort: but it did not acquire any permanent footing in Grecian dialectics.

The two last Antinomies, or four last Demonstrations, have, in common, for their point of departure, the negative proposition, *Si Unum non est:* and are likewise put together in parallel couples (6-7, 8-9), a Demonstration and a Counter-Demonstration—a Both and a Neither: first with reference to the subject *Unum*—next with reference to the subject *Cætera.*

Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII.

Si Unum est—Si Unum non est. Even from such a proposition as the first of these, we might have thought it difficult to deduce any string of consequences—which Plato has already done: from such a proposition as the second, not merely difficult, but impossible. Nevertheless the ingenious dialectic of Plato accomplishes the task, and elicits from each proposition a Both, and a Neither, respecting several predicates of Unum as well as of Cætera. When you say *Unum non est* (so argues the Platonic Parmenides in Demonst. 6), you deny existence respecting Unum: but the proposition *Unum non est,* is distinguishable from *Magnitudo non est—Parvitudo non est*—and such like: propositions wherein the subject is different, though the predicate is the same: so that *Unum non Ens* is still a Something knowable, and distinguishable from other things—a logical subject of which various other predicates may be affirmed, though the predicate of existence cannot be affirmed.[d] It is both like and unlike, equal and unequal—

[c] Aristotel. Physic. v. p. 235, b. 32, with the Scholion of Simplikius, p. 410, b. 20, Brandis.

The discussion occupies two or three pages of Aristotle's Physica. In regard to ἀλλοίωσις or qualitative change, he recognised what he called ἀθρόαν μεταβολήν—a change *all at once,* which occupied no portion of time. It is plain, however, that even his own scholars Theophrastus and Eudemus had great difficulty in accepting the doctrine, see Scholia, pp. 409-410-411, Brandis.

[d] Plato, Parmen. pp. 160-161 A. εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ τό γε ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτ' ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑποκεῖται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι.

like and equal to itself, unlike and unequal to other things.[e] These its predicates being all true, are also real existences: so that Unum partakes *quodam modo* in existence: though *Unum* be *non-Ens*, nevertheless, *Unum non-Ens est*. Partaking thus both of non-existence and of existence, it changes: it both moves and is at rest: it is generated and destroyed, yet is also neither generated nor destroyed.[f]

Having thus deduced from the fundamental principle this string of Both opposite predicates, the Platonic Parmenides reverts (in Demonstration 7) to the same principium (*Si Unum non est*) to deduce by another train of reasoning the Neither of these predicates. When you say that *Unum non est*, you must mean that it does not partake of existence in any way —absolutely and without reserve. It therefore neither acquires nor loses existence: it is neither generated nor destroyed: it is neither in motion nor at rest: it partakes of nothing existent: it is neither equal nor unequal—neither like nor unlike—neither great nor little—neither this, nor that: neither the object of perception, nor of knowledge, nor of opinion, nor of naming, nor of debate.[g]

Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of Parmenides.

These two last counter-demonstrations (6 and 7), forming the third Antinomy, deserve attention in this respect—That the seventh is founded upon the genuine Parmenidean or Eleatic doctrine about Non-Ens, as not merely having no attributes, but as being unknowable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is explained and defended by Plato in the Sophistes, as a substitute for, and refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine.[h] According to Number seven, when you deny, of Unum, the predicate existence, you deny of it also all other predicates: and the name Unum is left without any subject to apply to. This is the Eleatic dogma. Unum having been declared to be Non-Ens, is (like Non-Ens) neither knowable nor nameable. According to Number 6, the proposition *Unum est non-Ens*,

[e] Plato, Parmen. p. 161 C-D.
[f] Plato, Parmen. pp. 162-163 A. The steps by which these conclusions are made out are extremely subtle, and hardly intelligible to me.
[g] Plato, Parmen. pp. 163-164 A.
[h] Plato, Sophistes, pp. 258-259.

does not carry with it any such consequences. Existence is only one predicate, which may be denied of the subject Unum, but which, when denied, does not lead to the denial of all other predicates—nor, therefore, to the loss of the subject itself. Unum still remains Unum, knowable, and different from other things. Upon this first premiss are built up several other affirmations; so that we thus arrive circuitously at the affirmation of existence, in a certain way: *Unum*, though non-existent, does nevertheless exist *quodam modo*. This coincides with that which the Eleatic stranger seeks to prove in the Sophistes, against Parmenides.

Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered—Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning—The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words.

If we compare the two foregoing counter-demonstrations (7 and 6), we shall see that the negative results of the seventh follow properly enough from the assumed premisses: but that the affirmative results of the sixth are not obtained without very unwarrantable jumps in the reasoning, besides its extreme subtlety. But apart from this defect, we farther remark that here also (as in Numbers 1 and 2) the fundamental principle assumed is in terms the same, in signification materially different. The signification of *Unum non est*, as it is construed in Number 7, is the natural one, belonging to the words: but as construed in Number 6, the meaning of the predicate is altogether effaced (as it had been before in Number 1): we cannot tell what it is which is really denied about Unum. As, in Number 1, the proposition *Unum est* is so construed as to affirm nothing except *Unum est Unum*—so in Number 7, the proposition *Unum non est* is so construed as to deny nothing except *Unum non est Unum*, yet conveying along with such denial a farther affirmation—*Unum non est Unum, sed tamen est aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis.*[i] Here this *aliquid scibile* is assumed as a substratum underlying *Unum*, and remaining even when Unum is taken away: contrary to the opinion—that Unum was a separate nature and the fundamental Subject of all—which Aristotle announces as having been held by Plato.[k] There must be always some meaning (the Platonic Parmenides argues) at-

[i] Plato, Parmen. p. 160 C.

[k] Aristot. Metaphys. B. 1001, a. 6-20.

tached to the word Unum, even when you talk of *Unum non Ens:* and that meaning is equivalent to *Aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis.* From this he proceeds to evolve, step by step, though often in a manner obscure and inconclusive, his series of contradictory affirmations respecting Unum.

The last couple of Demonstrations—8 and 9—composing the fourth Antinomy, are in some respects the most ingenious and singular of all the nine. Si *Unum non est*, what is true about Cætera? The eighth demonstrates the *Both* of the affirmative predicates, the ninth proves the *Neither.*

Demonstration VIII. and IX.—Analysis of Demonstration VIII.

Si *Unum non est* (is the argument of the eighth), Cætera must nevertheless somehow still be Cætera: otherwise you could not talk about Cætera.[1] (This is an argument like that in Demonstration 6: What is talked about must exist, somehow.) But if Cætera can be named and talked about, they must be different from something,—and from something, which is also different from them. What can this Something be? Not certainly Unum: for Unum, by the Hypothesis, does not exist, and cannot therefore be the term of comparison. *Cætera* therefore must be different among themselves and from each other. But they cannot be compared with each other by units: for Unum does not exist. They must therefore be compared with each other by heaps or multitudes: each of which will appear at first sight to be an unit, though it be not an unit in reality. There will be numbers of such heaps, each in appearance one, though not in reality:[m] numbers odd and even, great and little, in appearance: heaps appearing to be greater and less than each other, and equal to each other, though not being really so. Each of these heaps will appear to have a beginning, middle, and end, yet will not really have any such: for whenever you grasp any one of them in your thoughts, there will appear another beginning before the beginning,[n] another end after the end, another centre more

[1] Plato, Parmen. p. 164 B. Ἀλλα μέν του δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο.

[m] Plato, Parmen. p. 164 D. Οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ἂν δὲ οὔ, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται. Οὕτως.

[n] Plato, Parmen. p. 165 A. Ὅτι ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἕξῃ τι τούτων ἓν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη

centrical than the centre,—minima ever decreasing because you cannot reach any stable unit. Each will be a heap without any unity; looking like one, at a distance,—but when you come near, each a boundless and countless multitude. They will thus appear one and many, like and unlike, equal and unequal, at rest and moving, separate and coalescing: in short, invested with an indefinite number of opposite attributes.[o]

Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian.

This Demonstration 8, with its strange and subtle chain of inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of Cætera without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the Apparent and the Real, which had not been noticed in the preceding demonstrations. Demonstration 8 is in its character Zenonian. It probably coincides with the proof which Zeno is reported (in the earlier half of this dialogue) to have given against the existence of any real Multa. If you assume Multa (Zeno argued), they must be both like and unlike, and invested with many other opposite attributes; but this is impossible; therefore the assumption is untrue.[p] Those against whom Zeno reasoned, contended for real Multa, and against a real Unum. Zeno probably showed, and our eighth Demonstration here shows also,—that Multa under this supposition are nothing real, but an assemblage of indefinite, ever-variable, contradictory appearances: an Ἄπειρον, Infinite, or Chaos: an object not real and absolute, but relative and variable according to the point of view of the subject.

Demonstration IX.—*Neither* following *Both*.

To the eighth Demonstration, ingenious as it is, succeeds a countervailing reversal in the ninth: the Neither following the Both. The fundamental supposition is in terms the same. *Si Unum non est*, what is to become of *Cætera? Cætera* are not *Unum:* yet neither are they *Multa:* for if there were any Multa, Unum would be

ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχὴ, μετὰ δὲ τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτὴ, ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός.

[o] Plato, Parmen. p. 165 E. Compare p. 158 E. τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς—ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν (πάρεσχε).

[p] Plato, Parmen. p. 127 E; compare this with the close of the eighth Demonstration, p. 165 E—εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν.

included in them. If none of the Multa were Unum, all of them would be nothing at all, and there would be no Multa. If therefore Unum be not included in Cætera, Cætera would be neither Unum nor Multa: nor would they appear to be either Unum or Multa: for Cætera can have no possible communion with Non-Entia: nor can any of the Non-Entia be present along with any of Cætera—since Non-Entia have no parts. We cannot therefore conceive or represent to ourselves Non-Ens as along with or belonging to Cætera. Therefore *Si Unum non est*, nothing among Cætera is conceived either as Unum or as Multa: for to conceive Multa without Unum is impossible. It thus appears, *Si Unum non est*, that Cætera neither are Unum nor Multa. Nor are they conceived either as Unum or Multa—either as like or as unlike —either as the same or as different—either as in contact or as apart.—In short, all those attributes which in the last preceding Demonstration were shown *to belong to them* in appearance, are now shown *not to belong to them* either in appearance or in reality.[q]

Concluding words of the Parmenides —Declaration that he has demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different propositions.

Here we find ourselves at the close of the Parmenides. Plato announces his purpose to be, to elicit contradictory conclusions, by different trains of reasoning, out of the same fundamental assumption.[r] He declares, in the concluding words, that—on the hypothesis of *Unum est*, as well as on that of *Unum non est*—he has succeeded in demonstrating the Both and the Neither of many distinct propositions, respecting Unum and respecting Cætera.

The close of the Parmenides, as it stands here, may be fairly compared to the enigma announced by Plato in his

[q] Plato, Parmen. p. 166 A-B. Ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἄλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἓν οὔτε πολλά. Οὔδ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια. Οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὔθ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς, οὐδὲ ἄλλ' ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν (compare διελθεῖν, p. 165 E) ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτὰ, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἄλλα, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

[r] Compare, with the passage cited in the last note, another passage, p. 159 B, at the beginning of Demonstration 5.

Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῶμεν ὡς φανερὰ, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς, ἢ οὕτω μόνον;

Here the purpose to prove οὐχ οὕτως, immediately on the heels of οὕτως, is plainly enunciated.

Republic—"A man and no man, struck and did not strike, with a stone and no stone, a bird and no bird, sitting upon wood and no wood."[1] This is an enigma, propounded for youthful auditors to guess: stimulating their curiosity, and tasking their intelligence to find it out. As far as I can see, the puzzling antinomies in the Parmenides have no other purpose. They drag back the forward and youthful Sokrates from affirmative dogmatism to negative doubt and embarrassment. There is however this difference between the enigma in the Republic, and the Antinomies in the Parmenides. The constructor of the enigma had certainly a preconceived solution to which he adapted the conditions of his problem: whereas we have no sufficient ground for asserting that the author of the Antinomies had any such solution present or operative in his mind. How much of truth Plato may himself have recognised, or may have wished others to recognise, in them, we have no means of determining. We find in them many equivocal propositions and unwarranted inferences—much blending of truth with error, intentionally or unintentionally. The veteran Parmenides imposes the severance of the two, as a lesson upon his youthful hearers Sokrates and Aristoteles.

Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not.

[1] Plato, Republ. v. 479 B. The allusion was to an eunuch knocking down a bat seated upon a reed. Αἴνός τις ἔστιν ὡς ἀνήρ τε κοὐκ ἀνήρ, Ὄρνιθά τε κοὐκ ὄρνιθ' ἑδών τε κοὐκ ἰδών, Ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοὐ ξύλου καθημένην Λίθῳ τε κοὐ λίθῳ βάλοι τε κοὐ βάλοι.

I read with astonishment the amount of positive philosophy which a commentator like Steinhart extracts from the concluding enigma of the Parmenides, and which he even affirms that no attentive reader of the dialogue can possibly miss (Einleit. zum Parm. pp. 302-303).

CHAPTER XXVI.

THEÆTETUS.

Subject and personages in the Theætêtus.

IN this dialogue, as in the Parmenides immediately preceding, Plato dwells upon the intellectual operations of mind: introducing the ethical and emotional only in a partial and subordinate way. The main question canvassed is, What is Knowledge—Cognition—Science? After a long debate, turning the question over in many distinct points of view, and examining three or four different answers to the question—all these answers are successively rejected, and the problem remains unsolved.

The two persons who converse with Sokrates are, Theodôrus, an elderly man, eminent as a geometrician, astronomer, &c., and teaching those sciences—and Theætêtus, a young man of great merit and still greater promise: acute, intelligent, and inquisitive—high-principled and courageous in the field, yet gentle and conciliatory to all: lastly, resembling Sokrates in physiognomy and in the flatness of his nose. The dialogue is supposed to have taken place during the last weeks of the life of Sokrates, when his legal appearance as defendant is required to answer the indictment of Melêtus, already entered in the official record.[a] The dialogue is here read aloud to Eukleides of Megara and his fellow-citizen Terpsion, by a slave of Eukleides: this last person had recorded it in writing from narrative previously made to him by Sokrates.[b]

[a] Plato, Theætêt. ad fin. p. 210.

[b] Plato, Theætet. i. pp. 142 E, 143 A. Plato hardly keeps up the fiction about the time of this dialogue with perfect consistency. When it took place, the indictment of Melêtus had already been recorded: Sokrates breaks off the conversation for the purpose of going to answer it: Eukleides hears the dialogue from the mouth of Sokrates afterwards. "Immediately on getting home to Megara" (says Eukleides) "I wrote down memoranda (of what I had heard): then afterwards I called it back to my mind at leisure, and as often as I visited Athens I questioned Sokrates about such portions as I did not remember, and made

It is prefaced by a short discourse between Eukleides and Terpsion, intended to attract our sympathy and admiration towards the youthful Theætêtus.

Question raised by Sokrates—What is Knowledge or Cognition? First answer of Theætêtus enumerating many different cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates.

In answer to the question put by Sokrates—What is Knowledge or Cognition? Theætêtus at first replies—That there are many and diverse cognitions:—of geometry, of arithmetic, of arts and trades, such as shoemaking, joinery, &c. Sokrates points out (as in the Menon, Hippias Major, and other dialogues) that such an answer involves a misconception of the question: which was general, and required a general answer, setting forth the characteristic common to all cognitions. No one can know what cognition is in shoemaking or any particular case—unless he first knows what is cognition generally.[c] Specimens of suitable answers to general questions are then given (or of definition of a general term), in the case of clay—and of numbers square and ob-

corrections on my return here, so that now nearly all the dialogue has been written out."

Such a process would require longer time than is consistent with the short remainder of the life of Sokrates. Socher indeed tries to explain this by assuming a long interval between the indictment and the trial, but this is noway satisfactory. (Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 251.)

Mr. Lewis Campbell, in the Preface to his very useful edition of this dialogue (p. lxxi. Oxford, 1861), considers that the battle in which Theætêtus is represented as having been wounded, is probably meant for that battle in which Iphikrates and his peltasts destroyed the Spartan Mora, B.C. 390; if not that, then the battle at the Isthmus of Corinth against Epaminondas, B.C. 369. Schleiermacher in his Einleitung to the dialogue (p. 185) seems to prefer the supposition of some earlier battle or skirmish under Iphikrates. The point can hardly be determined. Still less can we fix the date at which the dialogue was written, though the mention of the battle of Corinth certifies that it was later than 394 B.C. Ast affirms confidently that it was the first dialogue composed by Plato after the Phædon, which last was composed immediately after the death of Sokrates (Ast, Platon's Leben, &c. p. 192). I see no ground for this affirmation. Most of the commentators rank it among the dialectical dialogues, which they consider to belong to a later period of Plato's life than the ethical, but to an earlier period than the constructive, such as Republic, Timæus, &c. Most of them place the Theætêtus in one or other of the years between 393-383 B.C., though they differ much among themselves whether it is to be considered as later or earlier than other dialogues—Kratylus, Euthydemus, Menon, Gorgias, &c. (Stallbaum, Proleg. Theæt. pp. 6-10; Steinhart, Einleit. zum Theæt. pp. 100-213.) Munk and Ueberweg, on the contrary, place the Theætêtus at a date considerably later, subsequent to 368 B.C. Munk assigns it to 358 or 357 B.C. after Plato's last return from Sicily (Munk, Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon. Schr. pp. 357-597; Ueberweg, Ueber die Aechtheit der Pl. Schr. pp. 228-236).

[c] Plato, Theætêt. p. 147 A.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν, ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς; Οὐ γάρ.

long.[d] I have already observed more than once how important an object it was with Plato to impress upon his readers an exact and adequate conception of the meaning of general terms, and the proper way of defining them. For this purpose he brings into contrast the misconceptions likely to arise in the minds of persons not accustomed to dialectic.

Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given. Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy—mental obstetric—He cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds.

Theætêtus, before he attempts a second answer, complains how much the subject had embarrassed him. Impressed with what he had heard about the interrogatories of Sokrates, he had tried to solve this problem: but he had not been able to satisfy himself with any attempted solution—nor yet to relinquish the search altogether. "You are in distress, Theætêtus" (observes Sokrates), "because you are not empty, but pregnant.[e] You have that within you, of which you need to be relieved; and you cannot be relieved without obstetric aid. It is my peculiar gift from the Gods to afford such aid, and to stimulate the parturition of pregnant minds which cannot of themselves bring forth what is within them.[f] I can produce no truth myself: but I can, by my art inherited from my mother the midwife Phænaretê, extract truth from others, and test the answers given by others: so as to determine whether such answers are true and valuable, or false and worthless. I can teach nothing: I only bring out what is already struggling in the minds of youth: and if there be nothing within them, my procedure is unavailing. My most important function is, to test the answers given, how far they are true or false. But most people, not comprehending my drift, complain of me as a most eccentric person, who only makes others sceptical. They reproach me, and that truly enough, with always asking questions, and never saying any thing of my own; because I have nothing to say worth hearing.[g] The young compa-

[d] Plato, Theætêt. p. 148. Oblong (προμήκεις) numbers are such as can be produced only from two unequal factors. The explanation of this difficult passage, requiring us to keep in mind the geometrical conception of numbers usual among the Greek mathematicians, will be found clearly given in Mr. Campbell's edition of this dialogue, pp. 20-22.

[e] Plato, Theætêt. p. 148 E. ὠδίνεις, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

[f] Plato, Theætêt. p. 149 A, c. 19, p. 150 A.

[g] Plato, Theætêt. p. 149 A. οἱ δὲ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι

nions who frequent my society, often suffer long-continued pains of parturition night and day, before they can be delivered of what is within them. Some, though apparently stupid when they first come to me, make great progress, if my divine coadjutor is favourable to them: others again become tired of me, and go away too soon, so that the little good which I have done them becomes effaced. Occasionally, some of these impatient companions wish to return to me afterwards—but my divine sign forbids me to receive them: where such obstacle does not intervene, they begin again to make progress." [h]

Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates—He is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge.

This passage, while it forcibly depicts the peculiar intellectual gift of Sokrates, illustrates at the same time the Platonic manner of describing, full of poetry and metaphor. Cross-examination by Sokrates communicated nothing new, but brought out what lay buried in the mind of the respondent, and tested the value of his answers. It was applicable only to minds endowed and productive: but for them it was indispensable, in order to extract what they were capable of producing, and to test its value when extracted. "Do not think me unkind," (says Sokrates,) "or my procedure useless, if my scrutiny exposes your answers as fallacious. Many respondents have been violently angry with me for doing so: but I feel myself strictly forbidden either to admit falsehood, or to put aside truth." [i] Here we have a suitable prelude to a dialogue in which four successive answers are sifted and rejected, without reaching, even at last, any satisfactory solution.

The first answer given by Theætêtus is—"Cognition is sensation (or sensible perception)." Upon this answer Sokrates remarks, that it is the same doctrine, though in other words,

περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι, καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.

P. 150 B. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἔνι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἴδωλον ἢ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ διανοία, ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές· ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, &c.

[h] Plato, Theæt. pp. 150 E, 151 A. ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ· καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόασι.

We here see (what I have already adverted to in reviewing the Theagês, vol. i. ch. xiii. p. 437) the character of mystery, unaccountable and unpredictable in its working on individuals, with which Plato invests the colloquy of Sokrates.

[i] Plato, Theætêt. p. 151 D.

as what was laid down by Protagoras—"Man is the measure of all things: of things existent, that they exist: of things non-existent, that they do not exist. As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you."[k] Sokrates then proceeds to say, that these two opinions are akin to, or identical with, the general view of nature entertained by Herakleitus, Empedoklês, and other philosophers, countenanced moreover by poets like Homer and Epicharmus. The philosophers here noticed (he continues), though differing much in other respects, all held the doctrine that nature consisted in a perpetual motion, change, or flux: that there was no real Ens or permanent substratum, but perpetual genesis or transition.[l] These philosophers were opposed to Parmenides, who maintained (as I have already stated in a previous chapter) that there was nothing real except Ens—One, permanent, and unchangeable: that all change was unreal, apparent, illusory, not capable of being certainly known, but only matter of uncertain opinion or estimation.

Answer of Theætêtus—Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doctrine as the *Homo Mensura* laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except Parmenides.

The one main theme intended for examination here (as Sokrates[m] expressly declares) is the doctrine—That Cognition is sensible perception. Nevertheless upon all the three opi-

[k] Plato, Theætêt. p. 151 E.

Theætêt. οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.

Sokrat. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρηκέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας· τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. Φησὶ γάρ που—Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι —τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που.

Theætêt. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

Sokrat. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί—οἷα δὲ σοὶ τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ.

Theætêt. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

Here Plato appears to transcribe the words of Protagoras (compare p. 161 B, and the Kratylus, p. 386 A) which distinctly affirm the doctrine of *Homo Mensura*—Man is the measure of all things,—but do not affirm the doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception. The identification between the two doctrines is asserted by Plato himself. It is Plato who asserts "that Protagoras affirmed the same doctrine in another manner," citing afterwards the manner in which he supposed Protagoras to affirm it. If there had been in the treatise of Protagoras any more express or peremptory affirmation of the doctrine "that knowledge is sensible perception," Plato would probably have given it here.

[l] Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 A.

καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερεσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῇ ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος.

[m] Plato, Theætêt. p. 163 A.

nions, thus represented as cognate or identical,[n] Sokrates bestows a lengthened comment (occupying a half of the dialogue) in conversation, principally with Theætêtus, but partly also with Theodôrus. His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, because he often passes with little notice from one to the other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and farther because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes leaves us in the doubt what is his real purpose—whether to expound, or to deride, the opinions of others—whether to enlighten Theætêtus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies.[o] We cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty, that we have not before us either of the three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters. There remains no work either of Protagoras or of Herakleitus: so that we do not clearly know the subject matter upon which Plato is commenting—nor whether these authors would have admitted as just the view which he takes of their opinions.[p]

Plato here blends together three distinct theories, for the purpose of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition.

It is not improbable that the three doctrines, here put together by Plato and subjected to a common scrutiny, may have been sometimes held by the same philosophers. Nevertheless, the language[q] of Plato

The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other doctrines.

[n] Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 D. *Sokrat.* Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἰρήται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ἢ αἴσθησις· καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυμπέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον, οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα—κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον, πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι—κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον, τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων, αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι.

[o] See the answer of Theætêtus and the words of Sokrates following, p. 157 C.

[p] It would be hardly necessary to remark, that when Plato professes to put a pleading into the mouth of Protagoras (pp. 165-166) we have no other real speaker than Plato himself, if commentators did not often forget this. Steinhart indeed tells us (Einleit. zum Theætêt. pp. 36-47) positively—that Plato in this pleading keeps in the most accurate manner (auf das genaueste) to the thoughts of Protagoras, perhaps even to his words. How Steinhart can know this I am at a loss to understand. To me it seems very improbable. The mere circumstance that Plato forces into partnership three distinct theories, makes it probable that he did not adhere to the thoughts or language of any one of them.

[q] See Theætêt. p. 152 A. This is admitted (to be a construction put by Plato himself) by Steinhart in his note

himself shows us that Protagoras never expressly affirmed knowledge to be sensible Perception: and that the substantial identity between this doctrine, and the different doctrine maintained by Protagoras, is to be regarded as a construction put upon the two by Plato. That the theories of Herakleitus and Empedokles differed materially from each other, we know certainly: the theory of each, moreover, differed from the doctrine of Protagoras—"Man is the measure of all things." How this last doctrine was defended by its promulgator, we cannot say. But the defence of it noway required him to maintain—That knowledge is sensible perception. It might be consistently held by one who rejected that definition of knowledge.[r] And though Plato tries to refute both, yet the reasonings which he brings against one do not at all tell against the other.

The identification of them as one and the same is only constructive—the interpretation of Plato himself.

The Protagorean doctrine—Man is the measure of all things—is simply the presentation in complete view of a common fact—uncovering an aspect of it which the received phraseology hides. Truth and Falsehood have reference to some believing subject—and the words have no meaning except in that relation. Protagoras brings to view this subjective side of the same complex fact, of which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective side. He refuses to admit the object absolute—the pretended *thing in itself*—Truth without a believer. His doctrine maintains the indefeasible and necessary involution of the percipient mind in every perception—of the concipient mind in every conception — of the cognizant mind in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges many distinct believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every object known must be relative to (or in his language, *measured by*) the knowing

Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras—*Homo Mensura.*

7, p. 214, Einleitung zum Theætêtus, though he says that Plato's construction is the right one.

[r] Dr. Routh, in a note upon his edition of the Euthydêmus of Plato (p. 286 C) observes:—"Protagoras docebat, Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι· τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι· τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. Quâ quidem opinione qualitatum sensilium sine animi perceptione existentiam sustulisse videtur."

The definition here given by Routh is correct as far as it goes, though too narrow. But it is sufficient to exhibit the Protagorean doctrine as quite distinct from the other doctrine, ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ἢ αἴσθησις.

Subject: that every *cognitum* must have its *cognoscens*, and every *cognoscibile* its *cognitionis capax:* that the words have no meaning unless this be supposed: that these two names designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact of cognition—actual or potential—not two factors, which are in themselves separate or separable, and which come together to make a compound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or discard his own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily omnipresent; concerned in every moment of consciousness, and equally concerned in all, though more distinctly attended to in some than in others.[8] The Subject, self, or Ego, is that which all our moments of consciousness have in common and alike: Object is that in which they do or may differ—although some object or other there always must be. The position laid down by Descartes—*Cogito, ergo sum*—might have been stated with equal truth—*Cogito, ergo est* (*cogitatum aliquid*): *sum cogitans—est cogitatum*—are two opposite aspects of the same indivisible mental fact—*cogitatio.* In some cases, doubtless, the objective aspect may absorb our attention, eclipsing the subjective: in other cases, the subjective attracts exclusive notice: but in all cases and in every act of consciousness, both are involved as co-existent and correlative. That alone exists, to every man, which

[8] In regard to the impossibility of carrying abstraction so far as to discard the thinking subject, see Hobbes, Computation or Logic, ch. vii. 1.

"In the teaching of natural philosophy I cannot begin better than from *privation:* that is, from feigning the world to be annihilated. But if such annihilation of all things be supposed, it may perhaps be asked what would remain for any man (*whom only I except from this universal annihilation of things*) to consider as the subject of philosophy; or what to give names to for ratiocination's sake.

"I say, therefore, there would remain to that man ideas of the world, and of all such bodies as he had before their annihilation seen with his eyes, or perceived by any other sense; that is to say, the memory and imagination of magnitudes, motions, sounds, colours, &c., as also of their order and parts. All which things, though they be nothing but ideas and phantasms, happening internally to him that imagineth, yet they will appear as if they were external and not at all depending upon any power of the mind. And these are the things to which he would give names, and subtract them from and compound them with one another. For seeing that after the destruction of all other things I suppose man still remaining, and namely that he thinks, imagines, and remembers, there can be nothing for him to think of but what is past. . . . Now things may be considered, that is, be brought into account, *either as internal accidents of our mind*, in which manner we consider them when the question is about *some faculty of the mind:* or, as *species of external things, not as really existing, but appearing only to exist, or to have a being without us.* And in this manner we are now to consider them."

stands, or is believed by him to be capable of standing, in some mode of his consciousness as an Object correlative with himself as a Subject. If he believes in its existence, his own believing mind is part and parcel of such fact of belief, not less than the object believed in: if he disbelieves it, his own disbelieving mind is the like. Consciousness in all varieties has for its two poles Subject and Object: there cannot be one of these poles without the opposite pole—north without south—any more than there can be concave without convex (to use a comparison familiar with Aristotle), or front without back: which are not two things originally different and coming into conjunction, but two different aspects of the same indivisible fact.

Perpetual implication of Subject with Object —Relate and Correlate.

In declaring that "Man is the measure of all things"—Protagoras affirms that Subject is the measure of Object, or that every Object is relative to a correlative Subject. When a man affirms, believes, or conceives, an object as existing, his own believing or concipient mind is one side of the entire fact. It may be the dark side, and what is called *the Object* may be the light side, of the entire fact: this is what happens in the case of tangible and resisting substances, where Object, being the light side of the fact, is apt to appear all in all:[t] a man thinks of the Something which resists, without attending to the other aspect of the fact of resistance, viz.: his own energy or pressure, to which resistance is made. On the other hand, when we speak of enjoying any pleasure or suffering any pain, the enjoying or suffering Subject appears all in all, distinguished plainly from other Subjects, supposed to be not enjoying or suffering in the same way: yet it is no more than the light side of the fact, of which Object is the dark side. Each particular pain which we suffer has its objective or differential peculiarity,

[t] "Nobiscum semper est ipsa quam quærimus (anima): adest, tractat, loquitur—et, si fas et dicere, inter ista nescitur." (Cassiodorus, De Animâ, c. 1, p. 594, in the edition of his Opera Omnia, Venet. 1729).

"In the primitive dualism of consciousness, the Subject and Object being inseparable, either of them apart from the other must be an unknown quantity: the separation of either must be the annihilation of both." (F. W. Farrar, Chapters on Language, c. 23, p. 292: which chapter contains more on the same topic, well deserving of perusal.)

distinguishing it from other sensations, correlating with the same sentient Subject.

Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient capacities.

The Protagorean dictum will thus be seen, when interpreted correctly, to be quite distinct from that other doctrine with which Plato identifies it: that Cognition is nothing else but sensible Perception. If, rejecting this last doctrine, we hold that cognition includes mental elements distinct from, though co-operating with, sensible perception—the principle of relativity laid down by Protagoras will not be the less true. My intellectual activity—my powers of remembering, imagining, ratiocinating, combining, &c., are a part of my mental nature, no less than my powers of sensible perception: my cognitions and beliefs must all be determined by or relative to, this mental nature: to the turn and development which all these various powers have taken in my individual case. However multifarious the mental activities may be, each man has his own peculiar allotment and manifestations thereof, to which his cognitions must be relative. Let us grant (with Plato) that the Nous or intelligent Mind apprehends intelligible Entia or Ideas distinct from the world of sense: or let us assume that Kant and Reid in the eighteenth century, and M. Cousin with other French writers in the nineteenth, have destroyed the Lockian philosophy, which took account (they say) of nothing but the *à posteriori* element of cognition—and have established the existence of other elements of cognition *à priori*: intuitive beliefs, first principles, primary or inexplicable Concepts of Reason.[u] Still we must recollect that all

[u] See M. Jouffroy, Préface à sa Traduction des Œuvres de Reid, pp. xcvii.-ccxiv.

M. Jouffroy, following in the steps of Kant, declares these *à priori* beliefs or intuitions to be altogether relative to the human mind. "Kant, considérant que les conceptions de la raison sont des croyances aveugles auxquelles notre esprit se sent fatalement déterminé par sa nature, en conclut qu'elles sont rélatives à cette nature: que si notre nature était autre, elles pourraient être différentes: que par conséquent, elles n'ont aucune valeur absolue: et qu'ainsi notre vérité, notre science, notre certitude, sont une vérité, une science, une certitude, purement *subjective*, purement humaine—à laquelle nous sommes déterminés à nous fier par notre nature, mais qui ne supporte pas l'examen et n'a aucune valeur *objective*" (p. clxvii.). . . "C'est ce que répéte Kant quand il soutient que l'on ne peut *objectiver le subjectif*: c'est à dire, faire que la vérité humaine cesse d'être humaine, puisque la raison qui la trouve est humaine. On peut exprimer de vingt manières différentes cette impossibilité; elle reste toujours

such *à priori* Concepts, Intuitions, Beliefs, &c., are summed up in the mind: and that thus each man's mind, with its peculiar endowments, natural or supernatural, is still the measure or limit of his cognitions, acquired and acquirable. The Entia Rationis exist relatively to Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. This is a point upon which Plato himself insists, in this very dialogue. You do not, by producing this fact of innate mental intuitions, eliminate the intuent mind; which must be done in order to establish a negative to the Protagorean principle.[x] Each intuitive belief,

la même, et demeure toujours insurmontable," p. cxc. Compare p. xcvii. of the same Preface.

M. Pascal Galuppi (in his Lettres Philosophiques sur les Vicissitudes de la Philosophie, translated from the Italian by M. Peisse, Paris, 1844) though not agreeing in this variety of *à priori* philosophy, agrees with Kant in declaring the *à priori* element of cognition to be purely subjective, and the objective element to be *à posteriori* (Lett. xiv. pp. 337-338), or the facts of sense and experience. "L'ordre *à priori*, que Kant appelle *transcendental*, est purement idéal, et dépourvu de toute réalité. Je vis, qu'en fondant la connaissance sur l'ordre *à priori*, on arrive nécessairement au scepticisme: et je reconnus que la doctrine Écossaise est la mère légitime du Criticisme Kantien, et par conséquent, du scepticisme, qui est la conséquence de la philosophie critique. Je considérai comme de haute importance ce problème de Kant. Il convient de déterminer ce qu'il y a d'objectif, et ce qu'il y a de subjectif, dans la connaissance. Les Empiriques n'admettent dans la connaissance d'autres élémens que les objectifs," &c.

[x] See this point handled in Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. viii. 355-362. We may here cite a remark of Simplikius in his Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle (p. 64, a. in Scholi. Brandis). Aristotle (De Animâ, iii. 2, 426, a. 19; Categor. p. 7, b. 23) lays down the doctrine that in most cases Relata or (*τὰ πρός τι*) are "simul Naturâ, *καὶ συναναιρεῖ ἄλλημα*:" but that in some Relata this is not true: for example, *τὸ ἐπιστητὸν* is relative to *ἐπιστήμη*, yet still *it would seem prior* to *ἐπιστήμη* (*πρότερον ἂν δόξειε τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι*). There cannot be *ἐπιστήμη* without some *ἐπιστητὸν*: but there may be *ἐπιστητὸν* without any *ἐπιστήμη*. There are few things, if any (he says) in which the *ἐπιστητὸν* (cognoscibile) is *simul naturâ* with *ἐπιστήμη* (or cognitio), and cannot be without it.

Upon which Simplikius remarks, What are these few things? *Τίνα δὲ τὰ ὀλιγά ἐστιν, ἐφ' ᾧ ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν; Τὰ ἄνευ ὕλης, τὰ νοητὰ, ἅμα τῇ κατ' ἐνεργείαν ἀεὶ ἐστώσῃ ἐπιστήμῃ ἔστιν, εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἔστι τις τοιαύτη ἀεὶ ἄνω μένουσα, εἴτε καὶ ἐν τῷ κατ' ἐνεργείαν νῷ, εἴτις καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐκείνην ἐπιστήμην ἔλοιτο καλεῖν. δύναται δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ὑπόστασιν εἰρῆσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τούτων καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν. ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπλασμάτων τῶν τε ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν· ἅμα γὰρ χίμαιρᾳ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη χιμαίρας.*

We see from hence that Simplikius recognises Concepts, Abstractions, and Fictions, to be dependent on the Conceiving, Abstracting, Imagining, Mind, as distinguished from objects of Sense, which he does not recognise as dependent in the like manner. He agrees in the doctrine of Protagoras as to the former, but not as to the latter. This illustrates what I have affirmed, That the Protagorean doctrine of "*Homo Mensura*" is not only unconnected with the other principle (that Knowledge is resolvable into sensible perception) to which Aristotle and Plato would trace it, but that there is rather a repugnance between the two. The difficulty of proving the doctrine, and the reluctance to admit it, is greatest in the case of material objects, least in the case of Abstractions, and General Ideas. Yet Aristotle, in reasoning against the

whether correct or erroneous—whether held unanimously by every one *semper et ubique*, or only held by a proportion of mankind—is (or would be, if proved to exist) a fact of our nature; capable of being looked at either on the side of the believing Subject, which is its point of community with all other parts of our nature—or on the side of the Object believed, which is its point of difference or peculiarity. The fact with its two opposite aspects is indivisible. Without Subject, Object vanishes: without Object (some object or other, for this side of the fact is essentially variable), Subject vanishes.

Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in regard to the intelligible world.

That this general doctrine is true, not merely respecting the facts of sense, but also respecting the facts of mental conception, opinion, intellection, cognition—may be seen by the reasoning of Plato himself in other dialogues. How, for example, does Plato prove, in his Timæus, the objective reality of Ideas or Forms? He infers them from the subjective facts of his own mind. The subjective fact called Cognition (he argues) is generically different from the subjective fact called True Opinion: therefore the Object correlating with the One must be distinct from the Object correlating with the other: there must be a Noumenon or *νοητόν τι* correlating with Nous, distinct from the *δοξαστόν τι* which correlates with *δόξα*.[y]

Protagorean doctrine (Metaphysic. Γ. pp. 1009-1010, &c.) treats it like Plato, as a sort of corollary from the theory that Cognition is Sensible Perception.

Simplikius farther observes (p. 65, b. 14) that Aristotle is not accurate in making *ἐπιστητὸν* correlate with *ἐπιστήμη*: that in Relata, the potential correlates with the potential, and the actual with the actual. The Cognoscible is correlative, not with actual cognition (*ἐπιστήμη*) but with potential Cognition, or with a potential Cognoscens. Aristotle therefore is right in saying that there may be *ἐπιστητὸν* without *ἐπιστήμη*, but this does not prove what he wishes to establish.

Themistius, in another passage of the Aristotelian Scholia, reasoning against Boethus, observes to the same effect as Simplikius, that in relatives, the actual correlates with the actual, and the potential with the potential:—

Καίτοι, φησί γε ὁ Βοηθὸς, οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος, ὥσπερ οἶμαι τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ δίχα τοῦ αἰσθανομένου—σφάλλεται δὲ, ἅμα γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τί, καὶ τὰ δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ δυνάμει· ὥστε εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀριθμητικὸν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀριθμητόν (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 223, a. p. 393, Schol. Brandis).

Compare Aristotel. Metaphysic. M. 1087, a. 15, about *τὸ ἐπίστασθαι δυνάμει* and *τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐνεργείᾳ*.

About the essential co-existence of relatives—Sublato uno, tollitur alterum—see also Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, vii. 395, p. 449, Fabric.

[y] Plato, Timæus, p. 51 B-E, compare Republic, v. p. 477.

See this reasoning of Plato set forth in Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. pp. 412-416, ed. 2nd.

Nous, according to Plato (Tim. 51 E), belongs only to the Gods and to a select few among mankind. It is therefore only *to* the Gods and *to* these few men

So again, in the Phædon,[z] Sokrates proves the pre-existence of the human soul from the fact that there were pre-existent cognizable Ideas: if there were knowable Objects, there must also have been a Subject Cognoscens or Cognitionis capax. The two are different aspects of one and the same conception: upon which we may doubtless reason abstractedly under one aspect or under the other, though they cannot be separated in fact. Now both these two inferences of Plato rest on the assumed implication of Subject and Object.[a]

In truth, the Protagorean measure or limit is even more plainly applicable to our mental intuitions and mental processes (remembering, imagining, conceiving, comparing, abstracting, combining of hypotheses, transcendental or inductive) than to the matter of our sensible experience.[b] In regard to the

The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown, in reference to the intelligible world than in reference to sense.

that Νοητὰ exist. To the rest of mankind Νοητὰ are non-apparent and non-existent.

[z] Plato, Phædon, pp. 76-77. ἴσῃ ἀνάγκῃ ταῦτά τε (Ideas or Forms) εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι—καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε. Ἔπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τήν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.

Compare p. 92 E of the same dialogue with the notes of Wyttenbach and Heindorf—"Hæc autem οὐσίαIdearum, rerum intelligibilium, αὐτῆς ἐστιν (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) ut hoc loco dicitur, est propria et possessio animæ nostræ," &c.

About the essential implication of Νοῦς with the Νοητὰ, as well as of τὸ δόξαζον with τὰ δοξαζόμενα, and of τὸ αἰσθανόμενον with τὰ αἰσθμτὰ, see Plutarch, De Animæ Procreat. in Timæo, pp. 1012-1024; and a curious passage from Joannes Philoponus ad Aristot. Physica, cited by Karsten in his Commentatio De Empedoclis Philosophiâ, p. 372, and Olympiodorus ad Platon. Phædon, p. 21. τὸν νοῦν φαμὲν ἀκριβῶς γινώσκειν, διότι αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τὸ νοητόν.

Sydenham observes, in a note upon his translation of the Philêbus (note 76, p. 118), "Being Intelligent and Being Intelligible are not only correlatives, but are so in their very essence: neither of them can be at all, without the Being of the other."

[a] I think that the inference in the Phædon is not necessary to prove that conclusion, nor in itself just. For when I speak of Augustus and Antony as having once lived, and as having fought the battle of Actium, it is noway necessary that I should believe myself to have been then alive and to have seen them: nor when I speak of civil war as being now carried on in the United States of America, is it necessary that I should believe myself to be or to have been on the spot as a percipient witness. I believe, on evidence which appears to me satisfactory, that both these are real facts: that is, if I had been at Actium on the day of the battle, or if I were now in the United States, I should see and witness the facts here affirmed. These latter words describe the subjective side of the fact, without introducing any supposition that I have been myself present and percipient.

[b] Bacon remarks that the processes called mental or intellectual are quite as much relative to man as those called sensational or perceptive. "Idola Tribûs sunt fundata in ipsâ naturâ humanâ. Falso enim asseritur, Sensum humanum esse mensuram rerum: quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam Sensûs quam Mentis, sunt ex analogiâ hominis, non ex analogiâ Universi."

Entia Rationis, divergence between one theorist and another is quite as remarkable, as the divergence between one percipient and another in the most disputable region of Entia Perceptionis. Upon the separate facts of sense, there is a nearer approach to unanimity among mankind, than upon the theories whereby theorising men connect together those facts to their own satisfaction. An opponent of Protagoras would draw his most plausible arguments from the undisputed facts of sense. He would appeal to matter and what are called its primary qualities, as refuting the doctrine. For in describing mental intuitions, Mind or Subject cannot well be overlaid or ignored: but in regard to the external world, or material substance with its primary qualities, the objective sight is so lighted up and magnified in the ordinary conception and language—and the subjective side so darkened and put out of sight—that Object appears as if it stood single, apart, and independent.

A man conceives objects, like houses and trees, as existing when he does not actually see or touch them, just as much as when he does see or touch them. He conceives them as existing independent of any actual sensations of his own: and he proceeds to describe them as independent altogether of himself as a Subject—or as absolute, not relative, existences. But this distinction, though just as applied in ordinary usage, becomes inadmissible when brought to contradict the Protagorean doctrine; because the speaker professes to exclude what cannot be excluded, himself as concipient Subject.[c]

Nemesius, the Christian Platonist, has a remark bearing upon this question. He says that the lower animals have their intellectual movements all determined by Nature, which acts alike in all the individuals of the species, but that the human intellect is not wholly determined by Nature; it has a freer range, larger stores of Ideas, and more varied combinations: hence its manifestations are not the same in all, but different in different individuals —ἐλεύθερον γάρ τι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸ λογικὸν, ὅθεν οὐχ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν ἔργον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἑκάστῳ εἴδει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων· φύσει γὰρ μόνῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ φύσει ὁμοίως παρὰ πᾶσίν ἐστιν· αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ πράξεις ἄλλαι παρ' ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ αὗται παρὰ πᾶσιν. Nemesius, De Naturâ Hominis, c. ii. p. 53, ed. 1565.

[c] Bishop Berkeley observes:—

"But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees in a park, or books in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so—there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call *books* and *trees*, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? *But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?* This therefore is nothing to the purpose. It only shows, you have the power of imagining or form-

It is he who conceives absent objects as real and existing, though he neither sees nor touches them: he believes fully,

ing ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive it possible that the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. *To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy.* When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. *But the mind taking no notice of itself is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself.*"

Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, sect. xxiii. p. 34, ed. of Berkeley's Works, 1820. The same argument is enforced in Berkeley's First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, pp. 145-146 of the same volume.

I subjoin a passage from the work of Professor Bain on Psychology, where this difficult subject is carefully analysed (The Senses and the Intellect, p. 370). "There is no possible knowledge of the world except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of mind: the knowledge of material things is a mental thing. We are incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material world: the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a world presented to our own minds. By an illusion of language we fancy that we are capable of contemplating a world which does not enter into our own mental existence: but the attempt belies itself, for this contemplation is an effort of mind."

"Solidity, extension, space—the foundation properties of the material world—mean, as has been said above, certain movements and energies of our own bodies, and exist in our minds in the shape of feelings of force, allied with visible and tactile, and other sensible impressions. The sense of the external is the consciousness of particular energies and activities of our own."

(p. 376). "We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves and all mankind, that with the conscious movement of opening the eyes there will always be a consciousness of light, than by saying that the light exists as an independent fact, without any eyes to see it. But if we consider the fact fairly we shall see that this assertion errs, not simply in being beyond any evidence that we can have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming *that* to have an existence out of our minds, which we cannot know but as in our minds. In words we assert independent existence, while in the very act of doing so we contradict ourselves. Even a possible world implies a possible mind to conceive it, just as much as an actual world implies an actual mind. The mistake of the common modes of expression on this matter is the mistake of supposing the abstractions of the mind to have a separate and independent existence. Instead of looking upon the doctrine of an external and independent world as a generalisation or abstraction grounded on our particular experiences, summing up the past and predicting the future, we have got into the way of maintaining the abstraction to be an independent reality, the foundation, or cause, or origin, of all these experiences."

To the same purpose Mr. Mansel remarks in his Bampton Lectures on "The Limits of Religious Thought."

"A second characteristic of Consciousness is, that it is only possible in the form of a *relation*. There must be a Subject or person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious. There can be no consciousness without the union of these two factors; and in that union each exists only as it is related to the other. The subject is a subject only in so far as it is conscious of an object: the object is an object only so far as it is apprehended by a subject; and the destruction of either is the destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the Infinite. Our whole notion of Existence is necessarily relative, for it is existence as conceived by us. But

that if he were in a certain position near them, he would experience those appropriate sensations of sight and touch, whereby they are identified. Though he eliminates himself as a *percipient*, he cannot eliminate himself as a *concipient*: *i.e.* as conceiving and believing. He can conceive no object without being himself the subject conceiving, nor believe in any future contingency without being himself the Subject believing. He may part company with himself as percipient, but he cannot part company with himself altogether. His conception of an absent external object, therefore, when fully and accurately described, does not contradict the Protagorean doctrine. But it is far the most plausible objection which can be brought against that doctrine, and it is an objection deduced from the facts or cognitions of sense.

I cannot therefore agree with Plato in regarding the Protagorean doctrine—Homo Mensura—as having any dependance upon, or any necessary connection with, the other theory

existence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several ways in which objects are presented to our consciousness—a general term embracing a variety of relations. To assume Absolute Existence as an object of thought is thus to suppose a relation existing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker; while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation."

Dr. Henry More has also a passage asserting the essential correlation on which I am here insisting (Immortality of the Soul, ch. ii. p. 3). And Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of Metaphysic, has given much valuable elucidation respecting the essential relativity of cognition.

Though this note is already long, I shall venture to add from an eminent German critic—Trendelenburg—a passage which goes to the same point.

"Das Seyn ist als die absolute Position erklärt worden; Der Begriff des Seyns drücke bloss das aus—es werde bey dem einfachen Setzen eines *Was* sein Bewenden haben. Es hat sich hier die abstracte Vorstellung des Seyns nur in eine verwandte Anschauung umgekleidet: denn das Gesetzte steht in dem Raum da: und insofern fordert die absolute Position schon den Begriff des seienden Etwas, das gesetzt wird. *Fragt man weiter, so ist in der absoluten Position schon derjenige mitgedacht, der da setzt.* Das Seyn wird also *nicht unabhängig aus sich selbst bestimmt*, sondern zur Erklärung *ein Verhältniss zu der Thätigkeit des Gedankens herbeygezogen.*

"Ahnlich würde jede von vorn herein versuchte Bestimmung des Denkens ausfallen. Man würde es nur durch einen Bezug zu den Dingen erläutern können, welche in dem Denken Grund und Mass finden. Wir begeben uns daher jeder Erklärung, und setzen eine Vorstellung des Denkens und Seyns voraus, in der Hoffnung, dass beyde mit jedem Schritte der Untersuchung sich in sich selbst bestimmen werden." "Indem wer Denken und Seyn unterscheiden, fragen wir, wie ist es möglich, dass sich im Erkennen Denken und Seyn vereinigt? *Diese Vereinigung sprechen wir vorläufig als eine Thatsache aus, die das Theoretische wie das Praktische beherrscht.*" Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, sect. 3, pp. 103-104, Berlin, 1840.

(canvassed in the Theætêtus) which pronounces cognition to be sensible perception. Objects of thought exist in relation to a thinking Subject; as Objects of sight or touch exist in relation to a seeing or touching Subject. And this we shall find Plato himself declaring in the Sophistes (where his Eleatic disputant is introduced as impugning a doctrine substantially the same as that of Plato himself in the Phædon, Timæus, and elsewhere) as well as here in the Theætêtus. In the Sophistes, certain philosophers (called the Friends of Forms or Ideas) are noticed, who admitted that all sensible or perceivable existence (γένεσις—Fientia) was relative to a (capable) sentient or percipient— but denied the relativity of Ideas, and maintained that Ideas, Concepts, Intelligible Entia, were not relative but absolute. The Eleate combats these philosophers, and establishes against them—That the Cogitable or Intelligible existence, Ens Rationis, was just as much relative to an Intelligent or Cogitant subject, as perceivable existence was relative to a Subject capable of perceiving—That Existence, under both varieties, was nothing more than a potentiality, correlating with a counter-potentiality (*τὸ γνωστὸν* with *τὸ γνωστικόν, τὸ αἰσθητὸν* with *τὸ αἰσθητικόν*), and never realised except in implication therewith.[d]

Object always relative to Subject— Either without the other, impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes.

This doctrine of the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistes coincides with the Protagorean—*Homo Mensura*—construed in its true meaning: Object is implicated with, limited or measured by, Subject: a doctrine proclaiming the relativeness of all objects perceived,

Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate conjunction with the Herakleitean.

[d] Plato, Sophistes, pp. 247-248.

The view taken of this matter by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the third chapter of the first book of his System of Logic, is very instructive; see especially pp. 65-66 (ed. 4th).

Aristippus (one of the Sokratici viri, contemporary of Plato) and the Kyrenaic sect affirmed the doctrine—*ὅτι μόνα τὰ πάθη καταληπτά*. Aristokles refutes them by saying that there can be no *πάθος* without both Object and Subject—*ποιοῦν* and *πάσχον*. And he goes on to declare that these three are of necessary co-existence or consubstantiality. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγκη γε πρία ταῦτα συνυφίστασθαι — τό τε πάθος αὐτὸ, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ τὸ πάσχον* (ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xiv. 19, 1).

I apprehend that Aristokles by these words does not really refute what Aristippus meant to affirm. Aristippus meant to affirm the Relative, and to decline affirming anything beyond; and in this Aristokles agrees, making the doctrine even more comprehensive by showing that Object as well as Subject are relative also; implicated both with each other and in the *πάθος*.

conceived, known, or felt—and the omnipresent involution of the perceiving, conceiving, knowing, or feeling, Subject: the object varying with the Subject. "As things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you." This theory is just and important, if rightly understood and explained: but whether Protagoras did so explain or understand it, we cannot say; nor does the language of Plato enable us to make out. Plato passes on from this theory to another, which he supposes Protagoras to have held without distinctly stating it: That there is no Ens distinguishable in itself, or permanent, or stationary: that all existences are in perpetual flux, motion, change—acting and reacting upon each other, combining with or disjoining from each other.[e]

Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him.

Turning to the special theory of Protagoras (Homo Mensura), and producing arguments, serious or ironical in its defence, Sokrates says—What you call colour has no definite place or existence either within you or without you. It is the result of the passing collision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act upon them. It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but is something special and momentary generated in passing between the two. It will vary with the subject: it is not the same to you, to another man, to a dog or horse, or even to yourself at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself either great, or white, or hot: for if it were, it would not appear different to another Subject. Nor can the Subject touching or measuring be in itself great, or white, or hot: for if so, it would always be so, and would not be differently modified when applied to a different object. *Great, white, hot,* denote no positive and permanent attribute either in Object or Subject, but a passing result or impression generated between the two, relative to both and variable with either.[f]

[e] Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 D.

Though Plato states the grounds of this theory in his ironical way, as if it were an absurd fancy, yet it accidentally coincides with the largest views of modern physical science. Absolute rest is unknown in nature: all matter is in perpetual movement, molecular as well as in masses.

[f] Plato, Theætêt. pp. 153-154.

ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ πρόσβαλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός.

To illustrate this farther (continues Sokrates)—suppose we have here six dice. If I compare them with three other dice placed by the side of them, I shall call the six dice *more* and *double:* if I put twelve other dice by the side of them, I shall call the six *fewer* and *half.* Or take an old man—and put a growing youth by his side. Two years ago the old man was taller than the youth: now, the youth is grown, so that the old man is the shorter of the two. But the old man, and the six dice, have remained all the time unaltered, and equal to themselves. How then can either of them become either greater or less? or how can either *really be* so, when they were not so before?[g]

Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply, without a comparing subject.

The illustration here furnished by Sokrates brings out forcibly the negation of the absolute, and the affirmation of universal relativity in all conceptions, judgments, and predications, which he ascribes to Protagoras and Herakleitus. The predication respecting the six dice denotes nothing real, independent, absolute, inhering in them: for they have undergone no change. It is relative, and expresses a mental comparison made by me or some one else. It is therefore relative in two different senses:—1. To some other object with which the comparison of the dice is made:—2. To me as comparing Subject, who determine the objects with which the comparison shall be made.[h]—Though relativity in both senses is com-

Relativity twofold—to the comparing Subject—to another Object, besides the one directly described.

[g] Plato, Theætêt. pp. 154-155. Compare the reasoning in the Phædon, pp. 96-97-101.

[h] The Aristotelian Category of Relation (τὰ πρὸς τί, Categor. p. 6, a. 36) designates one object apprehended and named relatively to some other object—as distinguished from object apprehended and named not thus relatively, which Aristotle considers as *per se* καθ' αὐτό (Ethica Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 21). Aristotle omits or excludes relativity of the object apprehended to the percipient or concipient subject, which is the sort of relativity directly noted by the Protagorean doctrine.

Occasionally Aristotle passes from relativity in the former sense to relativity in the latter; as when he discusses ἐπιστητὸν and ἐπιστήμη, alluded to in one of my former notes on this dialogue. But he seems unconscious of any transition. In the Categories, Object, as implicated with Subject, does not seem to have been distinctly present to his reflection. In the third book of the Metaphysica, indeed, he discusses professedly the opinion of Protagoras; and among his objections against it, one is, that it makes everything relative or πρὸς τί (Metaph. Γ. p. 1011, a. 20, b. 5). This is hardly true in the sense which πρὸς τί bears as one of his Categories; but it is true in the other sense to which I have adverted.

A clear and full exposition of what is meant by the Relativity of Human Knowledge, will be found in Mr. John Stuart Mill's most recent work, 'Ex-

prehended by the Protagorean affirmation—Homo Mensura—yet relativity in the latter sense is all which that affirmation essentially requires. And this is true of all propositions, comparative or not—whether there be or be not reference to any other object beyond that which is directly denoted. But Plato was here illustrating the larger doctrine which he ascribes to Protagoras in common with Herakleitus: and therefore the more complicated case of relativity might suit his purpose better.

Sokrates now re-states that larger doctrine, in general terms, as follows.

Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus—yet so as to implicate it with that of Protagoras.

The universe is all flux or motion, divided into two immense concurrent streams of force, one active, the other passive; adapted one to the other, but each including many varieties. One of these is Object: the other is, sentient, cognizant, concipient, Subject. Object as well as Subject is, in itself and separately, indeterminate and unintelligible—a mere chaotic Agent or Patient. It is only by copulation and friction with each other that they generate any definite or intelligible result. Every such copulation, between parts adapted to each other, generates a twin offspring: two correlative and inseparable results infinitely diversified, but always born in appropriate pairs:[i] a definite perception or feeling, on the subjective side—a definite thing perceived or felt, on the objective. There cannot be one of these without the other: there can be no objective manifestation without its subjective correlate, nor any subjective without its objective. This is true not merely about the external senses—touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing—but also about the internal,—hot and cold, pleasure and pain, desire, fear, and all the countless variety of our feelings which have no separate names.[k] Each of these varieties of feeling has its own object co-existent and correlating with it. Sight, hearing, and smell, move and generate rapidly and

amination of Sir William-Hamilton's Philosophy,' ch. ii. pp. 6-15.

[i] Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 A. *ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν. Τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ—τὸ μὲν, αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.*

[k] Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 B.

from afar: touch and taste, slowly and only from immediate vicinity: but the principle is the same in all. Thus, *e.g.*, when the visual power of the eye comes into reciprocal action with its appropriate objective agent, the result between them is, that the visual power passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into a concrete and particular act of vision—the seeing a white stone or wood: while the objective force also passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into concrete—so that it is no longer whiteness, but a piece of white stone or wood actually seen.[l]

Agent and Patient—No absolute Ens.

Accordingly, nothing can be affirmed to exist separately and by itself. All existences come only as twin and correlative manifestations of this double agency. In fact neither of these agencies can be conceived independently, and apart from the other: each of them is a nullity without the other.[m] If either of them be varied, the result also will vary proportionally: each may be in its turn agent or patient, according to the different partners with which it comes into confluence.[n] It is therefore improper to say—Such or such a thing *exists*. Existence absolute, perpetual, and unchangeable is nowhere to be found: and all phrases which imply it are incorrect, though we are driven to use them by habit and for want of knowing better. All that is real is, the perpetual series of changeful and transient conjunctions; each Object, with a certain Subject,—each Subject, with a certain Object.[o] This is true not merely of individual objects, but also of those complex aggregates rationally apprehended which receive generic names, *man*, animal, stone, &c.[p] You must not there-

[l] Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 E. *ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγέγνετο οὔ τι ὄψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ ξυγγέννησαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκὸν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν χρῆμα ξυνέβη χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.*

Plato's conception of the act of vision was—That fire darted forth from the eyes of the percipient and came into confluence or coalescence with fire approaching from the perceived object (Plato, Timæus, pp. 45 C, 67 C).

[m] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. *ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὖ τι ἐπὶ ἑνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. Οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἔστι τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ—οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι,* &c.

[n] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 A. *τό τέ τινι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν, ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὸν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη.*

[o] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 B. *οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι παντάχοθεν ἐξαιρετέον,* &c.

[p] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 B. *δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος.*

In this passage I follow Heindorf's

fore say that anything *is*, absolutely and perpetually, good, honourable, hot, white, hard, great—but only that it is so felt or esteemed by certain subjects more or less numerous.[q]

Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered.

The arguments advanced against this doctrine from the phenomena of dreams, distempers, or insanity, admit (continues Sokrates) of a satisfactory answer. A man who is dreaming, sick, or mad, believes in realities different from, and inconsistent with, those which he would believe in when healthy. But this is because he is, under those peculiar circumstances, a different Subject, unlike what he was before. One of the two factors of the result being thus changed, the result itself is changed.[r] The cardinal principle of Protagoras—the essential correlation, and indefeasible fusion, of Subject and Object, exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I (the Subject) perceive,—is to say that I perceive some Object: to perceive and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an Object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient Subject: sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.[s] Necessity binds the essence of the percipient to that of something perceived: so that every name which you bestow upon either of them implies some reference to the other; and no name can be truly predicated of either, which implies existence (either perpetual or temporary) apart from the other.[t]

Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates, is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the

Such is the exposition which Sokrates is here made to give, of the Protagorean doctrine. How far the arguments, urged by him in its behalf, are such as Protagoras himself either really urged, or would have adopted, we cannot say. In so far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and implication between

explanation which seems dictated by the last word εἶδος. Yet I am not sure that Plato does really mean here the *generic* aggregates. He had before talked about sights, sounds, hot, cold, hard, &c., the separate sensations. He may perhaps here mean simply individual things as aggregates or ἀθροίσματα—a *man*, a *stone*, &c.

[q] Plato, Theætêt. p. 157 E.

[r] Plato, Theætêt. p. 159.

[s] Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 A.

[t] Plato, Theætêt. p. 160 B. ἔπειτερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς· ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι (*i. e.* τὸν αἰσθανόμενον and τὸ ποιοῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι). Ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ τινὸς, ἢ πρός τι, ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον.

Compare Aristot. Metaphys. T. 6, p. 1011, a. 23.

facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object.

Subject and Object, with actual multiplicity of distinct Subjects—denying the reality either of absolute and separate Subject, or of absolute and separate Object[u]—I think it true and instructive. We are reminded that when we affirm anything about an Object, there is always (either expressed or tacitly implied) a Subject or Subjects (one, many, or all), to *whom* the Object *is* what it is declared to be. This is the fundamental characteristic of consciousness, feeling, and cognition, in all their actual varieties. All of them are bi-polar or bi-lateral, admitting of being looked at either on the subjective or on the objective side. Comparisons and contrasts, gradually multiplied, between one consciousness and another, lead us to distinguish the one of these points of view from the other. In some cases, the objective view is brought into light and prominence, and the subjective thrown into the dark and put out of sight: in other cases, the converse operation takes place. Sometimes the Ego or Subject is prominent, sometimes the Mecum or Object.[x] Sometimes the Objective is as it were

[u] Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise De Animâ (iii. 2-4-7-8, ed. Trendelenburg, p. 425, b. 25, p. 426, a. 15-25, Bekk.), impugns an opinion of certain antecedent *φυσιόλογοι* whom he does not specify; which opinion seems identical with the doctrine of Protagoras. These philosophers said, that "there was neither white nor black without vision, nor savour without the sense of taste." Aristotle says that they were partly right, partly wrong. They were right in regard to the actual, wrong in regard to the potential. The actual manifestation of the perceived is one and the same with that of the percipient, though the two are not the same logically in the view of the reflecting mind (*ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς*). But this is not true when we speak of them potentially—*διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθὲν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει. Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς.*

I think that the distinction, which Aristotle insists upon as a confutation of these philosophers, is not well founded. What he states, in very just language, about *actual perception* is equally true about *potential perception*. As the present fact of actual perception implicates essentially a determinate percipient subject with a determinate perceived object, and admits of being looked at either from the one point of view or from the other—so the concept of potential perception implicates in like manner an indeterminate perceivable with an indeterminate subject competent to perceive. The perceivable or cogitable has no meaning except in relation to some Capax Percipiendi or Capax Cogitandi.

[x] The terms Ego and Mecum, to express the antithesis of these two *λόγῳ μόνον χωριστὰ*, are used by Professor Ferrier in his very acute treatise, Institutes of Metaphysic, pp. 93-96. The same antithesis is otherwise expressed by various modern writers in the terms Ego and non-Ego—le moi et le non-moi. I cannot think that this last is the proper way of expressing it. You do not want to negative the Ego, but to declare its essential implication with a variable correlate; to point out the bilateral character of the act of

divorced from the Subject, and projected outwards, so as to have an illusory appearance of existing apart from and independently of any Subject. In other cases, the subjective view is so exclusively lighted up and conspicuous, that Object disappears, and we talk of a mind conceiving, as if it had no correlative Concept. It is possible, by abstraction, to indicate, to name, and to reason about, the one of these two points of view without including direct notice of the other: this is abstraction or logical separation—a mental process useful and largely applicable, yet often liable to be mistaken for real distinctness and duality. In the present case, the two abstractions become separately so familiar to the mind, that this supposed duality is conceived as the primordial and fundamental fact: the actual, bilateral, consciousness being represented as a temporary derivative state, generated by the copulation of two factors essentially independent of each other. Such a theory, however, while aiming at an impracticable result, amounts only to an inversion of the truth. It aims at explaining our

consciousness. The two are not merely *Relata secundum dici* but *Relata secundum esse*, to use a distinction recognised in the scholastic logic.

The implication of Subject and Object is expressed in a peculiar manner (though still clearly) by Aristotle in the treatise De Animâ, iii. 8, 431, b. 21. *ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά. ἐστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά, πως, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά.* The adverb *πως* (*τρόπον τινα*, as Simplikius explains it, fol. 78, b. 1) here deserves attention. "The soul is all existing things *in a certain way* (or looked at under a certain aspect). All things are either Percepta or Cogitata: now Cognition is in a certain sense the Cognita—Perception is the Percepta." He goes on to say that the Percipient Mind is the Form of Percepta, while the matter of Percepta is without: but that the Cogitant Mind is identical with Cogitata, for they have no matter (iii. 4, 12, p. 430, a. 3, with the commentary of Simplikius, p. 78, b. 17, f. 19, a. 12). This is in other words the Protagorean doctrine—That the mind is the measure of all existences; and that this is even more true about *νοητὰ* than about *αἰσθητά*. That doctrine is completely independent of the theory, that *ἐπιστήμη* is *αἴσθησις*.

It is in conformity with this affirmation of Aristotle (partially approved even by Cudworth, see Mosheim's Transl. of Intell. Syst. Vol. II. ch. viii. pp. 27-28)—*ἡ ψυχὴ πως τὰ ὄντα ἔστι πάντα*—that Mr. John Stuart Mill makes the following striking remark about the number of ultimate Laws of Nature:—

"It is useful to remark, that the ultimate | Laws of Nature cannot possibly be less numerous than the distinguishable sensations or other feelings of our nature: those, I mean, which are distinguishable in quality, and not merely in quantity or degree. For example, since there is a phenomenon *sui generis* called colour, which our consciousness testifies to be not a particular degree of some other phenomenon, as heat, or odour, or motion, but intrinsically unlike all others, it follows that there are ultimate laws of colour. The ideal limit therefore of the explanation of natural phenomena would be to show that each distinguishable variety of our sensations or other states of consciousness has only one sort of cause." (System of Logic, Book iii. ch. 14, s. 2.)

consciousness as a whole; whereas all that we can really accomplish, is to explain, up to a certain point, the conditions of conjunction and sequence between different portions of our consciousness. It also puts the primordial in the place of the derivative, and transfers the derivative to the privilege of the primordial. It attempts to find a generation for what is really primordial—the total series of our manifold acts of consciousness, each of a bilateral character, subjective on one side and objective on the other: and it assigns as the generating factors two concepts obtained by abstraction from these very acts,—resulting from multiplied comparisons,—and ultimately exaggerated into an illusion which treats the logical separation as if it were bisection in fact and reality.

Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double potentiality—Subjective and Objective.

In Plato's exposition of the Protagorean theory, the true doctrine held by Protagoras,[y] and the illusory explanation (whether belonging to him or to Plato himself), are singularly blended together. He denies expressly all separate existence either of Subject or Object—all possibility of conceiving or describing the one as a reality distinct from the other. He thus acknowledges consciousness and cognition as essentially bilateral. Nevertheless he also tries to explain the generation of these acts of consciousness, by the hypothesis of

[y] The elaborate Dissertation of Sir William Hamilton, on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned (standing first in his 'Discussions on Philosophy'), is a valuable contribution to metaphysical philosophy. He affirms and shows, "That the Unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable: its notion being only a negation of the Conditioned, which last can alone be positively known and conceived" (p. 12); refuting the opposite doctrine as proclaimed, with different modification, both by Schelling and Cousin.

In an Appendix to this Dissertation, contained in the same volume (p. 608), Sir W. Hamilton not only re-asserts the doctrine ("Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is relative, conditioned — relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, or know them only as incognisable," &c.)—but affirms farther that philosophers of every school, with the exception of a few late absolute theorisers in Germany, have always held and harmoniously re-echoed the same doctrine.

In proof of such unanimous agreement, he cites passages from seventeen different philosophers.

The first name on his list stands as follows:—"1. Protagoras—(as reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, &c.)—Man is (for himself) the measure of all things."

Sir William Hamilton understands the Protagorean doctrine as I understand it, and as I have endeavoured to represent it in the present chapter. It has been very generally misconceived.

I cannot, however, agree with Sir William Hamilton in thinking that this theory respecting the Unconditioned and the Absolute, has been the theory generally adopted by philosophers. The passages which he cites from other authors are altogether insufficient to prove such an affirmation.

a *latens processus* behind them and anterior to them—two continuous moving forces, agent and patient, originally distinct, conspiring as joint factors to a succession of compound results. But when we examine the language in which Plato describes these forces, we see that he conceives them only as Abstractions and Potentialities;[z] though he ascribes to them a metaphorical copulation and generation. "Every thing is motion (or change): of which there are two sorts, each infinitely manifold: one, having power to act—the other having power to suffer." Here instead of a number of distinct facts of consciousness, each bilateral—we find ourselves translated by abstraction into a general potentiality of consciousness, also essentially bilateral and multiple. But we ought to recollect, that the Potential is only a concept abstracted from the actual, —and differing from it in this respect, that it includes what has been and what may be, as well as what is. But it is nothing new and distinct by itself: it cannot be produced as a substantive antecedent to the actual, and as if it afforded explanation thereof. The general proposition about motion or change (above cited in the words of Plato), as far as it purports to get behind the fact of consciousness and to assign its cause or antecedent—is illusory. But if considered as a general expression for that fact itself, in the most comprehensive terms—indicating the continuous thread of separate, ever-changing acts of consciousness, each essentially bilateral, or subjective as well as objective—in this point of view the proposition is just and defensible.[a]

[z] Plato, Theætêt. 33, p. 156 A. *τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν.*

[a] In that distinction, upon which Aristotle lays so much stress, between Actus and Potentia, he declares Actus or actuality to be the Prius—Potentia or potentiality to be the Posterius. See Metaphysica, Θ. 8, 1049, b. 5 seqq.; De Animâ, ii. 4, 415, a. 17. The Potential is a derivative from the Actual —derived by comparison, abstraction, and logical analysis; a Mental concept, helping us to describe, arrange, and reason about, the multifarious acts of sense or consciousness—but not an anterior generating reality.

Turgot observes (Œuvres, vol. iii. pp. 108-110; Article in the Encyclopédie, *Existence*):—

"Le prémier fondement de la notion *d'existence* est, la conscience de notre propre sensation, et le sentiment du Moi qui résulte de cette conscience. La rélation nécessaire entre l'être appercevant, et l'être apperçu, consideré hors du Moi, suppose dans ces termes la même réalité. Il y a dans l'un et dans l'autre un fondement de cette rélation, que l'homme, s'il avoit un langage, pourroit désigner par le nom commun *d'existence* ou de *présence*: car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore distinguées l'une de l'autre.

"Mais il est important d'observer

It is to be remembered, that the doctrine here criticised is brought forward by the Platonic Sokrates as a doctrine not his own, but held by others; among whom he ranks Protagoras as one.

Having thus set forth in his own language, and as an advocate, the doctrine of Protagoras, Sokrates proceeds to impugn it: in his usual rambling and desultory way, but with great dramatic charm and vivacity. He directs his attacks alternately against the two doctrines: 1. *Homo Mensura:* 2. Cognition is sensible perception.

I shall first notice what he advances against *Homo Mensura.* It puts every man (he says) on a par as to wisdom and intelligence: and not only every man, but every horse, dog, frog, and other animal along with him. Each man is a measure for himself: all his judgments and beliefs are true: he is therefore as wise as Protagoras and has no need to seek instruction from Protagoras.[b] Reflection, study, and dialectic discussion, are superfluous and useless to him: he is a measure to himself on the subject of geometry, and need not therefore consult a professed geometrician like Theodôrus.[c]

Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par—that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure.

The doctrine is contradicted (continues Sokrates) by the common opinions of mankind: for no man esteems himself a measure on all things. Every one believes that there are some things on which he is wiser than his neighbour—and others on which his neighbour is wiser than he. People are

que ni la simple sensation des objets présens, ni la peinture que fait l'imagination des objets absens, ni le simple rapport de distance ou d'activité réciproque, commun aux uns et aux autres —ne sont précisement la chose que l'esprit voudroit désigner par le mot général *d'existence.* C'est le fondement même de ces rapports, supposé commun au Moi, à l'objet vu, et à l'objet simplement distant, sur lequel tombe véritablement et le nom *d'existence* et notre affirmation, lorsque nous disons qu'une chose *existe.* Ce fondement n'est ni ne peut être connu immédiatement, et ne nous est indiqué que par les rapports généraux qui le supposent. Nous nous en formons cependant une espèce d'idée que nous tirons par voie d'abstraction du témoignage que la conscience nous rend de nous-mêmes et de notre sensation actuelle: c'est à-dire, que nous transportons en quelque sorte cette conscience du Moi sur les objets extérieurs, par une espèce d'assimilation vague, démentie aussitot par la séparation de tout ce qui caractérise le Moi, mais qui ne suffit pas moins pour devenir le fondement *d'une abstraction ou d'un signe commun, et pour être l'objet de nos jugemens.*"

[b] Plato, Theætêt. c. 48, 49, p. 161. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p. 386 C, where the same argument is employed.

[c] Plato, Theætêt. c. 67, p. 169 A.

constantly on the look out for teachers and guides.[d] If Protagoras advances an opinion which others declare to be false, he must, since he admits their opinion to be true, admit his own opinion to be false.[e] No animal, nor any common man, is a measure; but only those men, who have gone through special study and instruction in the matter upon which they pronounce.[f]

In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself. Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is required.

In matters of present and immediate sensation, hot, cold, dry, moist, sweet, bitter, &c., Sokrates acknowledges that every man must judge for himself, and that what each man pronounces is true *for himself*. So too, about honourable or base, just or unjust, holy or unholy—whatever rules any city may lay down, are true *for itself:* no man, no city,—is wiser upon these matters than any other.[g] But in regard to what is good, profitable, advantageous, healthy, &c., the like cannot be conceded. Here (says Sokrates) one man, and one city, is decidedly wiser, and judges more truly, than another. We cannot say that the judgment of each is true;[h] or that what every man or every city anticipates to promise good or profit, will necessarily realise such anticipations. In such cases, not merely present sentiment, but future consequences are involved.

Here then we discover the distinction which Plato would draw.[i] Where present sentiment alone is involved, as in hot and cold, sweet and bitter, just and unjust, honourable and base, &c., there each is a judge for himself, and one man is no better judge than another. But where future consequences are to be predicted, the ignorant man is incapable: none but the professional Expert, or the prophet,[k] is competent to declare the truth. When a dinner is on table, each man among the guests can judge whether it is good: but while it is being prepared, none but the cook can judge whether it *will be* good.[m] This is one Platonic objection against the opi-

[d] Plato, Theætêt. c. 70, p. 170.
[e] Plato, Theætêt. c. 72, p. 171. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ ξυγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;
[f] Plato, Theætêt. c. 73, p. 171 C.
[g] Plato, Theætêt. pp. 172 A, 177 E.
[h] Plato, Theætêt. c. 75, p. 172.
[i] Plato, Theætêt. c. 89, p. 178.
[k] Plato, Theætêt. c. 90, p. 179. εἶπη τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἀμεινον κρίνειεν ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ.
[m] Plato, Theætêt. c. 90, p. 178.

nion of Protagoras, when he says that every opinion of every man is true. Another objection is, that opinions of different men are opposite and contradictory,[n] some of them contradicting the Protagorean dictum itself.

Such are the objections urged by Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine—*Homo Mensura.* There may have been perhaps in the treatise of Protagoras, which unfortunately we do not possess, some reasonings or phrases countenancing the opinions against which Plato here directs his objections. But so far as I can collect, even from the words of Plato himself when he professes to borrow the phraseology of his opponent, I cannot think that Protagoras ever delivered the opinion which Plato here refutes—*That every opinion of every man is true.* The opinion really delivered by Protagoras appears to have been[o]—*That every opinion deli-*

Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind.

[n] Plato, Theætêt. c. 91, p. 179.

Theodor. Ἐκείνῃ μοι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ἁλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ᾗ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἀφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.

Sokrat. Πολλαχῇ καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστου πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται· ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀνάλωτοι γὰρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσί.

[o] Plato, Theætêt. p. 152 A.

Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει (Protagoras), ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοὶ—οἷα δὲ σοὶ, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί.

P. 158 A. τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται.

P. 160 D. Ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐγὼ κρίτης κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ, ὡς ἔστιν, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

Compare also pp. 166 D, 170 A, 177 C.

Instead of saying αἴσθησις (in the passage just cited, p. 160 D), we might with quite equal truth put Ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ **νόησις**· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἔστιν. In this respect αἴσθησις and νόησις are on a par. Νόησις is just as much relative to ὁ νοῶν as αἴσθησις to ὁ αἰσθανόμενος.

Sextus Empiricus adverts to the doctrines of Protagoras (mainly to point out how they are distinguished from those of the Sceptical school, to which he himself belongs) in Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. sects. 215-219; adv. Mathematicos, vii. s. 60-64-388-400. He too imputes to Protagoras both the two doctrines. 1. That man is the measure of all things: that what appears to each person is, *to him:* that all truth is thus relative. 2. That all phantasms, appearances, opinions, are *true.* Sextus reasons at some length (390 seq.) against this doctrine No. 2, and reasons very much as Protagoras himself would have reasoned, since he appeals to individual sentiment and movement of the individual mind (οὐχ ὡσαύτως γὰρ κινούμεθα, 391-400). It appears to me perfectly certain that Protagoras advanced the general thesis of Relativity: we see this as well from Plato as from Sextus—καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι—τῶν πρός τι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν (Steinhart is of opinion that these words τῶν πρός τι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν are an addition of Sextus himself, and do not describe the doctrine of Protagoras; an opinion from which I dissent, and which is contradicted by Plato himself, Steinhart, Einleitung, note 8). If Protagoras also advanced the doctrine—all opinions are true—this was not consistent with his cardinal principle of relativity. Either he himself did not take care always to enunciate the qualifications and limita-

vered by every man is true, to that man himself. But Plato, when he impugns it, leaves out the final qualification; falling unconsciously into the fallacy of passing (as logicians say), *à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.*[p] The qualification thus omitted by Plato forms the characteristic feature of the Protagorean doctrine, and is essential to the phraseology founded upon it. Protagoras would not declare any proposition to be true absolutely, or false absolutely. The phraseology belonging to that doctrine is forced upon him by Plato. Truth Absolute there is none, according to Protagoras. All truth is and must be truth relative to some one or more persons, either actually accepting and believing in it, or conceived as potential believers under certain circumstances. Moreover since these believers are a multitude of individuals, each with his own peculiarities—so no truth can be believed in, except under the peculiar measure of the believing individual mind. What a man adopts as true, and what he rejects as false, are conditioned alike by this limit: a limit not merely different in different individuals, but variable and frequently varying in the same individual. You cannot determine a dog, or a horse, or a child to believe in the Newtonian astronomy: you could not determine the author of the Principia in 1687 to believe what the child Newton had believed in 1647.[q] To say that what is true to one man, is false to another—that what *was* true to an individual as a child or as

tions which his theory requires, and which in common parlance are omitted —Or his opponents left out the limitations which he annexed, and impugned the opinion as if it stood without any. This last supposition I think the most probable.

The doctrine of Protagoras is correctly given by Sextus in the Pyrrhon. Hypot.

[p] Aristotle, in commenting on the Protagorean formula, falls into a similar inaccuracy in slurring over the restrictive qualification annexed by Protagoras. Metaphysic. Γ. p. 1009, a. 6. Compare hereupon Bonitz's note upon the passage, p. 199 of his edition.

This transition without warning, *à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*, is among the artifices ascribed by Plato to the Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus (Plat. Euthydêmus, p. 297 D).

[q] The argument produced by Plato to discredit the Protagorean theory, that it puts the dog or the horse on a level with man, furnishes in reality a forcible illustration of the truth of the theory.

Mr. James Harris, the learned Aristotelian of the last century, remarks, in his Dialogue on Happiness (Works, ed. 1772, pp. 143-168):—

"Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe. As things vary in their relations to it, they vary also in their value. If their value be ever doubtful, it can noway be adjusted but by recurring with accuracy to the natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations which such a State of course creates."

a youth, becomes false to him in his advanced years, is no real contradiction: though Plato, by omitting the qualifying words, presents it as if it were such. In every man's mind, the beliefs of the past have been modified or reversed, and the beliefs of the present are liable to be modified or reversed, by subsequent operative causes: by new supervening sensations, emotions, intellectual comparisons, authoritative teaching, or society, and so forth.

All exposition, and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language.

The fact, that all exposition and discussion is nothing more than an assemblage of individual judgments, depositions, affirmations, negations, &c., is disguised from us by the elliptical form in which it is conducted. For example:—I who write this book—can give nothing more than my own report, as a witness, of facts known to me, and of what has been said, thought, or done by others,—for all which I cite authorities:—and my own conviction, belief or disbelief, as to the true understanding thereof, and the conclusions deducible. I produce the reasons which justify my opinion: I reply to those reasons which have been supposed by others to justify the opposite. It is for the reader to judge how far my reasons appear satisfactory to his mind.[r] To deliver my own convictions, is all that is in my power: and if I spoke with full correctness and amplitude, it would be incumbent on me to avoid pronouncing any opinion to be *true* or *false* simply: I ought to say, it is *true to me*—or *false to me*. But to repeat this in every other sentence, would be a tiresome egotism. It is understood once for all by the title-page of the book: an

[r] M. Destutt Tracy observes as follows:—

"De même que toutes nos propositions peuvent être ramenées à la forme de propositions énonciatives, puisqu'au fond elles expriment toutes un jugement: de même, toutes nos propositions énonciatives peuvent être toujours réduites à n'être qu'une de celles-ci. Je pense, je sais, ou je perçois, que telle chose est de telle manière, ou que tel être produit tel effet—*propositions dont nous sommes nous-mêmes le sujet, puisqu'au fond nous sommes toujours le sujet de tous nos jugemens*—puisqu'ils n'expriment jamais qu'une impression que nous éprouvons." (Idéologie. Supplément à la première Section, vol. iv. pp. 164-165, ed. 1825 duodec.)

"On peut même dire que comme nous ne sentons, ne savons, et ne connaissons, rien que par rapport à nous—l'idée, sujet de la proposition, est toujours en définitif notre Moi: Car quand je dis, *cet arbre est vert*, je dis réellement, *je sens, je sais, je vois, que cet arbre est vert.* Mais *précisément parceque ce préambule se trouve toujours dans toutes nos propositions, nous le supprimons quand nous voulons:* et toute idée peut être le sujet d'une proposition." (Principes Logiques, vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 231.)

opponent will know what he has to deal with, and will treat the opinions accordingly. If any man calls upon me to give him *absolute truth*, and to lay down the canon of evidence for identifying it—I cannot comply with the request, any farther than to deliver my own best judgment, what is truth—and to declare what is the canon of evidence which guides my own mind. Each reader must determine for himself whether he accepts it or not. I might indeed clothe my own judgments in oracular and vehement language: I might proclaim them as authoritative dicta: I might speak as representing the Platonic Ideal, Typical Man,—or as inspired by a δαίμων like Sokrates: I might denounce opponents as worthless men, deficient in all the sentiments which distinguish men from brutes, and meriting punishment as well as disgrace. If I used all these harsh phrases, I should only imitate what many authors of repute think themselves entitled to say, about THEIR beliefs and convictions. Yet in reality, I should still be proclaiming nothing beyond my own feelings:—the force of emotional association, and antipathy towards opponents, which had grown round these convictions in my own mind. Whether I speak in accordance with others, or in opposition to others, in either case I proclaim my own reports, feelings, and judgments—nothing farther. I cannot escape from the Protagorean limit or measures.[s]

Argument—That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men

To this theory Plato imputes as a farther consequence, that it equalises all men and all animals. No doubt, the measure or limit as generically described, bears alike upon all: but it does not mark the same degree

[s] Sokrates himself states as much as this in the course of his reply to the doctrine of Protagoras, Theætêt. 171 D. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεί, ταῦτα

The *necessity* (ἀνάγκη) to which Sokrates here adverts, is well expressed by M. Degérando. "En jugeant ce que pensent les autres hommes, en comprenant ce qu'ils éprouvent, nous ne sortons point en effet de nous-mêmes, comme on seroit tenté de le croire. C'est dans nos propres idées que nous voyons leurs idées, leurs manières d'être, leur existence même. Le monde entier ne nous est connu que dans une sorte de chambre obscure: et lorsqu'au sortir d'une société nombreuse nous croyons avoir lu dans les esprits et dans les cœurs, avoir observé des caractères, et senti (si je puis dire ainsi) la vie d'un grand nombre d'hommes—nous ne faisons en effet que sortir d'une grande galerie dont notre imagination a fait tous les frais; dont elle a créé tous les personnages, et dessiné, avec plus ou moins de vérité, tous les tableaux." (Degérando, Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser, vol. i. ch. v. p. 132.)

in all. Each man's bodily efforts are measured or limited by the amount of his physical force: this is alike true of all men: yet it does not follow that the physical force of all men is equal. The dog, the horse, the newborn child, the lunatic, is each a measure of truth to himself: the philosopher is so also to himself: this is alike true, whatever may be the disparity of intelligence: and is rather more obviously true when the disparity is great, because the lower intelligence has then a very narrow stock of beliefs, and is little modifiable by the higher. But though the Protagorean doctrine declares the dog or the child to be a measure of truth—each to himself—it does not declare either of them to be a measure of truth to me, to you, or to any ordinary by-stander. How far any person is a measure of truth to others, depends upon the estimation in which he is held by others: upon the belief which they entertain respecting his character or competence. Here is a new element let in, of which Plato, in his objection to the Protagorean doctrine, takes no account. When he affirms that Protagoras by his equalising doctrine acknowledged himself to be no better in point of wisdom and judgment than a dog or a child, this inference must be denied.[t] The Protagorean doctrine is perfectly consistent with great diversities of knowledge, intellect, emotion, and character, between one man and another. Such diversities are recognised in individual belief and estimation, and are thus comprehended in the doctrine. Nor does Protagoras deny that men are teachable and modifiable. The scholar after being taught will hold beliefs different from those which he held before. Protagoras professed to know more than others, and to teach them: others on their side also believed that he knew more than they, and came to learn it. Such belief on both sides, noway contradicts the general doctrine here under discussion. What the scholar believes to be true, is still true to him: among those things which he believes to be true, one is, that the master knows more than he: in coming to be taught, he acts upon his own conviction. To say that a man is wise, is to say, that he

How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato's objection.

[t] Plato, Theætêt. c. 48-49, p. 161. ὅτι ἄλλου του δ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὢν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ

I substitute the dog or horse as illustrations.

is wise *in some one's estimation:* your own or that of some one else. Such estimation is always implied, though often omitted in terms. Plato remarks very truly, that every one believes some others to be on certain matters wiser than himself. In other words, what is called authority—that predisposition to assent, with which we hear the statements and opinions delivered by some other persons—is one of the most operative causes in determining human belief. The circumstances of life are such as to generate this predisposition in every one's mind to a greater or less degree, and towards some persons more than towards others.

Belief on authority is true to the believer himself—The efficacy of authority resides in the believer's own mind.

Belief on authority is true to the believer himself, like all his other beliefs, according to the Protagorean doctrine: and in acting upon it,—in following the guidance of A, and not following the guidance of B,—he is still a measure to himself. It is not to be supposed that Protagoras ever admitted all men to be equally wise, though Plato puts such an admission into his mouth as an inference undeniable and obvious. His doctrine affirms something altogether different:—that whether you believe yourself to be wise or unwise, in either case the belief is equally your own—equally the result of your own mental condition and predisposition,—equally true to yourself,—and equally an item among the determining conditions of your actions. That the beliefs and convictions of one person might be modified by another, was a principle held by Protagoras not less than by Sokrates: the former employed as his modifying instrument, eloquent lecturing—the latter, dialectical cross-examination. Both of them recognise the belief of the person to whom they address themselves as true to him, yet at the same time as something which may be modified and corrected, by appealing to what they thought the better parts of it against the worse.

Protagorean formula—is false, to those who dissent from it.

Again—Sokrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras—"Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons: but you admit that the belief of all persons is true: therefore your doctrine is false."[u]

[u] Plato, Theætêt. c. 72, p. 171 A. Sextus Empiric. (adv. Mathem. vii. 61) gives a pertinent answer to this objection.

Here also Plato omits the qualification annexed by Protagoras to his general principle—Every man's belief is true—that is, true *to him*. That a belief should be true, to one man, and false to another—is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates. He of course could only proclaim it as true to himself. It is the express purpose of his doctrine to disallow the absolutely true and the absolutely false. His own formula, like every other opinion, is false to those who dissent from it: but it is not false absolutely, any more than any other doctrine. Plato therefore does not make out his charge of contradiction.

Plato's argument—That the wise man alone is a measure—Reply to it.

Some men (says Sokrates) have learnt,—have bestowed study on special matters,—have made themselves wise upon those matters. Others have not done the like, but remain ignorant. It is the wise man only who is a measure: the ignorant man neither is so, nor believes himself to be so, but seeks guidance from the wise.[x]

Upon this we may remark—First, that even when the untaught men are all put aside, and the erudites or Experts remain alone—still these very erudites or Experts, the men of special study, are perpetually differing among themselves; so that we cannot recognise one as a measure, without repudiating the authority of the rest.[y] If by a measure, Plato means an infallible measure, he will not find it in this way: he is as far from the absolute as before. Next, it is perfectly correct that if any man be known to have studied or acquired experience on special matters, his opinion obtains an authority with others (more or fewer), such as the opinion of an ignorant man will not possess. This is a real difference between the graduated man and the non-graduated. But it is a difference not contradicting the theory of Protagoras; who did not affirm that every man's opinion was equally trustworthy in the estimation of others, but that every man's opinion was

[x] Plato, Theætêt. c. 73, p. 171 C, c. 91, p. 179 B.

[y] "Nam, quod dicunt omnino, se credere ei quem judicent fuisse sapientem—probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare potuissent (statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximé videtur esse sapientis). *Sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis: judicaverunt autem re semel auditâ, atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt.*" (Cicero, Academic. Priora, ii. 3, 9.)

alike a measure to the man himself. The authority of the guide resides in the belief and opinion of those who follow him, or who feel prepared to follow him if necessity arises. A man gone astray on his journey, asks the way to his destination from residents whom he believes to know it, just as he might look at a compass, or at the stars, if no other persons were near. In following their direction, he is acting on his own belief, that he himself is ignorant on the point in question and that they know. He is a measure to himself, both of the extent of his own ignorance, and of the extent of his own knowledge. And in this respect all are alike—every man, woman, child, and animal;[z] though they are by no

[z] Plato, Theætêt. c. 74, p. 171 E. I transcribe the following from the treatise of Fichte (Beruf des Menschen, Destination de l'Homme, Traduction de Barchou de Penhoën, ch. i. Le Doute, pp. 54, 55):—

"De la conscience de chaque individu, la nature se contemplant sous un point de vue différent, il en résulte que je m'appelle *moi*, et que tu t'appelles *toi*. Pour toi, je suis hors de toi; et pour moi, tu es hors de moi. Dans ce qui est hors de moi, je me saisis d'abord de ce qui m'avoisine le plus, de ce qui est le plus à ma portée; toi, tu fais de même.. Chacun de notre côté, nous allons ensuite au delà. Puis, ayant commencé à cheminer ainsi dans le monde de deux points de départ différens, nous suivons, pendant le reste de notre vie, des routes qui se coupent çà et là, mais qui jamais ne suivent exactement la même direction, jamais ne courent parallèlement l'une à l'autre. Tous les individus possibles peuvent être: par conséquent aussi, tous les points de vue de conscience possibles. *La somme de ces consciences individuelles fait la conscience universelle: il n'y a pas d'autre.* Ce n'est en effet que dans l'individu que se trouve à la fois et la limitation et la réalité. Dans l'individu la conscience est entièrement déterminée par la nature intime de l'individu. Il n'est donné à personne de savoir autre chose que ce qu'il sait. Il ne pourrait pas davantage savoir les mêmes choses d'une autre façon qu'il ne les sait."

The same doctrine is enforced with great originality and acuteness in a recent work of M. Eugène Véron, Du Progrès Intellectuel dans l'Humanité, Supériorité des Arts Modernes sur les Arts Anciens (Paris, 1862, Guillaumin). M. Véron applies his general doctrine mainly to the theory of Art and Æsthetics: moreover he affirms more than I admit respecting human progress as a certain and constant matter of fact. But he states clearly, as an universal truth, the relative point of view—the necessary measurement for itself, of each individual mind—and the consequent obligation, on each, to allow to other minds the like liberty. We read, pp. 14-16-17:—

"Cela revient à dire que dans quelque cas que nous supposions, nous ne pouvons sentir que dans la mesure de notre sensibilité, comprendre et juger que dans la mesure de notre intelligence; et que nos facultés étant en perpetuel developpement, les variations de notre personnalité entraînent nécessairement celles de nos jugemens, même quand nous n'en avons pas conscience. . . . . Chaque homme a son esprit particulier. Ce que l'un comprend sans peine, un autre ne le peut saisir; ce qui répugne à l'un, plaît à l'autre; ce qui me paraît odieux, mon voisin l'approuve. Quelque bonne envie que nous semblions avoir de nous perdre dans la foule, de dépouiller notre individualité pour emprunter des jugemens tout faits et des opinions taillées à la mesure et à l'usage du public—il est facile de voir que, tout en ayant l'air de répéter la leçon apprise, nous jugeons à notre manière, quand nous jugeons: que notre jugement, tout en paraissant être celui de tout le monde, n'en reste pas moins

means alike in the estimation of others, as trustworthy authorities.

A similar remark may be made as to Plato's distinction between the different matters to which belief may apply: present sensation or sentiment in one case —anticipation of future sensations or sentiments, in another. Upon matters of present sensation and sentiment (he argues), such as hot or cold, sweet or bitter, just or unjust, honourable or base, &c., one man is as good a judge as another: but upon matters involving future contingency, such as what is healthy or unhealthy,—profitable and good, or hurtful and bad,—most men judge badly: only a few persons, possessed of special skill and knowledge, judge well, each in his respective province.

Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation and anticipation of the future.

I for my part admit this distinction to be real and important. Most other persons admit the same.[a] In acting upon it, I follow out my belief,—and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting the circumstances which determine individual belief. Like all other causes of belief, it operates relatively to the individual mind, and thus falls under that general canon of relativity, which it is the express purpose of the Protagorean formula to affirm. Sokrates impugns the formula of relativity, as if it proclaimed every one to believe himself more competent to predict the future than any other person. But

The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible.

personnel, et n'est pas une simple imitation: que cette ressemblance même est souvent plus apparente que réelle: que l'identité extérieure des formules et des expressions ne prouve pas absolument celle de la pensée. Rien n'est élastique comme les mots, et comme les principes généraux dans lesquels on pense enfermer les intelligences. C'est souvent quand le langage est le plus semblable qu'on est le plus loin de s'entendre.

"Du reste, quand même cette ressemblance serait aussi réelle qu'elle est fausse, en quoi prouverait-il l'identité nécessaire des intelligences? Qu'y aurait-il d'étonnant qu'au milieu de ce communisme intellectuel qui régit l'éducation de chaque classe, et détermine nos habitudes intellectuelles et morales, les distinctions natives disparussent ou s'atténuassent? Ne faut-il pas plutôt admirer l'opiniâtre vitalité des différences originelles qui résistent à tant de causes de nivellement? L'identité primitive des intelligences n'est qu'une fiction logique sans réalité—une simple abstraction de langage, *qui ne repose que sur l'identité du mot avec lui-même.* Tout se reduit à la possibilité abstraite des mêmes développemens, dans les mêmes conditions d'hérédité et d'éducation—mais aussi de développemens différens dans des circonstances différentes: c'est à dire, que l'intelligence de chacun n'est identique à celle de tous, qu'au moment où elle n'est pas encore proprement une intelligence."

[a] Plato, Theætêt. p. 179 A. πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ.

no such assumption is implied in it. To say that a man is a measure to himself, is not to say that he is, or, that he believes himself to be, omniscient or infallible. A sick man may mistake the road towards future health, in many different directions. One patient may over-estimate his own knowledge,—that is one way, but only one among several: another may be diffident, and may undervalue his own knowledge: a third may over-estimate the knowledge of his professional adviser, and thus follow an ignorant physician, believing him to be instructed and competent: a fourth, instead of consulting a physician, may consult a prophet, whom Plato[b] here reckons among the authoritative infallible measures in respect to future events: a fifth may (like the rhetor Ælius Aristeides[c]) disregard the advice of physicians, and follow prescriptions enjoined to him in his own dreams, believing them to be sent by Æsculapius the Preserving God. Each of these persons judges differently about the road to future health: but each is alike a measure to himself: the belief of each is relative to his own mental condition and predispositions. You, or I, may believe that one or other of them is mistaken: but here another measure is introduced—*your* mind or *mine*.

Plato's argument is untenable—That if the Protagorean formula be dialectic discussion would be annulled—The reverse is true—Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the individual mind.

But the most unfounded among all Plato's objections to the Protagorean formula, is that in which Sokrates is made to allege, that if it be accepted, the work of dialectical discussion is at an end: that the Sokratic Elenchus, the reciprocal scrutiny of opinions between two dialogists, becomes nugatory—since every man's opinions are *right*.[d] Instead of *right*, we must add the requisite qualification, here as elsewhere, by reading, *right to the man himself*. Now, dealing with Plato's affirmation thus corrected, we must pronounce not only that it is not true, but

[b] Plato, Theætêt. p. 179 A, where Mr. Campbell observes in his note—"The μάντις is introduced as being ἐπιστήμων of the future generally; just as the physician is of future health and disease, the musician of future harmony," &c.

[c] See the five discourses of the rhetor Aristeides—Ἱερῶν Λόγοι, Oratt. xxiii.-xxvii.—containing curious details about his habits and condition, and illustrating his belief; especially Or. xxiii. p. 462 seqq. The perfect faith which he reposed in his dreams, and the confidence with which he speaks of the benefits derived from acting upon them, are remarkable.

[d] Plato, Theætêt. 49, p. 161 E.

that the direct reverse of it is true. Dialectical discussion and the Sokratic procedure, far from implying the negation of the Protagorean formula, involve the unqualified recognition of it. Without such recognition the procedure cannot even begin, much less advance onward to any result. Dialectic operates altogether by question and answer: the questioner takes all his premisses from the answers of the respondent, and cannot proceed in any direction except that in which the respondent leads him. Appeal is always directly made to the affirmative or negative of the individual mind, which is thus installed as measure of truth or falsehood *for itself*. The peculiar and characteristic excellence of the Sokratic Elenchus consists in thus stimulating the interior mental activity of the individual hearer, in eliciting from him all the positive elements of the debate, and in making him feel a shock when one of his answers contradicts the others. Sokrates not only does not profess to make himself a measure for the respondent, but expressly disclaims doing so: he protests against being considered as a teacher, and avows his own entire ignorance. He undertakes only the obstetric process of evolving from the respondent mind what already exists in it without the means of escape—and of applying interrogatory tests to the answer when produced: if there be nothing in the respondent's mind, his art is inapplicable. He repudiates all appeal to authority, except that of the respondent himself.[e] Accordingly there is neither

[e] Read the animated passage in the conversation with Pôlus, Plato, Gorgias, 472, and Theætêtus, 161 A. p. 150, 151.

In this very argument of Sokrates (in the Theætêtus) against the Protagorean theory, we find him unconsciously adopting (as I have already remarked) the very language of that theory, as a description of his own procedure, p. 171 D. Compare with this a remarkable passage in the colloquy of Sokrates with Thrasymachus, in Republic, i. 337 C.

Moreover, the long and striking contrast between the philosopher and the man of the world, which Plato embodies in this dialogue (the Theætêtus, from p. 172 to 177), is so far from assisting his argument against Protagoras, that it rather illustrates the Protagorean point of view. The beliefs and judgments of the man of the world are presented as flowing from *his* mental condition and predispositions: those of the philosopher, from *his*. The two are radically dissentient: each appears to the other mistaken and misguided. Here is nothing to refute Protagoras. Each of the two is a measure for himself.

Yes, it will be said; but Plato's measure is right, and that of the man of the world is wrong. Perhaps *I* may think so. As a measure for myself, I speak and act accordingly. But the opponents have not agreed to accept *me* any more than Plato as their judge. The case remains unsettled as before.

sense nor fitness in the Sokratic cross-examination, unless you assume that each person, to whom it is addressed, is a measure of truth and falsehood to himself. Implicitly indeed, this is assumed in rhetoric as well as in dialectic: wherever the speaker aims at persuading, he adapts his mode of speech to the predispositions of the hearer's own mind; and he thus recognises that mind as a measure for itself. But the Sokratic Dialectic embodies the same recognition, and the same essential relativity to the hearer's mind, more forcibly than any rhetoric. And the Platonic Sokrates (in the Phædrus) makes it one of his objections against orators who addressed multitudes, that they did not discriminate either the specialties of different minds, or the specialties of discourse applicable to each.[f]

Contrast with

umes
e au-
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aside Dia-
lectic.

Though Sokrates, and Plato so far forth as follower of Sokrates, employed a colloquial method based on he fundamental assumption of the Protagorean formula—autonomy of each individual mind—whether they accepted the formula in terms, or not; yet we shall find Plato at the end of his career, in his treatise De Legibus, constructing an imaginary city upon the attempted deliberate exclusion of this formula. We shall find him there monopolising all teaching and culture of his citizens from infancy upwards, barring out all freedom of speech or writing by a strict censorship, and severely punishing dissent from the prescribed orthodoxy. But then we shall also find that Plato in that last stage of his life—when he constitutes himself as lawgiver, the measure of truth or falsehood for all his citizens—has at the same time discontinued his early commerce with the Sokratic Dialectics.

Plato in

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n to
the formula.

On the whole then, looking at what Plato says about the Protagorean doctrine of Relativity—*Homo Mensura*—first, his statement what the doctrine really is, next his strictures upon it—we may see that he ascribes to it consequences which it will not fairly carry. He impugns it as if it excluded philosophy and argumentative scrutiny: whereas, on the contrary, it is the only basis upon which philosophy or "reasoned truth" can stand. Whoever denies the Protagorean auto-

[f] Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D-E; compare 268 A.

nomy of the individual judgment, must propound as his counter theory some heteronomy, such as he (the denier) approves. If I am not allowed to judge of truth and falsehood for myself, who is to judge for me? Plato, in the Treatise De Legibus, answers very unequivocally:—assuming to himself that infallibility which I have already characterised as the prerogative of King Nomos: "I, the lawgiver, am the judge for all my citizens: you must take my word for what is true or false: you shall hear nothing except what my censors approve—and if nevertheless, any dissenters arise, there are stringent penalties in store for them." Here is an explicit enunciation of the Counter-Proposition,[g] necessary to be maintained by those who deny the Protagorean doctrine. If you pronounce a man unfit to be the measure of truth for himself, you constitute yourself the measure, in his place: either directly as lawgiver—or by nominating censors according to your own judgment. As soon as he is declared a lunatic, some other person must be appointed to manage his property for him. You can only exchange one individual judgment for another. You cannot get out of the region of individual judgments, more or fewer in number: the King, the Pope, the Priest, the Judges or Censors, the author of some book, or the promulgator of such and such doctrine. The infallible measure which you undertake to provide must be found in some person or persons—if it can be found at all: in some person selected by yourself—that is, in the last result, *yourself*.[h]

[g] Professor Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic exhibit an excellent example of the advantages of setting forth explicitly the Counter-Proposition—that which an author intends to deny, as well as the Proposition, which he intends to affirm and prove.

[h] Aristotle says (Ethic. Nikomach. x. 1176, a. 15) δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι, τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. "That *is*, which *appears to be* in the judgment of the wise or virtuous man." The ultimate appeal is thus acknowledged to be, not to an abstraction, but to some one or more individual persons whom Aristotle recognises as wise. *That* is truth which this wise man declares to be truth. You cannot escape from the Relative by any twist of reasoning.

What Platonic critics call "Der Gegensatz des Seins und des Scheins" (see Steinhart, Einleitung zum Theætêt. p. 37) is unattainable. All that is attainable is the antithesis between that which appears to one person, and that which appears to one or more others, choose them as you will: between that which appears at a first glance, or at a distance, or on careless inspection—and that which appears after close and multiplied observations and comparisons, after full discussion, &c. *Das Seyn* is that which appears to the person or persons whom we judge to be wise, under these latter favourable circumstances.

Epiktetus, i. 28, 1. Τί ἐστιν αἴτιον

Import of the formula is explicitly brought out, that the full meaning of that formula can be discerned. If you deny it, the basis of all free discussion and scrutiny is withdrawn: philosophy, or what is properly called reasoned truth, disappears. In itself it says little.

state explicitly the counter-proposition.

Yet little as its positive import may seem to be, it clashes with various illusions, omissions, and exigencies, incident to the ordinary dogmatising process. It substitutes the concrete in place of the abstract—the complete in place of the elliptical. Instead of Truth and Falsehood, which present to us the Abstract and impersonal as if it stood alone—the Objective divested of its Subject—we are translated into the real world of beliefs and disbeliefs, individual believers and disbelievers: matters affirmed or denied by some Subject actual or supposable—by you, by me, by him or them, perhaps by all persons within our knowledge. All men agree in the subjective fact, or in the mental states called belief and disbelief: but all men do not agree in the matters believed and disbelieved, or in what they speak of as Truth and Falsehood. No infallible objective mark, no common measure, no canon of evidence, recognised by all, has yet been found. What is Truth to one man, is not truth, and is often Falsehood, to another: that which governs the mind as infallible authority in one part of the globe, is treated with indifference or contempt elsewhere.[1] Each man's belief,

Unpopular formula—Most believers insist upon making others, as well as for themselves. Appeal to Abstractions

τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαί τινι; Τὸ δή

[1] Respecting the grounds and conditions of belief among the Hindoos, Sir William Sleeman (Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, ch. xxvi. vol. i. pp. 227-228) observes as follows:—

"Every word of this poem (the Ramaen, Ramayana) the people assured me was written, if not by the hand of the Deity himself, at least by his inspiration, which was the same thing, and it must consequently be true. Ninety-nine out of a hundred among the Hindoos implicitly believe not only every word of this poem, but every word of every poem which has ever been written in Sanscrit. If you ask a man whether he really believes any very egregious absurdity quoted from these books, he replies with the greatest *naïveté*, 'Is it not written in the book; and how should it be there if not true?' The greater the improbability, the more monstrous and preposterous the fiction, the greater is the charm that it has over their minds; and the greater their learning in the Sanscrit, the more are they under the influence of this charm. Believing all to be written by the Deity, or by his inspirations, and the men and things of former days to have been very different from

though in part determined by the same causes as the belief of others, is in part also determined by causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks of Truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be Truth; unless he expressly superadds the indication of some other persons believing in it. This is the reality of the case, which the Protagorean formula brings into full view; but which most men dislike to recognise, and disguise from themselves as well as from others in the common elliptical forms of speech. In most instances a believer entirely forgets that his own mind is the product of a given time and place, and of a conjunction of circumstances always peculiar, amidst the aggregate of mankind—for the most part narrow. He cannot be content (like Protagoras) to be a measure for himself and for those whom his arguments may satisfy. This would be to proclaim what some German critics denounce as Subjectivism.[k] He insists upon constituting

the men and things of the present day, and the heroes of these fables to have been demigods, or people endowed with powers far superior to those of the ordinary men of their own day—the analogies of nature are never for a moment considered: nor do questions of probability, or possibility, according to those analogies, ever obtrude to dispel the charm with which they are so pleasingly bound. They go on through life reading and talking of these monstrous fictions, which shock the taste and understanding of other nations, without once questioning the truth of one single incident, or hearing it questioned. There was a time, and that not very distant, when it was the same in England and in every other European nation; and there are, I am afraid, some parts of Europe where it is so still. But the Hindoo faith, so far as religious questions are concerned, is not more capacious or absurd than that of the Greeks and Romans in the days of Sokrates and Cicero; the only difference is, that among the Hindoos, a greater number of the questions which interest mankind are brought under the head of religion."

[k] This is the objection taken by Schwegler, Prantl, and other German thinkers, against the Protagorean doctrine (Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, vol. i. p. 12 seq.; Schwegler, Gesch. der Philos. im Umriss. s. 11, b. p. 26, ed. 5th). I had transcribed from each of these works a passage of some length, but I cannot find room for them in this note.

These authors both say, that the Protagorean canon, properly understood, is right, but that Protagoras laid it down wrongly. They admit the principle of Subjectivity, as an essential aspect of the case, in regard to truth; but they say that Protagoras was wrong in appealing to individual, empirical, accidental, subjectivity of each man at every varying moment, whereas he ought to have appealed to an ideal or universal subjectivity. "What ought to be held true, right, good, &c.," (says Schwegler) "must be decided doubtless by *me*, but by *me* so far forth as a rational and thinking being. Now *my* thinking, *my* reason, is not something specially belonging to me, but something common to all rational beings, something universal; so far therefore as I proceed as a rational and thinking person, my subjectivity is an universal subjectivity. Every thinking person has the consciousness that what he regards as right, duty, good, evil, &c., presents itself not merely to him as such, but also to every rational person, and that, consequently, his judgment possesses

himself—or some authority worshipped by himself—or some abstraction interpreted by himself—a measure for all others besides, whether assentient or dissentient. That which *he* believes, all ought to believe.

This state of mind in reference to belief is usual with most men, not less at the present day than in the time of Plato and Protagoras. It constitutes the natural intolerance prevalent among mankind; which each man (speaking generally), in the case of his own beliefs, commends and exults in, as a virtue. It flows as a natural corollary from the sentiment of belief, though it may be corrected by reflection and social sympathy. Hence the doctrine of Protagoras—equal right of private judgment to each man for himself—becomes inevitably unwelcome.

the character of universality, universal validity: in one word, Objectivity."

Here it is explicitly asserted that wherever a number of individual men employ their reason, the specialities of each disappear, and they arrive at the same conclusions—Reason being a guide impersonal as well as infallible. And this same view is expressed by Prantl in other language, when he reforms the Protagorean doctrine by saying, "Das Denken ist der Mass der Dinge."

To me this assertion appears so distinctly at variance with notorious facts, that I am surprised when I find it advanced by learned historians of philosophy, who recount the very facts which contradict it. Can it really be necessary to repeat that the reason of one man differs most materially from that of another—and the reason of the same person from itself, at different times—in respect of the arguments accepted, the authorities obeyed, the conclusions embraced? The impersonal Reason is a mere fiction; the universal Reason is an abstraction, belonging alike to all particular reasoners, consentient or dissentient, sound or unsound, &c. Schwegler admits the Protagorean canon only under a reserve which nullifies its meaning. To say that the Universal Reason is the measure of truth is to assign no measure at all. The Universal Reason can only make itself known through an interpreter. The interpreters are dissentient; and which of them is to hold the privilege of infallibility? Neither Schwegler nor Prantl are forward to specify who the interpreter is, who is entitled to put dissentients to silence; both of them keep in the safe obscurity of an abstraction—"Das Denken"—The Universal Reason. Protagoras recognises in each dissentient an equal right to exercise his own reason, and to judge for himself.

In order to show how thoroughly incorrect the language of Schwegler and Prantl is, when they talk about the Universal Reason as unanimous and unerring, I transcribe from another eminent historian of philosophy a description of what philosophy has been from ancient times down to the present.

Degérando, Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie, vol. i. p. 49:—"Une multitude d'hypothèses, élevées en quelque sorte au hasard, et rapidement détruites: une diversité d'opinions, d'autant plus sensible que la philosophie a été plus développée: des sectes, des partis même, des disputes interminables, des spéculations stériles, des erreurs maintenues et transmises par une imitation aveugle: quelques découvertes obtenues avec lenteur, et mélangées d'idées fausses: des réformes annoncées à chaque siècle et jamais accomplies: une succession de doctrines qui se renversent les unes les autres sans pouvoir obtenir plus de solidité: la raison humaine ainsi promenée dans un triste cercle de vicissitudes, et ne s'élevant à quelques époques fortunées que pour retomber bientôt dans de nouveaux écarts, &c. . . . les mêmes questions, enfin, qui partagèrent il y a plus de vingt siècles les premiers génies de la Grèce, agitées encore aujourd'hui après tant de volumineux écrits consacrés à les discuter."

We are told that Demokritus, as well as Plato and Aristotle, wrote against Protagoras. The treatise of Demokritus is lost: but we possess what the two latter said against the Protagorean formula. In my judgment both failed in refuting it. Each of them professed to lay down objective, infallible, criteria of truth and falsehood: Demokritus on his side, and the other dogmatical philosophers, professed to do the same, each in his own way—and each in a different way.[m] Now the Protagorean formula neither allows nor disallows any one of these proposed objective criteria: but it enunciates the appeal to which all of them must be submitted—the subjective condition of satisfying the judgment of each hearer. Its protest is entered only when that condition is overleaped, and when the dogmatist enacts his canon of belief as imperative, peremptory, binding upon all (allgemeingültig) both assentient and dissentient. I am grateful to Aristotle for his efforts to lay down objective canons in the research of truth: but I claim the right of examining those canons for myself, and of judging whether that, which satisfied Aristotle, satisfies me also. The same right which I claim for myself, I am bound to allow to all others. The general expression of this compromise is, the Protagorean formula. No one demands more emphatically to be a measure for himself, even when all authority is opposed to him, than Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias.[n]

Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the formula—Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself [illegible] truth.

After thus criticising the formula—Homo Mensura—Plato

[m] Plutarch, adv. Kolot. p. 1108.

According to Demokritus all sensible perceptions were conventional, or varied according to circumstances, or according to the diversity of the percipient Subject; but there was an objective reality—minute, solid, invisible atoms, differing in figure, position, and movement, and vacuum along with them. Such reality was intelligible only by Reason. Νόμῳ γλυκὺ, [illegible] μὲν εἶναι καὶ αἰσθητὰ, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ

Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 135-139; Diogenes. Laert. ix. 72. See Mullach, Democriti Fragm. pp. 204-208.

The discourse of Protagoras Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, was read by Porphyry, who apparently cited from it a passage verbatim, which citation Eusebius unfortunately has not preserved (Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. x. 3, 17). One of the speakers in Porphyry's dialogue (describing a repast at the house of Longinus at Athens to celebrate Plato's birthday) accused Plato of having copied largely from the arguments of Protagoras—πρὸς τοὺς ἓν τὸ ὂν εἰσάγοντας. Allusion is probably made to the Platonic dialogues Parmenides and Sophistes.

[n] Plato, Gorgias, p. 472.

proceeds to canvass the other doctrine, which he ascribes to Protagoras along with others, and which he puts into the mouth of Theætêtus—"That knowledge is sensible perception." He connects that doctrine with the above-mentioned formula, by illustrations which exhibit great divergence between one percipient Subject and another. He gives us, as examples of sensible perception, the case of the wind, cold to one man, not cold to another: that of the wine, sweet to a man in health, bitter if he be sickly.[o] Perhaps Protagoras may have dwelt upon cases like these, as best calculated to illustrate the relativity of all affirmations: for though the judgments are in reality both equally relative, whether two judges pronounce alike, or whether they pronounce differently, under the same conditions—yet where they judge differently, each stands forth in his own individuality, and the relativity of the judgment is less likely to be disputed.

Plato's examples.

Percipients.

But though some facts of sense are thus equivocal, generating dissension rather than unanimity among different individuals—such is by no means true of the facts of sense taken generally.[p] On the contrary, it is only these facts—the world of reality, experience, and particulars—which afford a groundwork and assurance of unanimity in human belief, under all varieties of teaching or locality. Counting, measuring, weighing, are facts of sense simple and fundamental, and comparisons of those facts: capable of being so exhibited that no two persons shall either see them differently or mistrust them. Of two persons exposed to the same wind, one may feel cold, and the other not: but both of them will see

Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense—weighing, measuring, &c.

[o] Plato, Theætêt. c. 24, p. 152 A, c. 43, p. 159 C.

[p] Aristotle (Metaphysic. Γ. p. 1010, a, 25 seq.) in arguing against Herakleitus and his followers, who dwelt upon τὰ αἰσθητὰ as ever fluctuating and undefinable, urges against them that this is not true of *all* αἰσθητὰ, but only of those in the sublunary region of the Kosmos. But this region is (he says) only an imperceptibly small part of the entire Kosmos; the objects in the vast superlunary or celestial region of the Kosmos were far more numerous, and were also eternal and unchangeable, in constant and uniform circular rotation. Accordingly, if you predicate one or other about αἰσθητὰ generally, you ought to predicate constancy and unchangeability, not flux and variation, since the former predicates are true of much the larger proportion of αἰσθητὰ. See the Scholia on the above passage of Aristotle's Metaphysica, and also upon Book A, 991, a. 9.

the barometer or thermometer alike.[q] Πάντα μέτρῳ, καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ σταθμῷ—would be the perfection of science, if it could be obtained. Plato himself recognises, in more than one place, the irresistible efficacy of weight and measure in producing unanimity; and in forestalling those disputes which are sure to arise where weight and measure cannot be applied.[r] It is therefore among select facts of sense, carefully observed and properly compared, that the groundwork of unanimity is to be sought, so far as any rational and universal groundwork for it is attainable. In other words, it is here that we must seek for the basis of knowledge or cognition.

A loose adumbration of this doctrine is here given by Plato as the doctrine of Protagoras, in the words—Knowledge is sensible perception. To sift this doctrine is announced as his main purpose;[s] and we shall see how he performs the task. *Sokr.*—Shall we admit, man and answers,

Arguments of Sokrates in this

[q] Mr. Campbell, in his preface to the Theætêtus (p. lxxxiii.), while comparing the points in the dialogue with modern metaphysical views, observes: "Modern Experimental Science is equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has found means of measuring the motions by which they are caused, through *the effect of the same motions upon other things besides our senses.* When the same wind is blowing one of us feels warm and another cold (Theætêt. p. 152), but the mercury of the thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that the sensation of heat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law."

It might seem from Mr. Campbell's language (I do not imagine that he means it so) as if Modern Experimental Science had arrived at something more trustworthy than "individual impressions of sense." But the expansion or contraction of the mercury are just as much facts of sense as the feeling of heat or cold; only they are facts of sense determinate and uniform to all, whereas the feeling of heat or cold is indeterminate and liable to differ with different persons. The certainty about "universal law governing the sensations of heat and cold," was not at all felt in the days of Plato.

[r] Thus in the Philêbus (pp. 55-56) Plato declares that numbering, measuring, and weighing are the characteristic marks of all the various processes which deserve the name of Arts; and that among the different Arts those of the carpenter, builder, &c., are superior to those of the physician, pilot, husbandman, military commander, musical composer, &c., because the two first-named employ more measurement and a greater number of measuring instruments, the rule, line, plummet, compass, &c.

"When we talk about iron or silver" (says Sokrates in the Platonic Phædrus, p. 263 A-B) "we are all of one mind, but when we talk about the Just and the Good we are all at variance with each other, and each man is at variance with himself." Compare an analogous passage, Alkibiad. i. p. 109.

Here Plato himself recognises the verifications of sense as the main guarantee for accuracy; and the compared facts of sense, when select and simplified, as ensuring the nearest approach to unanimity among believers.

[s] Plato, Theætêt. p. 163 A. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα

not merely from different sensual impressibility, but from

that when we perceive things by sight or hearing, we at the same time *know* them all? When foreigners talk to us in a strange language, are we to say that we do not hear what they say, or that we both hear and know it? When unlettered men look at an inscription, shall we contend that they do not see the writing, or that they both see and know it? *Theætêt.*—We shall say, under these supposed circumstances, that what we see and hear, we also know. We hear and we know the pitch and intonation of the foreigner's voice. The unlettered man sees, and also knows, the colour, size, forms, of the letters. But that which the schoolmaster and the interpreter could tell us respecting their meaning, *that* we neither see, nor hear, nor know. *Sokr.*—Excellent, Theætêtus. I have nothing to say against your answer.[t]

This is an important question and answer, which Plato unfortunately does not follow up. It brings to view, though without fully unfolding, the distinction between what is really perceived by sense, and what is inferred from such perception: either through resemblance or through conjunctions of past experience treasured up in memory—or both together. Without having regard to such distinction, no one can discuss satisfactorily the question under debate.[u] Plato here aban-

[t] Plato, Theætêt, p. 163 C.

[u] I borrow here a striking passage from Dugald Stewart, which illustrates both the passage in Plato's text, and the general question as to the relativity of Cognition. Here, the fact of relative Cognition is brought out most conspicuously on its intellectual side, not on its perceptive side. The fact of sense is the same to all, and therefore, though really relative, has more the look of an absolute: but the mental associations with that fact are different with different persons, and therefore are more obviously and palpably relative. —Dugald Stewart (First Preliminary Dissertation to Encyclopæd. Britannica, p. 66, 8th edit.)

"To this reference of the sensation of colour to the external object, I can think of nothing so analogous as the feelings we experience in surveying a library of books. We speak of the volumes piled up on its shelves as treasures or magazines of the knowledge of past ages. Even in looking at a page of print or manuscript, we are apt to say that the ideas we acquire are received by the sense of sight; and we are scarcely conscious of a metaphor when we apply this language. We seldom recollect that nothing is experienced by the eye but a multitude of black strokes drawn upon white paper; and that it is our own acquired habits, which communicate to these strokes the whole of that significancy whereby they are distinguished from the unmeaning scrawling of an infant. The knowledge which we conceive to be preserved in books, like the fragrance of a rose or the gilding of the clouds, depends for its existence on the relation between the Object and the Percipient Mind: and the only difference between the two cases is, that, in the one, this relation is the local and temporary effect of conventional habits:

dons, moreover, the subjective variety of impression which he had before noticed as the characteristic of sense:—(the wind which blows cold, and the wine which tastes sweet, to one man, but not to another). Here it is assumed that all men hear the sounds, and see the written letters alike: the divergence between one man and another arises from the different prior condition of percipient minds, differing from each other in associative and reminiscent power.

Sokrates turns to another argument. *If knowledge be the* same thing as sensible perception, *then it follows,* that so soon as a man ceases to see and hear, he also ceases to know. The memory of what he has seen or heard, upon that supposition, is not knowledge. But Theætêtus admits that a man who remembers what he has seen or heard does know it. Accordingly, the answer that knowledge is sensible perception, cannot be maintained.[x]

Argument—*That Sensible Perception* include memory.

Here Sokrates makes out a good case against the answer in its present wording. But we may fairly doubt whether those who affirmed the matter of knowledge to consist in the facts of sense, ever meant to exclude memory. They meant probably the facts of sense both as perceived and as remembered; though the wording cited by Plato does not strictly include so much. Besides, we must recollect, that Plato includes in the meaning of the word Knowledge or Cognition an idea of perfect infallibility: distinguishing it generically from the highest form of opinion. But memory is a fallible process: sometimes quite trustworthy—under other circumstances, not so. Accordingly, memory, in a general sense, cannot be put on a level with present perception, nor said to generate what Plato calls knowledge.

The next argument of Plato is as follows. You can see,

in the other, it is the universal and unchangeable work of nature."—"What has now been remarked with respect to written characters may be extended very nearly to oral language. When we listen to the discourse of a public speaker, eloquence and persuasion seem to issue from his lips; and we are little aware that we ourselves infuse the soul into every word that he utters. The case is the same when we enjoy the conversation of a friend. We ascribe the charm entirely to his voice and accents: but without our cooperation, its potency would vanish. How very small the comparative proportion is, which in such cases the words spoken contribute to the intellectual and moral effect, I have elsewhere endeavoured to show."

[x] Plato, Theætêt, pp. 163, 164.

and not see, the same thing at the same time: for you may close one of your eyes, and look only with the other. But it is impossible to know a thing, and not to know it, at the same time. Therefore *to know* is not the same as *i*

Argument

same time.

This argument is proclaimed by Plato as a terrible puzzle, leaving no escape.[z] Perhaps he meant to speak ironically. In reality, this puzzle is nothing but a false inference deduced from a false premiss. The inference is false, because if we grant the premiss, that it is possible both to *see* a thing, and *not to see* it, at the same time—there is no reason why it should not also be possible *to know* a thing, and *not to know* it, at the same time. Moreover, the premiss is also false in the ordinary sense which the words bear: and not merely false, but logically impossible, as a sin against the maxim of contradiction. Plato procures it from a true premiss, by omitting an essential qualification. I see an object with my open eye: I do not see it with my closed eye. From this double proposition, alike intelligible and true, Plato thinks himself authorised to discard the qualification, and to tell me that I see a thing and do not see it—passing *à dicto secundum quid*

[y] Plato, Theætêt. p. 165 B.

[z] Plato, Theætêt. p. 165 B.

ματι, &c.

Mr. Campbell observes upon this passage:—"Perhaps there is here a trace of the spirit which was afterwards developed in the sophisms of Eubulidês." Stallbaum, while acknowledging the many subtleties of Sokrates in this dialogue, complains that other commentators make the ridiculous mistake ("errore perquam ridiculo") of accepting all the reasoning of Sokrates as seriously meant, whereas much of it (he says) is mere mockery and sarcasm, intended to retort upon the Sophists their own argumentative tricks and quibbles.—'Itaquè sæpe per petulantiam quandam argutiis indulget (Socrates), quibus isti haudquaquam abstinebant; sæpè ex adversariorum mente disputat, sed ita tamen disputat, ut eos suis ipsorum capiat laqueis: sæpè denique in disputando iisdem artificiis utitur, quibus illi uti consueverant, sicuti etiam in Menone, Cratylo, Euthydemo, fieri meminimus." (Stallb. Prolog. ad Theæt. pp. 12-13, 22-29).

Stallbaum pushes this general principle so far as to contend that the simile of the waxen tablet (p. 191 C), and that of the pigeon-house (p. 200 C), are doctrines of opponents, which Sokrates pretends to adopt with a view to hold them up to ridicule.

I do not concur in this opinion of Stallbaum, which he reproduces in commenting on many other dialogues, and especially on the Kratylus, for the purpose of exonerating Plato from the reproach of bad reasoning and bad etymology, at the cost of opponents "inauditi et indefensi." I see no ground for believing that Plato meant to bring forward these arguments as paralogisms obviously and ridiculously silly. He produced them, in my judgment, as suitable items in a dialogue of search; plausible to a certain extent, admitting both of being supported and opposed, and necessary to be presented to those who wish to know a question in all its bearings.

ad dictum simpliciter. This is the same liberty which he took with the Protagorean doctrine. Protagoras having said—"Everything which any man believes is true *to that man*"—Plato reasons against him as if he had said—"Everything which any man believes is *true*."

Again, argues Plato,[a] you cannot say—I *know* sharply, dimly, near, far, &c.—but you may properly say, I *see* sharply, dimly, near, far, &c.: another reason to show that knowledge and sensible perception are not the same. After a digression of some length directed against the disciples of Herakleitus—(partly to expose their fundamental doctrine that every thing was in flux and movement, partly to satirise their irrational procedure in evading argumentative debate, and in giving nothing but a tissue of mystical riddles one after another,)[b] Sokrates returns back

[a] Plato, Theætêt. p. 165 D. The reasonings here given by Plato from the mouth of Sokrates, are compared by Steinhart to the Trug-schlüsse, which in the Euthydêmus he ascribes to that Sophist and Dionysodorus. But Steinhart says that Plato is here reasoning in the style of Protagoras: an assertion thoroughly gratuitous, for which there is no evidence at all (Steinhart, Einleitung zum Theætêt. p. 53).

[b] Plato, Theætêt. pp. 179-183. The description which we read here (put into the mouth of the geometer Theodôrus) of the persons in Ephesus and other parts of Ionia, who speculated in the vein of Herakleitus—is full of vivid fancy and smartness, but is for that reason the less to be trusted as accurate.

The characteristic features ascribed to these Herakleiteans are quite unlike to the features of Protagoras, so far as we know them; though Protagoras, nevertheless, throughout this dialogue, is spoken of as if he were an Herakleitan. These men are here depicted as half mad—incapable of continuous attention — hating all systematic speech and debate—answering, when addressed, only in brief, symbolical, enigmatical phrases, of which they had a quiver-full, but which they never condescended to explain (ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀναπτῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, see Lassalle, vol. i. pp. 32-39—springing up by spontaneous inspiration, despising instruction, p. 180 A), and each looking down upon the others as ignorant. If we compare the picture thus given by Plato of the Herakleiteans, with the picture which he gives of Protagoras in the dialogue so called, we shall see that the two are as unlike as possible.

Lassalle, in his elaborate work on the philosophy of Herakleitus, attempts to establish the philosophical affinity between Herakleitus and Protagoras; but in my judgment unsuccessfully. According to Lassalle's own representation of the doctrine of Herakleitus, it is altogether opposed to the most eminent Protagorean doctrine, Ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτῷ μέτρον—and equally opposed to that which Plato seems to imply as Protagorean — Αἴσθησις = Ἐπιστήμη. The elucidation given by Lassalle of Herakleitus, through the analogy of Hegel, is certainly curious and instructive. The Absolute Process of Herakleitus is at variance with Protagoras, not less than the Absolute Object or Substratum of the Eleates, or the Absolute Ideas of Plato. Lassalle admits that Herakleitus is the entire antithesis to Protagoras, yet still contends that he is the prior stage of transition towards Protagoras (vol. i. p. 64).

to the same debate, and produces more serious arguments, as follows:—

Sokrates

Sokr.—If you are asked, With what does a man perceive white and black? you will answer, with his eyes: shrill or grave sounds? with his ears. Does it not seem to you more correct to say, that we see *through* our eyes rather than *with* our eyes:—that we hear *through* our ears, not *with* our ears. *Theætêt.*—I think it is more correct. *Sokr.*—It would be strange if there were in each man many separate reservoirs, each for a distinct class of perceptions.[c] All perceptions must surely converge towards one common form or centre, call it soul or by any other name, which perceives *through* them, as organs or instruments, all perceptible objects.—

Self, without the aid of any bodily organ.

We thus perceive objects of sense, according to Plato's language, *with* the central form or soul, and *through* various organs of the body. The various Percepta or Percipienda of tact, vision, hearing—sweet, hot, hard, light—have each its special bodily organ. But no one of these can be perceived through the organ affected to any other. Whatever therefore we conceive or judge respecting any two of them, is not performed through the organ special to either. If we conceive any thing common both to sound and colour, we cannot conceive it either through the auditory or through the visual organ.[d]

Now there are certain judgments (Sokrates argues) which we make common to both, and not exclusively belonging to either. First, we judge that they are two: that each is one, different from the other, and the same with itself: that each *is* something, or has existence, and that one *is not* the other. Here are predicates—existence, non-existence, likeness, unlikenesss, unity, plurality, sameness, difference, &c., which we affirm, or deny, not respecting either of these sensations exclusively, but respecting all of them. Through what bodily

c Plato, Theætêt. p. 184 D. δεινὸν εἴτε ψυχῆ που, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάτται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινα ἰδέαν, ταῦτα ἁ τούτων οἷον

Plato, Theætêt. pp. 184-185.

organ do we derive these judgments respecting what is common to all? There is no special organ: the mind perceives, through itself, these common properties.[e]

Some matters therefore there are, which the soul or mind apprehends through itself—others, which it perceives through the bodily organs. To the latter class belong the sensible qualities, hardness, softness, heat, sweetness, &c., which it perceives through the bodily organs; and which animals, as well as men, are by nature competent to perceive immediately at birth. To the former class belong existence (substance, essence), sameness, difference, likeness, unlikeness, honourable, base, good, evil, &c., which the mind apprehends through itself alone. But the mind is not competent to apprehend this latter class, as it perceives the former, immediately at birth. Nor does such competence belong to all men and animals; but only to a select fraction of men, who acquire it with difficulty and after a long time through laborious education. The mind arrives at these purely mental apprehensions, only by going over, and comparing with each other, the simple impressions of sense; by looking at their relations with each other; and by computing the future from the present and past.[f] Such comparisons and computations are a difficult and gradual attainment; accomplished only by a few, and out of the reach of most men. But without them, no one can apprehend real existence (essence, or substance), or arrive at truth: and without truth, there can be no knowledge.

Indication &c.

The result therefore is (concludes Sokrates), *That knowledge is not sensible perception:* that it is not to be found in the perceptions of sense themselves, which do not

Sokrates maintains that know-

[e] Plato, Theætêt. p. 185 D. δοκεῖ ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τούτοις οὐδὲν ἴδιον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις — ἀλλ' δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

[f] Plato, Theætêt. p. 186 B. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὃ τι ἔστον καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω (of hardness and softness) καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς τιότητος, αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανι καὶ ξυμβάλλουσα πρὸς ληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν.— Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις δσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τ ἀναλογίσματα, πρός τε ὠφελείαν, μόγις κι διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται, οἷς καὶ παραγίγνηται.

Knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons and computations of the mind respecting them.

apprehend real essence, and therefore not truth—but in the comparisons and computations respecting them, and in the relations between them, made and apprehended by the mind itself.[g] Plato declares good and evil, honourable and base, &c., to be among matters most especially relative, perceived by the mind computing past and present in reference to future.[h]

Examination of this view—Distinction from the views of modern philosophers.

Such is the doctrine which Plato here lays down, respecting the difference between sensible perception, and knowledge or cognition. From his time to the present day, the same topic has continued to be discussed, with different opinions on the part of philosophers. Plato's views are interesting, as far as his language enables us to make them out. He does not agree with those who treat sensation or sensible perception (in his language, the two are not distinguished) as a bodily phenomenon, and intelligence as a mental phenomenon. He regards both as belonging to the mind or soul. He considers that the mind is sentient as well as intelligent: and more-

[g] Plato, Theætêt. p. 186 C. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. The term συλλογισμὸς is here interesting, before it had received that technical sense which it has borne from Aristotle downwards. Mr. Campbell explains it properly as "nearly equivalent to abstraction and generalisation" (Preface to Theætêtus, p. lxxiv. also note, p. 144).

[h] Plato, Theætêt. p. 186 C. καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζόμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.

Base and honourable, evil and good, are here pointed out by Sokrates as most evidently and emphatically *relative*. In the train of reasoning here terminated, Plato had been combating the doctrine Αἴσθησις = Ἐπιστήμη. In his sense of the word αἴσθησις he has refuted the doctrine. But what about the other doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the same programme — *Homo Mensura* — the Protagorean formula? That formula, so far from being refuted, is actually sustained and established by this train of reasoning. Plato has declared οὐσία, ἀληθεία, ἐναντιότης, ἀγαθὸν, κακόν, &c., to be a distinct class of Objects not perceived by Sense. But he also tells us that they are apprehended by the Mind through its own working, and that they are apprehended always in relation to each other. We thus see that they are just as much relative to the concipient mind, as the Objects of sense are to the percipient and sentient mind. The Subject is the correlative limit or measure (to use Protagorean phrases) of one as well as of the other. This confirms what I observed above, that the two doctrines, 1. Homo Mensura, 2. Αἴσθησις = Ἐπιστήμη, — are completely distinct and independent, though Plato has chosen to implicate or identify them.

over, that the sentient mind is the essential basis and preliminary—universal among men and animals, as well as coæval with birth—furnishing all the matter, upon which the intelligent mind has to work. He says nothing, in this dialogue, about the three distinct souls or minds, (rational, courageous, and appetitive) in one and the same body, which form so capital a feature in his Timæus and Republic: nothing about eternal, self-existent, substantial Ideas, or about the pre-existence of the soul and its reminiscence as the process of acquiring knowledge. Nor does he countenance the doctrine of innate ideas, instinctive beliefs, immediate mental intuitions, internal senses, &c., which have been recognised by many philosophers. Plato supposes the intelligent mind to work altogether upon the facts of sense; to review and compare them with one another; and to compute facts present or past, with a view to the future. All this is quite different from the mental intuitions and instincts, assumed by various modern philosophers as common to all mankind. The operations, which Plato ascribes to the intelligent mind, are said to be out of the reach of the common man, and not to be attainable except by a few, with difficulty and labour. The distinctive feature of the sentient mind, according to him, is, that it operates through a special bodily organ of sense: whereas the intelligent mind has no such special bodily organ.

But this distinction, in the first place, is not consistent with Timæus—wherein Plato assigns to each of his three human souls a separate and special region of the bodily organism, as its physical basis. Nor, in the second place, is it consistent with that larger range of observed facts which the farther development of physiology has brought to view. To Plato and Aristotle the nerves and the nervous system were wholly unknown: but it is now ascertained that the optic, auditory, and other nerves of sense, are only branches of a complicated system of sensory and motory nerves, attached to the brain and spinal cord as a centre: each nerve of sense having its own special mode of excitability or manifestation. Now the physical agency

Different views given by Plato in other dialogues.

sensation is carried on, is, not the organ of sense is, but the cerebral centre acting along with that organ: whereas in the intellectual and memorial processes, the agency of the cerebral centre and other internal parts of the nervous system are sufficient, without any excitement beginning at the peripheral extremity of the special organ of sense, or even though that organ be disabled. We know the intelligent mind only in an embodied condition: that is, as working along with and through its own physical agency. When Plato, therefore, says that the mind thinks, computes, compares, &c., by itself—this is true only as signifying that it does so without the initiatory stimulus of a special organ of sense; not as signifying that it does so without the central nervous force or currents—an agency essential alike to thought, to sensation, to emotion, and to appetite.

Plato's discrimination to Cognition.

Putting ourselves back to the Platonic period, we must recognise that the discussion of the theory Ἐπιστήμη = Αἴσθησις, as it is conducted by Plato, exhibits a remarkable advance in psychological analysis. In analysing the mental phenomena, Plato displayed much more subtlety and acuteness than his predecessors—as far at least as we have the means of appreciating the latter. It is convenient to distinguish intellect from sensation (or sensible perception) and emotion, though both of them are essential and co-ordinate parts of our mental system, and are so recognised by Plato. It is also true that the discrimination of our sensations from each other, comparisons of likeness or unlikeness between them, observation of co-existence or sequence, and apprehension of other relations between them, &c., are more properly classified as belonging to intellect than to sense. But the language of psychology is, and always has been, so indeterminate, that it is difficult to say how much any writer means to include under the terms Sense[1]

[1] The discussion in pp. 184-185-186 of the Theætêtus is interesting as the earliest attempt remaining to classify psychological phenomena. What Demokritus and others proposed with the same view—the analogy or discrepancy between τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and τὸ νοεῖν—we gather only from the brief notices of Aristotle and others. Plato considers himself to

sensations detached and isolated, but—various relations of antecedence and consequence, likeness, difference, &c., be-

(observes Sir W. H.) "was equivalent to Reid's *Sensation* plus *Perception*. This is manifest even by the passages adduced in the text" (note to p. 289). But Reid in his remarks omits to notice this difference in the meaning of the same word. The case is similar with Plato when he refutes those who held the doctrine Ἐπιστήμη = Αἴσθησις. The last-mentioned word, in his construction, includes only a part of the meaning which they attributed to it; but he takes no notice of this verbal difference. Sir William Hamilton remarks, respecting M. Royer Collard's doctrine, which narrows prodigiously the province of Sense,—"*Sense* he so limits that, if rigorously carried out, no sensible perception, as no consciousness, could be brought to bear." This is exactly true about Plato's doctrine narrowing αἴσθησις. See Hamilton's edit. of Reid, Appendix, p. 844.

Aristotle understands αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ or ζωὴ—as occupying a larger sphere than that which Plato assigns to them in the Theætêtus. Aristotle recognises the five separate αἰσθήσεις, each correlating with and perceiving its ἴδιον αἰσθητόν: he also recognises ἡ κοινὴ αἴσθησις—common sensation or perception—correlating with (or perceiving) τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητὰ, which are *motion, rest, magnitude, figure, number*. The κοινὴ αἴσθησις is not a distinct or sixth sense, apart from the five, but a general power inhering in all of them. He farther recognises αἴσθησις as discriminating, judging, comparing, knowing: this characteristic, τὸ κριτικὸν and γνωστικὸν, is common to αἴσθησις, φαντασία, νόησις, and distinguishes them all from appetite—τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν, κινητικόν, &c. See the first and second chapters of the third Book of the Treatise De Animâ, and the Commentary of Simplikius upon that Treatise, especially p. 56, b. Aristotle tells us that all animals ἔχει δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν. Analyt. Poster. ii. p. 99, b. 35. And Sir William Hamilton adopts a similar view, when he remarks, that Judgment is implied in every act of Consciousness.

Occasionally indeed Aristotle partitions the soul between νοῦς and ὄρεξις — Intelligence and Appetite — recognising Sense as belonging to the head of Intelligence—see De Motu Animalium, 6, p. 700, b. 20. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν [illegible] νῷ χώραν ἔχουσι· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα. Compare also the Topica, ii. 4, p. 111, a. 18.

It will thus be seen that while Plato severs pointedly αἴσθησις from anything like discrimination, comparison, judgment, even in the most rudimentary form—Aristotle refuses to adopt this extreme abstraction as his basis for classifying the mental phenomena. He recognises a certain measure of discrimination, comparison, and judgment, as implicated in sensible perceptions. Moreover, that which he calls κοινὴ αἴσθησις is unknown to Plato, who isolates each sense, and indeed each act of each sense, as much as possible. Aristotle is opposed, as Plato is, to the doctrine Ἐπιστήμη = Αἴσθησις, but he employs a different manner of reasoning against it. See, *inter alia*, Analytica Posteriora, i. 31, p. 87, b. 28. He confines ἐπιστήμη to one branch of the νοητική.

The Peripatetic Straton, the disciple of Theophrastus, denied that there was any distinct line of demarcation between τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and τὸ νοεῖν: maintaining that the former was impossible without a certain measure of the latter. His observation is very worthy of note. Plutarch, De Solertiâ Animalium, iii. 6, p. 961 A. Καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἔστιν, ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τοπαράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει, καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἶτ' αὖτις ἐπαν- [illegible] καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ μεταστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ᾗ καὶ λέλεκται.—

Νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά. ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.

Straton here notices that remarkable

tween two or more sensations or facts of sense. We rise thus to a state of mind more complicated than simple sensation: including, (along with sensation,) association, memory, discrimination, comparison of sensations, abstraction and generalisation. This is what Plato calls opinion[k] or belief; a mental process, which, though presupposing sensations and based upon them, he affirms to be carried on by the mind through itself, not through any special bodily organ. In this respect it agrees with what he calls knowledge or cognition. Opinion or belief is the lowest form, possessed in different grades by all men, of this exclusively mental process: knowledge or cognition is the highest form of the same, attained only by a select few. Both opinion, and cognition, consist in comparisons and computations made by the mind about the facts of sense. But cognition (in Plato's view) has special marks:—

1. That it is infallible, while opinion is fallible. You have it[l] or you have it not—but there is no mistake possible.

fact (unnoticed by Plato and even by Aristotle, so far as I know) in the process of association, that impressions of sense are sometimes unheeded when they occur, but force themselves upon the attention afterwards, and are recalled by the mind in the order in which they occurred at first.

[k] Plato, Theætêt. p. 187 A. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν (ἐπιστήμην) ἐν αἰσθήσει τοπαράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὅ, τι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

Theæt. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, δοξάζειν.

Sokrat. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἴει.

Plato is quite right in distinguishing between αἴσθησις and δόξα, looking at the point as a question of psychological classification. It appears to me, however, most probable that those who maintained the theory Ἐπιστήμη = Αἴσθησις, made no such distinction, but included that which he calls δόξα in αἴσθησις. Unfortunately we do not possess their own exposition; but it cannot have included much of psychological analysis.

[l] Schleiermacher represents Plato as discriminating Knowledge (the region of infallibility, you either possess it or not) from Opinion (the region of fallibility, true or false, as the case may be) by a broad and impassable line—

"Auch hieraus erwächst eine sehr entscheidende, nur ebenfalls nicht ausdrücklich gezogene, Folgerung, dass die reine Erkenntniss gar nicht auf demselben Gebiet liegen könne mit dem Irrthum—und es in Beziehung auf sie kein Wahr und Falsch gebe, sondern nur ein Haben oder Nicht Haben." (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theæt. p. 176.)

Steinhart (in his Einleit. zum Theæt. p. 94) contests this opinion of Schleiermacher (though he seems to give the same opinion himself, p. 92). He thinks that Plato does not recognise so very marked a separation between Knowledge and Opinion: that he considers Knowledge as the last term of a series of mental processes, developed gradually according to constant laws, and ascending from Sensible Perception through Opinion to Knowledge: that the purpose of the Theætêtus is to illustrate this theory.

Ueberweg, on the contrary, defends

2. That it apprehends what Plato calls the real essence of things, and real truth, which, on the contrary, Opinion does not apprehend.

3. That the person who possesses it can maintain his own consistency under cross-examination, and can test the consistency of others by cross-examining them (λόγον δοῦναι καὶ

This at least is the meaning which Plato assigns to the two words corresponding to Cognition and to Opinion, in the present dialogue, and often elsewhere. But he also frequently employs the word *Cognition* in a lower and more general signification, not restricted, as it is here, to the highest philosophical reach, with infallibility—but comprehending much of what is here treated only as *opinion*. Thus, for example, he often alludes to the various professional men as possessing *Cognition*, each in his respective department: the general, the physician, the gymnast, the steersman, the husbandman, &c.[m] But he certainly does not mean, that each of them has attained what he calls real essence and philosophical truths—or that any of them are infallible.

Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or

One farther remark must be made on Plato's doctrine. His remark—That Cognition consists not in the affections of sense, but in computation or reasoning respecting those affections (*i. e.* abstraction, generalisation, &c.)

the opinion of Schleiermacher and maintains that Steinhart is mistaken (Ueber die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften, p. 279).

Passages may be produced from Plato's writings to support both these views: that of Schleiermacher, as well as that of Steinhart. In Timæus, p. 51 E, the like infallibility is postulated for Νοῦς (which there represents Ἐπιστήμη) as contrasted with δόξα. But I think that Steinhart ascribes to the Theætêtus more than can fairly be discovered in it. That dialogue is purely negative. It declares that ἐπιστήμη is *not* αἴσθησις. It then attempts to go a step farther towards the affirmative, by declaring also that ἐπιστήμη is a mental process of computation, respecting the impressions of αἴσθησις—that it is τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι, which is equivalent to τὸ δοξάζειν—compare Phædrus, 249 B. But this affirmative attempt breaks down: for Sokrates cannot explain what τὸ δοξάζειν is, nor how τὸ δοξάζειν ψευδῆ is possible; in fact he says (p. 200 B) that this cannot be explained until we know what ἐπιστήμη is. The entire result of the dialogue is negative, as the closing words proclaim emphatically. On this point many of the commentators agree—Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, Ueberweg, Zeller, &c.

Whether it be true, as Schleiermacher, with several others, thinks (Einl. pp. 184-185), that Plato intends to attack Aristippus in the first part of the dialogue, and Antisthenes in the latter part, we have no means of determining.

[m] Compare Plato, Sophistes, pp. 232 E, 233 A.

—is both true and important. But he has not added, nor would he have admitted, that if we are to decide whether our computation is true and right, or false and erroneous—our surest way is to recur to the simple facts of sense. Theory must be verified by observation; wherever that cannot be done, the best guarantee is wanting. The facts themselves are not cognition: yet they are the test by which all computations, pretending to be cognitions, must be tried.[n]

from facts of sense, as either necessary or possible.

We have thus, in enquiring—What is Knowledge or Cognition? advanced so far as to discover—That it does not consist in sensible perception, but in some variety of that purely mental process which is called opining, believing, judging, conceiving, &c. And here Theætêtus, being called upon for a second definition, answers — *That Knowledge consists in right or true opinion.* All opinion is not knowledge, because opinion is often false.[o]

Second definition.

Right or true opinion.

Sokr.—But you are here assuming that there *are* false opinions? How is this possible? How can any man judge or opine falsely? What mental condition is it which bears that name? I confess that I cannot tell: though I have often thought of the matter myself, and debated it with others.[p] Every thing comes under the head either of what a man knows, or of what he does not know. If he conceives, it must be either the known, or the unknown. He cannot mistake either one known thing for another known thing: or a known thing for an unknown: or an unknown for a known: or one unknown for another unknown. But to form a false opinion, he must err in one or other of

Objection by Sokrates—This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens; or confound together two distinct realities?

[n] See the remarks on the necessity of Verification, as a guarantee for the Deductive Process, in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book iii. ch. xi. s. 3. Newton put aside his own computation or theory respecting gravity as the force which kept the moon in its orbit, because the facts reported by observers respecting the lunar motions were for some time not in harmony with it. Plato certainly would not have surrendered any *συλλογισμὸς* under the same respect to observed facts. Aristotle might probably have done so; but this is uncertain.

[o] Plato, Theæt. p. 187 B. It is scarcely possible to translate *δοξάζειν* always by the same English word.

[p] Plato, Theæt. p. 187 C.

these four ways. It is therefore impossible that he can form a false opinion.[q]

If indeed a man ascribed to any subject a predicate which was non-existent, this would be evidently a false opinion. But how can any one conceive the non-existent? He who conceives must conceive *something:* just as he who sees or touches, must see or touch *something.* He cannot see or touch the non-existent: for that would be to see or touch nothing: in other words, not to see or touch at all. In the same manner, to conceive the non-existent, or *nothing*, is impossible.[r] *Theæt.*—Perhaps he conceives two realities, but confounds them together, mistaking the one for the other. *Sokr.*—Impossible. If he conceives two distinct realities, he cannot suppose the one to be the other. Suppose him to conceive just and unjust, a horse and an ox—he can never believe just to be unjust, or the ox to be the horse.[s] If again, he conceives one of the two alone and singly, neither could he on that hypothesis suppose it to be the other: for that would imply that he conceived the other also.

Let us look again in another direction (continues Sokrates). We have been hasty in our concessions. Is it really impossible for a man to conceive, that a thing, which he knows, is another thing which he does not know? Let us see. Grant me the hypothesis (for the sake of illustration), that each man has in his mind a waxen tablet—the wax of one tablet being larger, firmer, cleaner, and better in every way, than that of another: the gift of Mnemosynê, for inscribing and registering our sensible perceptions and thoughts. Every man remembers and knows these, so long as the impressions of them remain upon his tablet: as soon as they are blotted out, he has forgotten them and no longer knows them.[t] Now false opinion may occur thus. A man having inscribed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects A and B, which he has seen before, may come

Waxen memories engraved.

False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions.

[q] Plato, Theæt. p. 188.
[r] Plato, Theæt. pp. 188-189.
[s] Plato, Theæt. p. 190.
[t] Plato, Theæt. p. 191.

to see one of these objects again; but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong past impression, or with that past impression to which it does not belong. Thus on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it with the past impression B, instead of A: or *vice versâ*.[u] False opinion will thus lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensations with sensations—nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with thoughts—but in that of present sensations with past impressions or thoughts.[x]

Having laid this down, however, Sokrates immediately proceeds to refute it. In point of fact, false conceptions are found to prevail, not only in the wrong identification of present sensations with past impressions or thoughts, but also in the wrong identification of one past impression or thought with another. Thus a man, who has clearly engraved on his memorial tablet the conceptions of five, seven, eleven, twelve, —may nevertheless, when asked what is the sum of seven and five, commit error and answer eleven: thus mistaking eleven for twelve.

kno' he d know.

We are thus placed in this dilemma—Either false opinion is an impossibility:—Or else, it is possible that what a man knows, he may not know. Which of the two do you choose?[y]

To this question no answer is given. But Sokrates,—after remarking on the confused and unphilosophical manner in which the debate has been conducted, both he and Theætêtus having perpetually employed the words *know*, *knowledge*, and their equivalents, as if the meaning of the words were ascertained, whereas the very problem debated is, to ascertain their meaning[z]—takes up another path of enquiry. He distinguishes between possessing knowledge,—and having it actually in hand or on his person: which distinction he illustrates by comparing the mind to a pigeon-cage. A man hunts and catches pigeons, then turns

He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with about.

[u] Plato, Theæt. pp. 193-194.
[x] Plato, Theæt. p. 195 D.
[y] Plato, Theæt. p. 196. νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι τις οἶδεν, οἷον τε μὴ εἰδέναι· καὶ πότερα αἱρει;
[z] Plato, Theæt. p. 196 D.

them into the cage, within the limits of which they fly about: when he wants to catch any one of them for use, he has to go through a second hunt, sometimes very troublesome: in which he may perhaps either fail altogether, or catch the wrong one instead of the right. The first hunt Sokrates compares to the acquisition of knowledge: the second, to the getting it into his hand for use.[a] A man may *know*, in the first sense, and *not know*, in the second: he may have to hunt about for the cognition which (in the first sense) he actually possesses. In trying to catch one cognition, he may confound it with another: and this constitutes false opinion—the confusion of two *cognita* one with another.[b]

Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this.

Yet how can such a confusion be possible? (Sokrates here again replies to himself.) How can knowledge betray a man into such error? If he knows A, and knows B—how can he mistake A for B? Upon this supposition, knowledge produces the effect of ignorance: and we might just as reasonably imagine ignorance to produce the effects of knowledge.[c]—Perhaps (suggests Theætêtus), he may have *non-cognitions* in his mind, mingled with the cognitions: and in hunting for a cognition, he may catch a non-cognition. Herein may lie false opinion.—That can hardly be, (replies Sokrates). If the man catches what is really a non-cognition, he will not suppose it to be such, but to be a cognition. He will believe himself fully to *know*, that in which he is mistaken. But how is it possible that he should confound a non-cognition with a cognition, or *vice versâ?* Does not he know the one from the other? We must then require him to have a separate cognition of his own cognitions or non-cognitions—and so on *ad infinitum*.[d] The hypothesis cannot be admitted.

We cannot find out (continues Sokrates) what false opinion is: and we have plainly done wrong to search for it, until we have first ascertained what knowledge is.[e]

[a] Plato, Theæt. pp. 197-198.
[b] Plato, Theæt. p. 199.
[c] Plato, Theæt. p. 199 E.
[d] Plato, Theæt. p. 200 B.
[e] Plato, Theæt. p. 200 C.

Moreover, as to the question, Whether knowledge is identical with true opinion, Sokrates produces another argument to prove that it is not so: and that the two are widely different. You can communicate true opinion without communicating knowledge: and the powerful class of rhetors and litigants make it their special business to do so. They persuade, without teaching, a numerous audience.[f] During the hour allotted to them for discourse, they create, in the minds of the assembled dikasts, true opinions respecting complicated incidents of robbery or other unlawfulness, at which none of the dikasts have been personally present. Upon this opinion the dikasts decide, and decide rightly. But they cannot possibly *know* the facts without having been personally present and looking on. That is essential to knowledge or cognition.[g] Accordingly, they have acquired true and right opinions; yet without acquiring knowledge. Therefore the two are not the same.[h]

He brings another argument to prove that cognition is not the same as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but they do not teach or communicate knowledge.

[f] Plato, Theæt. p. 201. *οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ π θουσιν, οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ἃ ἂν βούλωνται.*

[g] Plato, Theæt. p. 201

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαί πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν ἐὰ μή, ταῦτα ς, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἐδίκασαν;

[h] The distinction between persuading and teaching—between creating opinion and imparting knowledge—has been brought to view in the Gorgias and is noted also in the Timæus. As it stands here, it deserves notice, because Plato not only professes to affirm what *knowledge* is, but also identifies it with sensible perception. The Dikasts (according to Sokrates) would have *known* the case, had they been present when it occurred, so as to see and hear it: there is no other way of acquiring knowledge.

Hearing the case only by the narration of speakers, they can acquire nothing more than a *true opinion*. Hence we learn wherein consists the difference between the two. That which I see, hear, or apprehend by any sensible perception, I *know*: compare a passage in Sophistes, p. 267 A-B, where *τὸ γιγνώσκειν* is explained in the same way. But that which I learn from the testimony of others amounts to nothing more than opinion; and at best to a true opinion.

Plato's reasoning here involves an admission of the very doctrine which he had before taken so much pains to confute—the doctrine that Cognition is Sensible Perception. Yet he takes no notice of the inconsistency. An occasion for sneering at the Rhetors and Dikasts is always tempting to him.

So, in the Menon (p. 97 B), the man who has been at Larissa is said to *know* the road to Larissa; as distinguished from another man who, never having been there, opines correctly which the road is. And in the Sophistes (p. 263) when Plato is illustrating the doctrine that false propositions, as well as true propositions, are possible, and really occur, he selects as his cases, *Θεαίτητος κάθηται, Θεαίτητος πέτεται.* That one of these propositions is false and the other true, can be known only by *αἴσθησις*—in the sense of that word commonly understood.

Theætêtus now recollects another definition of knowledge, learnt from some one whose name he forgets. Knowledge is (he says) true opinion, coupled with rational explanation. True opinion without such rational explanation, is not knowledge. Those things which do not admit of rational explanation, are not knowable.[i]

New answer of Theætêtus —Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation.

Taking up this definition, and elucidating it farther, Sokrates refers to the analogy of words and letters. Letters answer to the primordial elements of things; which are not matters either of knowledge, or of true opinion, or of rational explanation—but simply of sensible perception. A letter, or a primordial element, can only be perceived and called by its name. You cannot affirm of it any predicate or any epithet: you cannot call it *existing*, or *this*, or *that*, or *each*, or *single*, or by any other name than its own:[k] for if you do, you attach to it something extraneous to itself, and then it ceases to be an element. But syllables, words, propositions—*i. e.* the compounds made up by putting together various letters or elements—admit of being known, explained, and described, by enumerating the component elements. You may indeed conceive them correctly, without being able to explain them or to enumerate their component elements: but then you do not know them. You can only be said to know them, when besides conceiving them correctly, you can also specify their component elements[l]—or give explanation.

Analogy of words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained: compounds alone can be explained.

Having enunciated this definition, as one learnt from an-

Plato, Theætêt, p. 206 D. λόγου τὴν δὲ καὶ ὧν μὲν ἔστι λόγος, ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει,

The words οὕτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων are intended, according to Heindorf and Schleiermacher, to justify the use of the word ἐπιστητὰ, which was then a neologism. Both this definition, and the elucidation of it which Sokrates proceeds to furnish, are announced as borrowed from other persons not named.

Plato, Theæt. pp. 201-202. αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσοὐκ οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ αὐτό, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο, οὐδὲ τὸ τὸ μόνον, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, προσοιστέον, οὐδὲ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς

Also c. 147, p. 205 C.

Plato, Theæt. p. 202.

other person not named, Sokrates proceeds to examine and confute it. It rests on the assumption (he says), that the primordial elements are themselves unknowable; and that it is only the aggregates compounded of them which are knowable. Such an assumption cannot be granted. The result is either a real sum total, including both the two component elements: or it is a new form, indivisible and uncompounded, generated by the two elements, but not identical with them nor including them in itself. If the former, it is not knowable, because if neither of the elements are knowable, both together are not knowable: when you know neither A nor B, you cannot know either the sum or the product of A and B. If the latter, then the result, being indivisible and uncompounded, is unknowable for the same reason as the elements are so: it can only be named by its own substantive name, but nothing can be predicated respecting it.[m]

also.

Nor can it indeed be admitted as true—That the elements are unknowable, and the compound alone knowable. On the contrary, the elements are more knowable than the compound.[n]

When you say (continued Sokrates) that knowledge is true opinion coupled with rational explanation, you may mean by *rational explanation* one of three things. 1. The power of enunciating the opinion in clear and appropriate words. This every one learns to do, who is not dumb or an idiot: so that in this sense true opinion will always carry with it rational explanation.—2. The power of describing the thing in question by its component elements. Thus Hesiod says that there are a hundred distinct wooden pieces in a waggon: you and I do not know nor can we describe them all: we can distinguish only the more obvious fractions—the wheels, the axle, the body, the yoke, &c. Accordingly, we cannot be said to know a waggon: we have only a true opinion about it. Such is the second sense of λόγος or rational explanation. But

Rational explanation may have

nent elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings will the definition of Cognition hold.

[m] Plato, Theæt. pp. 203-205.

[n] Plato, Theæt. p. 206.

neither in this sense will the proposition hold—That knowledge is right opinion coupled with rational explanation. For suppose that a man can enumerate, spell, and write correctly, all the syllables of the name *Theaetêtus*—which would fulfil the conditions of this definition: yet, if he mistakes and spells wrongly in any other name, such as *Theodôrus*, you will not give him credit for knowledge. You will say that he writes *Theaetêtus* correctly, by virtue of right opinion simply. It is therefore possible to have right opinion coupled with rational explanation, in this second sense also,—yet without possessing knowledge.[o]

Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included in true opinion.

3. A third meaning of this same word λόγος or rational explanation, is, that in which it is most commonly understood—To be able to assign some mark whereby the thing to be explained differs from every thing else—to differentiate the thing.[p] Persons, who understand the word in this way, affirm, that so long as you only seize what the thing has in common with other things, you have only a *true opinion* concerning it: but when you seize what it has peculiar and characteristic, you then possess *knowledge* of it. Such is their view: but though it seems plausible at first sight (says Sokrates), it will not bear close scrutiny. For in order to have a true opinion about any thing, I must have in my mind not only what it possesses in common with other things, but what it possesses peculiar to itself also. Thus if I have a true opinion about Theætêtus, I must have in my mind not only the attributes which belong to him in common with other men, but also those which belong to him specially and exclusively. Rational explanation (λόγος) in this sense is already comprehended in true opinion, and is an essential ingredient in it—not any new element superadded. It will not serve therefore as a distinction between true opinion and knowledge.[q]

Plato, Theæt. pp. 207-208. ἔστιν ἄρα μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὕτω δεῖ ἐπιστ...

[o] Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ

[p] Plato, Theætêt. p. 208.

Plato, Theætêt. p. 209.

Such is the result (continues Sokrates) of our researches concerning knowledge. We have found that it is neither sensible perception—nor true opinion—nor true opinion along with rational explanation. But what it is, we have not found. Are we still pregnant with any other answer, Theætêtus, or have we brought forth all that is to come?—*I* have brought forth (replies Theætêtus) more than I had within me, through your furtherance. Well (rejoins Sokrates)—and my obstetric science has pronounced all your offspring to be mere wind, unworthy of being preserved![r] If hereafter you should again become pregnant, your offspring will be all the better for our recent investigation. If on the other hand you should always remain barren, you will be more amiable and less vexatious to your companions—by having a just estimate of yourself, and by not believing yourself to know what you really do not know.[s]

Conclusion of although purely negative.

The concluding observations of this elaborate dialogue deserve particular attention as illustrating Plato's point of view, at the time when he composed the Theætêtus. After a long debate, set forth with all the charm of Plato's style, no result is attained. Three different explanations of knowledge have been rejected as untenable.[t] No other can be found; nor is any suggestion offered, showing in what quarter we are to look for the true one. What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? Many persons would pronounce it to be a mere piece of useless ingenuity and elegance: but such is not the opinion of Plato himself. Sufficient gain (in his view) will have been ensured, if Theætêtus has acquired a

Remarks on removal.

[r] Plato, Theætêt. p. 210 B. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

[s] Plato, Theæt. p. 210. ἐάν τε γίγνῃ (ἐγκύμων), βελτιόνων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν· ἐάν τε βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι οὐκ οἰσθα.

Compare also an earlier passage in the Dialogue, p. 187 B.

[t] I have already observed, however, that in one passage of the interrogation carried on by Sokrates (p. 201 A-B, where he is distinguishing between persuasion and teaching, he unconsciously admits the identity between knowledge and sensible perception.

greater power of testing any fresh explanation which he may attempt of this difficult subject: or even if he should attempt none such, by his being disabused, at all events, of the false persuasion of knowing where he is really ignorant. Such false persuasion of knowledge (Plato here intimates) renders a man vexatious to associates; while a right estimate of his own knowledge and ignorance fosters gentleness and moderation of character. In this view, false persuasion of knowledge is an ethical defect, productive of positive mischief in a man's intercourse with others: the removal of it improves his character, even though no ulterior step towards real and positive knowledge be made. The important thing is, that he should acquire the power of testing and verifying all opinions, old as well as new. This, which is the only guarantee against the delusive self-satisfaction of sham knowledge, must be firmly established in the mind before it is possible to aspire effectively to positive and assured knowledge. The negative arm of philosophy is in its application prior to the positive, and indispensable, as the single protection against error and false persuasion of knowledge. Sokrates is here depicted as one in whom the negative vein is spontaneous and abundant, even to a pitch of discomfort—as one complaining bitterly, that objections thrust themselves upon him, unsought and unwelcome, against conclusions which he had himself just previously taken pains to prove at length.[u]

Formation of

To form in men's minds this testing or verifying power, is one main purpose in Plato's dialogues of Search—and in some of them the predominant purpose; as he himself announces it to be in the Theætêtus. I have already made the same remark before, and I repeat it here; since it is absolutely necessary for appreciating these dialogues of Search in their true bearing and value. To one who does not take account of the negative arm of philosophy, as an auxiliary without which the positive arm will strike at random—half of the Platonic dialogues will teach nothing, and will even appear as enigmas—the Theætêtus among the foremost. Plato ex-

molishing his own suggestions.

[u] See the emphatic passage, p. 195 B-C.

cites and strengthens the interior mental wakefulness of the hearer, to judge respecting all affirmative theories, whether coming from himself or from others. This purpose is well served by the manner in which Sokrates more than once in this dialogue first announces, proves and builds up a theory—then unexpectedly changes his front, disproves and demolishes it. We are taught that it is not difficult to find a certain stock of affirmative argument which makes the theory look well from a distance: we must inspect closely, and make sure that there are no counter-arguments in the background.[x] The way in which Sokrates pulls to pieces his own theories, is farther instructive, as it illustrates the exhortation previously addressed by him to Theætêtus—not to take offence when his answers were canvassed and shown to be inadmissible.[y]

Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor.

A portion of the dialogue to which I have not yet adverted, illustrates this anxiety for the preliminary training of the ratiocinative power, as an indispensable qualification for any special research. "We have plenty of leisure for investigation"[z] (says Sokrates). "We are not tied to time, nor compelled to march briefly and directly towards some positive result. Engaged as we are in investigating philosophical truth, we stand in pointed contrast with politicians and rhetors in the public assembly or dikastery. We are like freemen; they, like slaves. They have before them the Dikasts, as their masters, to whose temper and approbation they are constrained to adapt themselves. They are also in presence of antagonists, ready to entrap and confute them. The personal interests, sometimes even the life, of an individual are at stake; so that every thing must be sacrificed to the purpose of obtaining a verdict. Men brought up in these habits become sharp in observation and emphatic in expression; but merely with a view to win the assent and approbation of the master before them, as to the case in hand. No free aspirations or spontaneous enlargement can have place in their minds. They

auditors.

[x] Plato, Theætêt. p. 208 E.
[y] Plato, Theætêt. p. 151 C.
[z] Plato, Theæt. p. 155. ὡς πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, &c.; also p. 172.

become careless of true and sound reasoning—slaves to the sentiment of those whom they address—and adepts in crooked artifice which they take for wisdom.[a]

Of all this (continues Sokrates) the genuine philosopher is the reverse. He neither possesses, nor cares to possess, the accomplishments of the lawyer and politician. He takes no interest in the current talk of the city; nor in the scandals afloat against individual persons. He does not share in the common ardour for acquiring power or money: nor does he account potentates either happier or more estimable for possessing them. Being ignorant and incompetent in the affairs of citizenship as well as of common life, he has no taste for club-meetings or joviality. His mind, despising the particular and the practical, is absorbed in constant theoretical research respecting universals. He spares no labour in investigating—What is man in general? and what are the attributes, active and passive, which distinguish man from other things? He will be overthrown and humiliated before the Dikastery by a clever rhetor. But if this opponent chooses to ascend out of the region of speciality, and the particular ground of injustice alleged by A against B—into the general question, What is justice or injustice? Wherein do they differ from each other or from other things? What constitutes happiness and misery? How is the one to be attained and the other avoided? —If the rhetor will meet the philosopher on this elevated ground, then he will find himself put to shame and proved to be incompetent, in spite of all the acute stratagems of his petty mind.[b] He will look like a child and become ashamed of himself:[c] but the philosopher is noway ashamed of his incompetence for slavish pursuits, while he is passing a life of freedom and leisure among his own dialectics.[d]

his own debates.

[a] Plato, Theætêt. pp. 172-173.

I give only an abstract of this eloquent passage, not an exact translation. Steinhart (Einleitung zum Theætêt. p. 37) calls it "a sublime Hymn" (einen erhabenen Hymnus). It is a fine piece of poetry or rhetoric, and shows that Plato was by nature quite as rhetorical as the rhetors whom he depreciates—though he had also, besides, other lofty intellectual peculiarities of his own, beyond these rivals.

[b] Plato, Theæt. c. 81-84, pp. 175-176.

[c] Plato, Theæt. c. 86, p. 177 B.

[d] Plato, Theæt. c. 84, p. 175 E.

In these words of Sokrates we read a contrast between practice and theory—one of the most eloquent passages in the dialogues—wherein Plato throws overboard the ordinary concerns and purposes both of public and private life, admitting that true philosophers are unfit for them. The passage, while it teaches us caution in receiving his criticisms on the defects of actual statesmen and men of action, informs us at the same time that he regarded philosophy as the only true business of life—the single pursuit worthy to occupy a freeman.[e] This throws light on the purpose of many of his dialogues. He intends to qualify the mind for a life of philosophical research, and with this view to bestow preliminary systematic training on the ratiocinative power. To announce at once his own positive conclusions with their reasons, (as I remarked before) is not his main purpose. A pupil who, having got all these by heart, supposed himself to have completed his course of philosophy, so that nothing farther remained to be done, would fall very short of the Platonic exigency. The life of the philosopher —as Plato here conceives it—is a perpetual search after truth, by dialectic debate and mutual cross-examination between two minds, aiding each other to disembroil that confusion and inconsistency which grows up naturally in the ordinary mind. For such a life a man becomes rather disqualified than prepared, by swallowing an early dose of authoritative dogmas and proofs dictated by his teacher. The two essential requisites for it are, that he should acquire a self-acting ratiocinative power, and an earnest, untiring interest in the dialectic process. Both these aids Plato's negative dialogues are well calculated to afford: and when we thus look at his purpose, we shall see clearly that it did not require the presentation of any positive result.

Purpose of life of Search.

The course of this dialogue—the Theætêtus—has been already described as an assemblage of successive perplexities without any solution. But what deserves farther notice is—That the perplexities, as they are not solved in this dialogue, so they are

the tus logue.

[e] ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐπιστήμη, Plato, Sophistês, c. 82, p. 253 D.

not solved in any other dialogue. The view taken by Schleiermacher and other critics—that Plato lays out the difficulties in one anterior dialogue, in order to furnish the solution in another posterior—is not borne out by the facts. In the Theætêtus, many objections are propounded against the doctrine, That Opinion is sometimes true, sometimes false. Sokrates shows that false opinion is an impossibility: either therefore all opinions are true, or no opinion is either true or false. If we turn to the Sophistês, we shall find this same question discussed by the Eleatic Stranger who conducts the debate. He there treats the doctrine—That false opinion is an impossibility and that no opinion could be false—as one which had long embarrassed himself, and which formed the favourite subterfuge of the impostors whom he calls Sophists. He then states that this doctrine of the Sophists was founded on the Parmenidean dictum—That Non-Ens was an impossible supposition. Refuting the dictum of Parmenides (by a course of reasoning which I shall examine elsewhere), he arrives at the conclusion—That Non-Ens exists in a certain fashion, as well as Ens: That false opinions are possible: That there may be false opinions as well as true. But what deserves most notice here, in illustration of Plato's manner, is—that though the Sophistês[f] is announced as a continuation of the Theætêtus (carried on by the same speakers, with the addition of the Eleate), yet the objections taken by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, against the possibility of false opinion are not even noticed in the Sophistês—much less removed. Other objections to it are propounded and dealt with: but not those objections which had arrested the march of Sokrates in the Theætêtus.[g] Sokrates and Theætêtus hear the Eleatic Stranger discussing this same matter in the Sophistês, yet neither of them allude to those objections against his conclusion which had appeared to both of them irresistible in the preceding dialogue known as Theætêtus.

[f] See the end of the Theætêtus and the opening of the Sophistês. Note, moreover, that the Politikus makes reference not only to the Sophistês, but also to the Theætêtus (pp. 258 A, 266 D, 284 B, 286 B).

[g] In the Sophistês, the Eleate establishes (to his own satisfaction) that τὸ μὴ ὂν is not ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος, but ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος (p. 257 B), that it is one γένος among the various γένη (p. 260 C), and that it (τὸ μὴ ὂν

Nor are the objections refuted, in any other of the Platonic dialogues.

Such a string of objections never answered, and of difficulties without solution, may appear to many persons nugatory as well as tiresome. To Plato they did not appear so. At the time when most of his dialogues were composed, he considered that the Search after truth was at once the noblest occupation, and the highest pleasure, of life. Whoever has no sympathy with such a pursuit—whoever cares only for results, and finds the chase in itself fatiguing rather than attractive—is likely to take little interest in the Platonic dialogues. To repeat what I said in Chapter VI.—Those who expect from Plato a coherent system in which affirmative dogmas are first to be laid down, with the evidence in their favour—next, the difficulties and objections against them enumerated—lastly, these difficulties solved—will be disappointed. Plato is, occasionally, abundant

Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest occupation of life.

κοινωνεῖ) enters into communion or combination with δόξα, λόγος, φαντασία, &c. It is therefore possible that there may be ψευδὴς δόξα or ψευδὴς λόγος, when you affirm, respecting any given subject, ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων or τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (p. 263 B-C). Plato considers that the case is thus made out against the Sophist, as the impostor and dealer in falsehoods; false opinion being proved to be possible and explicable.

But if we turn to the Theætêtus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that this very explication of ψευδὴς δόξα is there enunciated and impugned by Sokrates in a long argument. He calls it there ἀλλοδοξία, ἑτεροδοξία, τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν (pp. 189 A, 190 E, 193 D). No man (he says) can mistake one thing for another; if this were so, he must be supposed both to know and not to know the same thing, which is impossible (pp. 196 A, 200 A). Therefore ψευδὴς δόξα is impossible.

Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, against the possibility of ἀλλοδοξία, no notice is taken in the Sophistês either by Sokrates, or by Theætêtus, or by the Eleate in the Sophistês. Indeed the Eleate congratulates himself upon the explanation as more satisfactory than he had expected to find (p. 264 B): and speaks with displeasure of the troublesome persons who stir up doubts and contradictions (p. 259 C): very different from the tone of Sokrates in the Theætêtus (pp. 195, B, C).

I may farther remark that Plato, in the Republic, reasons about τὸ μὴ ὂν in the Parmenidean sense, and not in the sense which he ascribed to it in the Sophistês, and which he recognises in the Politikus, p. 284 B. Republic, v. pp. 477 A, 478 C.)

Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 260-270) points out the discrepancy between the doctrines of the Eleate in the Sophistês, and those maintained by Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues; inferring from thence that the Sophistês and Politikus are not compositions of Plato. As between the Theætêtus and the Sophistês, I think a stronger case of discrepancy might be set forth than he has stated; though the end of the former is tied to the beginning of the latter plainly, directly, and intentionally. But I do not agree in his inference. He concludes that the Sophistês is not Plato's composition: I conclude, that the scope for dissident views and doctrine, within the long philosophical career and numerous dialogues of Plato, is larger than his commentators admit.

in his affirmations: he has also great negative fertility in starting objections: but the affirmative current does not come into conflict with the negative. His belief is enforced by rhetorical fervour, poetical illustration, and a vivid emotional fancy. These elements stand to him in the place of positive proof; and when his mind is full of them, the unsolved objections, which he himself had stated elsewhere, vanish out of sight. Towards the close of his life (as we shall see in the Treatise De Legibus), the love of dialectic, and the taste for enunciating difficulties even when he could not clear them up, died out within him. He becomes ultra-dogmatical, losing even the poetical richness and fervour which had once marked his affirmations, and substituting in their place a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.

Contrast between the philosopher and the practical statesman—between knowledge and Opinion.

The contrast between the philosopher and the man engaged in active life—which is so emphatically set forth in the Theætêtus[h]—falls in with the distinction between Knowledge and Opinion—The Infallible and the Fallible. It helps the purpose of the dialogue, to show what knowledge is *not:* and it presents the distinction between the two on the ethical and emotional side, upon which Plato laid great stress. The philosopher (or man of Knowledge, *i.e.* Knowledge viewed on its subjective side) stands opposed to the men of sensible perception and opinion, not merely in regard to intellect, but in regard to disposition, feeling, character, and appreciation of objects. He neither knows nor cares about particular things or particular persons: all his intellectual force, and all his emotional interests, are engaged in the contemplation of Universals or Real Entia, and of the great pervading cosmical forces. He despises the occupations of those around him, and the actualities of life, like the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias:[i] assimilating himself as much as possible to the Gods; who have no other occupation (according to the Aristotelian[k] Ethics), except that of contemplating and theorising. He pursues these objects not with a view to any ulterior result, but because

[h] Plato, Theætêt. pp. 173-176. Compare Republic, v. pp. 476-477, vii. p. 517.

[i] See above, chap. xxii. p. 130.

[k] Ethic. Nikomach. x. 8, p. 1178, b. 9-25.

the pursuit is in itself a life both of virtue and happiness; neither of which are to be found in the region of opinion. Intense interest in speculation is his prominent characteristic. To dwell amidst these contemplations is a self-sufficing life; even without any of the aptitudes or accomplishments admired by the practical men. If the philosopher meddles with their pursuits, he is not merely found incompetent, but also incurs general derision; because his incompetence becomes manifest even to the common-place citizens. But if *they* meddle with his speculations, they fail not less disgracefully; though their failure is not appreciated by the unphilosophical spectator.

The professors of knowledge are thus divided by the strongest lines from the professors of Opinion. And opinion itself—The Fallible—is, in this dialogue, presented as an inexplicable puzzle. You talk about true and false opinions: but how can false opinions be possible? and if they are not possible, what is the meaning of *true*, as applied to opinions? Not only, therefore, opinion can never be screwed up to the dignity of knowledge—but the world of opinion itself defies philosophical scrutiny. It is a chaos in which there is neither true nor false; in perpetual oscillation (to use the phrase of the Republic) between Ens and Non-Ens.[1]

[1] Plato, Republic, v. pp. 478-479.

The Theætêtus is more in harmony (in reference to δόξα and ἐπιστήμη) with the Republic, than with the Sophistês and Politikus. In the Politikus (p. 309 C) ἀληθὴς δόξα μετὰ βεβαιώσεως is placed very nearly on a par with knowledge: in the Menon also, the difference between the two, though clearly declared, is softened in degree, pp. 97-98.

The Alexandrine physician Herophilus attempted to draw, between πρόρρησις and πρόγνωσις, the same distinction as that which Plato draws between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη — The Fallible as contrasted with the Infallible. Galen shows that the distinction is untenable (Prim. Commentat. in Hippokratis Prorrhetica, Tom. xvi. p. 487, ed. Kühn).

Bonitz, in his Platonische Studien (pp. 41-78) has given an instructive analysis and discussion of the Theætêtus. I find more to concur with in his views, than in those of Schleiermacher or Steinhart. He disputes altogether the assumption of other Platonic critics, that a purely negative result is unworthy of Plato; and that the negative apparatus is an artifice to recommend, and a veil to conceal, some great affirmative truth, which acute expositors can detect and enunciate plainly (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theætêt. p. 124 seq.). Bonitz recognises the result of the Theætêtus as purely negative, and vindicates the worth of it as such. Moreover, instead of denouncing the opinions which Plato combats, as if they were perverse heresies of dishonest pretenders, he adverts to the great difficulty of those problems which both Plato and Plato's opponents undertook to elucidate: and he remarks that, in those early days, the first attempts to explain psychological phenomena were even more liable to error than the first attempts to explain physical phenomena (pp. 75-77). Such recognition, of the real difficulty of a problem, is rare among the Platonic critics.

CHAPTER XXVII.

SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS.

Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues

THESE two dialogues are both of them announced by Plato as forming sequel to the Theætêtus. The beginning of the Sophistês fits on to the end of the Theætêtus: and the Politikus is even presented as a second part or continuation of the Sophistês.[a] In all the three, the same

[a] At the beginning of the Politikus, Plato makes Sokrates refer both to the Theætêtus and to the Sophistês (p. 258 A). In more than one passage of the Politikus he even refers to the Sophistês directly and by name, noticing certain points touched in it—a thing very unusual with him. In the Sophistês also (p. 233 B), express reference is made to a passage in the Theætêtus.

(Plato, Politik. pp. 266 D, 284 B, 286 C.) See also the allusion in Sophistês (to the appearance of the younger Sokrates as respondent), p. 218 B.

Socher (in his work, Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 258-294) maintains that neither the Sophistês, nor the Politikus, nor the Parmenidês, are genuine works of Plato. He conceives the two dialogues to be contemporary with the Theætêtus (which he holds to have been written by Plato), but to have been composed by some acute philosopher of the Megaric school, conversant with the teachings of Sokrates and with the views of Plato, after the visit of the latter to Megara in the period succeeding the death of Sokrates (p. 268).

Even if we grant the exclusion of Plato's authorship, the hypothesis of an author belonging to the Megaric school is highly improbable: the rather, since many critics suppose (I think erroneously) that the Megarici are among those attacked in the dialogue. The suspicion that Plato is not the author of Sophistês and Politikus has undoubtedly more appearence of reason than the same suspicion as applied to other dialogues—though I think the reasons altogether insufficient. Socher observes, justly: 1. That the two dialogues are peculiar, distinguished from other Platonic dialogues by the profusion of logical classification, in practice as well as in theory. 2. That both, and especially the Sophistês, advance propositions and conclusions discrepant from what we read in other Platonic dialogues.—But these two reasons are not sufficient to make me disallow them. I do not agree with those who require so much uniformity, either of matter or of manner, in the numerous distinct dialogues of Plato. I recognise a much wider area of admissible divergence.

The plain announcement contained in the Theætêtus, Sophistês, and Politikus themselves, that the two last are intended as sequel to the first, is in my mind a proof of sameness of authorship, not counterbalanced by Socher's objections. Why should a Megaric author embody in his two dialogues a false pretence and assurance, that they are sequel of the Platonic Theætêtus? Why should so acute a writer (as Socher admits him to be) go out of his way to suppress his own personality, and merge his fame in that of Plato?

I make the same remark on the views of Suckow (Form der Platonischen Schriften, p. 87, seq., Breslau, 1855), who admits the Sophistês to be a genuine work of Plato, but declares the Politikus to be spurious; composed by some fraudulent author, who wished to give to his dialogue the false ap-

interlocutors are partially maintained. Thus Sokrates, Theodôrus, and Theætêtus are present in all three: and Theætêtus makes the responses, not only in the dialogue which bears his name, but also in the Sophistês. Both in the Sophistês and Politikus, however, Sokrates himself descends from the part of principal speaker to that of listener: it is he, indeed, who by his question elicits the exposition, but he makes no comment either during the progress of it or at the close. In both the dialogues, the leading and expository function is confided to a new personage introduced by Theodôrus:—a stranger not named, but announced as coming from Elea—the friend and companion of Parmenides and Zeno. Perhaps (remarks Sokrates) your friend may, without your knowledge, be a God under human shape; as Homer tells us that the Gods often go about, in the company of virtuous men, to inspect the good and bad behaviour of mankind. Perhaps your friend may be a sort of cross-examining God, coming to test and expose our feebleness in argument. No (replies Theo-

pearance of being a continuation of the Sophistês: he admits (p. 93) that it must be a deliberate deceit, if the Politikus be really the work of a different author from the Sophistês; for identity of authorship is distinctly affirmed in it.

Suckow gives two reasons for believing that the Politikus is not by Plato:—1. That the doctrines respecting government are different from those of the Republic, and the cosmology of the long mythe which it includes different from the cosmology of the Timæus. These are reasons similar to those advanced by Socher, and (in my judgment) insufficient reasons. 2. That Aristotle, in a passage of the Politica (iv. 2, p. 1289, b. 5) alludes to an opinion, which is found in the Politikus in the following terms: ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως, &c. Suckow maintains that Aristotle could never have alluded to Plato in these terms, and that he must have believed the Politikus to be composed by some one else. But I think this inference is not justified by the premisses. It is noway impossible that Aristotle might allude to Plato sometimes in this vague and general way: and I think that he has done so in other passages of the same treatise (vii. 2, 1324, a. 29—vii. 7, p. 1327, b. 37).

Ueberweg (Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift. p. 102, seq.) combats with much force the views of Suckow. It would be rash to build so much negative inference upon a loose phrase of Aristotle. That he should have spoken of Plato in this vague manner is much more probable, or much less improbable, than the counter-supposition, that the author of a striking and comprehensive dialogue, such as the Politikus, should have committed a fraud for the purpose of fastening his composition on Plato, and thus abnegating all fame for himself.

The explicit affirmation of the Politikus itself ought to be believed, in my judgment, unless it can be refuted by greater negative probabilities than any which Socher and Suckow produce.

I do not here repeat, what I have endeavoured to justify in an earlier chapter of this work, the confidence which I feel in the canon of Thrasyllus; a confidence which it requires stronger arguments than those of these two critics to overthrow.

dôrus) that is not his character. He is less given to dispute than his companions. He is far from being a God, but he is a divine man: for I call all true philosophers divine.[b]

This Eleate performs the whole task of exposition, by putting questions to Theætêtus, in the Sophistês—to the younger Sokrates in the Politikus. Since the true Sokrates is merely listener in both dialogues, Plato provides for him an additional thread of connection with both; by remarking that the youthful Sokrates is his namesake, and that Theætêtus resembles him in flat nose and physiognomy.[c]

Relation of the two dialogues to the

Though Plato himself plainly designates the Sophistês as an intended sequel to the Theætêtus, yet the method of the two is altogether different, and in a certain sense even opposite. In the Theætêtus, Sokrates extracts answers from the full and pregnant mind of that youthful respondent: he himself professes to teach nothing, but only to canvass every successive hypothesis elicited from his companion. But the Eleate is presented to us in the most imposing terms, as a thoroughly accomplished philosopher: coming with doctrines established in his mind,[d] and already practised in the task of exposition which Sokrates entreats him to undertake. He is, from beginning to end, affirmative and dogmatical: and if he declines to proceed by continuous lecture, this is only because he is somewhat ashamed to appropriate all the talk to himself.[e] He therefore prefers to accept Theætêtus as respondent. But Theætêtus is no longer pregnant, as in the preceding dialogue. He can do no more than give answers signifying assent and dissent, which merely serve to break and diversify the exposition. In fact, the dialogue in the Sophistês and Politikus is assimilated by Plato himself,[f] not to that in the Theætêtus, but to that

[b] Plato, Sophist, p. 216 B-C.
[c] Plato, Polit. p. 257 E.
[d] Plato, Sophistês, p. 217 B. γέ φησιν

[e] Plato, Soph. pp. 216-217.
[f] Plato, Sophist. p. 217 C. The words of Sokrates show that he alludes to the last half of the Parmenidês, in which he is only present as a listener —not to the first half, in which he takes an active part. Compare the Parmenidês, p. 137 C. In this last-mentioned dialogue, Sokrates (then a youth) and Aristotelês are the parallel of Theætêtus and the younger Sokrates in the Sophistês and Politikus. (See p. 135 D.)

in the last half of the Parmenidês; wherein Aristotelês the respondent answers little more than Ay or No, to leading questions from the interrogator.

In noticing the circumlocutory character, and multiplied negative criticism, of the Theætêtus, without any ultimate profit realised in the form of positive result —I remarked, that Plato appreciated dialogues, not merely as the road to a conclusion, but for the mental discipline and suggestive influence of the tentative and verifying process. It was his purpose to create in his hearers a disposition to prosecute philosophical research of their own, and at the same time to strengthen their ability of doing so with effect. This remark is confirmed by the two dialogues now before us, wherein Plato defends himself against reproaches seemingly made to him at the time.[g] "To what does all this tend? Why do you stray so widely from your professed topic? Could you not have reached this point by a shorter road?" He replies by distinctly proclaiming—That the process, with its improving influence on the mind, stands first in his thoughts—the direct conclusion of the enquiry, only second: That the special topic which he discusses, though in itself important, is nevertheless chosen principally with a view to its effect in communicating general method and dialectic aptitude: just as a schoolmaster, when he gives out to his pupils a word to be spelt, looks mainly, not to their exactness in spelling that particular word, but to their command of good spelling generally.[h] To form inquisitive, testing minds, fond of philosophical debate as a pursuit, and looking at opinions on the negative as well as on the positive side, is the first object in most of Plato's dialogues: to teach positive truth, is only a secondary object.

Plato declares that his first purpose is to

purpose.

Both the Sophistês and the Politikus are lessons and

Plato, Politikus, pp. 283 B, 286-287.

Plato, Politikus, p. 285 D.

Ξ ε ν.—Τί δ' αὖ; νῦν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ [illegible] τησις ἕνεκ' αὐτοῦ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα

Ν έ ο ς Σ ω κ ρ.—Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ περὶ πάντα.

Again, p. 286 D. τὸ δ' αὖ πρὸς τοῦ προβληθέντος ζήτησιν, ὡς [illegible] ν, δεύτερον ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον ὁ λόγος πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τ αὐτὴν τιμᾷν, τοῦ κατ' [illegible] ν, &c.

specimens of that process which the logical manuals recognise under the names—Definition and Division. What a Sophist? What is a politician or statesman? What is a philosopher? In the first place—Are the three really distinct characters? for this may seem doubtful: since the true philosopher, in his visits of inspection from city to city, is constantly misconceived by an ignorant public, and confounded with the other two.[j] The Eleate replies that the three are distinct. Then what is the characteristic function of each? How is he distinguished from other persons or other things? To what class or classes does each belong: and what is the specific character belonging to the class, so as to mark its place in the scheme descending by successive logical subdivision from the highest genus down to particulars? What other professions or occupations are there analogous to those of Sophist and Statesman, so as to afford an illustrative comparison? What is there in like manner capable of serving as illustrative contrast?

Method of Division.

Such are the problems which it is the direct purpose of the two dialogues before us to solve. But a large proportion of both is occupied by matters bearing only indirectly upon the solution. The process of logical subdivision, or the formation of classes in subordination to each other, can be exhibited just as plainly in application to an ordinary craft or profession, as to one of grave importance. The Eleate Stranger even affirms that the former case will be simpler, and will serve as explanatory introduction to the latter.[k] He therefore selects the craft of an angler, for which to find a place in logical classification. Does not an angler belong to the general class—men of art or craft? He is not a mere artless, non-professional, private man. This being so, we must distribute the class Arts—Artists, into two subordinate classes: Artists who construct or put together some new substance or compound—Artists who construct nothing new, but are employed in getting, or keeping, or employing, substances already made. Thus the class Artists is bisected into Con-

Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To

nd deduction of the u- es division.

[j] Plato, Sophist. p. 216 E.

[k] Plato, Soph. p. 218 E.

structive—Acquisitive. The angler constructs nothing: he belongs to the acquisitive branch. We now bisect this latter branch. Acquirers either obtain by consent, or appropriate without consent. Now the angler is one of the last-mentioned class: which is again bisected into two sub-classes, according as the appropriation is by force or stratagem—Fighters and Hunters. The angler is a hunter: but many other persons are hunters also, from whom he must be distinguished. Hunters are therefore divided into, Those who hunt inanimate things (such as divers for sponges, &c.), and Those who hunt living things or animals, including of course the angler among them. The hunters of animals are distinguished into hunters of walking animals, and hunters of swimming animals. Of the swimming animals some are in air, others in water:[1] hence we get two classes, Bird-Hunters, and Fish-Hunters; to the last of whom the angler belongs. The fish-hunters (or fishermen) again are bisected into two classes, according as they employ nets or striking instruments of one kind or another, such as tridents, &c. Of the striking fishermen there are two sorts: those who do their work at night by torch-light, and those who work by day. All these day-fishermen, including among them the angler, use instruments with hooks at the end. But we must still make one bisection more. Some of them employ tridents, with which they strike from above downwards at the fishes, upon any part of the body which may present itself: others use hooks, rods, and lines, which they contrive to attach to the jaws of the fish, and thereby draw him from below upward.[m] This is the special characteristic of the angler. We have now a class comprehending the anglers alone, so that no farther subdivision is required. We have obtained not merely the name of the angler, but also the rational explanation of the function to which the name is attached.[n]

[1] Plato, Sophist. p. 220 A. Νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φῦλον ὁρῶ-

It deserves notice that Plato here considers the air as a fluid in which birds swim.

[m] Plato, Sophist. pp. 219-221.

[n] Plato, Sophist, p. 221 A. Νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς—οὐ μόνη καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοὔργον, (

This is the first specimen which Plato gives of a systematic classification descending, by successive steps of bifurcation, through many subordinations of genera and species, each founded on a real and proclaimed distinction—and ending at last in an *infima species*. He repeats the like process in regard to the Sophist, the Statesman, and other professions to which he compares the one or the other: but it will suffice to have given one specimen of his method. If we transport ourselves back to his time, I think that such a view of the principles of classification implies a new and valuable turn of thought. There existed then no treatises on logic; no idea of logic as a scheme of mental procedure; no sciences out of which it was possible to abstract the conception of a regular method more or less diversified. On no subject was there any mass of facts or details collected, large enough to demand some regular system for the purpose of arranging and rendering them intelligible. Classification to a certain extent is of necessity involved, consciously or unconsciously, in the use of general terms. But the process itself had never been made a subject of distinct consciousness or reflection to any one, (as far as our knowledge reaches) in the time of Plato. No one had yet looked at it as a process natural indeed to the human intellect, up to a certain point and in a loose manner, —but capable both of great extension and great improvement, and requiring especial study, with an end deliberately set before the mind, in order that it might be employed with advantage to regularise and render intelligible even common and well-known facts. To determine a series of descending classes, with class-names, each connoting some assignable characteristic—to distribute the whole of each class between two correlative sub-classes, to compare the different ways in which this could be done, and to select such *membra condividentia* as were most suitable for the purpose—this was in the time of Plato an important novelty. We know from Xenophon[o] that Sokrates considered Dialectic to be founded, both etymo-

novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed.

[o] Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.

logically and really, upon the distribution of particular things into genera or classes. But we find little or no intentional illustration of this process in any of the conversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates: and we are farther struck by the fact that Plato, in the two dialogues which we are here considering, assigns all the remarks on the process of classification, not to Sokrates himself, but to the nameless Eleatic Stranger.

Plato determines genus of art.

After giving the generic deduction of the angler from the comprehensive idea of Art, distributed into two sections, constructive and acquisitive, Plato proceeds to notice the analogy between the Sophist and an angler: after which he deduces the Sophist also from the acquisitive section of Art. The Sophist is an angler for rich young men.[p] To find his place in the preceding descending series, we must take our departure from the bisection—hunters of walking animals, hunters of swimming animals. The Sophist is a hunter of walking animals: which may be divided into two classes, wild and tame. The Sophist hunts a species of tame animals—men. Hunters of tame animals are bisected into such as hunt by violent means (robbers, enslavers, despots, &c.),[q] and such as hunt by persuasive means. Of the hunters by means of persuasion there are two kinds: those who hunt the public, and those who hunt individuals. The latter again may be divided into two classes: those who hunt to their own loss, by means of presents, such as lovers, &c., and those who hunt with a view to their own profit. To this latter class belongs the Sophist: pretending to associate with others for the sake of virtue, but really looking to his own profit.[r]

Again, we may find the Sophist by descending through a different string of subordinate classes from the genus—

[p] Plato, Sophist. p. 222 A.

[q] Plato, Sophist. p. 222 C.

It illustrates the sentiment of Plato's age respecting classification, when we see the great diversity of particulars which he himself, here as well as elsewhere, ranks under the general name *θήρα, hunting—θήρα γὰρ παμπολύ τι πρᾶγμα ἐστι, περιειλημμένον ὀνόματι νῦν σχεδὸν ἑνί*, Plato, Legg. viii. 822-823-824, and the Euthydêmus, p. 290 B. He includes both *στρατηγικὴ* and *φθειριστικὴ* as varieties of *θηρευτική*, Sophist. p. 227 B.

Compare also the interesting conversation about *θήρα ἀνθρώπων* between Sokrates and Theodotê, Xenophon, Memorab. iii. ii. 7; and between Sokrates and Kritobulus, ii. b. 29.

[r] Plato, Sophist. p. 223 A.

Acquisitive Art. The professors of this latter may be bisected into two sorts—hunters and exchangers. Exchangers are of two sorts—givers and sellers. Sellers again sell either their own productions, or the productions of others. Those who sell the productions of others are either fixed residents in one city, or hawkers travelling about from city to city. Hawkers again carry about for sale either merchandise for the body, or merchandise for the mind, such as music, poetry, painting, exhibitions of jugglery, learning, and intellectual accomplishments, and so forth. These latter (hawkers for the mind) may be divided into two sorts: those who go about teaching, for money, arts and literary accomplishments—and those who go about teaching virtue for money. They who go about teaching virtue for money are the Sophists.[s] Or indeed if they sell virtue and knowledge for money, they are not the less Sophists—whether they buy what they sell from others, or prepare it for themselves—whether they remain in one city or become itinerant.

The Sophist subdivision.

A third series of subordinate classes will also bring us down from the genus—*Acquisitive Art*—down to the *infima species—Sophist.* In determining the class-place of the angler, we recognised a bisection of acquisitive art into acquirers by exchange, or mutual consent—and acquirers by appropriation, or without consent.[t] These latter we divided according as they employed either force or stratagem: contenders and hunters. We then proceeded to bisect the class hunters, leaving the contenders without farther notice. Now let us take up the class contenders. It may be divided into two: competitors for a set prize (pecuniary or honorary), and fighters. The fighters go to work either body against body, violently — or tongue against tongue, as arguers. These arguers again fall into two classes: the pleaders, who make long speeches, about just or unjust, before the public assembly and dikastery: and the dialogists, who meet each other in short question and answer. The dialogists again are di-

Also, by a third.

[s] Plato, Sophist. p. 224 B.

[t] Plato, Sophist. p. 219 E.

vided into two: the private, untrained antagonists, quarrelling with each other about the particular affairs of life—(who form a species by themselves, since characteristic attributes may be assigned to them; though these attributes are too petty and too indefinite to have ever received a name in common language, or to deserve a name from us[u])—and the trained practitioners or wranglers, who dispute not about particular incidents, but about just and unjust in general, and other general matters.[x] Of wranglers again there are two sorts: the prosers, who follow the pursuit from spontaneous taste and attachment, not only without hope of gain, but to the detriment of their private affairs, incurring loss themselves, and wearying or bothering their hearers: and those who make money by such private dialogues. This last sort of wrangler, is the Sophist.[y]

The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or discriminating art.

There is yet another road of class-distribution which will bring us down to the Sophist. A great number of common arts (carding wool, straining through a sieve, &c.) have, in common, the general attribute of separating matters confounded in a heap. Of separation there are two sorts: you may separate like from like (this has no established name)—or better from worse, which is called *purification*. Purification is of two sorts: either of body or of mind. In regard to body, the purifying agents are very multifarious, comprising not only men and animals, but also inanimate things: and thus including many varieties which in common estimation are mean, trivial, repulsive, or ludicrous. But all these various sentiments (observes Plato) we must disregard. We must follow out a real

Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C.
ἑνός.—Τοῦ δὲ
...νῶς περὶ αὐτὸ
πράττεται,—ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἴδος, ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὂν ὁ λόγος· ἀτὰρ
οὔτε νῦν
ἄξιον.
κρὰ λίαν καὶ

These words illustrate Plato's view of an εἶδος or species. Any distinguishable attributes, however petty, and however multifarious, might be taken to form a species upon; but if they were petty and multifarious, there was no advantage in bestowing a specific name.

[x] Plato, Sophist. p. 225 D.
τὸ δέ γε ἔντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν
ρ' οὐκ

Plato, Sophist. p. 225 E.

analogy wherever it leads us, and recognise a logical affinity wherever we find one; whether the circumstances brought together be vile or venerable, or some of them vile and some venerable, in the eyes of mankind. Our sole purpose is to improve our intelligence. With that view, all particulars are of equal value in our eyes, provided only they exhibit that real likeness which legitimates them as members of the same class—purifiers of body: the correlate of that other class which we now proceed to study—purifiers of mind.[z]

In a logical

This precept (repeated by Plato also in the Politikus) respecting the principles of classification, deserves notice. It protests against, and seeks to modify, one of the ordinary turns in the associating principles of the human mind. With unreflecting men, classification is often emotional rather than intellectual. The groups of objects thrown together in such minds, and conceived in immediate association, are such as suggest the same or kindred emotions: pleasure or pain, love or hatred, hope or fear, admiration, contempt, disgust, jealousy, ridicule. Community of emotion is a stronger bond of association between different objects than community in any attribute not immediately interesting to the emotions, and appreciable only intellectually. Thus objects which have

ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classification.

[z] Plato, Sophist. pp. 226-227. τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἡ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰ, τὸ δὲ μέγαλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαίρον. Τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκεν νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ἐὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, τερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ μικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς τα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόλικεν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἤρου, τί σῶμα εἴτε ἔμψυχον εἴτε ', οὐδὲν αὐτῇ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα ξυνδῆσαν ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. To maintain the equal scientific position of στρατηγικὴ and φθειριστικὴ, as two different species under the genus θηρευτικὴ, is a strong illustration.

Compare also Plato, Politikus, p. 266 D.

A similar admonition is addressed (in the Parmenidês, p. 130 D) by the old Parmenides to the youthful Sokrates, when the latter cannot bring himself to admit that there exist εἴδη or Forms of vulgar and repulsive objects, such as θρὶξ and πῆλος. Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, καὶ οὔπω σοῦ ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔτι πρὸς ἀν

See above ch. xxvi. p. 269, in my review of the Parmenidês.

nothing else in common, except appeal to the same earnest emotion, will often be called by the same general name, and will be constituted members of the same class. To attend to attributes in any other point of view than in reference to the amount and kind of emotion which they excite, is a process uncongenial to ordinary taste: moreover, if any one brings together, in the same wording, objects really similar, but exciting opposite and contradictory emotions, he usually provokes either disgust or ridicule. All generalizations, and all general terms connoting them, are results brought together by association and comparison of particulars somehow resembling. But if we look at the process of association in an unreflecting person, the resemblances which it fastens upon will be often emotional, not intellectual: and the generalizations founded upon such resemblances will be emotional also.

It is against this natural propensity that Plato here enters his protest, in the name of intellect and science. For the purpose of obtaining a classification founded on real, intrinsic affinities, we must exclude all reference to the emotions: we must take no account whether a thing be pleasing or hateful, sublime or mean:[a] we must bring ourselves to rank objects useful or grand in the same logical compartment with objects

[a] Compare Politikus, p. 266 D; Parmenidês, p. 130 E.

We see that Plato has thus both anticipated and replied to the objection of Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 260-262), who is displeased with the minuteness of this classification, and with the vulgar objects to which it is applied. Socher contends that this is unworthy of Plato, and that it was peculiar to the subtle Megaric philosophers.

I think, on the contrary, that the purpose of illustrating the process of classification was not unworthy of Plato; that it was not unnatural to do this by allusion to vulgar trades or handicraft, at a time when no scientific survey of physical facts had been attempted; that the allusion to such vulgar trades is quite in the manner of Plato, and of Sokrates before him.

Stallbaum, in his elaborate Prolegomena both to the Sophistês and to the Politikus, rejects the conclusion of Socher, and maintains that both dialogues are the work of Plato. Yet he agrees to a certain extent in Socher's premisses. He thinks that minuteness and over-refinement in classification were peculiarities of the Megaric philosophers, and that Plato intentionally pushes the classification into an extreme subtlety and minuteness, in order to parody their proceedings and turn them into ridicule. (Proleg. ad Sophist. pp. 32-36, ad Politic. pp. 54-55.)

But how do Socher and Stallbaum know that this extreme minuteness of subdivision into classes *was* a characteristic of the Megaric philosophers? Neither of them produce any proof of it. Indeed Stallbaum himself says, most truly (p. 55), "Quæ de Megaricorum arte dialecticâ accepimus, sane quam sunt paucissima." He might have added, that the little which we do hear about their dialectic, is rather adverse to this supposed minuteness of positive classification, than conso-

hurtful or ludicrous. We must examine only whether the resemblance is true and real, justifying itself to the comparing intellect: and whether the class-term chosen be such as to comprise all these resemblances, holding them apart (*μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς*) from the correlative and opposing class.[b]

After these just remarks on classification generally, the Eleate pursues the subdivision of his own theme. To purify the mind is to get rid of the evil, and retain or improve the good. Now evil is of two sorts—disease (injustice, intemperance, cowardice, &c.) and ignorance. Disease, which in the body is dealt with by the physician, is in the mind dealt with by the judicial tribunal: ignorance (corresponding to ugliness, awkwardness, disability, in the body, which it is the business of the gymnastic trainer to correct) falls under the treatment of the teacher or in-

The purifier under genus dis-

evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worse sort is, Ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge.

nant with it. What we hear is, that they were extremely acute and subtle in contentious disputations—able assailants of the position of a logical opponent. But this talent has nothing to do with minuteness of positive classification; and is even indicative of a different turn of mind. Moreover, we hear about Eukleides, the chief of the Megaric school, that he enlarged the signification of the Summum Genus of Parmenides—the Ἓν καὶ Πᾶν. Eukleides called it Unum, Bonum, Simile et Idem Semper, Deus, &c. But we do not hear that Eukleides acknowledged a series of subordinate Genera or Species, expanding by logical procession below this primary Unum. As far as we can judge, this seems to have been wanting in his philosophy. Yet it is exactly these subordinate Genera or Species, which the Platonic Sophistês and Politikus supply in abundance, and even excess, conformably to the precept laid down by Plato in the Philêbus (p. 14). The words of the Sophistês (p. 216 D) rather indicate that the Eleatic Stranger is declared *not* to possess the character and attributes of Megaric disputation.

[b] Though the advice here given by Plato about the principles of classification is very judicious, yet he has himself in this same dialogue set an example of repugnance to act upon it. (Sophist. p. 231 A-B.) In following out his own descending series of partitions, he finds that the Sophist corresponds with the great mental purifier—the person who applies the Elenchus, or cross-examining test, to youthful minds, so as to clear out that false persuasion of knowledge which is the great bar to all improvement. But though brought by his own process to this point, Plato shrinks from admitting it. His dislike towards the Sophist will not allow him. "The Sophist is indeed "(he says)" very like to this grand educator: but so also a wolf is very like to a dog—the most savage of animals to the most gentle. We must always be extremely careful about these likenesses; the whole body of them are most slippery. Still we cannot help admitting the Sophist to represent this improving process—that is, the high and true bred Sophist."

It will be seen that Plato's remark here about *ὁμοιότητες* contradicts what he had himself said before (p. 227 B.) The reluctance to rank *dog* and *wolf* together, in the same class, is an exact specimen of that very mistake which he had been just pointing out for correction. The scientific resemblance between the two animals is very close; but the antithesis of sentiment, felt by men towards the one and the other, is extreme.

structor.[c] Ignorance again may be distributed into two heads: one, though special, being so grave as to counterbalance all the rest, and requiring to be set apart by itself—that is, ignorance accompanied with the false persuasion of knowledge.[d]

To meet this special and gravest case of ignorance, we must recognise a special division of the art of instruction or education. Exhortation, which is the common mode of instruction, and which was employed by our forefathers universally, is of no avail against this false persuasion of knowledge: which can only be approached and cured by the Elenchus, or philosophical cross-examination. So long as a man believes himself to be wise, you may lecture for ever without making impression upon him: you do no good by supplying food when the stomach is sick. But the examiner, questioning him upon those subjects which he professes to know, soon entangles him in contradictions with himself, making him feel with shame and humiliation his own real ignorance. After having been thus disabused—a painful but indispensable process, not to be accomplished except by the Elenchus—his mind becomes open and teachable, so that positive instruction may be communicated to him with profit. The Elenchus is the grand and sovereign purification: whoever has not been subjected to it, were he even the Great King, is impure, unschooled, and incompetent for genuine happiness.[e]

Exhortation [illegible] worst mode of e[illegible] shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier.

This cross-examining and disabusing process, brought to bear upon the false persuasion of knowledge and forming the only antidote to it, is the business of the Sophist looked at on its best side.[f] But Plato will not allow the Elenchus, the great Sokratic accomplishment and mission, to be shared by the

The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist, looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really

[c] Plato, Sophist. pp. 228-229.

[d] Plat. Soph. p. 229 C. Ἀγνοίας δ' οὖν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὁρᾶν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσι. Τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι, δοκεῖν εἰδέναι.

[e] Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D-E.

[f] Plato, Sophist. p. 231 B. τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική.

is, he is a juggler who

pupils to dispute about every thing —who palms off falsehood for truth.

Sophists: and he finds or makes a subtle distinction to keep them off. The Sophist (so the Eleate proceeds) is a disputant, and teaches all his youthful pupils to dispute about everything as if they knew it—about religion, astronomy, philosophy, arts, laws, politics, and everything else. He teaches them to argue in each department against the men of special science: he creates a belief in the minds of others that he really knows all those different subjects, respecting which he is able to argue and cross-examine successfully: he thus both possesses, and imparts to his pupils, a seeming knowledge, an imitation and pretence of reality.[g] He is a sort of juggler: an imitator who palms off upon persons what appears like reality when seen from a distance, but what is seen to be not like reality when contemplated closely.[h]

Doubts started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely?

Here however (continues Plato) we are involved in a difficulty. How can a thing appear to be what it is not? How can a man who opines or affirms, opine or affirm falsely—that is, opine or affirm the thing that is not? To admit this, we must assume the thing that is not (or Non-Ens, Nothing) to have a real existence. Such an assumption involves great and often debated difficulties. It has been pronounced by Parmenides altogether inadmissible.[i]

[g] Plato, Sophist. pp. 232-233 C, 235 A. Sokrates tells us in the Platonic Apology (p. 23 A) that this was the exact effect which his own cross-examination produced upon the hearers: they supposed him to be wise on those topics on which he exposed ignorance in others. The Memorabilia of Xenophon exhibit the same impression as made by the conversation of Sokrates, even when he talked with artisans on their own arts. Sokrates indeed professed not to teach any one—and he certainly took no fee for teaching. But we see plainly that this disclaimer imposed upon no one; that he did teach, though gratuitously; and that what he taught was, the art of cross-examination and dispute. We learn this not merely from his enemy, Aristophanes, and from the proceedings of his opponents, Kritias and Charikles (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2), but also from his own statement in the Platonic Apology (pp. 23 C, 37 E, 39 B), and from the language of Plato and Xenophon throughout. Plato is here puzzled to make out a clear line of distinction between the Elenchus of Sokrates, and the disputatious arguments of those Sophists whom he calls Eristic—a name deserved quite as much by Sokrates as by any of them. Plato here accuses the Sophists of talking upon a great many subjects which they did not know, and teaching their pupils to do the same. This is exactly what Sokrates passed his life in doing, and what he did better than any one—on the negative side.

[h] Plato, Soph. pp. 235-236.

[i] Plato, Sophist. pp. 236-237. πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ

We have already seen that Plato discussed this same question in the Theætêtus, and that after trying and rejecting many successive hypotheses to show how false supposition, or false affirmation, might be explained as possible, by a theory involving no contradiction, he left the question unsolved. He now resumes it at great length. It occupies more than half[k] the dialogue. Near the close, but only then, he reverts to the definition of the Sophist.

He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions.

First, the Eleate states the opinion which perplexes him, and which he is anxious either to refute or to explain away. (Unfortunately, we have no statement of the opinion, nor of the grounds on which it was held, from those who actually held it.) Non-Ens, or Nothing, is not the name of any existing thing, or of any Something. But every one who speaks must speak something: therefore if you try to speak of Non-Ens, you are trying to speak nothing—which is equivalent to not speaking at all.[l] Moreover, to every Something, you can add something farther: but to Non-Ens, or Nothing, you cannot add any thing. (Non-Entis nulla sunt prædicata.) Now Number is something, or included among the Entia: you cannot therefore apply number, either singular or plural, to Non-Ens: and inasmuch as every thing conceived or described must be either one or many, it is impossible either to conceive or describe Non-Ens. You cannot speak of it without falling into a contradiction.[m]

The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming

When therefore we characterise the Sophist as one who builds up phantasms for realities—who presents to us what is not, as being like to what *is*, and as a false substitute for what *is*—he will ask us what we

τῷ
γὰρ

ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν.

[k] From p. 236 D to p. 264 D.

[l] Plato, Sophist. p. 237 E. The Eleate here recites this opinion, not as his own but as entertained by others, and as one which he did not clearly see through: in Republic (v. p. 478 B-C) we find Sokrates advancing a similar doctrine as his own. So in the Kratylus, where this same topic is brought under discussion (pp. 429 D, 430 A), Kratylus is represented as contending that false propositions were impossible; that propositions, improperly called false, were in reality combinations of sounds without any meaning, like the strokes on a bell.

[m] Plato, Sophist. pp. 238-239.

that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make out a rational theory explaining Non-Ens.

mean? If, to illustrate our meaning, we point to images of things in mirrors or clear water, he will pretend to be blind, and will refuse the evidence of sense: he will require us to made out a rational theory explaining Non-Ens or Nothing.[n] But when we try to do this, we contradict ourselves. A phantasm is that which, not being a true counterpart of reality, is yet so like it as to be mistaken for reality. *Quatenus* phantasm, it is Ens: *quatenus* reality, it is Non-Ens: thus the same thing is both Ens, and Non-Ens: which we declared before to be impossible.[o] When therefore we accuse the Sophist of passing off phantasms for realities, we suppose falsely: we suppose matters not existing, or contrary to those which exist: we suppose the existent not to exist, or the non-existent to exist. But this assumes as done what cannot be done: since we have admitted more than once that Non-Ens can neither be described in language by itself, nor joined on in any manner to Ens.[p]

Stating the case in this manner, we find that to suppose falsely, or affirm falsely, is a contradiction. But there is yet another possible way out of the difficulty (the Eleate continues).

Let us turn for a moment (he says) from Non-Ens to Ens.

The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of va-

Ens.

The various physical philosophers tell us a good deal about Ens. They differ greatly among themselves. Some philosophers represent Ens as triple, comprising three distinct elements, sometimes in harmony, sometimes at variance with each other. Others tell us that it is double—wet and dry—or hot and cold. A third sect, especially Xenophanes and Parmenides, pronounce it to be essentially One. Herakleitus blends together the different theories, affirming that Ens is both many and one, always in process of disjunction and conjunction:

[n] Plato, Sophist. p. 239-240. *καταγελάσεταί σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λέγῃς αὐτῷ, προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα οὔτε ὕδατα γιγνώσκειν, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν· τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν ι σε μόνον.*

[o] Plato, Sophist. p. 240 B.

[p] Plato, Sophist. p. 241 B. *τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸ ὂν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολνῦν δὴ που τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυτατον.*

Empedokles adopts a similar view, only dropping the *always*, and declaring the process of disjunction to alternate with that of conjunction, so that Ens is sometimes Many, sometimes One.[q]

Now when I look at these various theories (continues the Eleate), I find that I do not follow or understand them; and that I know nothing more or better about Ens than about Non-Ens. I thought, as a young man, that I understood both: but I now find that I understand neither.[r] The difficulties about Ens are just as great as those about Non-Ens. What do these philosophers mean by saying that Ens is double or triple? that there are two distinct existing elements—Hot and Cold—or three? What do you mean by saying that Hot and Cold *exist?* Is existence any thing distinct from Hot and Cold? If so, then there are three elements in all, not two. Do you mean that existence is something belonging to both and affirmed of both? Then you pronounce both to be One: and Ens, instead of being double, will be at the bottom only One.

Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens.

Such are the questions which the Eleatic spokesman of Plato puts to those philosophers who affirm Ens to be plural: He turns next to those who affirm Ens to be singular, or Unum. Do you mean that Unum is identical with Ens—and are they only two names for the same One and only thing? There cannot be two distinct names belonging to one and the same thing: and yet, if this be not so, one of the names must be the name of nothing. At any rate, if there be only one name and one thing, still the name itself is different from the thing—so that duality must still be recognised. Or if you take the name as identical with the One thing, it will either be the name of nothing, or the name of a name.[s]

Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about one and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them.

Again, as to the Whole:—is the Whole the same with the Ens Unum, or different from it. We shall be told that it is the same: but according to the description given by Par-

[q] Plato, Sophist. p. 242 D-E. [r] Plato, Sophist. p. 243 B.
[s] Plato, Sophist. p. 244 D.

menides, the whole is spherical, thus having a centre and circumference, and of course having parts. Now a whole divisible into parts may have unity predicable of it, as an affection or accident in respect to the sum of its parts: but it cannot be the genuine, essential, self-existent, One, which does not admit of parts or division. If Ens be One by accident, it is not identical with One, and we thus have two existent things: and if Ens be not really and essentially the Whole, while nevertheless the Whole exists—Ens must fall short of or be less than itself, and must to this extent be Non-Ens: besides that Ens, and Totum, being by nature distinct, we have more things than One existing. On the other hand, if we assume Totum not to be Ens, the same result will ensue. Ens will still be something less than itself;—Ens can never have any quantity, for each quantum is necessarily a whole in itself—and Ens can never be generated, since everything generated is also necessarily a whole.[t]

Theories of a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof.

Such is the examination which the Eleate bestows on the theories of those philosophers who held one, two, or a definite number of self-existent Entia or elements. His purpose is to show, that even on their schemes, Ens is just as unintelligible, and involves as many contradictions, as Non-Ens. And to complete the same demonstration, he proceeds to dissect the theories of those who do not recognise any definite or specific number of elements or Entia.[u] Of these he distinguishes two classes; in direct and strenuous opposition to each other, respecting what constituted Essentia.[x]

The Materialist Philosophers. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia.

First, the Materialist Philosophers, who recognise nothing as existing except what is tangible: defining Essence as identical with Body, and denying all incorporeal essence. Plato mentions no names; but he means (according to some commentators), Leukippus and Demokritus—perhaps Aristippus also. Secondly, other philosophers who, diametrically opposed to

[t] Plato, Sophist. p. 245 A-C. γε ἑ' αὐτοῖς οἷον εἶναι
[u] Plato, Sophist. p. 245 E. διὰ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας
[x] Plato, Sophist. p. 246 A. ἔοικέ

the Materialists, affirmed that there were no real Entia except certain Forms, Ideas, genera or species, incorporeal and conceivable only by intellect:—that true and real essence was not to be found in those bodies wherein the Materialists sought it: that bodies were in constant generation and disappearance, affording nothing more than a transitory semblance of reality, not tenable[y] when sifted by reason. By these last are understood (so Schleiermacher and others think, though in my judgment erroneously) Eukleides and the Megaric school of philosophers.

The Eleate proceeds to comment upon the doctrines held by these opposing schools of thinkers respecting Essence or Reality. It is easier (he says) to deal with the last-mentioned, for they are more gentle. With the Materialists it is difficult, and all but impossible, to deal at all. Indeed, before we can deal with them, we must assume them to be for this occasion better than they show themselves in reality, and ready to answer in a more becoming manner than they actually do.[z] These Materialists will admit (Plato continues) that man exists—an animated body, or a compound of mind and body: they will farther allow that the mind of one man differs from that of another:—one is just, prudent, &c., another is unjust and imprudent. One man is just, through the habit and presence of justice: another is unjust, through the habit and presence of injustice. But justice must surely be *something*—injustice also must be *something*—if each may be present to, or absent from, anything; and if their presence or absence makes so sensible a difference.[a] And justice or injustice, prudence or imprudence, as well as

Argument

difference—But Justice is not a body.

[y] Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B. νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν (*i. e.* the Materialists) οὐσίαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγο-

[z] Plato, Sophist. p. 246 C. τῶν ἐν εἴδεσιν αὐτὴν (τὴν οὐσίαν) τιθεμένων βᾷον· ἡμερώτεροι γὰρ παρὰ πάντι

δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν δρᾶν· μάλιστα εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτί αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μ λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι.

[a] Plato, Sophist. p. 247 A. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατὸν τῷ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι, πάντως εἶναί τι φή-

the mind in which the one or the other inheres, are neither visible nor tangible, nor have they any body: they are all invisible.

At least many of them will concede this point, though not all. Ens is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent to potentiality.

Probably (replies Theætêtus) these philosophers would contend that the soul or mind had a body; but they would be ashamed either to deny that justice, prudence, &c., existed as realities—or to affirm that justice, prudence, &c., were all bodies.[b] These philosophers must then have become better (rejoins the Eleate): for the primitive and genuine leaders of them will not concede even so much as that. But let us accept the concession. If they will admit any incorporeal reality at all, however small, our case is made out. For we shall next call upon them to say, what there is in common between these latter, and those other realities which have bodies connate with and essential to them—to justify the names *real*—*essence*—bestowed upon both.[c] Perhaps they would accept the following definition of Ens or the Real—of Essence or Reality. Everything which possesses any sort of power, either to act upon anything else or to be acted upon by any thing else, be it only for once or to the smallest degree—every such thing is true and real Ens. The characteristic mark or definition of Ens or the Real is, power or potentiality.[d]

Argument against the Idealists—who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with

The Eleate now turns to the philosophers of the opposite school—the Mentalists or Idealists,—whom he terms the friends of Forms, Ideas, or species.[e] These men (he says) distinguish the generated, transitory and changeable—from Ens or the Real, which is eternal, unchanged, always the same: they distinguish ge-

[b] Plato, Sophist. p. 247 B. *νονται—τ τι ἕκαστον ὢν ἠρώτηκας, ὁνται τὸ τολμᾷν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι*

Plato, Sophist. p. 247 C. *εἰ γάρ τι τῶν ὄντων συγτὸ γὰρ τε τούτοις ἅμα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει γεγονὸς, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσιν, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον.*

[d] Plato, Sophist. p. 247 E. *λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτημένον δύναμιν, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.*

[e] Plato, Sophist. p. 248 A. *τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους.*

neration from essence. With the generated (according to their doctrine) we hold communion through our bodies and our bodily perceptions: with Ens, we hold communion through our mind and our intellectual apprehension. But what do they mean (continues the Eleate) by this "holding of communion"? Is it not an action or a passion produced by a certain power of agent and patient coming into co-operation with each other? and is not this the definition which we just now laid down, of Ens or the Real.

the former through our minds, with the latter, through our bodies and senses.

No—these philosophers will reply—we do not admit your definition as a definition of Ens: it applies only to the generated. Generation does involve, or emanate from, a reciprocity of agent and patient: but neither power nor action, nor suffering, have any application to Ens or the Real. But you admit (says the Eleate) that the mind knows Ens:—and that Ens is known by the mind. Now this *knowing*, is it not an action—and is not the *being known*, a passion? If to *know* is an action, then Ens being known, is acted upon, suffers something, or undergoes some change,—which would be impossible if we assume Ens to be eternally unchanged. These philosophers might reply, that they do not admit *to know* as an action, nor *to be known* as a passion. They affirm Ens to be eternally unchanged, and they hold to their other affirmation that Ens is known by the mind. But (urges the Eleate) can they really believe that Ens is eternally the same and unchanged,—that it has neither life, nor mind, nor intelligence, nor change, nor movement? This is incredible. They must concede that Change, and the Changeable, are to be reckoned as Entia or Realities: for if these be not so reckoned, and if all Entia are unchangeable, no Ens can be an object of knowledge to any mind. But though the changeable belongs to Ens, we must not affirm that *all* Ens is changeable. There cannot be either intellect or knowledge, without something constant and unchangeable. It is equally necessary to recognise something as constant and unchangeable—something else as moving and change-

Holding communion—What? Immutable

changeable

able: Ens or reality includes alike one and the other. The true philosopher therefore cannot agree with those "Friends of Forms" who affirm all Ens or Reality to be at rest and unchangeable, either under one form or under many:—still less can he agree with those opposite reasoners, who maintain all reality to be in perpetual change and movement. He will acknowledge both and each—rest and motion—the constant and the changeable—as making up together total reality or Ens Totum.

Motion and Rest are both of them Entia or Realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a *tertium quid*—distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both?

Still however, we have not got over our difficulties. Motion and Rest are contraries; yet we say that each and both are Realities or Entia. In what is it that they both agree? Not in moving, nor in being at rest, but simply in existence or reality. Existence or reality therefore must be a *tertium quid*, apart from motion and rest, not the sum total of those two items. Ens or the Real is not, in its own proper nature, either in motion or at rest, but is distinct from both. Yet how can this be? Surely, whatever is not in motion, must be at rest—whatever is not at rest, must be in motion. How can anything be neither in motion nor at rest; standing apart from both?[f]

Here the

Here the Eleate breaks off his enquiry, without solving the problems which he has accumulated. My purpose was (he says[g]) to show that Ens was just as full of difficulties and embarrassments as Non-Ens. Enough has been said to prove this clearly. When we can once get clear of obscurity about Ens, we may hope to be equally successful with Non-Ens.

Non-Ens.

Argument against those who admit no predica-

each other.

Let us try (he proceeds) another path. We know that it is a common practice in our daily speech to apply many different predicates to one and the same subject. We say of the same man, that he is fair, tall, just, brave, &c., and several other epithets. Some persons deny our right to do this. They say that the predicate ought always to be identical with the subject: that we can only employ with propriety

[f] Plato, Sophist. p. 250 C. [g] Plato, Sophist. p. 250 D.

such propositions as the following—man is man—good is good, &c.: that to apply many predicates to one and the same subject is to make one thing into many things.[h] But in reply to these opponents, as well as to those whom we have before combated, we shall put before them three alternatives, of which they must choose one. 1. Either all Forms admit of intercommunion one with the other. 2. Or no Forms admit of such intercommunion. 3. Or some Forms do admit of it, and others not. Between these three an option must be made.[i]

No intercommunion between any distinct Forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis.

If we take the first alternative—that there is no intercommunion of Forms—then the Forms *motion* and *rest* can have no intercommunion with the Forms, *essence* or *reality*. In other words, neither motion nor rest exist: and thus the theory both of those who say that all things are in perpetual movement, and of those who say that all things are in perpetual rest, becomes unfounded and impossible. Besides, these very men, who deny all intercommunion of Forms, are obliged to admit it implicitly and involuntarily in their common forms of speech. They cannot carry on a conversation without it, and they thus serve as a perpetual refutation of their own doctrine.[k]

Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms—inadmissible.

The second alternative—that all Forms may enter into communion with each other—is also easily refuted. If this were true, motion and rest might be put together: motion would be at rest, and rest would be in motion—which is absurd. These and other forms are contrary to each other. They reciprocally exclude and repudiate all intercommunion.[l]

Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables.

Remains only the third alternative—that some forms admit of intercommunion—others not. This is the real truth (says the Eleate). So it stands in regard to letters and words in language: some letters come together in words frequently and conveniently—others rarely and awkwardly—others never do nor ever can come together. The same with the com-

[h] Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B. ὡς ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι, &c.

[i] Plato, Sophist. p. 251 E.

[k] Plato, Sophist. p. 252 D.

[l] Plato, Sophist. p. 252 E.

bination of sounds to obtain music. It requires skill and art to determine which of these combinations are admissible.

Art and skill

So also, in regard to the intercommunion of Forms, skill and art are required to decide which of them will come together, and which will not. In every special art and profession the case is similar: the ignorant man will fail in deciding this question—the man of special skill alone will succeed.—So in regard to the intercommunion of Forms or Genera universally with each other, the comprehensive science of the true philosopher is required to decide.[m] To note and study these Forms, is the purpose of the philosopher in his dialectics or ratiocinative debate. He can trace the one Form or Idea, stretching through a great many separate particulars; he can distinguish it from all different Forms: he knows which Forms are not merely distinct from each other, but incapable of alliance and reciprocally repulsive—which of them are capable of complete conjunction, the one circumscribing and comprehending the other—and which of them admit conjunction partial and occasional with each other.[n] The philosopher thus keeps close to the form of eternal and unchangeable Ens or Reality—a region of such bright light that the eyes of the vulgar cannot clearly see him: while the Sophist on the other hand is also difficult to be seen, but for an opposite reason—from the darkness of that region of Non-Ens or Non-Reality, wherein he carries on his routine-work.[o]

what Forms do not. This

of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens.

We have still to determine, however (continues Plato), what this Non-Ens or Non-Reality is. For this purpose we will take a survey, not of all the Forms or Genera, but of some few the most important. We will begin with the two before noticed—Motion and Rest (=Change and Permanence), which are confessedly irreconcileable and reciprocally exclu-

He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five principal Forms—Motion—Rest—Ens—Same—Different.

[m] Plato, Sophist. p. 253 B. ἆρ' οὐ μετ' ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς ν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα

μ· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς κ καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀ

[n] Plato, Sophist. p. 253 D-E.

[o] Plato, Sophist. p. 254 A. Ὁ δέ

sive. Ens however enters into partnership with both: for both of them *are*, or exist.[p] This makes up three Forms or Genera—Motion, Rest, Ens: each of the three being the same with itself, and different from the other two. Here we have pronounced two new words—Same—Different.[q] Do these words designate two other Forms, over and above the three before-named, yet necessarily always intermingling in partnership with those three, so as to make five Forms in all? Or are these two—Same and Different—essential appendages of the three before-named? This last question must be answered in the negative. Same and Different are not essential appendages, or attached as parts, to Motion, Rest, Ens. Same and Different may be predicated both of Motion and of Rest: and whatever can be predicated alike of two contraries, cannot be an essential portion or appendage of either. Neither Motion nor Rest therefore *are* essentially either Same or Different: though both of them partake of Same or Different—*i. e.* come into accidental co-partnership with one as well as the other.[r] Neither can we say that Ens is identical with either Idem or Diversum. Not with Idem—for we speak of both Motion and Rest as Entia or Existences: but we cannot speak of them as the same. Not with Diversum—for *different* is a name relative to something else from which it is different, but Ens is not thus relative. Motion and Rest *are* or exist, each in itself: but each is *different*, relatively to the other, and to other things generally. Accordingly we have here five Forms or Genera—Ens, Motion, Rest, Idem, Diversum: each distinct from and independent of all the rest.[s]

This Form of Diversum or Different pervades all the others: for each one of them is different from the others, not through anything in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form of Difference.[t]

Form of Diversum—pervades all the others.

[p] Plato, Sophist. p. 254 D. τὸ δέ γε ὂν μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν· ἔστον γὰρ ἄμφω ποῦ.

[q] Plato, Sophist. p. 254 E. τί ποτ' αὖ νῦν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτὼ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, &c.

[r] Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B. μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου. Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν γ' εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἢ θάτερον, μηδ' αὖ στάσιν.

[s] Plato, Sophist. p. 255 D.

[t] Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν (τὴν θατέρου φύσιν) ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν

Each of the five is different from others: or, to express the same fact in other words, each of them *is not* any one of the others. Thus motion is different from rest, or *is not* rest: but nevertheless motion *is* or exists, because it partakes of the Form—Ens. Again, Motion is different from Idem: it *is not* the Same: yet nevertheless it *is* the same, because it partakes of the nature of Idem, or is the same with itself. Thus then both predications are true respecting motion: it *is the* same: it *is not* the same, because it partakes of or enters into partnership with both Idem and Diversum.[u] If motion in any way partook of Rest, we should be able to talk of stationary motion: but this is impossible: for we have already said that some Forms cannot come into intercommunion—that they absolutely exclude each other.

Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is different from Ens—in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens.

Again, Motion is different not only from Rest, and from Idem, but also from Diversum itself. In other words, it is both Diversum in a certain way, and also not Diversum: different and not different.[x] As it is different from Rest, from Idem, from Diversum—so also it is different from Ens, the remaining one of the five forms or genera. In other words Motion is not Ens,—or is Non-Ens. It is both Ens, and Non-Ens: Ens so far as it partakes of Entity or Reality—Non-Ens, so far as it partakes of Difference, and is thus different from Ens as well as from the other Forms.[y] The same may be said of the other Forms,—Rest, Idem, Diversum: each of them is Ens, because it partakes of entity or reality: each of them is also Non-Ens, or different from Ens, because it partakes of Difference. Moreover, Ens itself is different from the other four, and so far as these others go, it is Non-Ens.[z]

οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.

[u] Plato, Sophist. p. 256 A. τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταὐτόν τ' εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταὐτὸν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον, &c.

[x] Plato, Sophist. p. 256 C. οὐχ [illegible] καὶ νῦν λόγον.

Plato, Sophist. p. 256 D. οὐκοῦν οὐκ [illegible] εἴπερ τοῦ ὄντο[illegible]

[z] Plato, Sophist. p. 257 A. καὶ τὸ ὂν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσα περ ἔστι τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ [illegible] ἓν αὐτὸ ἔστιν—ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν [illegible] τἄλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὖ.

Now note the consequence (continues the Eleate). When we speak of Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens, but only something different from Ens. When we call anything *not great*, we do not affirm it to be the contrary of great, or to be *little:* for it may perhaps be simply equal: we only mean that it is different from great.[a] A negative proposition, generally, does not signify anything contrary to the predicate, but merely something else distinct or different from the predicate.[b] The Form of Different, though of one and the same general nature throughout, is distributed into many separate parts or specialties, according as it is attached to different things. Thus *not beautiful* is a special mode of the general Form or Genus Different, placed in antithesis with another Form or Genus, *the beautiful.* The antithesis is that of one Ens or Real thing against another Ens or Real thing: *not beautiful, not great, not just,* exist just as much and are quite as real, as *beautiful, great, just.* If the Different be a real Form or Genus, all its varieties must be real also. Accordingly Different from Ens is just as much a real Form as Ens itself:[c] and this is what we mean by Non-Ens:—not anything contrary to Ens.

By Non-Ens, w m

N re well as Ens.

Here then the Eleate professes to have found what Non-Ens is: that it is a real substantive Form, numerable among the other Forms, and having a separate constant nature of its own, like *not beautiful, not great:*[d] that it is real and existent, just as much as *Ens, beautiful, great,* &c. Disregarding the prohi-

an sh

[a] Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. Ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντιόν τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον. Οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμεν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλόν τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

Plato here means to imply that τὸ σμικρὸν is the real contrary of τὸ μέγα. When we say μὴ μέγα, we do not necessarily mean σμικρὸν—we may mean ἴσον. Therefore τὸ μὴ μέγα does not (in his view) imply the contrary of

Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. Οὐκ ἄρ' ὅταν μαίνειν τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι καὶ τὸ οὐ ὀνομ περὶ ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὑνόματα. λέγηται τὸ

[c] Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος, πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων, ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἧττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἔστιν· οὐκ ἐναντίον

[d] Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. τὸ ν βεβαίως ἔστι τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἔχ τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἕ

bition of Parmenides, we have shown (says he) not only that Non-Ens exists, but also what it is. Many Forms or Genera enter into partnership or communion with each other; and Non-Ens is the partnership between Ens and Diversum. Diversum, in partnership with Ens, *is* (exists), in consequence of such partnership:—yet *it is not* that with which it is in partnership, but different therefrom—and being thus different from Ens, it is clearly and necessarily Non-Ens: while Ens also, by virtue of its partnership with Diversum, is different from all the other Forms, or *is not* any one of them, and to this extent therefore Ens is Non-Ens. We drop altogether the idea of contrariety, without enquiring whether it be reasonably justifiable or not: we attach ourselves entirely to the Form—*Different*.[e]

The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different from the subject.

Let those refute this explanation, who can do so (continues the Eleate), or let them propose a better of their own, if they can: if not, let them allow the foregoing as possible.[f] Let them not content themselves with multiplying apparent contradictions, by saying that the same may be in some particular respect different, and that the different may be in some particular respect the same, through this or the other accidental attribute.[g] All these sophisms lead but to make us believe—That no one thing can be predicated of any other—That there is no intercommunion of the distinct Forms one with another, no right to predicate of any subject a second

Plato, Sophist. pp. 258-259.

ς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς
χαίρειν π
ἢ λόγον
', &c.

τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνο γε οὗ μέτεσχεν ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὂν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν, &c.

[f] Plato, Sophist. p. 259 A-C. ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν,
τις ὡς οὐ
ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ
καθάπερ
ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατά.

The language of the Eleate here is altogether at variance with the spirit of Plato in his negative or Searching Dialogues. To say, as he does, "Either accept the explanation which I give, or propose a better of your own"—is a dilemma which the Sokrates of the Theætêtus, and other dialogues, would have declined altogether. The complaint here made by the Eleate, against disputants who did nothing but propound difficulties—is the same as that which the hearers of Sokrates made against *him* (see Plato, Philêbus, p. 20 A, where the remark is put into the mouth, not of an opponent, but of a respectful young listener); and many a reader of the Platonic Parmenidês has indulged in the complaint.

[g] Plato, Sophist. p. 259 D. ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο ὃ φησι τούτων
πότερον.

name and the possession of a new attribute—That therefore there can be no dialectic debate or philosophy, which is all founded upon such intercommunion of Forms.[h] We have shown that Forms do really come into conjunction, so as to enable us to conjoin, truly and properly, predicate with subject, and to constitute proposition and judgment as taking place among the true Forms or Genera. Among these true Forms or Genera, Non-Ens is included as one.[i]

Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommu-

The Eleate next proceeds to consider, whether these two Genera or Forms—Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, on the one hand, and Non-Ens on the other—are among those which may or do enter into partnership and conjunction with each other. For we have admitted that there are some Forms which cannot come into partnership; and the Sophist against whom we are reasoning, though we have driven him to concede that Non-Ens is a real Form, may still contend that it is one of those which cannot come into partnership with Proposition, Judgment, Opinion—and he may allege that we can neither embody in language, nor in mental judgment, that which *is not*.[k]

Opinion, Judgment.

Analysis of a Proposition. Every proposition must have a noun and a verb—it must be proposition

Let us look attentively what Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, are. As we said about Forms and letters, so about words: it is not every combination of words which is possible, so as to make up a significant proposition. A string of nouns alone will not make one, nor a string of verbs alone. To compose the simplest proposition, you must put together at least one noun and one verb, in order to signify something respecting things existing, or events past, present, and future.[l] Now every proposition must be a proposition about something, or belonging to a certain subject: every proposition must also be of a certain

subject.

[h] Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B, c. 97, p. 260 A. διὰ γὰρ λόγος γέγονε

Chs. 79-80, p. 252 B. οἱ μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἑτέρου προσαγορεύειν.

[i] Plato, Sophist. p. 260 A. πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι γενῶν εἶναι:—p. 258 B. τὸ μὴ ὂν, αὐτοῦ

[k] Plato, Sophist. p. 260 C-D-E.

[l] Plato, Sophist. pp. 261-262.

quality.[m] *Theætêtus is sitting down—Theætêtus is flying.* Here are two propositions, both belonging to the same subject, but with opposite qualities: the former true, the latter false. The true proposition affirms respecting Theætêtus real things as they are; the false proposition affirms respecting him things different from real, or non-real, as being real. The attribute of *flying* is just as real in itself as the attribute of *sitting:* but as respects Theætêtus, or as predicated concerning him, it is different from the reality, or non-real.[n] But still Theætêtus is the subject of the proposition, though the predicate *flying* does not really belong to him: for there is no other subject than he, and without a subject the proposition would be no proposition at all. When therefore different things are affirmed as the same, or non-realities as realities, respecting you or any given subject, the proposition so affirming is false.[o]

Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c. are akin to Proposition, and may be also, by with the Form Non-Ens.

As propositions may be true or false, so also opinion or judgment or conception, may be true or false: for opinion or judgment is only the concluding result of deliberation or reflection—and reflection is the silent dialogue of the mind with itself: while conception or phantasy is the coalescence or conjunction of opinion with present perception.[p] Both opinion and conception are akin to proposition. It has thus been shown that false propositions, and false opinions or judgments, are perfectly real, and involve no contradiction: and that the Form or Genus—Proposition, Judgment, Opinion—comes properly and naturally into partnership with the Form Non-Ens.

This was the point which Plato's Eleate undertook to prove against Parmenides, and against the plea of the Sophist founded on the Parmenidean doctrine.

Plato, Sophist. p. 262 D. λόγον καῖον, ὅταν περ ᾖ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον· δέ τινος ἀδύνατον.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν

[n] Plato, Sophist. p. 263 C. Ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ.

That is, ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων,—being the explanation given by Plato of τὰ μὴ ὄντα.

[o] Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D.

[p] Plato, Sophist. pp. 263-264.

Οὐκοῦν ἔπειπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν κ ψευδὴς, τούτων δ' ἐφάνη διάνοια μ αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δό δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, φαίνεται

σεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ξυγγενῶν αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε

Here Plato closes his general philosophical discussion, and reverts to the process of logical division from which he had deviated. In descending the predicamental steps, to find the logical place of the Sophist, Plato had reached a point where he assumed Non-Ens, together with false propositions and judgments affirming Non-Ens. To which the Sophist is conceived as replying, that Non-Ens was contradictory and impossible, and that no proposition could be false. On these points Plato has produced an elaborate argument intended to refute him, and to show that there was such a thing as falsehood imitating truth, or passing itself off as truth: accordingly, that there might be an art or profession engaged in producing such falsehood.

It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it.

Now the imitative profession may be distributed into those who know what they imitate—and those who imitate without knowing.[q] The man who mimics your figure or voice, knows what he imitates: those who imitate the figure of justice and virtue often pass themselves off as knowing it, yet do not really know it, having nothing better than fancy or opinion concerning it. Of these latter again—(*i.e.* the imitators with mere opinion, but no knowledge, respecting that which they imitate)—there are two classes: one, those who sincerely mistake their own mere opinions for knowledge, and are falsely persuaded that they really know: the other class, those who by their perpetual occupation in talking, lead us to suspect and apprehend that they are conscious of not knowing things, which nevertheless they discuss before others as if they did know.[r]

Logical distribution of Imitators—those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know—of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others.

Of this latter class, again, we may recognise two sections: those who impose upon a numerous audience by long discourses on public matters: and those who in private, by short question and answer, compel the person conversing with them to contradict him-

Last class divided—Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the

[q] Plato, Sophist. p. 267 A-D.

[r] Plato, Sophist. p. 268. τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα, διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδησιν, ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται.

Rhetor—Those who impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself—the Sophist.

self.[s] The man of long discourse is not the true statesman, but the popular orator: the man of short discourse, but without any real knowledge, is not the truly wise man, since he has no real knowledge—but the imitator of the wise man, or Sophist.

Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist.

We have here the conclusion of this abstruse and complicated dialogue, called Sophistês. It ends by setting forth, as the leading characteristics of the Sophist —that he deals in short question and answer so as to make the respondent contradict himself: That he talks with small circles of listeners, upon a large variety of subjects, on which he possesses no real knowledge: That he mystifies or imposes upon his auditors; not giving his own sincere convictions, but talking for the production of a special effect. He is ἐναντιοποιολογικὸς and εἴρων, to employ the two original Platonic words, neither of which is easy to translate.

These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself.

I dare say that there were some acute and subtle disputants in Athens to whom these characteristics belonged, though we do not know them by name. But we know one to whom they certainly belonged: and that was, Sokrates himself. They stand manifest and prominent both in the Platonic and in the Xenophontic dialogues. The attribute which Xenophon directly predicates about him, that "in conversation he dealt with his interlocutors just as he pleased,"[t]

[s] Plato, Sophist. p. 268 B. τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ· τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ.

[t] Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 14, τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως βούλοιτο.

Compare, to the same purpose, i. 4, 1, where we are told that Sokrates employed his colloquial Elenchus as a means of chastising (κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα) those who thought that they knew everything; and the conversation of Sokrates with the youthful Euthydêmus, especially what is said by Xenophon at the close of it (iv. 4, 39-40).

The power of Sokrates to vanquish in dialogue the persons called Sophists, and to make them contradict themselves in answering—is clearly brought out, and doubtless intentionally brought out, in some of Plato's most consummate dialogues. Alkibiades says, in the Platonic Protagoras (p. 336), "Sokrates confesses himself no match for Protagoras in long speaking. If Protagoras on his side confesses himself inferior to Sokrates in dialogue, Sokrates is satisfied."

s amply exemplified by Plato in the Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Lachês, Charmides, Lysis, Alkibiadês I. and II., Hippias I. and II., &c. That he cross-examined and puzzled every one else, without knowing the subjects on which he talked, better than they did—is his own declaration in the Apology. That the Athenians regarded him as a clever man mystifying them—talking without sincere persuasion, or in a manner so strange that you could not tell whether he was in jest or in earnest—overthrowing men's established convictions by subtleties which led to no positive truth—is also attested both by what he himself says in the Apology, and by other passages of Plato and Xenophon.[u]

Moreover, if we examine not merely the special features assigned to the Sophist in the conclusion of the dialogue, but also those indicated in the earlier part of it, we shall find that many of them fit Sokrates as well as they could have fitted any one else. If the Sophists hunted after rich young men,[x] Sokrates did the same; seeking opportunities for conversation with them by assiduous frequentation of the palæstræ, as well as in other ways. We see this amply attested by Plato

The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person.

[u] Plato, Apolog. c. 28, p. 37 E. *ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' καὶ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευο-*

Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 4, 9. *γὰρ* (says Hippias to Sokrates) *ὅτι*

, αὐτὸς δὲ λόγον, ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ

See also Memorab. iii. 5, 24.

Compare a striking passage in Plato's Menon, c. 13, p. 80 A; also Theætêt. p. 149; and Plutarch, Quæst. Platonic. p. 1000.

The attribute *α*, which Plato here declares as one of the main characteristics of the Sophists, is applied to Sokrates in a very special manner, not merely in the Platonic dialogues, but also by Timon in the fragments of his Silli remaining—*Αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους* (Plato, Republic, i. c. 11, p. 337 A); and again—*προὔλεγον ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίμὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύκαὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ο, εἴτις τί σε ἐρωτᾷ.* So also in the Symposion, c. 40, p. 216 E, Alkibiades says about Sokrates *εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ*, and Gorgias, c. 98, p. 489 E. In another part of the Gorgias, Kallikles says, "Tell me, Chærephron, does Sokrates mean seriously what he says, or is he bantering? *σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;* (c. 81, p. 481 B.) Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, &c., do not seem to have been *εἴρωνες* at all, as far as our scanty knowledge goes.

The words *εἴρων, εἰρωνικὸς, εἰρωνε* seem to include more than is implied in our words *irony, ironical.* Schleiermacher translates the words *, εἰρωνικὸν ν*, at the end of the Sophistês, by "den ehrlichen, den schlauen, Nachahmer;" which seems to me near the truth,—meaning one who either speaks what he does not think, or evades speaking what he does think, in order to serve some special purpose.

[x] Plato, Sophist. p. 223. *σίων καὶ*

and Xenophon:[y] we see farther that Sokrates announces it as a propensity natural to him, and meritorious rather than otherwise. Again, the argumentative dialogue—disputation or eristic reduced to an art, and debating on the general theses of just and unjust, which Plato notes as characterising the Sophists[z]—belonged in still higher perfection to Sokrates. It not only formed the business of his life, but is extolled by Plato elsewhere,[a] as the true walk of virtuous philosophy. But there was undoubtedly this difference between Sokrates and the Sophists, that he conversed and argued gratuitously, delighting in the process itself: while they both asked and received money for it. Upon this point, brought forward by Plato both directly and with his remarkable fertility in multiplying indirect illusions, the peculiarity of the Sophist is made mainly to turn. To ask or receive a fee for communicating knowledge, virtue, aptitude in debate, was in the view of Sokrates and Plato a grave enormity: a kind of simoniacal practice.[b]

The art which Plato calls "the

We have seen also that Plato assigns to what he terms "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistic art" (ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστικὴ), the employment of the Elenchus,

[y] In the opening words of the Platonic Protagoras, we read as a question from the friend or companion of Sokrates, Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν;

See also the opening of the Charmidês, Lysis, Alkibiadês I., and the speech of Alkibiades in the Symposion.

Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2, 1-2-6, with the commencement of the Platonic Protagoras; in which the youth Hippokrates, far from being run after by the Sophist Protagoras, is described as an enthusiastic admirer of that Sophist from reputation alone, and as eagerly soliciting Sokrates to present him to Protagoras (Protag. pp. 310-311).

[z] Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. Τὸ ἔν- καὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων

Spengel says truly—in his Συν- p. 40—"Quod si sermo et locus hic esset de Sophistarum doctrinâ et philosophiâ, odium quod nunc vulgo in eos vertunt, majore ex parte sine causâ et ratione esse conceptum, eosque laude magis quam vituperatione dignos esse censendos — haud multâ cum operâ exponi posset. Sic, quo proscinduntur convicio, juvenes non nisi magno pretio eruditos esse, levissimum est: immo hoc sophistas suæ ipsorum scientiæ satis confisos esse neque eam despexisse, docet: et vitium, si modo vitium dicendum, commune est vel potius ortum optimis lyricæ poeseos asseclis, Simonide, Pindaro, aliis."

[a] Plato, Theætêt. p. 175 C.

[b] It is to be remembered, however, that Plato, though doubtless exacting no fee, received presents from rich admirers like Dion and Dionysius; and there were various teachers who found presents more lucrative than fees. "M. Antonius Guipho, fuisse dicitur ingenii magni, memoriæ singularis, nec minus Græcé, quam Latiné, doctus: præterea comi facilique naturâ, *nec unquam de mercedibus pactus—eoque plura ex liberalitate discentium consecutus.*" (Sueton. De Illustr. Grammat. 7.)

or the purpose of destroying, in the minds of others, hat false persuasion of existing knowledge which vas the radical impediment to their imbibing acquiitions of real knowledge from the teacher.[c] Here Plato draws a portrait not only strikingly resembling Sokrates, but resembling no one else. As far as we can make out, Sokrates stood alone in this original conception of the purpose of the Elenchus, and in his no less original manner of working it out. To prove to others that they knew nothing, is what he himself represents to be his mission from the Delphian oracle. Sokrates is a Sophist of the most genuine and noble stamp: others are Sophists, but of a more degenerate variety. Plato admits the analogy with reluctance, and seeks to attenuate it.[d] We may remark, however, that according to the characteristic of the true Sophist here given by Plato, Protagoras and Prodikus were less of Sophists than Sokrates. For though we know little of the two former, yet there is good reason to believe, That the method which they generally employed was, that of continuous and eloquent discourse, lecture, exhortation: that disputation by short question and answer was less usual with them, and was not their strong point: and that the Elenchus, in the Sokratic meaning, can hardly be said to have been used by them at all. Now Plato, in this dialogue, tells us that the true and genuine Sophist renounces the method of exhortation as unprofitable; or at least employs it only subject to the condition of having previously administered the Elenchus with success, as his own patent medicine.[e] Upon this defininition, Sokrates is more truly a Sophist than either Protagoras or Prodikus: neither of whom, so far as we know, made it their business to drive the respondent to contradictions.

thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus this sense

Again, Plato tells us that the Sophist is a person who disputes about all matters, and pretends to know all matters: respecting the invisible Gods, respecting the visible Gods, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c., re-

Universal knowledge— was professed at that time

Plato, Sophist. p. 230 D. πρὶν ἂν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσ-, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν φήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἅπερ εἰδέναι μόνον, πλείω δὲ μή.

[d] Plato, Sophist. p. 231 C.

[e] Plato, Sophist. p. 230 E.

Sophers—Plato, Aristotle, &c.

specting transcendental philosophy, generation and essence—and respecting all civil, social, and political questions—and respecting special arts. On all these miscellaneous topics, according to Plato, the Sophists pretended to be themselves instructed, and to qualify their disciples for arguing on all of them.

Now it is possible that the Sophists of that day may have pretended to this species of universal knowledge; but most certainly Plato and Aristotle did the same. The dialogues of Plato embrace all that wide range of topics which he tells us that the Sophists argued about, and pretended to teach. In an age when the amount of positive knowledge was so slender, it was natural for a clever talker or writer to fancy that he knew everything. In reference to every subject then discussed, an ingenious mind could readily supply deductions from bold hypotheses—generalities ratiocinative or imaginative—strung together into an apparent order sufficient for the exigencies of hearers. There was no large range of books to be studied; no stock of facts or experience to be mastered. Every philosopher wove his own tissue of theory for himself, without any restraint upon his intellectual impulse, in regard to all the problems then afloat. What the theories of the Sophists were, we do not know: but Plato, author of the Timæus, Republic, Leges, Kratylus, Menon—who affirmed the pre-existence as well as post-existence of the mind, and the eternal self-existence of Ideas—has no fair ground for reproaching them with blamable rashness in the extent and diversity of topics which they presumed to discuss. They obtained indeed (he says justly) no truth or knowledge, but merely a fanciful semblance of knowledge—an equivocal show or imitation of reality.[f] But Plato himself obtains nothing more in the Timæus: and we shall find Aristotle pronouncing

[f] Plato, Sophistês, p. 233 C. *δοξαστικὴν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.*—p. 234 B. *ματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν*

When the Eleate here says about the Sophists (p. 233 B), *δοκοῦσι πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ*, this is exactly what Sokrates, in the Platonic Apology, tells us about the impression made by his own dialectics or refutative conversation, Plato, Apolog. c. 8, p. 23 A.

ἐκ ταύτησι δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομά τε τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι· οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτ' οἱ

the like condemnation on the Platonic self-existent Ideas. If the Sophists professed to be encyclopedists, this was an error natural to the age; and was the character of Grecian philosophy generally, even in its most illustrious manifestations.

Having traced the Sophist down to the character of a man of delusion and imposture, passing off appearance as if it were reality, and falsehood as if it were truth—Plato (as we have seen) suddenly turns round upon himself, and asks how such a character is possible. He represents the Sophist as maintaining that no man could speak falsely[g]—that a false proposition was self-contradictory, inasmuch as Non-Ens was inconceivable and unutterable. I do not see how the argument which Plato here ascribes to the Sophist, can be reconciled with the character which he had before given of the Sophist—as a man who passed his life in disputation and controversy: which involves the perpetual arraigning of other men's opinions as false. A professed disputant may perhaps be accused of admitting nothing to be true; but he cannot well be charged with maintaining that nothing is false.

Inconsistency—a disputatious man, who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible.

To pass over this inconsistency, however—the reasoning of Plato himself on the subject of Non-Ens is an interesting relic of ancient speculation. He has made for himself an opportunity of canvassing, not only the doctrine of Parmenides, who emphatically denied Non-Ens—but also the opposite doctrine of other schools. He farther comments upon a different opinion, advanced by other philosophers—That no proposition can be admitted, in which the predicate is different from the subject: That no proposition is true or valid, except an identical proposition. You cannot say, Man is good: you can only say Man is Man, or Good is good. You cannot say—Sokrates is good, brave, old, stout, flat-nosed, &c., because you thereby multiply the one Sokrates into many. One thing cannot be many, nor many things one.[h]

Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens—No predications except identical.

[g] Plato, Sophist. pp. 240-241. Compare 260 E.
[h] Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B-C. Compare Plato, Philêbus, p. 14 C.

This last opinion is said to have been held by Antisthenes, one of the disciples of Sokrates. We do not know how he explained or defended it, nor what reserves he may have admitted to qualify it. Plato takes no pains to inform us on this point. He treats the opinion with derision, as an absurdity. We may conceive it as one of the many errors arising from a misconception of the purpose and function of the copula in predication. Antisthenes probably considered that the copula implied identity between the predicate and the subject. Now the explanation or definition of *man* is different from the explanation or definition of *good:* accordingly, if you say, Man is good, you predicate identity between two different things: as if you were to say, Two is Three, or Three is Four. And if the predicates were multiplied, the contradiction became aggravated, because then you predicated identity not merely between one thing and another different thing, but between one thing and many different things. The opinion of Antisthenes depends upon two assumptions—That each separate word, whether used as subject or as predicate, denotes a Something separate and existent by itself: That the copula implies identity. Now the first of these two assumptions is not unfrequently admitted, even in the reasonings of Plato, Aristotle, and many others: while the latter is not more remarkable than various other erroneous conceptions which have been entertained, as to the function of the copula.

Misconception of the function of the copula in predication.

What is most important to observe is—That at the time which we are here discussing, there existed no such sciences as either grammar or formal logic. There was a copious and flexible language—a large body of literature, chiefly poetical—and great facility as well as felicity in the use of speech for the purposes of communication and persuasion. But no attempt had yet been made to analyse or theorise on speech: to distinguish between the different functions of words, and to throw them into suitable classes: to generalise the conditions of good or bad use of speech for proving a conclusion: or to draw up rules for grammar, syntax, and logic. Both Pro-

No formal sciences before the works of Aristotle.

tagoras and Prodikus appear to have contributed something towards this object, and Plato gives various scattered remarks going still farther. But there was no regular body either of grammar or of formal logic: no established rules or principles to appeal to, no recognised teaching on either topic. It was Aristotle who rendered the important service of filling up this gap. I shall touch hereafter upon the manner in which he proceeded: but the necessity of laying down a good theory of predication, and precepts respecting the employment of propositions in reasoning, is best shown by such misconceptions as this of Antisthenes; which naturally arise among argumentative men yet untrained in the generalities of grammar and logic.

Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês—To confute the various schools of thinkers—Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c.

Plato announces his intention, in this portion of the Sophistês, to confute all these different schools of thinkers, to whom he has made allusion.[1] His first purpose, in reasoning against those who maintained Non-Ens to be an incogitable absurdity, is, to show that there are equal difficulties respecting Ens: that the Existent is just as equivocal and unintelligible as the Non-Existent. Those who recognise two co-ordinate and elementary principles (such as Hot and Cold) maintain that both are really existent, and call them both, Entia. Here (argues Plato) they contradict themselves: they call their two elementary principles *one*. What do they mean by existence, if this be not so?

Then again, Parmenides—and those who affirm that Ens Totum was essentially Unum, denying all plurality—had difficulties on their side to surmount. Ens could not be identical with Unum, nor was the name *Ens*, identical with the thing named Ens. Moreover, though Ens Unum was *Totum*, yet Totum was not identical with Ens or with Unum. *Totum* necessarily implied *partes:* but the *Unum per se* was indivisible or implied absence of parts. Though it was true therefore that Ens was both Unum and Totum, these two

[1] Plato, Sophist. p. 251 C-D. Ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους | καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις νῦν

were both of them essentially different from Ens, and belonged to it only by way of adjunct accident. Parmenides was therefore wrong in saying that Unum alone existed.

Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes.

The reasoning here given from Plato throws some light upon the doctrine just now cited from Antisthenes. You cannot say (argues Plato against the advocates of duality) that *two* elements (Hot and Cold) are both of them Entia or Existent, because by so doing you call them *one*. You cannot say (argues Antisthenes) that Sokrates is good, brave, old, &c., because by such speech you call one thing three. Again, in controverting the doctrine of Parmenides, Plato urges, That Ens cannot *be* Unum, because it is Totum (Unum having no parts, while Totum has parts): but it may carry with it the accident Unum, or may have Unum applied to it as a predicate by accident. Here again, we have difficulties similar to those which perplexed Antisthenes. For the same reason that Plato will not admit, That Ens *is* Unum—Antisthenes will not admit, That Man *is* good. It appeared to him to imply essential identity between the predicate and the subject.

All these difficulties and others to which we shall come presently, noway peculiar to Antisthenes—attest the incomplete formal logic of the time: the want of a good theory respecting predication and the function of the copula.

Plato's argument against the Materialists.

Pursuing the purpose of establishing his conclusion (viz. That Ens involved as many perplexities as Non-Ens), Plato comes to the two opposite sects:—1. Those (the Materialists) who recognised bodies and nothing else, as the real Entia or Existences. 2. Those (the Friends of Forms, the Idealists) who maintained that incorporeal and intelligible Forms or Species were the only real existences; and that bodies had no existence, but were in perpetual generation and destruction.[k]

Respecting the first, Plato says that they must after all be ashamed not to admit, that justice, intelligence, &c., are something real, which may be present or absent in different individual men, and therefore must exist apart from all indivi-

[k] Plato, Sophist. p. 246 B.

duals. Yet justice and intelligence are not bodies. Existence therefore is something common to body and not-body. The characteristic mark of existence is, power or potentiality. Whatever has power to act upon any thing else, or to be acted on by any thing else, is a real Ens or existent something.[1]

Unfortunately we never know anything about the opponents of Plato, nor how they would have answered his objection—except so much as he chooses to tell us. But it appears to me that the opponents whom he is here confuting would have accepted his definition, and employed it for the support of their own opinion. "We recognise" (they would say) "just men, or hard bodies, as existent, because they conform to your definition: they have power to act and be acted upon. But justice, apart from just men—hardness, apart from hard bodies—has no such power: they neither act upon any thing, nor are acted on by any thing: therefore we do not recognise them as existent." According to their view, objects of perception acted on the mind, and therefore were to be recognised as existent: objects of mere conception did not act on the mind, and therefore had not the same claim to be ranked as existent: or at any rate they acted on the mind in a different way, which constitutes the difference between the real and unreal. Of this difference Plato's definition takes no account.[m]

Reply open to the Materialists.

Plato now presents this same definition to the opposite class of philosophers: to the Idealists, or partisans of the incorporeal—or of self-existent and separate Forms. These thinkers drew a marked distinction between the Existent and the Generated—between Ens and Fiens—τὸ ὂν and τὸ γιγνόμενον. Ens or the Existent was eternal and unchangeable: Fiens or the Generated was always in change or transit, coming or going. We hold communion (they said) with the generated or transitory, through our bodies and sensible perceptions: we hold communion with unchangeable Ens through our mind and by

Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their point of view against him.

[1] Plato, Sophist. p. 247 E. λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν κεκτήμενον δύναμιν, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ—πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

[m] Plato, Sophist. p. 247 E. τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν, &c.

intellection. They did not admit the definition of existence just given by Plato. They contended that that definition applied only to Fiens or to the sensible world—not to Ens or the intelligible world.[n] Fiens had power to act and be acted upon, and existed only under the condition of being so: that is, its existence was only temporary, conditional, relative: it had no permanent or absolute existence at all. Ens was the real existent, absolute and independent—neither acting upon any thing nor being acted upon. They considered that Plato's definition was not a definition of Existence, or the Absolute: but rather of Non-Existence, or the Relative.

Plato argues—That to know, and to be known, is action and passion, a mode of relativity.

But (asks Plato in reply) what do you mean by "the mind holding communion" with the intelligible world? You mean that the mind knows, comprehends, conceives, the intelligible world: or in other words, that the intelligible world (Ens) is known, is comprehended, is conceived, by the mind. To be known or conceived, is to be acted on by the mind.[o] Ens, or the intelligible world, is thus acted upon by the mind, and has a power to be so acted upon: which power is, in Plato's definition here given, the characteristic mark of existence. Plato thus makes good his definition as applying to Ens, the world of intelligible Forms—not less than to Fiens, the world of sensible phenomena.

The definition of *existence*, here given by Plato, and the way in which he employs it against the two different sects of philosophers—Materialists and Idealists—deserves some remark.

Plato's reasoning—compared with the points of view of both.

According to the Idealists or Immaterialists, Plato's definition of existence would be supposed to establish the case of their opponents the Materialists, who recognised nothing as existing except the sensible world: for Plato's definition (as the Idealists thought) fitted the sensible world, but fitted nothing else. Now these Idealists did not recognise the sensible world as existent at all.

[n] Plato, Sophist. p. 248 C. εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν δὲ . . . —Τί δέ; τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ γιγνώσκεσθαι πάθος ἢ

[o] Plato, Sophist. p. 248 D.

They considered it merely as Fiens, ever appearing and vanishing. The only Existent, in their view, was the intelligible world—Form or Forms, absolute, eternal, unchangeable, but neither visible nor perceivable by any of the other senses. This is the opinion against which Plato *here* reasons, though in various other dialogues he gives it as his own opinion, or at least, as the opinion of his representative spokesman.

In this portion of the present dialogue (Sophistês), the point which he makes is, to show to the Idealists, or Absolutists, that their Forms are not really absolute, or independent of the mind: that the existence of these Forms is relative, just as much as that of the sensible world. The sensible world exists relatively to our senses, really or potentially exercised: the intelligible world exists relatively to our intelligence, really or potentially exercised. In both cases alike, we hold communion with the two worlds: the communion cannot be left out of sight, either in the one case or in the other. The communion is the entire and fundamental fact, of which the Subject conceiving and the Object conceived, form the two opposite but inseparable faces—the concave and convex, to employ a favourite illustration of Aristotle. Subject conceiving, in communion with Object conceived, are one and the same indivisible fact, looked at on different sides. This is, in substance, what Plato urges against those philosophers who asserted the absolute and independent existence of intelligible Forms. Such Forms (he says) exist only in communion with, or relatively to, an intelligent mind: they are not absolute, not independent: they are Objects of intelligence to an intelligent Subject, but they are nothing without the Subject, just as the Subject is nothing without them or some other Object. Object of intelligence implies an intelligent Subject: Object of sense implies a sentient Subject. Thus Objects of intelligence, and Objects of sense, exist alike relatively to a Subject—not absolutely or independently.

This argument, then, of Plato against the Idealists is an argument against the Absolute—showing that there can be no Object of intelligence or conception without its obverse

side, the intelligent or concipient Subject. The Idealists held, that by soaring above the sensible world into the intelligible world, they got out of the region of the Relative into that of the Absolute. But Plato reminds them that this is not the fact. Their intelligible world is relative, not less than the sensible; that is, it exists only in communion with a mind or Subject, but with a Cogitant or intelligent Subject, not a percipient Subject.

The argument of Plato.

ment of the Relative.

The argument here urged by Plato coincides in its drift and result with the dictum of Protagoras—Man is the measure of all things. In my remarks on the Theætêtus,[p] I endeavoured to make it appear that the Protagorean dictum was really a negation of the Absolute, of the Thing in itself, of the Object without a Subject:—and an affirmation of the Relative, of the Thing in communion with a percipient or concipient mind, of Object implicated with Subject—as two aspects or sides of one and the same conception or cognition. Though Plato in the Theætêtus argued at length against Protagoras, yet his reasoning here in the Sophistês establishes by implication the conclusion of Protagoras. Here Plato impugns the doctrine of those who (like Sokrates in his own Theætêtus) held that the sensible world alone was relative, but that the intelligible world or Forms were absolute. He shows that the latter were no less relative to a mind than the former; and that mind, either percipient or cogitant, could never be eliminated from "communion" with them.

Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the Theætêtus.

The same Idealist philosophers also maintained—That Forms, or the intelligible world, were eternally the same and unchangeable. Plato here affirms that this opinion is not true: he contends that the intelligible world includes both change and unchangeableness, motion and rest, difference and sameness, life, mind, intelligence, &c. He argues that the intelligible world, whether assumed as consisting of

The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely unchangeable.

[p] See my notice of the Theætêtus, in the chapter immediately preceding, where I have adverted to Plato's reasoning in the Sophistês.

one Form or of many Forms, could not be regarded either as wholly changeable or wholly unchangeable: it must comprise both constituents alike. If all were changeable, or if all were unchangeable, there could be no Object of knowledge; and, by consequence, no knowledge.[q] But the fact that there *is* knowledge (cognition, conception), is the fundamental fact from which we must reason; and any conclusion which contradicts this must be untrue. Therefore the intelligible world is not all homogeneous, but contains different and even opposite Forms—change and unchangeableness—motion and rest—different and same.[r]

changeable, partly unchangeable.

Let us now look at Plato's argument, and his definition of existence, as they bear upon the doctrine of the opposing Materialist philosophers, whom he states to have held that bodies alone existed, and that the Incorporeal did not exist:—in other words that all real existence was concrete and particular: that the abstract (universals, forms, attributes) had no real existence, certainly no separate existence. As I before remarked, it is not quite clear what or how much these philosophers denied. But as far as we can gather from Plato's language, what they denied was, the existence of attributes *apart from* a substance. They did not deny the existence of just and wise men, but the existence of justice and wisdom, apart from men real or supposable.

Plato's reasoning against the Materialists.

In the time of Plato, distinction between the two classes of words, Concrete and Abstract, had not become so clearly matter of reflection as to be noted by two appropriate terms: in fact, logical terminology was yet in its first rudiments. It is therefore the less matter of wonder that Plato should not here advert to the relation between the two, or to the different sense in which existence might properly be predicable of both. He agrees with the Materialists or friends of the Concrete, in affirming that sensible objects, Man, Horse, Tree, exist (which the Idealists or friends of the Abstract denied): but he differs from them by saying that

Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to Ens —comprehending not only Objects of Perception but Objects of Conception besides.

Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι τε ὄντων

[r] Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C.

Centaurs, are not real, because no individuals possessing the attributes, or belonging to the class, have ever been perceived, or authenticated by induction. Plato's Materialist opponents would here have urged, that if he used the word *existent* or Ens in so wide a sense; comprehending all that is conceivable or nameable, fiction as well as reality—they would require some other words to distinguish fiction from reality—Centaur from Man: which is what most men mean when they speak of one thing as non-existent, another thing as existent. At any rate, here is an equivocal sense of the word Ens—a wider and a narrower sense—which we shall find frequently perplexing us in the ancient metaphysics; and which, when sifted, will often prove, that what appears to be a difference of doctrine, is in reality little more than a difference of phraseology.[s]

This enquiry respecting Ens is left by Plato professedly unsettled; according to his very frequent practice. He pretends only to have brought it to this point: that Ens or the Existent is shown to present as many difficulties and perplexities as Non-Ens or the non-existent.[t] I do not think that he has shown thus much: for, according to his definition, Non-Ens is an impossibility: the term is absolutely unmeaning: it is equivalent to the Unknowable or Inconceivable—as Parmenides affirmed it to be. But he has undoubtedly shown that Ens is in itself

Different definitions of Ens—by Plato—the Materialists, the Idealists.

[s] Plato here aspires to deliver one definition of Ens, applying to all cases. The contrast between him and Aristotle is shown in the more cautious procedure of the latter, who entirely renounces the possibility of giving any one definition fitting all cases. Aristotle declares Ens to be an equivocal word (*δμώνυμον*), and discriminates several different significations which it bears; all these significations having nevertheless an analogical affinity, more or less remote, with each other. See Aristot. Metaphys. Δ. 1017, a. 7, seq.; vi. 1028, a. 10.

It is declared by Aristotle to be the question first and most disputed in Philosophia Prima, Quid est Ens? *καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι, τίς ἡ οὐσία* (p. 1028, b. 2). Compare, B. 1001, a. 6, 31.

This subject is well treated by Brentano, in his Dissertation Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden im Aristoteles. See pp. 49-50 seq., of that work.

Aristotle observes truly, that these most general terms are the most convenient hiding-places for equivocal meaning (Analyt. Post. ii. 97, b. 29).

The analogical varieties of Ens or Essence are graduated, according to Aristotle: Complete, Proper, typical, *οὐσία*, stands at the head: there are then other varieties more or less approaching to this proper type: some of them which *μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος*. (Metaphys. vi. 1029, b. 9.)

[t] Plato, Sophist. p. 250 E.

perplexing: which instead of lightening the difficulties about Non-Ens, aggravates them: for all the difficulties about Ens must be solved, before you can pretend to understand Non-Ens. Plato has shown that Ens is used in three different meanings:—

1. According to the Materialists, it means only the concrete and particular, including all the attributes thereof, essential and accidental.

2. According to the Idealists or friends of Forms, it means only Universals, Forms, and Attributes.

3. According to Plato's own definition here given, it means both the one and the other: whatever the mind can either perceive or conceive: whatever can act upon the mind in any way, or for any time however short. It is therefore wholly relative to the mind: yet not exclusively to the *perceiving* mind (as the Materialists said), nor exclusively to the *conceiving* mind (as the friends of Forms said): but to both alike.

views about Non-Ens examined.

Here is much confusion, partly real but principally verbal, about Ens. Plato proceeds to affirm, that the difficulty about Non-Ens is no greater, and that it admits of being elucidated. The higher Genera or Forms (he says) are such that some of them will combine or enter into communion with each other, wholly or partially, others will not, but are reciprocally exclusive. Motion and Rest will not enter into communion, but mutually exclude each other: neither of them can be predicated of the other. But each or both of them will enter into communion with Existence, which latter may be predicated of both. Here are three Genera or Forms: motion, rest, and existence. Each of them is the *same* with itself, and *different* from the other two. Thus we have two new distinct Forms or Genera —*Same* and *Different*—which enter into communion with the preceding three, but are in themselves distinct from them.[u] Accordingly you may say, motion *partakes* of (or enters into communion with) Diversum, because motion differs from rest:

[u] In the Timæus (pp. 35-36-37), Plato declares these three elements—Θάτερον, Οὐσία—to be the three constituent elements of the cosmical soul, and of the human rational soul.

also you may say, motion *partakes* of Idem, as being identical with itself: but you cannot say, motion *is* different, motion *is* the same; because the subject and the predicate are essentially distinct and not identical.[x]

Some things are always named or spoken of *per se*, others with reference to something else. Thus, Diversum is always different from something else: it is relative, implying a correlate.[y] In this, as well as in other points, Diversum (or Different) is a distinct Form, Genus, or Idea, which runs through all other things whatever. Each thing is different from every other thing: but it differs from them, not through any thing in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form or Idea of Diversum or the Different.[z] So, in like manner, the Form or Idea of Idem (or Same) runs through all other things: since each thing is both different from all others, and is also the same with itself.

[x] Plato, Sophist. p. 255 C. Μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω (i. e. κίνησις καὶ στάσις) ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου.

Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησίν γ' εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἢ θάτερον, μηδ' αὖ στάσιν. He had before said—Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν κίνησίς γε καὶ στάσις οὐθ' ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστιν.

Plato here says, it is true that κίνησις μετέχει ταὐτοῦ, but it is not true that κίνησίς ἐστι ταυτόν. Again, 95, p. 259 A. τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὸν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνο γ' οὐ μέτεσχεν ἀλλ' ἕτερον. He understands, therefore, that ἔστι, when used as copula, implies identity between the predicate and the subject.

This is the same point of view from which Antisthenes looked, when he denied the propriety of saying Ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἀγαθός—Ἄνθρωπός ἐστι κακός: and when he admitted only identical propositions, such as Ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος—Ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἀγαθός. He assumed that ἐστιν, when intervening between the subject and the predicate, implies identity between them; and the same assumption is made by Plato in the passage now before us. Whether Antisthenes would have allowed the proposition—Ἄνθρωπος μετέχει κακίας, or other propositions in which ἐστιν does not appear as copula, we do not know enough of his opinions to say.

Compare Aristotel. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 27, with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 330, a. 331, b, 18-28, ed. Brandis.

[y] Plato, Sophist. p. 255 D. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον. Νῦν δ' ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅ, τι περ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἔστιν εἶναι. These last words partly anticipate Aristotle's explanation of τὰ πρός τι (Categor. p. 6, a. 38).

Here we have, for the first time so far as I know (certainly anterior to Aristotle), names *relative* and names *non-relative*, distinguished as classes, and contrasted with each other. It is to be observed that Plato here uses λέγεσθαι and εἶναι as equivalent; which is not very consistent with the sense which he assigns to ἐστιν in predication: see the note immediately preceding.

[z] Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν· ἓν ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.

His review of the select Five Forms.

Now motion is altogether different from rest. Motion therefore *is not* rest. Yet still motion *is*, because it partakes of existence or Ens. Accordingly, motion both *is*, and *is not*.

Again, motion is different from Idem or the Same. It is therefore *not the same*. Yet still motion *is the same;* because every thing partakes of identity, or is the same with itself. Motion therefore both *is* the same and *is not* the same. We must not scruple to advance both these propositions. Each of them stands on its own separate ground.[a] So also motion is different from Diversum or The Different; in other words, it *is not* different, yet still it *is* different. And, lastly, motion is different from Ens, in other words, *it is not Ens*, or is non-Ens: yet still *it is Ens*, because it partakes of existence. Hence motion is both Ens and Non-Ens.

Here we arrive at Plato's explanation of Non-Ens, τὸ μὴ ὂν: the main problem which he is now setting to himself. Non-Ens is equivalent to, *different from Ens*. It is the Form or Idea of Diversum, considered in reference to Ens. Every thing is Ens, or partakes of entity, or existence. Every thing also is different from Ens, or partakes of difference in relation to Ens: it is thus Non-Ens. Every thing therefore is at the same time both Ens, and Non-Ens. Nay, Ens itself, inasmuch as it is different from all other things, is Non-Ens in reference to them. It is Ens only as one, in reference to itself: but it is Non-Ens an infinite number of times, in reference to all other things.[b]

Plato's doctrine—That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens.

When we say Non-Ens, therefore (continues Plato), we do not mean any thing *contrary* to Ens, but merely something *different from* Ens. When we say *Not-great*, we do not mean any thing contrary to Great, but only something different from great. The negative generally, when annexed to any name, does not designate any thing contrary to what is meant by that name, but something different from it. The general nature or Form of difference is disseminated into a multitude of different parts

[a] Plato, Sophist. pp. 255-256. [b] Plato, Sophist. pp. 256-257.

or varieties according to the number of different things with which it is brought into communion: *Not-great, Not-just,* &c., are specific varieties of this general nature, and are just as much realities as *great, just.* And thus Non-Ens is just as much a reality as Ens, being not contrary, but only that variety of the general nature of difference which corresponds to Ens. *Non-Ens, Not-great, Not-just,* &c., are each of them permanent Forms, among the many other Forms or Entia, having each a true and distinct nature of its own.[c]

I say nothing about contrariety (concludes Plato), or about any thing contrary to Ens; nor will I determine whether Non-Ens in this sense be rationally possible or not. What I mean by Non-Ens is a particular case under the general doctrine of the communion or combination of Forms: the combination of Ens with Diversum, composing that which is different from Ens, and which is therefore Non-Ens. Thus Ens itself, being different from all other Forms, is Non-Ens in reference to them all, or an indefinite number of times[d] (*i. e.* an indefinite number of negative predications may be made concerning it).

Non-Ens being thus shown to be one among the many other Forms, disseminated among all the others, and entering into communion with Ens among the rest—we have next to enquire whether it enters into communion with the Form of Opinion and Discourse. It is the communion of the two which constitutes false opinion and false proposition: if therefore such communion be possible, false opinion and false proposition are possible, which is the point that Plato is trying to prove.[e]

Now it has been already stated (continues Plato) that some Forms or Genera admit of communion with each other, others do not. In like manner some words admit of communion with each other—not others.

Communion of Non-Ens

[c] Plato, Sophist. p. 258 C. εἰς γὰρ ἐναντίου ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὂν βεβαίως ἔστι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστ τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος

[d] Plato, Sophist. pp. 258-259. εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ λόγον ἔχ παντάπασιν ἄλογον, ὃ δὲ νῦν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, &c.

[e] Plato, Sophist. p. 260 B.

Those alone admit of communion, which, when put together, make up a proposition significant or giving information respecting Essence or Existence. The smallest proposition must have a noun and a verb put together: the noun indicating the agent, the verb indicating the act. Every proposition must be a proposition concerning something, or must have a logical subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality. Let us take (he proceeds) two simple propositions: *Theætêtus is sitting down—Theætêtus is flying.*[f] Of both these two, the subject is the same: but the first is true, the second is false. The first gives things existing as they are, respecting the subject: the second gives respecting the subject, things different from those existing, or in other words things non-existent, as if they did exist.[g] A false proposition is that which gives things different as if they were the same, and things non-existent as if they were existent, respecting the subject.[h]

Imperfect analysis of a proposition—the predicate.

The foregoing is Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. Before we remark upon it, let us examine his mode of analysing a proposition. He conceives the proposition as consisting of a noun and a verb. The noun marks the logical *subject*, but he has no technical word equivalent to *subject:* his phrase is, that a proposition must be *of something* or *concerning something.* Then again, he not only has no word to designate the predicate, but he does not even seem to conceive the predicate as distinct and separable: it stands along with the copula embodied in the verb. The two essentials of a proposition, as he states them, are—That it should have a certain subject—That it should be of a certain quality, true or false.[i] This conception is just, as far

[f] Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A. Θεαίτητος κάθηται. Θεαίτητος πέτεται.

[g] Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B. λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν (τῶν λόγων of the two propositions) ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστι περὶ σοῦ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει. Ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.

[h] Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D. Περὶδὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτά, καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάπασιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

It is plain that this explanation takes no account of negative propositions: it applies only to affirmative propositions.

[i] Since the time of Aristotle, the *quality* of a proposition has been un-

as it goes: but it does not state all which ought to be known about proposition, and it marks an undeveloped logical analysis. It indicates moreover that Plato, not yet conceiving the predicate as a distinct constituent, had not yet conceived the copula as such: and therefore that the substantive verb ἔστιν had not yet been understood by him in its function of pure and simple copula. The idea that the substantive verb when used in a proposition must mark *existence* or *essence*, is sufficiently apparent in several of his reasonings.

I shall now say a few words on Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. It is given at considerable length, and was, in the judgment of Schleiermacher, eminently satisfactory to Plato himself. Some of Plato's expressions[k] lead me to suspect that his satisfaction was not thus unqualified: but whether he was himself satisfied or not, I cannot think that the explanation ought to satisfy others.

Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory—Objections to it.

Plato here lays down the position—That the word *Not* signifies nothing more than difference, with respect to that other word to which it is attached. It does not signify (he says) what is contrary; but simply what is different. *Not-great, Not-beautiful* —mean what is different from great or beautiful: Non-Ens means, not what is contrary to Ens, but simply what is different from Ens.

First, then, even if we admit that Non-Ens has this latter meaning and nothing beyond—yet when we turn to Plato's own definition of Ens, we shall find it so all-comprehensive, that there can be absolutely nothing different from Ens:—these last words can have no place and no meaning. Plato defines Ens so as to include all that is knowable, conceivable, thinkable.[1] One portion of this total differs from another: but there can be nothing which differs from it all. The Form or nature of Diversum (to use Plato's phrase) as it is among

derstood to designate its being either affirmative or negative: that being *formal*, or belonging to its form only. Whether affirmative or negative, it may be true or false: and this is doubtless a *quality*, but belonging to its matter, not to its form. Plato seems to have taken no account of the formal distinction, *negative or affirmative*.

[k] Plato, Sophist. p. 259 A-B. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Sophistes, vol. iv. p. 134, of his translation of Plato.

[1] Plato, Sophist. pp. 247-248.

the knowable or conceivable, is already included in the total of Ens, and comes into communion (according to the Platonic phraseology) with one portion of that total as against another portion. But with Ens as a whole, it cannot come into communion, for there is nothing apart from Ens. Whenever we try to think of any thing apart from Ens, we do by the act of thought include it in Ens, as defined by Plato. *Different from great—different from white* (*i. e.* not great, not white, sensu Platonico) is very intelligible: but *Different from Ens*, is not intelligible: there is nothing except the inconceivable and incomprehensible: the words professing to describe it, are mere unmeaning sound. Now this is just[m] what Parmenides said about Non-Ens. Plato's definition of Ens appears to me to make out the case of Parmenides about Non-Ens; and to render the Platonic explanation—*different from Ens*—open to quite as many difficulties, as those which attach to Non-Ens in the ordinary sense.

Secondly, there is an objection still graver against Plato's explanation. When he resolves negation into an affirmation of something different from what is denied, he effaces or puts out of sight one of the capital distinctions of logic. What he says is indeed perfectly true: *Not-great, Not-beautiful, Non-Ens*, are respectively different from *great, beautiful, Ens*. But this, though true, is only a part of the truth; leaving unsaid another portion of the truth which, while equally essential, is at the same time special and characteristic. The negative not only differs from the affirmative, but has such peculiar meaning of its own, as to exclude the affirmative: both cannot be true together. *Not-great* is certainly different from *great:* so also, *white, hard, rough, just, valiant,* &c. are all different from *great.* But there is nothing in these latter epithets to exclude the co-existence of great. *Theætêtus is great—Theætêtus is white:* in the second of these two propositions I affirm something respecting Theætêtus quite different from what I affirm in the first, yet nevertheless noway excluding what is affirmed in the first.[n] The two propositions may both

[m] Compare Kratylus, 430 A.

[n] Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidês (p. 281 p. 785, Stallbaum), says, with reference to the doctrine laid down by Plato in the Sophistês, γὰρ αἱ ἀποφάσεις ἔγγονοί εἰσι τῆς

be true. But when I say—*Theætêtus is dead—Theætêtus is not dead:* here are two propositions which cannot both be true, from the very form of the words. To explain *not-great*, as Plato does, by saying that it means *only* something different from great,[o] is to suppress this peculiar meaning and virtue of the negative, whereby it simply excludes the affirmative, without affirming any thing in its place. Plato is right in saying that *not-great* does not affirm the *contrary* of great, by which he means *little*.[p] The negative does not affirm any thing: it simply denies. Plato seems to consider the negative as a species of affirmative:[q] only affirming something different from what is affirmed by the term which it accompanies. Not-Great, Not-Beautiful, Not-Just—he declares to be Forms just as real and distinct as Great, Beautiful, Just: only different from these latter. This, in my opinion, is a conception logically erroneous. Negative stands opposed to affirmative,

ρότητος τῆς νοερᾶς· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐχ ἵππος, ὅτι ἕτερον—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἄλλο.

Proklus here adopts and repeats Plato's erroneous idea of the negative proposition and its function. When I deny that Caius is just, wise, &c., my denial does not intimate simply that I know him to be something *different* from just, wise; for he may have fifty *different* attributes, co-existent and consistent with justice and wisdom.

To employ the language of Aristotle (see a pertinent example, Physic. i. 8, 191, b. 15, where he distinguishes τὸ μὴ ὂν καθ' αὑτὸ from τὸ μὴ ὂν κατὰ συμβεβηκός), we may say that it is not of the essence of the Different to deny or exclude that from which it is different: the Different may deny or exclude, but that is only by *accident*—κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Plato includes, in the essence of the Different, that which belongs to it only by accident.

Aristotle in more than one place distinguishes διαφορὰ from ἐναντίωσις—not always in the same language. In Metaphysic. i. (ix.) p. 1055 a. 33, he considers that the root of all ἐναντίωσις is ἕξις and στέρησις, understood in the widest sense, *i. e.* affirmative and negative. See Bonitz, not. ad loc. and Waitz, ad Categor. p. 12, a. 26. The last portion of the treatise Περὶ :s was interpreted by Syrianus with a view to uphold Plato's opinion here given in the Sophistes (Schol. ad Aristot. p. 136, a. 15 Brandis).

[o] Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.

If we look to the Euthydêmus, we shall see that this confusion between what is different from A, and what is incompatible with or exclusive of A, is one of the fallacies which Plato puts into the mouth of the two Sophists Euthydêmus and Dionysodôrus, whom he exhibits and exposes in that dialogue. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἢ δ' ὅς (Dionysodôrus) ὢν λίθου, οὐ λίθος εἶ; καὶ ἕτερος ὢν χρυσοῦ, οὐ χρυσὸς εἶ; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ἔφη, ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς, οὐκ ἂν πατὴρ εἴη; (Plat. Euthydem. p. 298 A).

[p] Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.

[q] Plato, Soph. pp. 257 E, 258 A. Ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὂν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἔοικ', εἶναι ξυμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλὸν.

Ὁμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ, εἶναι λεκτέον.

Plato distinctly recognises here Forms or Ideas τῶν ἀποφάσεων, which the Platonists professed not to do, according to Aristotle, Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13—see the instructive Scholia of Alexander, p. 565, a. Brandis.

as one of the modes of distributing both terms and propositions. A purely negative term cannot stand alone in the subject of a proposition: *Non-Entis nulla sunt prædicata*—was the scholastic maxim. The apparent exceptions to this rule arise only from the fact, that many terms negative in their form have taken on an affirmative signification.

Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction.

The view which Plato here takes of the negative deserves the greater notice, because, if it were adopted, what is called the maxim of contradiction would be divested of its universality. Given a significant proposition with the same subject and the same predicate, each taken in one and the same signification—its affirmative and its negative cannot both be true. But if by the negative, you mean to make a new affirmation, different from that contained in the affirmative—the maxim just stated cannot be broadly maintained as of universal application: it may or may not be valid, as the case happens to stand. The second affirmation may be, as a matter of fact, incompatible with the first: but this is not to be presumed, from the mere fact that it is different from the first: proof must be given of such incompatibility.

Examination of the illustrative propositions which Plato gives as examples of true and false. *Theætêtus is sitting down—Theætêtus is flying.* Both the examples are of affirmative propositions: and it seems clear that Plato, in all this reasoning, took no account of negative propositions: those which simply deny, affirming nothing. The second of these propositions (says Plato) affirms *what is not*, as if it were, respecting the subject. But how do we know this to be so? In the form of the second proposition there is nothing to show it: there is no negation of anything, but simply affirmation of a different positive attribute. Although it happens, in this particular case, that the two attributes are incompatible, and that the affirmation of the one includes the negation of the other—yet there is nothing in the form of either proposition to deny the other:—no formal incompatibility between them. Both are alike affirmative, with the

that one is true, the other false.

same subject, but different predicates. These two propositions therefore do not serve to illustrate the real nature of the negative, which consists precisely in this formal incompatibility. The proper negative belonging to the proposition —*Theætêtus is sitting down*—would be, *Theætêtus is not sitting down.* Plato ought to maintain, if he followed out his previous argument, that Not-Sitting down is as good a Form as Sitting-down, and that it meant merely—Different from Sitting down. But instead of doing this Plato gives us a new affirmative proposition, which, besides what it affirms, conceals an implied negation of the first proposition. This does not serve to illustrate the purpose of his reasoning—which was to set up the formal negative as a new substantive attribute, different from its corresponding affirmative. As between the two, the maxim of contradiction applies: both cannot be true. But as between the two propositions given in Plato, that maxim has no application: they are two propositions with the same subject, but different predicates; which happen in this case to be, the one true, the other false—but which are not formally incompatible. The second is not false because it differs from the first: it has no essential connection with the first, and would be equally false, even if the first were false also.

The function of the negative is to deny. Now denial is not a species of affirmation, but the reversal or antithesis of affirmation: it nullifies a belief previously entertained, or excludes one which might otherwise be entertained,—but it affirms nothing. In particular cases, indeed, the denial of one thing may be tantamount to the affirmation of another: for a man may know that there are only two suppositions possible, and that to shut out the one is to admit the other. But this is an inference drawn in virtue of previous knowledge possessed and contributed by himself: another man without such knowledge would not draw the same inference, nor could he learn it from the negative proposition *per se.* Such then is the genuine meaning of the negative; from which Plato departs, when he tells us that the negative is a kind of affirmation, only affirming something different—and

when he illustrates it by producing two affirmative propositions respecting the same subject, affirming different attributes, the one as matter of fact incompatible with the other.

But how do we know that the first proposition—*Theætêtus is sitting down*—affirms what is:—and that the second proposition—*Theætêtus is flying*—affirms what is not? If present, our senses testify to us the truth of the first, and the falsehood of the second: if absent, we have the testimony of a witness, combined with our own past experience attesting the frequency of facts analogous to the one, and the non-occurrence of facts analogous to the other. When we make the distinction, then,—we assume that what is attested by sense or by comparisons and inductions from the facts of sense, is real, or *is:* and that what is merely conceived or imagined, without the attestation of sense (either directly or by way of induction), is not real, or *is not.* Upon this assumption Plato himself must proceed, when he takes it for granted, as a matter of course, that the first proposition is true, and the second false. But he forgets that this assumption contradicts the definition which, in this same dialogue,[r] he had himself given of Ens—of the real or *the thing that is.* His definition was so comprehensive, as to include not only all that could be seen or felt, but also all that had capacity to be known or conceived by the mind: and he speaks very harshly of those who admit the reality of things perceived, but refuse to admit equal reality to things only conceived. Proceeding then upon this definition, we can allow no distinction as to truth or falsehood between the two propositions—*Theætêtus is sitting down—Theætêtus is flying:* the predicate of the second affirms *what is,* just as much as the predicate of the first: for it affirms something which, though neither perceived nor perceivable by sense, is distinctly conceivable and conceived by the mind. When Plato takes for granted the distinction between the two, that the first affirms *what is,* and the second *what is not*—he unconsciously slides into that very recognition of the testimony of sense (in other words, of fact and experience), as

sense.

[r] Plato, Sophist. pp. 247 D-E, 248 D-E.

the certificate of reality, which he had so severely denounced in the opposing materialist philosophers: and upon the ground of which he thought himself entitled, not merely to correct them as mistaken, but to reprove them as wicked and impudent.[s]

I have thus reviewed a long discussion—terminating in a conclusion which appears to me unsatisfactory—of the meaning and function of the negative. I hardly think that Plato would have given such an explanation of it, if he had had the opportunity of studying the Organon of Aristotle. Prior to Aristotle, the principles and distinctions of formal logic were hardly at all developed; nor can we wonder that others at that time fell into various errors which Plato scornfully derides, but very imperfectly rectifies. For example, Antisthenes did not admit the propriety of any predication, except identical, or at most essential, predication: the word ἔστιν appeared to him incompatible with any other. But we perceive in this dialogue, that Plato also did not conceive the substantive verb as performing the simple function of copula in predication: on the contrary he distinguishes ἔστιν, as marking identity between subject and predicate—from μετέχει, as marking accidental communion between the two. Again, there were men in Plato's day who maintained that Non-Ens (τὸ μὴ ὂν) was inconceivable and impossible. Plato, in refuting these philosophers, gives a definition of Ens (τὸ ὂν), which puts them in the right—fails in stating what the true negative is—and substitutes, in place of simple denial, a second affirmation to overlay and supplant the first.

Errors of Antisthenes—depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day.

To complete the examination of this doctrine of the Sophistês, respecting Non-Ens, we must compare it with the doctrine on the same subject laid down in other Platonic dialogues. It will be found to contradict, very distinctly, the opinion assigned by Plato to Sokrates both in the Theætêtus and in the fifth Book of the Republic:[t] where Sokrates deals with Non-Ens in its

logues.

[s] Plato, Sophist. p. 246 D.

[t] Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478. Theætêt. pp. 188-189. Parmenidês, pp. 160 C, 163 C. Euthydêmus, p. 284 B-C. Aristotle (De Interpretat. p. 21, a.

usual sense as the negation of Ens: laying down the position that Non-Ens can be neither the object of the cognizing Mind, nor the object of the opining (δοξάζων) or cogitant Mind: that it is uncognizable and incogitable, correlating only with Non-Cognition or Ignorance. Now we find that this doctrine (of Sokrates, in Theætêtus and Republic) is the very same as that which is affirmed, in the Sophistês, to be taken up by the delusive Sophist: the same as that which the Eleate spends much ingenuity in trying to refute, by proving that Non-Ens is not the negation of Ens, but only that which differs from Ens, being itself a particular variety of Ens. It is also the same doctrine as is declared, both by the Eleate in the Sophistês and by Sokrates in the Theætêtus, to imply as an undeniable consequence, that the falsehood of any proposition is impossible. "A false proposition is that which speaks the thing that is not (τὸ μὴ ὄν). But this is an impossibility. You can neither know, nor think, nor speak, the thing that is not. You cannot know without

32) briefly expresses his dissent from an opinion, the same as what is given in the Platonic Sophistês—that τὸ μὴ ὄν is ὄν τι. He makes no mention of Plato, but Ammonius in the Scholia alludes to Plato (p. 129, b. 20, Schol. Bekk.)

We must note that the Eleate in the Sophistês states both opinions respecting τὸ μὴ ὄν: first that which he refutes—next that which he advances. The Scholiast may, therefore, refer to both opinions, as *stated* in the Sophistês, though one of them is stated only for the purpose of being refuted.

We may contrast with these views of Plato (in the Sophistês) respecting τὸ μὴ ὄν, as not being a negation τοῦ ὄντος, but simply a something ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος, the different views of Aristotle about τὸ μὴ ὄν, set forth in the instructive Commentary of M. Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, p. 360.

"Le non-être s'oppose à l'être, comme sa négation: ce n'est donc pas, non plus que l'être, une chose simple; et autant il y a de genres de l'être, autant il faut que le non-être ait de genres. Cependant l'opposition de l'être et du non-être différente, en realité, dans chacune des catégories, est la même dans toutes par sa forme. Dans cette forme, le second terme n'exprime pas autre chose que l'absence du premier. Le rapport de l'être et du non-être consiste donc dans une pure contradiction: dernière forme à laquelle toute opposition doit se ramener."

Aristotle seems to allude to the Sophistês, though not mentioning it by its title, in three passages of the Metaphysica—E 1026, b. 14; K. 1064, b. 29; N. 1089, a. 5 (see the note of Bonitz on the latter passage)—perhaps also elsewhere (see Ueberweg, pp. 153-154). Plato replied in one way, Leukippus and Demokritus in another, to the doctrine of Parmenides, who banished Non-Ens as incogitable. Leukippus maintained that Non-Ens was equivalent to τὸ κενόν, and that the two elements of things were τὸ πλῆρες and τὸ κενόν, for which he used the expressions δὲν and οὐδέν. Plato replied as we read in the Sophistês: thus both he and Leukippus tried in different ways to demonstrate a positive nature and existence for Non-Ens. See Aristot. Metaph. A. 985, b. 4, with the Scholia, p. 538, Brandis. The Scholiast cites Plato ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ, which seems a mistake for ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ.

knowing something: you cannot speak without speaking something (*i. e.* something that is)." Of this consequence—which is expressly announced as included in the doctrine, both by the Eleate in the Sophistês and by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætêtus—no notice is taken in the Republic.[u]

Again, the doctrine maintained by the Eleate in the Sophistês respecting Ens, as well as respecting Ideas or Forms, is in other ways inconsistent with what is laid down in other Platonic dialogues. The Eleate in the Sophistês undertakes to refute two different classes of opponents; first, the Materialists, of whom he speaks with derision and antipathy—secondly, others of very opposite doctrines, whom he denomi-

[u] Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 264-265) is upon this point more satisfactory than the other Platonic commentators. He points out—not only without disguise, but even with emphasis—the discrepancies and contradictions between the doctrines ascribed to the Eleate in the Sophistês, and those ascribed to Sokrates in the Republic, Phædon, and other Platonic dialogues. These are the main premisses upon which Socher rests his inference, that the Sophistês is not the composition of Plato. I do not admit his inference: but the premisses, as matters of fact, appear to me undeniable. Stallbaum, in his Proleg. to the Sophistês, p. 40 seq., attempts to explain away these discrepancies—in my opinion his remarks are obscure and unsatisfactory. Various other commentators, also holding the Sophistês to be a genuine work of Plato, overlook or extenuate these premisses, which they consider unfavourable to that conclusion. Thus Alkinous, in his Εἰσαγωγὴ, sets down the explanation of τὸ μὴ ὂν which is given in the Sophistês, as if it were the true and Platonic explanation, not adverting to what is said in the Republic and elsewhere (Alkin. c. 35, p. 189 in the Appendix Platonica annexed to the edition of Plato by K. F. Hermann). The like appears in the Προλεγόμενα τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας: c. 21, p. 215 of the same edition. Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidês, speaks in much the same manner about τὸ μὴ ὂν—considering the doctrine advanced and defended by the Eleate in the Sophistês, to represent the opinion of Plato (p. 785 ed. Stallbaum; see also the Commentary of Proklus on the Timæus, b. iii. p. 188 E, 448 ed. Schneid.) So likewise Simplikius and the commentators on Aristotle, appear to consider it—see Schol. ad Aristotel. Physica, p. 332, a. 8, p. 333, b. 334, a. 343, a. 5. It is plain from these Scholia that the commentators were much embarrassed in explaining τὸ μὴ ὄν. They take the Sophistês as if it delivered Plato's decisive opinion upon that point (Porphyry compares what Plato says in the Timæus, but not what he says in the Republic or in Theætêtus, p. 333, b. 25); and I think that they accommodate Plato to Aristotle, in such manner as to obscure the real antithesis which Plato insists upon in the Sophistês—I mean the antithesis according to which Plato excludes what is ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος, and admits only what is ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος.

Ritter gives an account (Gesch. der Philos. part ii. pp. 288-289) of Plato's doctrine in the Sophistês respecting Non-Ens; but by no means an adequate account. K. F. Hermann also omits to (Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philos. pp. 504-505-507) notice the discrepancy between the doctrine of the Sophistês, and the doctrine of the Republic, and Theætêtus, respecting τὸ μὴ ὂν—though he pronounces elsewhere that the Republic is among the most indisputably positive of all Plato's compositions (p. 536).

nates the Friends of Ideas or Forms, speaking of them in terms of great respect. Now by these Friends of Forms or Ideas, Schleiermacher conjectures that Plato intends to denote the Megaric philosophers. M. Cousin, and most other critics (except Ritter) have taken up this opinion. But to me it seems that Socher is right in declaring the doctrine, ascribed to these Friends of Ideas, to be the very same as that which is laid down by Plato himself in other important dialogues—Republic, Timæus, Phædon, Phædrus, Kratylus, &c.—and which is generally understood as that of the Platonic Ideas.[x] In all these dialogues, the capital contrast

[x] Socher, p. 266; Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Sophistes, p. 134; Cousin, Œuvres de Platon, vol. xi. 517 notes.

Schleiermacher gives this as little more than a conjecture; and distinctly admits that any man may easily suppose the doctrine ascribed to these Friends of Forms to be Plato's own doctrine—"Nicht zu verwundern wäre es, wenn Mancher auf den Gedanken käme, Platon meinte hier sich selbst und seine eigene Lehre," &c.

But most of the subsequent critics have taken up Schleiermacher's conjecture (that the Megarici are intended), as if it were something proved and indubitable.

It is curious that while Schleiermacher thinks that the opinions of the Megaric philosophers are impugned and refuted in the Sophistês, Socher fancies that the dialogue was composed by a Megaric philosopher, not by Plato. Ueberweg (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp. 275-277) points out as explicitly as Socher, the discrepancy between the Sophistês and several other Platonic dialogues, in respect to what is said about Forms or Ideas. But he draws a different inference: he infers from it a great change in Plato's own opinion, and he considers that the Sophistês is later in its date of composition than those other dialogues which it contradicts. I think this opinion about the late composition of the Sophistês, is not improbable; but the premisses are not sufficient to prove it.

My view of the Platonic Sophistês differs from the elaborate criticism on it given by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Soph. p. 417 seq.) Moreover, there is one assertion in that Einleitung which I read with great surprise. Steinhart not only holds it for certain that the Sophistês was composed after the Parmenidês, but also affirms that it solves the difficulties propounded in the Parmenidês—discusses the points of difficulty "in the best possible way" ("in der wünschenwerthesten Weise" pp. 470-471).

I confess I cannot find that the difficulties started in the Parmenidês are even noticed, much less solved, in the Sophistês. And Steinhart himself tells us that the Parmenidês places us in a circle both of persons and doctrines entirely different from those of the Sophistês (p. 472). It is plain also that the other Platonic commentators do not agree with Steinhart in finding the Sophistês a key to the Parmenidês; for most of them (Ast, Hermann, Zeller, Stallbaum, Brandis, &c.) consider the Parmenidês to have been composed at a later date than the Sophistês (as Steinhart himself intimates; compare his Einleitung zum Parmenides, p. 312 seq.) Ueberweg, the most recent enquirer (posterior to Steinhart), regards the Parmenidês as the latest of all Plato's compositions—if indeed it be genuine, of which he rather doubts. (Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift. pp. 182-183.)

M. Mallet (Histoire de l'École de Megare, Introd. pp. xl.-lviii., Paris, 1845) differs from all the three opinions of Schleiermacher, Ritter, and Socher. He thinks that the philosophers, designated as Friends of Forms, are intended for the Pythagoreans. His reasons do not satisfy me.

and antithesis is that between Ens or Entia on one side, and Fientia (the transient, ever generated and ever perishing), on the other: between the eternal, unchangeable, archetypal Forms or Ideas—and the ever-changing flux of particulars, wherein approximative likeness of these archetypes is imperfectly manifested. Now it is exactly this antithesis which the Friends of Forms in the Sophistês are represented as upholding, and which the Eleate undertakes to refute.[y] We shall find Aristotle, over and over again, impugning the total separation or demarcation between Ens and Fientia (*εἴδη—γένεσις—χωριστὰ*), both as the characteristic dogma, and the untenable dogma, of the Platonic philosophy: it is exactly the same issue which the Eleate in the Sophistês takes with the Friends of Forms. He proves that Ens is just as full of perplexity, and just as difficult to understand, as Non-Ens:[z] whereas, in the other Platonic dialogues, Ens is constantly spoken of as if it were plain and intelligible. In fact, he breaks down the barrier between Ens and Fientia, by including motion, change, the moving or variable, among the world of Entia.[a] Motion or Change belongs to Fieri; and if it be held to belong to Esse also (by recognising a Form or Idea of Motion or Change, as in the Sophistês), the antithesis between the two, which is so distinctly declared in other Platonic dialogues, disappears.[b]

[y] Plato, Sophist. pp. 246 B, 248 B. The same opinion is advanced by Sokrates in the Republic, v. p. 479 B-C. Phædon, pp. 78-79. Compare Sophist. p. 248 C with Symposion, p. 211 B. In the former passage, *τὸ πάσχειν* is affirmed of the Ideas: in the latter passage, *τὸ πάσχειν μηδέν*.

[z] Plato, Sophist. p. 245 E. Yet he afterwards talks of *τὸ* ..... as contrasted with *τὸ σκοτοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, p. 254 A, which seems not consistent.

[a] Plato, Sophist. p. 249 B. "Ipsæ ideæ per se simplices sunt et immutabiles: sunt æternæ, ac semper fuerunt ab omni liberæ mutatione," says Stallbaum ad Platon. Republ. v. p. 476; see also his Prolegg. to the Parmenidês, pp. 39-40. This is the way in which the Platonic Ideas are presented in the Timæus, Republic, Phædon, &c., and the way in which they are conceived by the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* in the Sophistês, whom the Eleate seeks to confute.

Zeller's chapter on Plato seems to me to represent not so much what we read in the separate dialogues, as the attempt of an able and ingenious man to bring out something like a consistent and intelligible doctrine which will do credit to Plato, and to soften down all the inconsistencies (see Philos. der Griech. vol. ii. pp. 394-415-429 ed. 2nd.)

[b] See a striking passage about the unchangeableness of Forms or Ideas in the Kratylus, p. 439 D-E; also Philêbus, p. 15.

In the Parmenidês (p. 132 D) the supposition *τὰ εἴδη ἑστάναι ἐν τ*

The persons

If we examine the reasoning of the Eleate, in the Sophistês, against the persons whom he calls the Friends of Forms, we shall see that these latter are not Parmenideans only, but also Plato himself in the Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere. We shall also see that the ground, taken up by the Eleate, is much the same as that which was afterwards taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic Ideas. Plato, in most of his dialogues, declares Ideas, Forms, Entia, to be eternal substances distinct and apart from the flux and movement of particulars: yet he also declares, nevertheless, that particulars have a certain communion or participation with the Ideas, and are discriminated and denominated according to such participation. Aristotle controverts both these doctrines: first, the essential separation of the two, which he declares to be untrue: next, the participation or coming together of the two separate elements—which he declares to be an unmeaning fiction or poetical metaphor, introduced in order to elude the consequences of the original fallacy.[c] He maintains that the two (Entia and Fientia—Universals and Particulars) have no reality except in conjunction and implication together; though they are separable by reason (λόγῳ χωριστὰ—τῷ εἶναι, χωριστά) or abstraction, and though we may reason about them apart, and must often reason about them apart.[d] Now it is this implication and conjunction of the Universal with its particulars, which is the doctrine of the Sophistês, and which distinguishes it from other Platonic dialogues,

Plato himself as espouses in Phædon, Republic, &c.

is one of those set up by Sokrates and impugned by Parmenides. Nevertheless in an earlier passage of that dialogue Sokrates is made to include κίνησις and στάσις among the εἴδη (p. 129 E). It will be found, however, that when Parmenides comes to question Sokrates, What εἴδη do you recognise? attributes and subjects only (the latter with hesitation) are included: no such thing as actions, processes, events—τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (p. 130). In Republic, vii. 529 D, we find mention made of τὸ ὂν τάχος and ἡ οὖσα βραδύτης, which implies κίνησις as among the εἴδη. In Theætêt. pp. 152 D, 156 A, κίνησις is noted as the constituent and characteristic of Fieri—τὸ γιγνόμενον—which belongs to the domain of sensible perception, as distinguished from permanent and unchangeable Ens.

[c] Aristot. Metaphys. A. 991-992.

[d] Aristot. Metaph. vi. 1038, a-b. The Scholion of Alexander here (p. 763, b. 36, Brandis) is clearer than Aristotle himself. Τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι δεῖξαι ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου οὐσία ἔστιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος ἡ ὁ καθόλου ἵππος, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν διανοίας ἀπὸ μαξίς ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένων οὐσιῶν καὶ

wherein the Universal is transcendentalized—lodged in a separate world from particulars. No science or intelligence is possible (says the Eleate in the Sophistês) either upon the theory of those who pronounce all Ens to be constant and unchangeable, or upon that of those who declare all Ens to be fluent and variable. We must recognise both together, the constant and the variable, as equally real and as making up the totality of Ens.[e] This result, though not stated in the language which Aristotle would have employed, coincides very nearly with the Aristotelian doctrine, in one of the main points on which Aristotle distinguishes his own teaching from that of his master.

The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and approaches the Aristotelian.

That the Eleate in the Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view and approaches towards the Aristotelian, will be seen also if we look at the lesson of logic which he gives to Theætêtus. In his analysis of a proposition—and in discriminating such conjunctions of words as are significant, from such as are insignificant—he places himself on the same ground as that which is travelled over by Aristotle in the Categories and the treatise De Interpretatione. That the handling of the topic by Aristotle is much superior, is what we might naturally expect from the fact that he is posterior in time. But there is another difference between the two which is important to notice. Aristotle deals with this topic, as he does with every other, in the way of methodical and systematic exposition. To expound it as a whole, to distribute it into convenient portions each illustrating the others, to furnish suitable examples for the general principles laid down—are announced as his distinct purposes. Now Plato's manner is quite different. Systematic exposition is not his primary

[e] Plato, Sophist. p. 249 D. Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα πᾶσα ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἓν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πάντὸν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων τε καὶ τὸ ὂν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν,

Ritter states the result of this portion of the Sophistês correctly. "Es bleibt uns als Ergebniss aller dieser Untersuchungen über das Seyn, dass die Wahrheit sowohl des Werdens, als auch des beharrlichen Seyns, anerkannt werden müsse" (Geschichte der Philos. ii. p. 281).

purpose: he employs it up to a certain point, but as means towards another and an independent purpose—towards the solution of a particular difficulty, which has presented itself in the course of the dialogue.—"*Nosti morem dialogorum.*" Aristotle is demonstrative: Plato is dialectical. In our present dialogue (the Sophistês), the Eleate has been giving a long explanation of Non-Ens; an explanation intended to prove that Non-Ens was a particular sort of Ens, and that there was therefore no absurdity (though Parmenides had said that this was absurdity) in assuming it as a possible object of Cognition, Opination, Affirmation. He now goes a step farther, and seeks to show that it is, actually and in fact, an object of Opination and Affirmation.[f] It is for this purpose, and for this purpose only, that he analyses a proposition, specifies the constituent elements requisite to form it, and distinguishes one proposition from another.

Accordingly, the Eleate,—after pointing out that neither a string of nouns repeated one after the other, nor a string of verbs so repeated, would form a significant proposition,—declares that the conjunction of a noun with a verb is required to form one; and that opination is nothing but that internal mental process which the words of the proposition express. The smallest proposition must combine a noun with a verb:—the former signifying the agent, the latter, the action or thing done.[g] Moreover the proposition must be a proposition *of something;* and it must be of a certain quality. By a proposition *of something*, Plato means, that what is called technically the subject of the proposition (in his time there were no technical terms of logic) must be something positive, and cannot be negative: by the quality of the proposition, he means that it must be either true or false.[h]

[f] Plato, Sophist. p. 261 D.

[g] Plato, Sophist. p. 262 C.

[h] Plato, Sophist. p. 262 E. Compare p. 237 E. Λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν περ ᾖ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ δέ τινος, ἀδύνατον.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ.

In the words here cited Plato unconsciously slides back into the ordinary acceptation of μὴ τι: that is, to μὴ in the sense of negation. If we adopt that peculiar sense of μὴ, which the Eleate has taken so much pains to prove just before in the case of τὸ μὴ ὄν (that is, if we take μὴ as signifying not negation but simply difference), the above argument will not hold. If τὶς signifies one subject (A), and μὴ τις signifies simply another subject (B)

This early example of rudimentary grammatical or logical analysis, recognising only the two main and principal parts of speech, is interesting as occurring prior to Aristotle; by whom it is repeated in a manner more enlarged, systematic,[i] and instructive. But Aristotle assumes, without proof and without supposing that any one will dispute the assumption—that there are some propositions true, other propositions false: that a name or noun, taken separately, is neither true nor false:[k] that propositions (enunciations) only can be true or false.

Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false.

The proceeding of Plato in the Sophistès is different. He supposes a Sophist who maintains that no proposition either is false or can be false, and undertakes to prove against him that there are false propositions: he farther supposes this antagonist to reject the evidence of sense and visible analogies, and to acknowledge no proof except what is furnished by reason and philosophical deduction.[l] Attempting, under these restrictions, to prove his point, Plato's Eleatic disputant rests entirely upon the peculiar meaning which he professes to have shown to attach to Non-Ens. He applies this to prove that Non-Ens may be predicated as well as Ens: assuming that such predication of Non-Ens constitutes a false proposition. But the proof fails. It serves only to show that the peculiar meaning ascribed by the Eleate to Non-Ens is inadmissible. The Eleate compares two distinct propositions—*Theætêtus is sitting down—Theætêtus is flying.* The first is true: the second is false. Why? Because (says

Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task—He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there *are* false propositions.

different from A (ἕτερον), the predicate ἀδύνατον cannot be affirmed. But if we take μὴ τις in its proper sense of negation, the ἀδύνατον will be so far true that οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ Θεαίτητος, cannot be the subject of a proposition. Aristotle says the same in the beginning of the Treatise De Interpretatione (p. 16, a. 30).

[i] Aristotel. De Interpr. init. with Scholia of Ammonius, p. 98, Bekk.

[k] In the Kratylus of Plato Sokrates maintains that names may be true or false as well as propositions, pp. 385 D, 431 B.

[l] Plato, Sophist. p. 240 A. It deserves note that here Plato presents to us the Sophist as rejecting the evidence of sense: in the Theætêtus he presents to us the Sophist as holding the doctrine ἐπιστήμη = αἴσθησις. How these propositions can both be true respecting the Sophists as a class I do not understand. The first may be true respecting some of them; the second may be true respecting others: respecting a third class of them, neither may be true. About the Sophists in a body there is hardly a single proposition which can be safely affirmed.

the Eleate) the first predicates Ens, the second predicates Non-Ens, or (to substitute his definition of Non-Ens) another Ens different from the Ens predicated in the first.[m] But here the reason assigned, why the second proposition is false, is not the real reason. Many propositions may be assigned, which predicate attributes different from the first, but which are nevertheless quite as much true as the first. I have already observed, that the reason why the second proposition is false is, because it contradicts the direct testimony of sense, if the persons debating are spectators: if they are not spectators, then because it contradicts the sum total of their previous sensible experience, remembered, compared, and generalised, which has established in them the conviction that no man does or can fly. If you discard the testimony of sense as unworthy of credit (which Plato assumes the Sophist to do), you cannot prove that the second proposition is false—nor indeed that the first proposition is true. Plato has therefore failed in giving that dialectic proof which he promised. The Eleate is forced to rely (without formally confessing it) on the testimony of sense, which he had forbidden Theætêtus to invoke, twenty pages before.[n] The long intervening piece of dialectic about Ens and Non-Ens is inconclusive for his purpose, and might have been omitted. The proposition—*Theætêtus is flying*—does undoubtedly predicate attributes *which are not* as if they were,[o] and is thus false. But then we must consult and trust the evidence of our perception: we must farther accept *are not* in the ordinary sense of the words, and not in the sense given

[m] Plato, Sophist. p. 263 C.

[n] Theætêtus makes this attempt and is checked by the Eleate, pp. 239-240. It is in p. 261 A that the Eleate begins his proof in refutation of the supposed Sophist—that δόξα and λόγος may be false. The long interval between the two is occupied with the reasoning about Ens and Non-Ens.

[o] Plato, Sophist. p. 263 E. τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα λεγόμενα, &c.

The distinction between these two propositions, the first as true, the second as false (Theætêtus is sitting down, Theætêtus is flying), is in noway connected with the distinction which Plato had so much insisted upon before respecting the intercommunion of Forms, Ideas, General Notions, &c., that some Forms will come into communion with each other, while others will not (pp. 252-253).

There is here no question of repugnancy or intercommunion of Forms: the question turns upon the evidence of vision, which informs us that Theætêtus is sitting down and not standing up or flying. If any predicate be affirmed of a subject, contrary to what is included in the definition of that subject, then indeed repugnancy of Forms might be urged.

to them by the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistês. His attempt to banish the specific meaning of the negative particle, and to treat it as signifying nothing more than difference, appears to me fallacious.[p]

What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion.

In all reasoning, nay in all communication by speech, you must assume that your hearer understands the meaning of what is spoken: that he has the feelings of belief and disbelief, and is familiar with those forms of the language whereby such feelings are expressed: that there are certain propositions which he believes—in other words, which he regards as true: that there are certain other propositions which he disbelieves, or regards as false: that he has had experience of the transition from belief to disbelief, and *vice versâ*—in other words, of having fallen into error and afterwards come to perceive that it was error. These are the mental facts realised in each man and assumed by him to be also realised in his neighbours, when communication takes place by speech. If a man could be supposed to believe nothing, and to disbelieve nothing;—if he had no forms of speech to express his belief, disbelief, affirmation, and denial—no information could be given, no discussion would be possible. Every child has to learn this lesson in infancy; and a tedious lesson it undoubtedly is.[q] Antisthenes (who composed several dialogues) and the other disputants of whom we are now speaking, must have learnt the lesson as other men have: but they find or make some general theory which forbids them to trust the lesson when learnt. It was in obedience to some such theory that Antisthenes discarded all predication except essential

[p] Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B.

[q] Aristotel. Metaphys. vii. 1043, b. 25. ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν, ἔχει τινα καιρόν, &c.

Compare respecting this paradox or θέσις of Antisthenes, the scholia of Alexander on the passage of Aristotle's Topica above cited, p. 259, b. 15, in Schol. Bekk.

If Antisthenes admitted only identical predications, of course τ- γειν became impossible. I have endeavoured to show, in a previous note on this dialogue, that a misconception (occasionally shared even by Plato) of the function of the copula, lay at the bottom of the Antisthenean theory respecting identical predication. Compare Aristotel. Physic. i. p. 185, b. 28, together with the Scholia of Simplikius, pp. 329-330, ed. Bekk., and Plato, Sophistês, p. 245.

predication, and discarded also the form suited for expressing disbelief—the negative proposition: maintaining, That to contradict was impossible. I know no mode of refuting him, except by showing that his fundamental theory is erroneous.

Discussion and theorising can only begin when these processes, partly intellectual, partly emotional, have become established and reproducible portions of the train of mental association. As processes, they are common to all men. But though two persons agree in having the feeling of belief, and in expressing that feeling by one form of proposition—also in having the feeling of disbelief, and in expressing it by another form of proposition—yet it does not follow that the propositions which these two believe or disbelieve are the same. How far such is the case must be ascertained by comparison—by appeal to sense, memory, inference from analogy, induction, feeling, consciousness, &c. The ground is now prepared for fruitful debate: for analysing the meaning, often confused and complicated, of propositions: for discriminating the causes, intellectual and emotional, of belief and disbelief, and for determining how far they harmonise in one mind and another: for setting out general rules as to sequence, or inconsistency, or independence, of one belief as compared with another. To a certain extent, the grounds of belief and disbelief in all men, and the grounds of consistency or inconsistency between some beliefs and others, will be found to harmonise: they can be embodied in methodical forms of language, and general rules can be laid down preventing in many cases inadvertence or erroneous combination. It is at this point that Aristotle takes up rational grammar and logic, with most profitable effect. But he is obliged to postulate (what Antisthenes professed to discard) predication, not merely identical, but also accidental as well as essential—together with names and propositions both negative and affirmative.[r]

Discussion and theorising pre-

disbelief, expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which Antisthenes discarded.

[r] See the remarks in Aristotel. Metaphys. Γ. 1005, b. 2, 1006. a. 6. He calls it ἀπαιδευσία—ἀπαιδευσία τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν—not to be able to dis-

He cannot avoid postulating thus much: though he likewise postulates a great deal more, which ought not to be granted.

The long and varied predicamental series, given in the Sophistês, illustrates the process of logical partition, as Plato conceived it, and the definition of a class-name founded thereupon. You take a logical whole, and you subtract from it part after part until you find the *quæsitum* isolated from everything else.[s] But you must always divide into two parts (he says) wherever it can be done: dichotomy or bipartition is the true logical partition: should this be impracticable, trichotomy, or division into the smallest attainable number of parts, must be sought for.[t] Moreover, the bipartition must be made according to Forms (Ideas, Kinds): the parts which you recognise must be not merely parts, but forms: every form is a part, but every part is not a form.[u] Next, you must draw the line of division as nearly as you can through the middle of the *dividendum*, so that the parts on both sides may be nearly equal: it is in this way that your partition is most likely to coincide with forms on both sides of the line.[x] This is the longest way of proceeding, but the safest. It is a logical mistake to divide into two parts very unequal: you may find a form on one side of the line, but you obtain none on the other side. Thus, it is bad classification to distribute the human race into Hellênes + Barbari: the *Barbari* are of infinite number and diversity, having no one common form to which the name can apply. It is also improper to distribute Number into the

Precepts and

tinguish those matters which can be proved and require to be proved, from those matters which are true, but require no proof and are incapable of being proved. But this distinction has been one of the grand subjects of controversy from his day down to the present day; and between different schools of philosophers, none of whom would allow themselves to deserve the epithet of ἀπαίδευτοι.

Aristotle calls Antisthenes and his followers ἀπαίδευτοι, in the passage cited in the preceding note.

[s] Plato, Politikus, p. 268 D. μέρος ἀεὶ μέρους ἀφαιρουμένους ἐπ' ἄκρον ἐφικνεῖσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον.

Ueberweg thinks that Aristotle, when he talks of αἱ γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις, alludes to these logical distributions in the Sophistês and Politikus (Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp. 153-154).

[t] Politik. p. 287 C.

[u] Politik. p. 263 C.

[x] Politik. pp. 262 B, 265 A. ἰεσοτομεῖν ὡς μάλιστα, &c.

myriad on one side, and all other numbers on the other—for a similar reason. You ought to distribute the human race into the two forms, Male—Female: and number into the two, Odd—Even.[y] So also, you must not divide gregarious creatures into human beings on one side, and animals on the other; because this last term would comprise numerous particulars utterly disparate. Such a classification is suggested only by the personal feeling of man, who prides himself upon his intelligence. But if the classification were framed by any other intelligent species, such as Cranes,[z] they would distinguish Cranes on the one side from animals on the other, including Man as one among many disparate particulars under *animal*.

Division of dichotomical bipartition.

The above-mentioned principle—dichotomy or bipartition into two equal or nearly equal halves, each resting upon a characteristic form—is to be applied as far as it will go. Many different schemes of partition upon this principle may be found, each including forms subordinated one to the other, descending from the more comprehensive to the less comprehensive. It is only when you can find no more parts which are forms, that you must be content to divide into parts which are not forms. Thus after all the characteristic forms, for dividing the human race, have been gone through, they may at last be partitioned into Hellênes and Barbari, Lydians and non-Lydians, Phrygians and non-Phrygians: in which divisions there is no guiding form at all, but only a capricious distribution into fractions with separate names[a]—meaning by *capricious*, a distribution founded on some feeling or circumstance peculiar to the distributor, or shared by him only with a few others; such as the fact, that he is himself a Lydian or a Phrygian, &c.

These precepts in the Sophistês and Politikus, respecting the process of classification, are illustrated by an important

[y] Politikus, p. 262 D-E.

[z] Politikus, p. 263. σεμνῦνον αὐτὸ αυτό, &c.

[a] Politikus, p. 262 E. Λυδοὺς δὲ ἢ Φρύγας ἢ τινας ἑτέρους πρὸς ἅπαντας τάττων ἀπόσχιζοι τότε, ἡνίκα ἀποροῖ γένος ἅμα καὶ μέρος εὑρίσκειν ἑκάτερον

passage of the Philêbus:[b] wherein Plato tells us that the constitution of things includes the Determinate and the Indeterminate implicated with each other, and requiring study to disengage them. Between the highest One, Form, or Genus—and the lowest array of indefinite particulars—there exist a certain number of intermediate Ones or Forms, each including more or fewer of these particulars. The process of study or acquired cognition is brought to bear upon these intermediate Forms: to learn how many there are, and to discriminate them in themselves as well as in their position relative to each other. But many persons do not recognise this: they apprehend only the Highest One, and the Infinite Many, not looking for anything between: they take up hastily with some extreme and vague generality, below which they know nothing but particulars. With knowledge thus imperfect, you do not get beyond contentious debate. Real, instructive, dialectic requires an understanding of all the intermediate forms. But in descending from the Highest Form downwards, you must proceed as much as possible in the way of bipartition, or if not, then of tripartition, &c.: looking for the smallest number of forms which can be found to cover the whole field. When no more forms can be found, then and not till then, you must be content with nothing better than the countless indeterminate particulars.

Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus.

This instructive passage of the Philêbus—while it brings to view a widespread tendency of the human mind, to pass from the largest and vaguest generalities at once into the region of particulars, and to omit the distinctive sub-classes which lie between—illustrates usefully the drift of the Sophistês and Politikus. In these two last dialogues it is the method itself of good logical distribution which Plato wishes to impress upon his readers: the formal part of the process.[c] With this view, he not only makes the process intentionally circuitous

[b] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 16-17.

The notes of Dr. Badham upon this passage in his edition of the Philêbus, p. 11, should be consulted as a just correction of Stallbaum in regard to *πέρας* and *τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων*.

[c] He states this expressly, Politik. p. 286 D.

and diversified, but also selects by preference matters of common sensible experience, though in themselves indifferent, such as the art of weaving,[d] &c.

The reasons given for this preference deserve attention. In these common matters (he tells us) the resemblances upon which Forms are founded are perceived by sense, and can be exhibited to every one, so that the form is readily understood and easily discriminated. The general terms can there be explained by reference to sense. But in regard to incorporeal matters, the higher and grander topics of discussion, there is no corresponding sensible illustration to consult. These objects can be apprehended only by reason, and described only by general terms. By means of these general terms, we must learn to give and receive rational explanations, and to follow by process of reasoning from one form to another. But this is more difficult, and requires a higher order of mind, where there are no resemblances or illustrations exposed to sense. Accordingly, we select the common sensible objects as an easier preparatory mode of a process substantially the same in both.[e]

Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived by sense.

This explanation given by Plato, in itself just, deserves to be compared with his view of sensible objects as knowable, and of sense as a source of knowledge. noticed in a preceding chapter the position which Sokrates is made to lay down in the Theætêtus,[f]— That (*αἴσθησις*) sensible perception reaches only to the separate impressions of sense, and does not apprehend the likeness and other relations between them. I have also noticed the contrast which he establishes elsewhere between

Province of sensible perception—is uch wed by

[d] Plato, Politik. p. 285 D.

[e] Plato, Politik. pp. 285-286. *τοὺς πλείστοις λέληθεν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων ῥᾳδίως αἰσθηταί τινες*

αὐτῶν τις
ντι περί του,
τοῖς δ' αὖ
τοις οὐκ ἔστιν

τῷ λόγον
μετὰ π
ως ἐν
σι καὶ
οὐδὲν πρὸς

ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, οὗ δειχθέντος, &c.

About the *εἴδωλον εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς*, which is affirmed in one of these two cases and denied in the other, compare a striking analogy in the Phædrus, p. 250 A-E.

[f] Plato, Theæt. pp. 185-186. See above p. 375.

Esse and Fieri: *i.e.* between Ens which alone (according to him) is knowable, and the perpetual flux of Fientia which is not knowable at all, but is only matter of opinion or guesswork. Now in the dialogue before us, the Politikus, there is no such marked antithesis between opinion and knowledge. Nor is the province of *αἴσθησις* so strictly confined: on the contrary, Plato here considers sensible perception as dealing with Entia, and as appreciating resemblances and other relations between them. It is by an attentive study and comparison of these facts of sense that Forms are detected. "When a man," (he says) "has first perceived by sense the points of communion between the Many, he must not desist from attentive observation until he has discerned in that communion all the differences which reside in Forms: and when he has looked at the multifarious differences which are visible among these Many, he must not rest contented until he has confined all such as are really cognate within one resemblance, tied together by the essence of one common Form." [g]

These passages may be compared with others of similar import in the Phædrus.[h] Plato here considers the Form, not as an Entity *per se* separate from and independent of the particulars, but as implicated in and with the particulars: as a result reached by the mind through the attentive observation and comparison of particulars: as corresponding to what is termed in modern language abstraction and generalisation. The self-existent Platonic Ideas do not appear in the Politikus:[i] which approximates rather to the Aristotelian doctrine:—that is, the doctrine of the universal, logically distinguishable from its particulars, but having no reality apart from them

Comparison of the Sophistes and the Phædrus.

[g] Plato, Politikus, p. 285 B. *δέον, ὅταν μὲν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν πρότερόν τις αἴσθηται κοινωνίαν, μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς διαφορὰς ἴδῃ πάσας ὁπόσαί περ ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται· τὰς δὲ αὖ ἀνομοιότητας, ὅταν ἐν πλήθεσιν ὀφθῶσι, μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι δυσωπουμένους παύεσθαι, πρὶν*

[h] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.

[i] This remark is made by Stallbaum in his Prolegg. ad Politicum, p. 81; and it is just, though I do not at all concur in his general view of the Politikus, wherein he represents the dialogue as intended to deride the Megaric philosophers.

μόνον). But in other dialogues of Plato, the separation between the two is made as complete as possible, especially in the striking passages of the Republic: wherein we read that the facts of sense are a delusive juggle—that we must turn our back upon them and cease to study them—and that we must face about, away from the sensible world, to contemplate Ideas, the separate and unchangeable furniture of the intelligible world—and that the whole process of acquiring true Cognition, consists in passing from the higher to the lower Forms or Ideas, without any misleading illustrations of sense.[k] Here, in the Sophistês and Politikus, instead of having the Universal behind our backs when the particulars are before our faces, we see it *in and amidst* particulars: the illustrations of sense, instead of deluding us, being declared to conduce, wherever they can be had, to the clearness and facility of the process.[l] Here, as well as in the Phædrus, we find the process of Dialectic emphatically recommended, but described as consisting mainly in logical classification of particulars, ascending and descending divisions and conjunctions, as Plato calls them[m]—analysis and synthesis. We are enjoined to divide and analyse the larger genera into their component species until we come to the lowest species which can no longer be divided: also, conversely, to conjoin synthetically the subordinate species until the highest genus is attained, but taking care not to omit any of the intermediate species, in their successive gradations.[n] Throughout all this process, as described

[k] See the Republic, v. pp. 476-479, vi. pp. 508-510-511, and especially the memorable simile about the cave and the shadows within it, in Book vii. pp. 518-519, together with the περιαγωγὴ which he there prescribes—ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου εἰς τὸ ὄν—and the remarks respecting observations in astronomy and acoustics, p. 529.

[l] Compare the passage of the Phædrus (p. 263 A-C) where Plato distinguishes the sensible particulars on which men mostly agree, from the abstractions (Just and Unjust, &c., corresponding with the ἀσώματα, κάλλιστα, μέγιστα, τιμιώτατα, Politikus, p. 286 A) on which they are perpetually dissenting.

[m] Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστὴς τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν—τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν—καλῶ διαλεκτικούς. The reason which Sokrates gives in the Phædrus for his attachment to dialectics, that he may become competent in discourse and in wisdom (ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν), is the same as that which the Eleate assigns in recommendation of the logical exercises in the Politikus.

[n] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 271 D, 277.

both in the Phædrus and in the Politikus, the eye is kept fixed upon the constituent individuals. The Form is studied in and among the particulars which it comprehends: the particulars are looked at in groups put together suitably to each comprehending Form. And in both dialogues, marked stress is laid upon the necessity of making the division dichotomous; as well as according to Forms, and not according to fractions which are not legitimate Forms.[o] Any other method, we are told, would be like the wandering of a blind man.

What distinguishes the Sophistês and Politikus from most other dialogues of Plato, is, that the method of logical classification is illustrated by setting the classifier to work upon one or a few given subjects, some in themselves trivial, some important. Though the principles of the method are enunciated in general terms, yet their application to the special example is kept constantly before us; so that we are never permitted, much less required, to divorce the Universal from its Particulars.

Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês.

As a dialogue illustrative of this method, the Politikus (as I have already pointed out) may be compared to the Phædrus: in another point of view, we shall find instruction in comparing it to the Parmenidês. This last too is a dialogue illustrative of method, but of a different variety of method.

Variety of method in dialectic research—Diversity of Plato.

What the Sophistês and Politikus are for the enforcement of logical classification, the Parmenidês is for another part of the philosophising process—laborious evolution of all the consequences deducible from the affirmative as well as from the negative of every hypothesis bearing upon the problem. And we note the fact, that both in the Politikus and Parmenidês, Plato manifests the consciousness that readers will complain of him as prolix, tiresome, and wasting ingenuity upon unprofitable matters.[p] In the Parmenidês, he even

[o] Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265 E, 270 E. *ἐοίκοι ἂν ὥσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείᾳ.*

[p] Plato, Politikus, p. 283 B. *πρὸς δὴ τὸ νόσημα τὸ τοιοῦτον*, and the long series of questions and answers which follows to show that prolixity is unavoidable, pp. 285 C, 286 B-E.

goes the length of saying that the method ought only to be applied before a small and select audience; to most people it would be repulsive, since they cannot be made to comprehend the necessity for such circuitous preparation in order to reach truth.[q]

[q] Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D-E.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

POLITIKUS.

I HAVE examined in the preceding sections both that which the Sophistês and Politikus present in common— (viz. a lesson, as well as a partial theory, of the logical processes called Definition and Division)— and that which the Sophistês presents apart from the Politikus. I now advert to two matters which we find in the Politikus, but not in the Sophistês. Both of them will be found to illustrate the Platonic mode of philosophising.

The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês.

I. Plato assumes, that there will be critics who blame the two dialogues as too long and circuitous; excessive in respect of prolixity. In replying to those objectors,[a] he enquires, What is meant by long or short—excessive or deficient—great or little? Such expressions denote mensuration or comparison. But there are two varieties of mensuration. We may measure two objects one against the other: the first will be called great or greater, in relation to the second—the second will be called little or less in relation to the first. But we may also proceed in a different way. We may assume some third object as a standard, and then measure both the two against it: declaring the first to be great, greater, excessive, &c., because it exceeds the standard—and the second to be little, less, deficient, &c., because it falls short of the standard. Here then are two judgments or estimations altogether different from each other, and yet both denoted by the same words *great* and *little:* two distinct *essences* (in Platonic phrase) of great and little, or of greatness and littleness.[b] The art of mensuration has thus two varieties.

Views of

Obj
sur

pared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard.

[a] The treatment of this subject begins, Politik. p. 283 C, where Plato intimates that the coming remarks are of wide application.

[b] Plato, Politik. p. 283 E. *δίττας ἄρα ταύτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ θετέον.*

One includes arithmetic and geometry, where we simply compare numbers and magnitudes with each other, determining the proportions between them: the other assumes some independent standard; above which is excess, and below which is deficiency. This standard passes by different names according to circumstances. The Moderate, Becoming, Seasonable, Proper, Obligatory, &c.[c] Such a standard is assumed in every art—in every artistic or scientific course of procedure. Every art has an end to be attained, a result to be produced; which serves as the standard whereby each preparatory step of the artist is measured, and pronounced to be either excessive or deficient, as the case may be.[d] Unless such a standard be assumed, you cannot have regular art or science of any kind; neither in grave matters, nor in vulgar matters—neither in the government of society, nor in the weaving of cloth.[e]

Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is—To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable.

Now what is the end to be attained, by this our enquiry into the definition of a Statesman? It is not so much to solve the particular question started, as to create in ourselves dialectic talent and aptitude, applicable to everything. This is the standard with reference to which our enquiry must be criticised—not by regard to the easy solution of the particular problem, or to the immediate pleasure of the hearer. And if an objector complains, that our exposition is too long or our subject-matters too vulgar—we shall require him to show that the proposed end might have been attained with fewer words and with more solemn illustrations. If he cannot show this, we shall disregard his censure as inapplicable.[f]

[c] Plato, Politik. p. 284 E. *τὸ μέτριον, τὸ πρέπον, τὸν καιρὸν, τὸ δέον*, &c.

The reader will find these two varieties of mensuration, here distinguished by Plato, illustrated in the "two distinct modes of appreciating weight" (the Absolute and the Relative), described and explained by Professor Alexander Bain in his work On the Senses and the Intellect, p. 111. This explanation forms an item in the copious enumeration given by Mr. Bain of the fundamental sensations of our nature.

[d] Plato, Politik. p. 283 D. *κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαίαν οὐσίαν.*—284 A-C. *πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν.*

[e] Plato, Politik. p. 284 C.

[f] Plato, Politik. pp. 286 D, 287 A. Compare Plato, Philêbus, p. 36 D.

The above-mentioned distinction between the two varieties of mensuration or comparison, is here given by Plato, simply to serve as a defence against critics who censured the peculiarities of the Politikus. It is not pursued into farther applications. But it deserves notice, not merely as being in itself just and useful, but as illustrating one of the many phases of Plato's philosophy. It is an exhibition of the relative side of Plato's character, as contra-distinguished from the absolute or dogmatical: for both the two, opposed as they are to each other, co-exist in him and manifest themselves alternately. It conveys a valuable lesson as to the apportionment of praise and blame. "When you blame me" (he says to his critics), "you must have in your mind some standard of comparison upon which the blame turns. Declare what that standard is:—what you mean by the Proper, Becoming, Moderate, &c. There is such a standard, and a different one, in every different Art. What is it here? You must choose this standard, explain what it is, and adhere to it when you undertake to praise or blame." Such an enunciation (thoroughly Sokratic[g]) of the principle of relativity, brings before critics the fact—which is very apt to be forgotten—that there must exist in the mind of each some standard of comparison, varying or unvarying, well or ill understood: while at the same time it enforces upon them the necessity of determining clearly for themselves, and announcing explicitly to others, what that standard is. Otherwise the propositions, affirming comparison, can have no uniform meaning with any two debaters, nor even with the same man at different times.

Plato's de- ag tic sity t critic declare explicitly what his standard of comparison is.

To this relative side of Plato's mind belong his frequent commendations of measurement, numbering, computation, comparison, &c. In the Protagoras,[h] he describes the art of measurement as the main guide and protector of human life: it is there treated as applicable to the correct estimation of pleasures and pains.

Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c.

[g] Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 7, iii. 10, 12.

[h] Plato, Protagor. p. 357 B.

In the Phædon,[j] it is again extolled; though the elements to be calculated are there specified differently. In the Philêbus, the antithesis of Πέρας and Ἄπειρον (the Determinant or Limit, and the Indeterminate or Infinite) is one of the leading points of the dialogue. We read in it moreover a bipartite division of Mensuration or Arithmetic,[k] which is quite different from the bipartite division just cited out of the Politikus. Plato divides it there (in the Philêbus) into arithmetic for theorists, and arithmetic for practical life: besides which, he distinguishes the various practical arts as being more or less accurate, according as they have more or less of measurement and sensible comparison in them. Thus the art of the carpenter, who employs measuring instruments such as the line and rule—is more accurate than that of the physician, general, pilot, husbandman, &c., who have no similar means of measuring. This is a classification quite different from what we find in the Politikus; yet tending in like manner to illustrate the relative point of view, and its frequent manifestation in Plato. In the Politikus, he seeks to refer praise and blame to a standard of measurement, instead of suffering them to be mere outbursts of sentiment unsystematic and unanalysed.

Definition of the Statesman or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing.

II. The second peculiarity to which I call attention in the Politikus, is the definition or description there furnished of the character so-called: that is, the Statesman, the King, Governor, Director, or Manager, of human society. At the outset of the dialogue, this person is declared to belong to the Genus—Men of Science or of Art (the two words are faintly distinguished in Plato). It is possession of the proper amount of scientific competence which constitutes a man a Governor: and which entitles him to be so named, whether he actually governs any society or not.[l] (This point of departure is purely Sokratic: for in the Memorabilia of Xenophon,[m] So-

[j] Plato, Phædon, p. 69 B.

[k] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 25 C, 27 D, 57. δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ, καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ, τὴν διὰ δνόματος δὲ

This same bipartition, however, is noticed in another passage of the Politikus, p. 258 D-E.

[l] Plato, Politikus, pp. 258 B, 259 B.

[m] Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 10.

krates makes the same express declaration.) The King knows, but does not act: yet he is not a simple critic or spectator—he gives orders: and those orders are not suggested to him by any one else (as in the case of the Herald, the Keleustês, and others),[n] but spring from his own bosom and his own knowledge. From thence Plato carries us through a series of descending logical subdivisions, until we come to define the King as the shepherd and feeder of the flock of human beings.[o] But many other persons, besides the King, are concerned in feeding the human flock, and will therefore be included in this definition: which is thus proved to be too large, and to require farther qualification and restriction.[p] Moreover the feeding of the human flock belongs to others rather than to the King. He tends and takes care of the flock, but does not feed it: hence the definition is, in this way also, unsuitable.[q]

Our mistake (says Plato) was of this kind. In describing the King or Governor, we have unconsciously fallen upon the description of the King, such as he was in the Saturnian period or under the presidency of Kronus; and not such as he is in the present period. Under the presidency of Kronus, each human flock was tended and governed by a divine King or God, who managed everything for it, keeping it happy and comfortable by his own unassisted agency: the entire Kosmos too, with its revolutions, was at that time under the immediate guidance of a divine mover. But in the present period this divine superintendance is withdrawn: both the entire Kosmos, and each separate portion of it, is left to its own movement, full of imperfection and irregularity. Each human flock is now tended not by a divine King, as it was then; but by a human King, much less perfect, less effective, less exalted above the constituent members. Now the definition which we fell upon (says Plato) suited the King of the Saturnian period; but does not suit the King of the present or human

King during the Saturnian period of a breed superior to the people—not so any longer.

[n] Plato, Politik. p. 260 C-E. τὸ μὲν τῶν βασιλέων γένος εἰς τὴν αὐτεπιν θέντες, &c.

[o] Plato, Politikus, pp. 267 B, 268 C.

[p] Plato, Politik. p. 268.

[q] Plato, Politik. p. 275 D-E.

period.[r] At the first commencement of the present period, the human flock, left to themselves without superintendance from the Gods, suffered great misery: but various presents from some Gods (fire from Prometheus, arts from Hephæstus and Athênê, plants and seeds from Dêmêtêr) rendered their condition more endurable, though still full of difficulty and hardship.[s]

[r] Plato, Politik. pp. 274 A-275 B.

[s] Plato, Politik. p. 274 C.

Plato embodies these last-mentioned comparisons in an elaborate and remarkable mythe-theological, cosmical, zoological, social—which occupies six pages of the Politikus (268 D-274 E). Meiners and Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 273-275) point out that the theology of Plato in this fable differs much from what we read in the Phædon, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such discrepancy as one of his arguments against the genuineness of the Politikus. I have already observed that I do not concur in his inference. I do not expect uniformity of doctrine in the various Platonic dialogues: more especially on a subject so much beyond experience, and so completely open to the conjectures of a rich imagination, as theology and cosmogony. In the Sophistês, pp. 242-243, Plato had talked in a sort of contemptuous tone about those who dealt with philosophical doctrine in the way of mythe, as a proceeding fit only for boys: (not unlike the manner of Aristotle, when he speaks of *οἱ μυ-*

Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 15-18, Λ. 1071, b. 27): while here, in the Politikus, he dilates upon what he admits to be a boyish mythe, partly because a certain portion of it may be made available in illustration of his philosophical purpose, partly because he wishes to enliven the monotony of a long-continued classification. Again, in the Phædrus (p. 229 C), the Platonic Sokrates is made to censure as futile any attempt to find rational explanations for the popular legends (*σοφίζεσθαι*): but here, in the Politikus, the Eleate expressly adapts his theory about the backward and forward rotation of the Kosmos to the explanation of the popular legends—about earthborn men, and about Helios turning back his chariot, in order to escape the shocking spectacle of the Thyestean banquet: which legends, when so explained, Plato declares that people would be wrong to disbelieve (*οἱ νῦν ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται*, pp. 271 B, 268 A, B, C).

The differences of doctrine and handling, between the various Platonic dialogues, are facts not less worthy to be noted than the similarities. Here, in the mythe of the Politikus, we find a peculiar theological view, and a very remarkable cosmical doctrine—the rotation and counter-rotation of the Kosmos. The Kosmos is here declared (as in the Timæus) to be a living and intelligent Subject; having received these mental gifts from its Demiurgus. But the Kosmos is also Body as well as Mind; so that it is incapable of that constant sameness or uniformity which belongs to the Divine: Body having in itself an incurable principle of disorder (p. 269 D). The Kosmos is perpetually in movement; but its movement is only rotatory or circular in the same place: which is the nearest approximation to uniformity of movement. It does not always revolve by itself; nor is it always made to revolve by the Divine Steersman (*κυβερνήτης*, p. 272 E), but alternately the one and the other. This Divine Steersman presides over its rotation for a certain time, and along with him many subordinate Deities or Dæmons; until an epoch fixed by some unassigned destiny has been reached (p. 272 E). Then the Steersman withdraws from the process to his own watch-tower (*εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ περιωπήν*), and the other Deities along with him. The Kosmos being left to itself, ceases to revolve in the same direction, and begin its counter rotation; revolving by itself backwards, or in the contrary direction. By such violent revulsion many of the living inhabitants of the Kosmos are de-

The human King, whom we shall now attempt to define, tends the human flock; but there are other persons also who assist in doing so, and without whose concurrent agency he could not attain his purpose. We may illustrate this by comparing with him the weaver of woollen garments: who requires many subsidiary and preparatory processes, performed by agents different from himself (such as the carder of wool, the spinner, and the manufacturer of the instruments for working the loom) to enable him to finish his work. In all matters, important as well as vulgar, two separate processes

Distinction of Causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend princ... also.

stroyed. The past phenomena are successively reproduced, but in an inverse direction—the old men go back to maturity, boyhood, infancy, death: the dead are born again, and pass through their lives backwards from age to infancy. Yet the counter-rotation brings about not simply an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, but new phenomena also: for we are told that the Kosmos, when left to itself, did tolerably well as long as it remembered the Steersman's direction, but after a certain interval became forgetful and went wrong, generating mischief and evil: so that the Steersman was at last forced to put his hand again to the work, and to impart to it a fresh rotation in his own direction (p. 273 B-D). The Kosmos never goes satisfactorily, except when the hand of the Steersman is upon it. But we are informed that there are varieties of this divine administration: one named the period of Kronus or Saturn; another that of Zeus, &c. The *present* is the period of Zeus (p. 272 B). The period of Kronus was one of spontaneous and universal abundance, under the immediate superintendence of the Deity. This Divine Ruler was infinitely superior to the subjects whom he ruled, and left nothing to be desired. But *now*, in the present period of Zeus, men are under human rule, and not divine: there is no such marked superiority of the Ruler to his subjects. The human race has been on the point of becoming extinct; and has only been saved by beneficent presents from various Gods — fire from Prometheus, handicraft from Hephæstus and Athênê (pp. 272 C, 274 C).

All this prodigious bulk of mythical invention (*θαυμαστὸς ὄγκος*, p. 277 B) seems to be introduced here for the purpose of illustrating the comparative ratio between the Ruler and his subjects; and the material difference in this respect between King and Shepherd—between the government of mankind by kings, and that of flocks and herds by the herdsman. In attempting to define the True and Genuine Ruler (he lays it down), we can expect nothing better than a man among other men; but distinguished above his fellows, so far as wisdom, dialectic, and artistic accomplishment, can confer superiority.

There is much in this copious mythe which I cannot clearly understand or put together: nor do I derive much profit from the long exposition of it given by Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Polit. pp. 100-128). We cannot fairly demand either harmonious consistency or profound meaning in the different features of an ingenious fiction. The hypothesis of a counter-rotation of the Kosmos (spinning like a top, *ἐπὶ σμικροτάτου βαῖνον ποδὸς ἰέναι*, p. 270 A,) with an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, appears to me one of the most singular fancies in the Greek mythology. I cannot tell how far it may have been suggested by any such statement as that of the Egyptian priests (Herodot. ii. 142). I can only repeat the observation made by Phædrus to the Platonic Sokrates, in the dialogue Phædrus (p. 275 A): "You, Sokrates, construct easily enough Egyptian tales, or any other tales that you please."

or arts, or contributory persons, are to be distinguished: Causes and Co-Causes, *i. e.* Principal Causes, and Concurrent, Auxiliary, Co-efficient, Subordinate, Causes.[t] The King, like the Weaver, is distinguishable, from other agents helping towards the same end, as a Principal Cause from Auxiliary Causes.[u] The Causes auxiliary to the King, in so far as they are inanimate, may be distributed roughly under seven heads (bipartition being here impracticable)—Implements, Vessels, Vehicles, Protections surrounding the body, Recreative Objects, Raw Material of every variety, Nutritive Substances, &c.[x] Other auxiliary Causes are, the domestic cattle, bought slaves, and all descriptions of serving persons; being often freemen who undertake, for hire, servile occupations and low trades. There are moreover ministerial officers of a higher grade: heralds, scribes, interpreters, prophets, priests, Sophists, rhetors; and a great diversity of other functionaries, military, judicial, forensic, dramatic, &c., who manage different departments of public affairs, often changing from one post to another.[y] But these higher ministerial functionaries differ from the lower in this—That they pretend to be themselves the directors and managers of the government, not recognising the genuine King: whereas the truth is, that they are only ministerial and subordinate to him:—they are Concurrent Causes, while he is the only real or principal Cause.[z]

Plato does not admit the received classification

Our main object now (says the Eleate), is to distinguish this Real Cause from the subordinate Causes which are mistaken for its partners and equals:—the genuine intelligent Governor, from those who pretend falsely to be governors, and are supposed often to be such.[a] We cannot admit the lines of distinction,

does not touch the point upon which all

[t] Plato, Politikus, p. 281 D-E.

[u] Plato, Politik. p. 287 D.

[x] Plato, Polit. pp. 288-289.

[y] Plato, Polit. pp. 290-291 B. Plato describes these men by comparing them to lions, centaurs, satyrs, wild beasts, feeble and crafty. This is not very intelligible, but I presume that it alludes to the variety of functions, and the frequent alternation of functions. I cannot think that such an obscure jest deserves Stallbaum's compliment:—"Ceterum lepidissima hæc est istorum hominum irrisio, qui cum leonibus, Centauris, Satyris, aliisque monstris comparantur." Plato repeats it p. 303 C.

[z] Plato, Politik. p. 291 C.

[a] Plato, Politik. p. 292 D.

which are commonly drawn between different governments, as truly logical: at least they are only subordinate to ours. Most men distinguish the government of one, or a few, or the many: government of the poor or of the rich: government according to law, or without law:—by consent, or by force. The different names current, monarchy or despotism, aristocracy, or oligarchy, &c., correspond to these definitions. But we hold that these definitions do not touch the true characteristic: which is to be found in Science, Knowledge, Intelligence, Art or scientific procedure, &c., and in nothing else. The true government of mankind is, the scientific or artistic: whether it be carried on by one, or a few, or many—whether by poor or rich, by force or consent—whether according to law, or without law.[b] This is the right and essential characteristic of genuine government:—it is government conducted according to science or art. All governments not conforming to this type are only spurious counterfeits and approaches to it, more or less defective or objectionable.[c]

true Scientific or Unscientific.

Looking to the characteristic here suggested, the Eleate pronounces that all numerous and popular governments must be counterfeits. There can be no genuine government except by One man, or by a very small number at most. True science or art is not attainable by many persons, whether rich or poor: scarcely even by a few, and probably by One alone; since the science or art of governing men is more difficult than any other science or art.[d] But the government of this One is the only true and right government, whether he proclaims laws or governs without law, whether he employs severity or mildness—provided only he adheres to his art, and achieves its purpose, the good and improvement of the governed.[e] He is like the true physician, who cuts and burns patients, when his art commands, for the pur-

Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be

[b] Plato, Politik. pp. 292 C, 293 B.

[c] Plato, Politik. p. 293 D-E. ταύτην δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιούτους ὅρους μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον, ὅσας δὲ ἄλλας λέγομεν, οὐ γνησίας οὔσ[ας] ὄντως οὔσας λ[έγ]ομεν.

[d] Plato, Politik. pp. 292 D-E, 297 B, 300 E.

[e] Plato, Politik. p. 293 B-E.

pose of curing them. He will not be disposed to fetter himself by fixed general laws: for the variety of situations and the fluctuation of circumstances, is so perpetual, that no law can possibly fit all cases. He will recognise no other law but his art.[f] If he lays down any general formula or law, it will only be from necessity, because he cannot be always at hand to watch and direct each individual case: but he will not hesitate to depart from his own formula whenever Art enjoins it.[g] That alone is *base, evil, unjust,* which he with his political Science or Art declares to be so. If in any particular case he departs from his own declaration, and orders such a thing to be done—the public have no right to complain that he does injustice. No patient can complain of his physician, if the latter, acting upon the counsels of his art, disregards a therapeutic formula.[h] All the acts of the true Governor are right, whether according or contrary to law, so long as he conducts himself with Art and Intelligence—aiming exclusively to preserve the people, and to render them better instead of worse.[i]

How mischievous would it be (continues the Eleate), if we prescribed by fixed laws how the physician or the steersman should practise their respective arts: if we held them bound to peremptory rules, punishing them whenever they departed from those rules, and making them accountable before the Dikastery, when any one accused them of doing so: if we consecrated these rules and dogmas, forbidding all criticism or censure upon them, and putting to death the free enquirer as a dreaming, prosy, Sophist, corrupting the youth and inciting lawless discontent![k] How absurd, if we pretended that every citizen did know, or might or ought to know, these two arts; because the

Fixed laws,

vernor, are mischievous, as they would be for the physician and the

ning practice by laws, and presuming every one to know it.

[f] Plato, Polit. p. 297 A. *οὐ γράμματα τιθεὶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν τέχνην νόμον παρεχόμενος.*

[g] Plato, Polit. pp. 300 C, 295 B-C.

[h] Plato, Polit. p. 296 C-D.

[i] Plato, Polit. p. 297 A.

[k] Plato, Polit. pp. 298-299. *Καὶ τοίνυν ἔτι δεήσει θέσθαι νόμον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις, ἂν τις κυβερνητικὴν καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ ἰατρικῆς ἀληθείαν—ζητῶν φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ σοφιζόμενος ὅτιοῦν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, πρῶτον μὲν μήτε ἰατρικὸν αὐτὸν μήτε κυβερνητικὸν ὀνομάζειν, [illegible]τεωρόλογον ἀδολέσχην τινὰ εἶθ' ὡς διαφθείροντα ἄλλους [illegible] καὶ ἀναπείθοντα ἐπ[illegible]ικῇ, &c.*

matters concerning them were enrolled in the laws, and because no one ought to be wiser than the laws?[1] Who would think of imposing any such fetters on other arts, such as those of the general, the painter, the husbandman, the carpenter, the prophet, the cattle-dealer? To impose them would be to render life, hard as it is even now, altogether intolerable. Yet these are the trammels under which in actual cities the political Art is exercised.[m]

Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is a second-best.

Such are the mischiefs inseparable, in greater or less degree, from fixed and peremptory laws. Yet grave as these mischiefs are, there are others yet graver, which such laws tend to obviate. If the magistrate appointed to guard and enforce the laws, ventures to break or contravene them, simulating, but not really possessing, the Art or Science of the genuine Ruler—he will make matters far worse. The laws at any rate are such as the citizens have been accustomed to, and such as give a certain measure of satisfaction. But the arbitrary rule of this violent and unscientific Governor is a tyranny:[n] which is greatly worse than the laws. Fixed laws are thus a second-best:[o] assuming that you cannot obtain a true scientific, artistic, Governor. If such a man could be obtained, men would be delighted to live under him. But they despair of ever seeing such a character, and they therefore cling to fixed laws, in spite of the numerous concomitant mischiefs.[p] These mischiefs are indeed so serious, that when we look at actual cities, we are astonished how they get on under such a system; and we cannot but feel how firm and deeply rooted a city naturally is.[q]

We see therefore (the Eleate goes on) that there is no true polity—nothing which deserves the name of a genuine poli-

[1] Plato, Polit. p. 299 C. ἂν δὲ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα δόξῃ πείθειν εἴτε νέους εἴτε πρεσβύτας, κολάζειν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. Οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖν τῶν νόμων εἶναι σοφώτερον· οὐδένα γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν τό τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κυβερνητικὸν ἐξεῖναι γὰρ τῷ ἓ γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτρια ἔθη κείμενα.

[m] Plato, Polit. p. 299 D-E. ὥστε ὁ βίος, ὢν καὶ νῦν χαλεπὸς, εἰς τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον ἀβίωτος γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν.

[n] Plato, Polit. p. 300 A-B, 301 B-C.

[o] Plato, Polit. p. 300 C. δεύτερος πλοῦς.

[p] Plato, Polit. p. 301 D.

[q] Plato, Polit. p. 302 A. ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἡμῖν θαυμαστέον μᾶλλον, ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι ἐστὶ φύσει;

tical society—except the government of one chief, scientific or artistic. With him laws are superfluous and even inconvenient. All other polities are counterfeits: factions and cabals, rather than governments:[r] delusions carried on by tricksters and conjurers. But among these other polities or sham polities, there is a material difference as to greater or less badness: and the difference turns upon the presence or absence of good laws. Thus, the single-headed government, called monarchy (assuming the Prince not to be a man of science or art) is the best of all the sham-polities, if the Prince rules along with and in observance of known good laws: but it is the worst of them all, if he rules without such laws, as a despot or tyrant. Oligarchy, or the government of a few—if under good laws, is less good than that of the Prince under the same circumstances—if without such laws, is less bad than that of the despot. Lastly, the government of the many is less good under the one supposition—and less bad under the other. It is less effective, either for good or for evil. It is in fact less of a government: the administrative force being lost by dissipation among many hands for short intervals; and more free play being thus left to individuals. Accordingly, assuming the absence of laws, democracy is the least bad or most tolerable of the six varieties of sham-polity. Assuming the presence of laws, it is the worst of them.[s]

Comparison

Is the least bad, because it is least of a government.

We have thus severed the genuine scientific Governor from the unworthy counterfeits by whom his agency is mimicked in actual society. But we have still to sever him from other worthier functionaries, analogous and cognate, with whom he co-operates; and to show by what characteristic he is distinguished from persons such as the General, the Judge, the Rhetor or Persuader to good and just objects. The

The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries.

[r] Plato, Polit. pp. 302-303 B. *τοὺς κοινωνοὺς τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, πλὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμονος, ἀφαιρετέον ὡς οὐκ ὄντας πολιτικοὺς ἀλλὰ στασιαστικούς, καὶ εἰδώλων μεγίστων προστάτας καὶ αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοιούτους, μεγίστους μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς.*

[s] Plato, Polit. pp. 302 B, 303 A-B. *τίς δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ἥκιστα χαλεπὴ συζῆν, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ τί*

distinction is, that all these functions, however honourable functions, are still nevertheless essentially subordinate and ministerial, assuming a sovereign guidance from some other quarter to direct them. Thus the General may, by his strategic art, carry on war effectively: but he must be directed when, and against whom, war is to be carried on. The Judge may decide quarrels without fear, antipathy, or favour: but the general rules for deciding them must be prescribed to him by a higher authority. So too the Rhetor may apply his art well, to persuade people, or to work upon their emotions, without teaching them: but he must be told by some one else, when and on what occasions persuasion is suitable, and when force must be employed instead of it.[t] Each of these functionaries must learn, what his own art will not teach him, the proper seasons, persons, and limitations, among and under which his art is to be applied. To furnish such guidance is the characteristic privilege and duty of the scientific chief, for which he alone is competent. He does not act himself, but he originates, directs, and controuls, all the real agents and agencies. Without him, none of them are available or beneficial towards their special ends. He alone can judge of their comparative value, and of the proper reasons for invoking or restraining their interference.[u]

What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them.

The great scientific Governor being thus defined, and logically distinguished from all others liable to be confounded with him, Plato concludes by a brief statement what his principal functions are. He will aim at ensuring among his citizens the most virtuous characters and the best ethical combinations. Like the weaver (to whom he has been already assimilated) he will put together the great political web or tissue of improved citizenship, intertwining the strong and energetic virtues (the warp) with the yielding and gentler virtues (the woof).[x] Both these disposi-

[t] Plato, Polit. pp. 304-305. καὶ ὁρμὴν τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς
Plato, Polit. p. 305 D. τὴν γὰρ | ἐγκαιρίας τε περὶ καὶ ἀκαιρίας, τὰς δ'

ν, γιγνώσκουσαν | τ

[u] Plato, Polit. pp. 306-307. βασιλικὴν συμπλοκήν.

tions are parts or branches of virtue; but there is a natural variance or repulsion between them.[y] Each of them is good, in proper measure and season: each of them is bad, out of measure and season. The combination of both, in due proportion, is indispensable to form the virtuous citizen: and that combination it is the business of the scientific Governor to form and uphold. It is with a view to this end that he must set at work all the agents of teaching and education, and must even interfere to arrange the intermarriages of the citizens; not allowing the strong and courageous families to form alliance with each other, lest the breed should in time become too violent—nor the gentle and quiet families to do the like, lest the offspring should degenerate into stupidity.[z]

If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous stand orthodoxy.

All persons, who, unable to take on this conjunction, sin by an excess of the strong element, manifesting injustice or irreligion—must be banished or put to death:[a] all who sin by excess of the feebler element, exhibiting stupidity and meanness, must be degraded into slavery. Above all things, the scientific Governor must himself dictate, and must implant and maintain, in the minds of all his citizens, an authoritative standard of orthodox sentiment respecting what is just, honourable, good—and the contrary.[b] If this be ensured, and if the virtues naturally discordant be attempered with proper care, he will make sure of a friendly and harmonious community, enjoying as much happiness as human affairs admit.[c]

Remarks—Sokratic Ideal—Title to govern mankind derived exclusively from scientific

I have thus given a brief abridgment of the main purpose of the Politikus, and of the definition which Plato gives of the True Governor and his function. I proceed to make a few remarks upon it.

Plato's theory of government is founded upon the supposition of perfect knowledge—scientific or artistic intelligence—in the person of the Governor: a

[y] Plato, Polit. pp. 306 A-B, 307 C, 308 B.
[z] Plato, Polit. pp. 308-309-310.
[a] Plato, Polit. p. 309 A.
[b] Plato, Polit. pp. 309 C, 310 E.
[c] Plato, Polit. p. 311 B-C.

partial approach, through teaching and acquired knowledge, to that immense superiority of the Governor over the Governed, which existed in the Saturnian period. It is this, and this alone, which constitutes, in his estimation, the title to govern mankind. The Governor does not himself act: he directs the agency of others: and the directions are dictated by his knowledge. I have already observed that Sokrates had himself enunciated the doctrine—Superior scientific competence (the special privilege of a professor or an artist) is the only legitimate title to govern.

Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action.

From Sokrates the idea passed both to Plato and to Xenophon: and the contrast between the two is shown forcibly by the different way in which they deal with it. Xenophon has worked it out on a large scale, in the Cyropædia—on a small scale, in the Œconomicus. Cyrus in the former, Ischomachus in the latter, knows better than any one else what is to be done, and gives orders accordingly. But both the one and the other are also foremost in action, setting example as well as giving orders to others. Now Plato, while developing the same idea, draws a marked line of distinction between Science and Practice:—between direction and execution.[d] His scientific Governor does not act at all, but he gives orders to all the different men of action, and he is the only person who knows on what occasions and within what limits each agent should put forth his own special aptitude. Herein we discern one of the distinctions between these two *viri Socratici:* Xenophon, the soldier and man of action—Plato, the speculative philosopher. Xenophon conceives the conditions of the True Governor in a larger way than Plato, for he includes among them the forward and energetic qualities requisite for acting on the feelings of the subject Many, and for disposing them to follow orders with cheerfulness and zeal:[e] whereas Plato makes abstraction of this part of the

[d] Plato, Polit. pp. 259 C-D, 305 D.

[e] See the preface to Xenophon's Cyropædia; also Cyropæd. i. 6, 20; and his Œconomicus, c. 21, and c. 13, 4, where we see the difference between the Xenophontic idea, and the Platonic idea, of ὁ ἀρχικὸς ... οἱ θεῖοι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ

conditions, and postulates obedience on the part of the many as an item in his fundamental hypothesis. Indeed he perpetually presents us with the comparison of the physician, who cuts and burns for the purpose of ultimate cure. Plato either neglects, or assumes as a matter of course, the sentiments of the persons commanded, or the conditions of *willing* obedience; while Xenophon dwells upon the maintenance of such sentiments as one of the capital difficulties in the problem of government. And we perceive a marked contrast between the unskilful proceedings of Plato, when he visited Dionysius II. at Syracuse, illustrating his (Plato's) inaptitude for dealing with a real situation—and the judicious management of Xenophon, when acting as one of the leaders of the Cyreian army under circumstances alike unexpected and perilous.

The theory

contradiction to that goras.

Plato here sets forth the business of governing as a special art, analogous to the special art of the weaver, the steersman, the physician. Now in each special art, the requisite knowledge and competence is possessed only by the one or few artists who practise them. The knowledge possessed by such one or few, suffices for all the remaining community; who benefit by it, but are altogether ignorant on the matter, and follow orders blindfold. As this one Artist is the only competent person for the task, so he is assumed *quâ* Artist, to be infallible in the performance of the task—never to go wrong, nor to abuse his power, nor to aim at any collateral end.[f] Such is Plato's theory of government in the Politikus. But if we turn to the Protagoras, we shall find this very theory of government explicitly denied, and a counter-theory affirmed, in the discourse put into the mouth of Protagoras. That Sophist is made to distinguish the political or social art, upon which the possibility of constituting or keeping up human society depends, from all other arts (manual, useful, linguistic), by this express characteristic: All other arts were distributed among mankind in such manner, that knowledge

[f] Compare Plato, Republic, i. pp. 340-341.

and skill were confined to an exclusive few, whose knowledge, each in his own special department, sufficed for the service of all the rest, not favoured with the like knowledge—but the political or social art was distributed (by order of Zeus to Hermes) on a principle quite opposite. It was imparted to every member of society without exception. If it had been granted only to a few, and not to all, society could not have held together. Justice and the sense of shame (Temperance or Moderation), which are the bonds of the city and the fruits of the political art, must be instilled into every man. Whoever cannot take on and appropriate them (Zeus proclaims it as his law), must be slain as a nuisance or distemper of the city.[g]

Points of the Protagorean theory—rests upon common sentiment.

Such we have seen to be the theory enunciated by the Platonic Protagoras (in the dialogue so called) respecting the political or social art. It pervades all the members of society, as a common and universal attribute, though each man has his own specialty besides. It was thus distributed at the outset by Zeus. It stands embodied in the laws and in the unwritten customs, so that one man may know it as well as another. Every man makes open profession of knowing and possessing it:—which he cannot do with any special art. Fathers enforce it on their children by rewards and punishments, schoolmasters and musicians impart it by extracts from the poets: the old teach it to the young: nay every man, far from desiring to monopolise it for himself, is forward in teaching it to others: for it is the interest of every one that his neighbour should learn it. Since every one thus teaches it, there are no professed or special teachers: yet there are still some few who can teach it a little better than others—and among those few I (says Protagoras) am one.[h]

Whoever compares the doctrine of the Politikus[i] with the portion of the Protagoras[k] to which I have just referred, will

[g] Plato, Protagoras, pp. 322, 325 A.
[h] Plato, Protagor. pp. 327-328.
[i] Plato, Politik. p. 301 E.
The portion of this dialogue, from p. 296 to p. 302, enunciates the doctrine of which I have given a brief abstract in the text.
[k] Plato, Protagoras, pp. 321-328.

see that they stand to each other as theory and counter-theory. The theory in the Politikus sets aside (intentionally or not) that in the Protagoras. The Platonic Protagoras, spokesman of King Nomos, represents common sense, sentiment, sympathies antipathies, written laws, and traditional customs known to all as well as reverenced by the majority: the Platonic Politikus repudiates all these, as preposterous fetters to the single Governor who monopolises all political science and art. Let us add, too, that the Platonic Protagoras (whom many commentators teach us to regard as a person of exorbitant arrogance and pretensions) is a very modest man compared to the Eleate in the Platonic Politikus. For the former accepts all the written laws and respected customs around him,—admits that most others know them, in the main, as well as he,—and only professes to have acquired a certain amount of superior skill in impressing them upon others: whereas the latter sets them all aside, claims for himself an uncontradicted monopoly of social science and art, and postulates an extent of blind submission from society such as has never yet been yielded in history.

Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigences of the Protagoras.

The Eleate here complains of it as a hardship, that amidst a community actually established and existing, directed by written laws, traditional customs and common sentiment (the Protagorean model),—he, the political artist, is interdicted from adverse criticism and outspoken censure of the legal and consecrated doctrines. If he talks as one wiser than the laws, or impugns them as he thinks that they deserve, or theorises in his own way respecting the doctrines which they sanction—he is either laughed to scorn as a visionary, prosing, Sophist—or hated, and perhaps punished, as a corruptor of youth; as a person who brings the institutions of society into contempt, and encourages violators of the law.[1]

The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse criticism or dissenter is either condemned to silence or punished.

[1] Plato, Politikus, p. 299 B. ἂν τις ζητῶν φαίνηται παρὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ σοφιζόμενος ὀτιοῦν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

In the seventh book of Republic (p. 520 B), Plato describes the position of the philosopher in an established society, springing up by his own internal force, against the opposition of

The reproach implied in these phrases of Plato is doubtless intended as an allusion to the condemnation of Sokrates. It is a reproach well-founded against that proceeding of the government of Athens:—and would have been still better founded against other contemporary governments. That the Athenians were intolerant, is not to be denied: but they were less intolerant than any of their contemporaries. Nowhere else except at Athens could Sokrates have gone on until seventy years of age talking freely in the market-place against the received political and religious orthodoxy. There was more free speech (παῤῥησία)[m] at Athens than in any part of the contemporary world. Plato, Xenophon, and the other companions of Sokrates, proclaimed by lectures and writings that they thought themselves wiser than the laws of Athens: yet though the Gorgias was intended as well as adapted to bring into hatred and contempt both those laws and the persons who administered them, the Athenian Rhetors never indicted Plato for libel. Upon this point, we can only speak comparatively: for perfect liberty of proclaiming opinions neither does now exist, nor ever has existed, anywhere. Most men have no genuine respect for the right of another to form and express an opinion dissentient from theirs: if they happen to hate the opinion, they account it a virtue to employ as much ill-usage or menace as will frighten the holder thereof into silence. Plato here points out in emphatic language,[n] the deplorable consequences of assuming infallibility and perfection for the legal and customary orthodoxy of the country, and prohibiting free censure by dissentient individuals. But this is on the supposition that the laws and customs are founded only on common sense and traditional reverence:—and that the scientific Governor is among the dissenters. Plato's judgment is radically different

Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs.

all the social influences—*α γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ (πόλει) πολιτείας*, &c.

[m] See Euripides, Ion, 671.
ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν μ' ἡ τεκοῦσ' εἴη γυνὴ, ὥς μοι γένοιτο μητρόθεν παῤῥησία—
also Euripid. Hippolyt. 424, and Plato, Gorgias, p. 461 E, where Sokrates says to Polus—*δεινὰ μέντ' ἂν πάθοις, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις*, &c.

[n] Plato, Polit. p. 299 E.

when he supposes the case reversed:—when King Nomos is superseded by the scientific Professor of whom Plato dreams, or by a lawgiver who represents him. We shall observe this when we come to the Treatise de Legibus, in which Plato constitutes an orthodoxy of his own, prohibiting free dissent by restrictions and penalties stricter than any which were known to antiquity. He cannot recognise an infallible common sense: but he has no scruple in postulating an infallible scientific dictator, and in enthroning himself as such. Though well aware that reasoned truth presents itself to different philosophers in different versions, he does not hesitate to condemn those philosophers who differ from him, to silence or to something worse.

It will appear then that the Platonic Politikus distinguishes three varieties and gradations of social constitution.

Theory of the Politikus—distinguished three gradations of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst.

1. *Science or Art. Systematic Construction from the beginning, based upon Theory.*—That which is directed by the constant supervision of a scientific or artistic Ruler. This is the only true or legitimate polity. Represented by Plato in Republic. Illustrated by the systematic scheme of weights, measures, apportionment of years, months, and days, in calendar—put together on scientific principles by the French Convention in 1793—as contrasted with the various local, incoherent, growths, which had obtained recognition through custom or arbitrary preference of unscientific superiors.

2. *Common Sense. Unsystematic Aggregate of Customs, accepted in an Actual Society.*—That which is directed by written laws and fixed traditional customs, known to every one, approved by the common sense of the community, and communicated as well as upheld by the spontaneous teaching of the majority. King Nomos.

This stands for the second best scheme: the least objectionable form of degeneracy—yet still a degeneracy. It is the scheme set forth by the Platonic-Protagoras, in the dialogue so called. Represented with improvements by Plato in Treatise De Legibus.

3. *Gigantic Individual Force.*—That in which some violent

individual—not being really scientific or artistic, but perhaps falsely pretending to be so—violates and tramples under foot the established laws and customs, under the stimulus of his own exorbitant ambition and unmeasured desires.

This is put forward as the worst scheme of all: as the greatest depravation of society, and the greatest forfeiture of public as well as private happiness. We have here the proposition which Pôlus and Kalliklês are introduced as defending in the Gorgias, and Thrasymachus in the Republic. In both dialogues, Sokrates undertakes to expose it. The great benefit conferred by King Nomos, is, that he protects society against the maximum of evil.

Another interesting comparison may be made: that between the Politikus and the Republic. We must remember that the Politikus is announced by Plato as having two purposes. 1. To give a lesson in the method of definition and division. 2. To define the characteristic of the person bearing the name of Politikus, distinguishing him from all others, analogous or disparate.—The method is here more prominent than the doctrine.

Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference.

But in the Republic, no lesson of method is attempted; the doctrine stands alone and independent of it. We shall find however that the doctrine is essentially the same. That which the Politikus lays down in brief outline, is in the Republic amplified and enlarged; presented with many variations and under different points of view, yet, still at the bottom, the same doctrine, both as to affirmation and negation. The Republic affirms (as the Politikus does) the exclusive legitimacy of science, art, intelligence, &c., as the initiatory and omnipotent authority over all the constituent members of society: and farther, that such intelligence can have no place except in one or a few privileged persons. The Republic (like the Politikus) presents to us the march of society with its Principal Cause—its concurrent or Auxiliary Causes—and its inferior governable mass or matter, the human flock, indispensable and co-essential as a part of the whole scheme. In the Republic, the Cause is represented by the small council of philosophical Elders: the concurrent causes,

by the Guardians or trained soldiers: the inferior matter, by the remaining society, which is distributed among various trades, providing for the subsistence and wants of all. The explanation of Justice (which is the ostensible purpose of the Republic) is made to consist in the fact—That each one of these several parts does its own special work—nothing more—nothing less. Throughout all the Republic, a constant parallelism is carried on (often indeed overstrained) between the community and the individual man. In the one as well as in the other, Plato recognises the three constituent elements, all essential as co-operators, but each with its own special function: in the individual he recognises three souls (encephalic, thoracic, and abdominal) as corresponding to Elders, Guardians, and Producers, in the community. Here are the same features as those given in outline in the Politikus: but the two higher features of the three appear greatly expanded in the Republic: the training and conditions proper for the philosophic Artist or Governor, and for his auxiliaries the Guardians, being described and vindicated at great length. Moreover, in the Republic, Plato not only repeats the doctrine[o] that the right of command belongs to every art in its own province and over its own subject-matter (which is the cardinal point in the Politikus)—but he farther proclaims that each individual neither can exercise, nor ought to exercise, more than one art. He allows no double men or triple men[p]—"Quam quisque novit artem, in eâ se exerceat." He would not have respected the Xenophontic Cyrus or Ischomachus. He carries the principle of specialization to its extreme point. His Republic is an aggregate of special artists and professional aptitudes: among whom the Governor is only one, though the first and rarest. He sets aside the common basis of social endowments essential to every man: upon which each man's specialty is superinduced in the theory of the Platonic Protagoras. The only common quality which Plato admits is,—That each man, and

[o] Plato, Republ. i. p. 342 C. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὗ εἰσὶ.

B-395-397 E. οὐκ ἔστ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, ἕκαστος ἓν πράττει.

[p] Plato, Republ. ii. pp. 370 B, 374

each of the three souls composing each man, shall do his own business and his own business only: this is his definition of Justice, in the Republic.[q]

Lastly, I will illustrate the Politikus by comparison with the Kratylus, which will be treated in the next chapter. The conception of dictatorial science or art, which I have stated as the principal point in the Politikus, appears again in the Kratylus applied to a different subject—naming, or the imposition of names. Right and legitimate name-giving is declared to be an affair of science or art, like right and legitimate polity: it can only be performed by the competent scientific or artistic name-giver, or by the lawgiver considered in that special capacity. The second title of the dialogue Kratylus is Περὶ Ὀνομάτων Ὀρθότητος—On the Rectitude or legitimacy of names. What constitutes right and legitimate Name-giving? In like manner, we might provide a second title for the Politikus—Περὶ Πολιτείας Ὀρθότητος—On the rectitude or legitimacy of polity or sociality. What constitutes right or legitimate sociality?[r] Plato answers—It is the constant dictation and supervision of art or science—or of the scientific, artistic dictator, who alone knows both the End and the means. This alone is right and true sociality—or sociality as it ought to be. So, if we read the Kratylus, we find Plato defining in the same way right Name-giving—or name-giving as it ought to be. It is when each name is given by an artistic name-constructor, who discerns the Form of the name naturally suitable in each particular case, and can embody it in appropriate letters and

Comparison of the Politikus, constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration—in the latter to the formation and modification of names.

[q] Plato, Republ. iv. p. 433.

[r] The exact expression occurs in Politikus, pp. 293 E, 294 A. νῦν δὲ φανερὸν ἤδη ὅτι τοῦτο περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄνευ

The ὀρθὴ, ἀληθινὴ, γνησία, πολιτεία, are phrases employed several times—pp. 292 A-C, 293 B-E, 296 E, 297 B-D. ὁ ἀληθινὸς, ὁ ἔντεχνος—p. 300 E. τὴν ἰνην, τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς μετὰ τος πολιτείαν, p. 302 A-E.

Plato sometimes speaks as if a bad πολιτεία were no πολιτεία at all—as if a bad νόμος were no νόμος at all. See above, vol. i. ch. xii. pp. 421-425, where I have touched on this point in reviewing the Minos. This is a frequent and perplexing confusion, but purely verbal. Compare Aristotel. Polit. iii. 2, p. 1276, a. 1, where he deals with the like confusion—ἆρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης;

syllables.[s] A true or right name signifies by likeness to the thing signified.[t] The good lawgiver discerns this likeness: but all lawgivers are not good: the bad lawgiver fancies that he discerns it, but is often mistaken.[u] It would be the ideal perfection of language, if every name could be made to signify by likeness to the thing named. But this cannot be realised: sufficient likenesses cannot be found to furnish an adequate stock of names. In the absence of such best standard, we are driven to eke out language by appealing to a *second-best*, an inferior and vulgar principle approximating more or less to rectitude—that is, custom and convention.[x]

We see thus that in the Kratylus also, as well as in the Politikus, the systematic dictation of the Man of Science or Art is pronounced to be the only basis of complete rectitude. Below this, and far short of it, yet still indispensable as a supplement in real life—is, the authority of unsystematic custom or convention; not emanating from any systematic constructive Artist, but actually established (often, no one knows how) among the community, and resting upon their common sentiment, memory, and tradition.

This is the true Platonic point of view, considering human affairs in every department, the highest as well as the lowest, as subjects of Art and Science: specialization of attributes and subdivision of function, so that the business of governing falls to the lot of one or a few highly qualified Governors: while the social edifice is assumed to have been constructed from the beginning by one of these Governors, with a view to consistent, systematic, predetermined ends—instead of that incoherent aggregate[y] which is consecrated under the empire of

Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and

[s] Plato, Kratylus, p. 388 E. *Οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ὄνομα θέσθαι ἔστιν, ἀλλά τινος ὀνοματουργοῦ· οὗτος δ' ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.* Compare Politikus, p. 292 D.

[t] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430, 431 D, 433 C.

[u] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 431 E, 436 B.

[x] Plato, Kratyl. p. 435 B-C. So in the Protagoras (p. 328 A) we find the Platonic Protagoras comparing the self-originated and self-sustaining traditional ethics, to the traditional language—*τίς*

[y] The want of coherence, or of reference to any common and distinct End, among the bundle of established *Νόμιμα* is noted by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 2, 1324, b. 5. *διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χν-*

law and custom. Here in the Politikus, we read that the great purpose of the philosophical Governor is to train all the citizens into virtuous characters: by a proper combination of Courage and Temperance, two endowments naturally discordant, yet each alike essential in its proper season and measure. The interweaving of these two forms the true Regal Web of social life.[z]

Such is the concluding declaration of the accomplished Eleatic expositor, to Sokrates and the other auditors. But this suggests to us another question, when we revert to some of the Platonic dialogues handled in the preceding pages. What *are* Virtue, Courage, Temperance? In the Menon, the Platonic Sokrates had proclaimed, that he did not himself know what virtue was: that he had never seen any one else who did know: that it was impossible to say how virtue could be communicated, until you knew what virtue was—and impossible to determine any one of the parts of virtue, until virtue had been determined as a whole. In the Charmidês, Sokrates had affirmed that he did not know what Temperance was; he then tested several explanations thereof, propounded by Charmides and Kritias: but ending only in universal puzzle and confessed ignorance. In the Lachês, he had done the same with Courage: not without various expressions of regret for his own ignorance, and of surprise at those who talked freely about generalities which they had never probed to the bottom.

δὴν, ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως, εἴ πού τι πρὸς ἓν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχά-

πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέδν ἥ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν

Custom and education surround all prohibitions with the like sanctity—both those most essential to the common security, and those which emanate from capricious or local antipathy—in the minds of docile citizens.

Aristotle dissents from Plato on the point of always vesting the governing functions in the same hands. He considers such a provision dangerous and intolerable to the governed.

Aristot. Politik. ii. 5, 1264, b. 6.

[z] Plato, Polit. p. 306 A. βασιλικὴ μπλοκὴ, &c.

Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the Politikus (pp. 254-256) treats this βασιλικὴ συμπλοκὴ as a poor and insignificant function, for the political Artist determined and installed by so elaborate a method and classification. But the dialogue was already so long that Plato could not well lengthen it by going into fuller details. Socher points out (Ueber Platon's Schrift. p. 274) discrepancies between the Politikus on one side, and Protagoras and Gorgias on the other—which I think are really discoverable, though I do not admit the inference which he draws from them.

Perplexed by these doubts and difficulties—which perplexed yet more all his previous hearers, the modest beauty of Charmides and the mature dignity of Nikias and Laches—Sokrates now finds himself in presence of the Eleate, who talks about Virtue, Temperance, Courage, &c., as matters determinate and familiar. Here then would have been the opportunity for Sokrates to reproduce all his unsolved perplexities, and to get them cleared up by the divine Stranger who is travelling on a mission of philosophy. The third dialogue, to be called the Philosophus, which Plato promises as sequel to the Sophistês and Politikus, would have been well employed in such a work of elucidation.

Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search—To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions.

This, I say, is what we might have expected, if Plato had corresponded to the picture drawn by admiring commentators: if he had merely tied knots in one dialogue, in order to untie them in another. But we find nothing of the kind, nor is such a picture of Plato correct. The dialogue Philosophus does not exist, and probably was never written. Respecting the embarrassments of the Menon, Lachês, Charmidês, Alkibiadês I., Protagoras, Euthyphron—Sokrates says not a word—*οὐδὲ γρύ*—to urge them upon the attention of the Eleate: who even alludes with displeasure to contentious disputants as unfair enemies. For the right understanding of these mysterious but familiar words—Virtue, Courage, Temperance—we are thrown back upon the common passive, unscientific, unreasoning, consciousness: or upon such measure and variety of it as each of us may have chanced to imbibe from the local atmosphere, unassisted by any special revelation from philosophy. At any rate the Eleate furnishes no interpretative aid. He employs the words, as if the hearers understood them of course, without the slightest intimation that any difficulty attaches to them. Plato himself ignores all the difficulties, when he is putting positive exposition into the mouth of the Eleate. Puzzles and perplexities belong to the Dialogues of Search; in which they serve their purpose, if they provoke the intellect of the hearer to active meditation and effort, for the purpose of obtaining a solution.

CHAPTER XXIX.

KRATYLUS.

THE dialogue entitled Kratylus presents numerous difficulties to the commentators: who differ greatly in their manner of explaining, First, What is its main or leading purpose? Next, How much of it is intended as serious reasoning, how much as mere caricature or parody, for the purpose of exposing and reducing to absurdity the doctrines of opponents? Lastly, who, if any, are the opponents thus intended to be ridiculed?

The subject proposed for discussion is, the rectitude or inherent propriety of names. How far is there any natural adaptation, or special fitness, of each name to the thing named? Two disputants are introduced who invoke Sokrates as umpire. Hermogenes asserts the negative of the question; contending that each name is destitute of natural significance, and acquires its meaning only from the mutual agreement and habitual usage of society.[a] Kratylus on the contrary maintains the doctrine that each name has a natural rectitude or fitness for its own significant function:—that there is an inherent bond of connection, a fundamental analogy or resem-

Persons and subject of the di Kratylus— Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others.

[a] In the arguments put into the mouth of Hermogenes, he is made to maintain two opinions which are not identical, but opposed. 1. That names are significant by habit and convention, and not by nature. 2. That each man may and can give any name which he pleases to any object (pp. [illegible]). The first of these two opinions is that which is really discussed here: impugned in the first half of the dialogue, conceded in the second. It is implied that names are to serve the purpose of mutual communication and information among persons living in society; which purpose they would not serve if each individual gave a different name to the same object. The second opinion is therefore not a consequence of the first, but an implied contradiction of the first.

He who says that the names Horse and Dog are significant by convention, will admit that at the outset they might have been inverted in point of signification; but he will not say that any individual may invert them at pleasure, now that they are established. The purposes of naming would no longer be answered, if this were done.

blance between each name and the thing signified. Sokrates carries on the first part of the dialogue with Hermogenes, the last part with Kratylus.[b] He declares more than once, that the subject is one on which he is ignorant, and has formed no conclusion: he professes only to prosecute the search for a good conclusion, conjointly with his two companions.[c]

Argument

Sokrates, refuting Hermogenes, lays down the following doctrines.[d] If propositions are either true or false, names, which are parts of propositions, must be true or false also.[e] Everything has its own fixed and determinate essence, not relative to us nor varying according to our fancy or pleasure, but existing *per se* as nature has arranged.[f] All agencies either by one thing upon other things, or by other things upon it, are in like manner determined by nature, independent of our will and choice. If we intend to cut or

Hermogenes—all proceed according to fixed laws—speaking and naming among the rest.

[b] The question between Hermogenes and Kratylus was much debated among the philosophers and literary men throughout antiquity (Aul. Gell. x. 4). Origen says (contra Celsum, i. c. 24)—λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόῤῥητος ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων, πότερον, ὡς οἴεται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς.

Aristotle assumes the question in favour of *θέσει*, in his treatise De Interpretatione, without any reasoning, against the Platonic Kratylus; but his commentators, Ammonius and Boethius, note the controversy as one upon which eminent men in antiquity were much divided.

Plato connects his opinion, that names have a natural rectitude of signification, with his general doctrine of self-existent, archetypal, Forms or Ideas. The Stoics, and others who defended the same opinion afterwards, seem to have disconnected it from this latter doctrine.

[c] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 C, 391 A.

[d] Aristot. De Interpretat. i. 2.

κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ ὅτι φύσει ἐστιν, &c. —τὸ δὲ κατὰ

This is the same doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of Hermogenes (Kratylus, p. 384 E), and which Sokrates himself, in the latter half of the dialogue, admits as true to a large extent: that is, he admits that names are significant κατὰ συνθήκην, though he does not deny that they are or may be significant φύσει.

Τὸ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου (p. 397 A) is another phrase for expressing the opinion opposed to ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης.

[e] Plato, Kratyl. p. 385.

Here too, Aristotle affirms the contrary: he says (with far more exactness than Plato) that propositions alone are true or false; and that a name taken by itself is neither. (De Interpret. i. 2.)

The mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is analogous to that which we read in the Philêbus, where Pleasures are distinguished as true and false.

[f] Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 D. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἑλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα

burn any substance, we must go to work, not according to our own pleasure, but in the manner that nature prescribes: by attempting to do it contrary to nature, we shall do it badly or fail altogether.[g] Now *speaking* is one of these agencies, and *naming* is a branch of *speaking:* what is true of other agencies is true of these also—we must name things, not according to our own will and pleasure, but in the way that nature prescribes that they shall be named.[h] Farther, each agency must be performed by its appropriate instrument: cutting by the axe, boring by the gimlet, weaving by the bodkin. The name is the instrument of naming, whereby we communicate information and distinguish things from each other. It is a didactic instrument: to be employed well, it must be in the hands of a properly qualified person for the purpose of teaching.[i] Not every man, but only the professional craftsman, is competent to fabricate the instruments of cutting and weaving. In like manner, not every man is competent to make a name: no one is competent except the lawgiver or the gifted name-maker, the rarest of all existing artists.[k]

To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? Compare the analogy of other instruments. The artisan who constructs a bodkin or shuttle for weaving, has present to his mind as a model the Idea or Form of the bodkin—the self-existent bodkin of

The Name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the lawgiver upon the type of the

[g] Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 A.

[h] Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. Οὔκουν καὶ τὸ ὀνομάζειν πρᾶξίς τίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ λέγειν πρᾶξίς τις ἦν περὶ τὰ πράγματα. Αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἐφάνησαν οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὖσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν τινα ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχουσαι. Οὔκουν καὶ ὀνομαστέον ᾗ πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα ὀνομάζειν τε καὶ ἰῶμεν, εἴπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι; καὶ οὕτω πλέον τι ποιοῖμεν καὶ ὀνομάζοι-

Speaking and naming are regarded by Plato as acts whereby the thing (spoken of or) named is acted upon or suffers. So in the Sophistês (p. 248) he considers Knowing as an act performed, whereby the thing known suffers. Deuschle (Die Platonische Sprach-philosophie, p. 59, Marpurg. 1852) treats this comparison made by Plato between naming and material agencies, as if it were mere banter—and even indifferent banter. Schleiermacher in his note thinks it seriously meant and Platonic; and I fully agree with him (Schl. p. 456).

[i] Plato, Kratyl. p. 388 C. Ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον, καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος. See Boethius ap. Schol. ad Aristot. Interp. p. 108, a. 40. Aristotle (De Interpr. 3) says that λόγος

Several even of the Platonic critics consider Plato's choice of the metaphor ὄργανον as inappropriate; but modern writers on logic and psychology often speak of names as "*instruments* of thought."

[k] Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 A. ὁ νομοθέτης, ὃς δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπανιώτατος ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται.

Name-Form, and employed as well as appreciated, by the philosopher.

Nature herself. If a broken shuttle is to be replaced, it is this Idea or type, not the actual broken instrument, which he seeks to copy. Whatever may be the variety of web for which the shuttle is destined, he modifies the new instrument accordingly: but all of them must embody the Form or Idea of the shuttle. He cannot choose another type according to his own pleasure: he must embody the type, prescribed by nature, in the iron, wood, or other material of which the instrument is made.[l]

So about names: the lawgiver, in distributing names, must look to the Idea, Form, or type—the self-existent Name of Nature—and must embody this type, as it stands for each different thing, in appropriate syllables. The syllables indeed may admit of great variety, just as the material of which the shuttle is made may be diversified: but each aggregate of syllables, whether Hellenic or barbaric, must embody the essential Name-Idea or Type.[m] The lawgiver[n] ought to know, enumerate, and classify all the sorts of things on the one hand, and all the varieties of letters or elements of language on the other; distinguishing the special significative power belonging to each letter. He ought then to construct his words, and adapt each to signify that with which it is naturally connected. Who is to judge whether this process has been well or ill performed? Upon that point, the judge is, the professional man who uses the instrument. It is for the working weaver to decide whether the shuttle given to him is well or ill made. To have a good ship and rudder, it must be made by a professional builder, and appreciated by a professional pilot or steersman. In like manner, the names constructed by the lawgiver must be appreciated by the man who is qualified by training or study to use names skilfully:

Plato, Kratyl. p. 389 B. *αὐτὸ ὁ τι κερκὶς—πάσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος ἔχειν εἶδος—οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς ᾖ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπεφύκει.*

Plato, Kratyl. c. 14-15, pp. 389-390. *τὸ ἑκάστῳ φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὸν νομοθέτην ἐκεῖνον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι τιθέναι, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κύριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης.*

Οὕτως ἀξιώσεις τὸν νομοθέτην τόν τε [illegible], ἕως τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἐν ὁποιαισοῦν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χείρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουσοῦν ἄλλοθι;

[n] Plato, Kratyl. p. 424 D-E.

that is, by the dialectician or philosopher, competent to ask and answer questions.[o]

Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another.

It is the fact then, though many persons may think it ridiculous, that names—or the elementary constituents and letters, of which names are composed—have each an intrinsic and distinctive aptitude, fitting them to signify particular things.[p] Names have thus a standard with reference to which they are correct or incorrect. If they are to be correct, they cannot be given either by the freewill of an ordinary individual, or even by the convention of all society. They can be affixed only by the skilled lawgiver, and appreciated only by the skilled dialectician.

Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable—essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum.

Such is the theory here laid down by Sokrates respecting Names. It is curious as illustrating the Platonic vein of speculation. It enlarges to an extreme point Plato's region of the absolute and objective. Not merely each thing named, but each name also, is in his view an Ens absolutum; not dependent upon human choice—not even relative (so he alleges) to human apprehension. Each name has its own self-existent Idea, Form, or Type, the reproduction or copy of which is imperative. The Platonic intelligible world included Ideas of things, and of names correlative to them; just as it included Ideas of master and slave correlative to each other. It contained Noumena of names, as well as Noumena of things.[q] The essence of the name was, to be significant of the essence of the thing named; though such significance admitted of diversity, multiplication, or curtailment, in the letters or syllables wherein it was embodied.[r] The name became significant, by imitation or resemblance: that name was right, the essence of which imitated the essence of the thing named.[s] The vocal mimic imitates sounds, the painter imitates the colours: the name-giver imitates in letters or

[o] Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 C.
[p] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 425-426.
[q] Plato, Parmenid. p. 133 E.
[r] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393 D, 432.
[s] Plato, Kratyl. p. 422 D. τῶν ὀνο- τις , οἷα δηλοῦν οἷον ὄντων.—c. 86, p. 423 D. οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ι τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως τοῦ εἶναι; Τί οὖν; εἴτις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο τὴν οὐσίαν,

syllables, the essence of colours, sounds, and everything else which is nameable.

Another point here is peculiar to Plato. The Name-Giver must provide names such as can be used with effect by the dialectician or philosopher: who is the sole competent judge whether the names have genuine rectitude or not.[t] We see from hence that the aspirations of Plato went towards a philosophical language fit for those who conversed with forms or essences: something like (to use modern illustrations) a technical nomenclature systematically constructed for the expositions of men of science: such as that of Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. Assuredly no language actually spoken among men, has ever been found suitable for this purpose without much artificial help.[u]

Exclusive competence of a privileged few to discern these essences, and portion rightly.

As this theory of naming is a deduction from Plato's main doctrine of absolute or self-existing Ideas, so it also illustrates (to repeat what was said in the last chapter) his recognition of professional skill and of competence vested exclusively in a gifted One or Few: which he ranks as the sole producing cause of Good or the Best, setting it in contrast with those two causes which he considers as productive of Evil, or at any rate of the Inferior or Second-Best: 1. The One or Few, who are ungifted and unphilosophical: perhaps ambitious pretenders. 2. The spontaneous, unbespoken inspirations, conventions, customs, or habits, which grow up without formal

συλλαβαῖς, ἆρ' οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; Compare p. 433.

The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2) about the experiment made by the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out whether the Egyptians or the Phrygians were the oldest or first of mankind: he accordingly caused two children to be brought up without having a word spoken to them, with a view to ascertain what language they would come to by nature. At the age of two years they uttered the Phrygian word signifying *bread*. Psammetichus was then satisfied that the Phrygians were the first of mankind.

This story undoubtedly proceeds upon the assumption that there is one name which naturally suggests itself for each object. But when M. Renan says that the assumption is the same "as Plato has developed with so much subtlety in the Kratylus," I do not agree with him. The Absolute Name-Form or Essence, discernible only by the technical Lawgiver, is something very different. See M. Renan, Origines du Langage, ch. vi. p. 146.

[t] Plato, Kratyl. p. 390 D. Respecting the person called ὁ διαλεκτικός, whom Plato describes as grasping Ideas, or Forms, Essences, and employing nothing else in his reasoning—λόγον διδοὺς καὶ λαμβάνων τῆς οὐσίας—see Republic, vi. p. 511 B, vii. pp. 533-534-537 C.

[u] Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 A. ὁ περὶ ὀνομάτων τεχνικός, &c.

mandate among the community. To find the right name of each thing, is no light matter, nor within the competence of any one or many ordinary men. It can only be done by one of the few privileged lawgivers. Plato even glances at the necessity of a superhuman name-giver: though he deprecates the supposition generally, as a mere evasion or subterfuge, introduced to escape the confession of real ignorance.[x]

In laying down the basis of his theory respecting names, Plato states another doctrine as opposed to it: viz. the Protagorean doctrine—Man is the Measure of all things. I have already said something about this doctrine, in reviewing the Theætêtus, where Plato impugns it: but as he here impugns it again, by arguments in part different—a few words more will not be misplaced.

Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns—the Protagorean doctrine—Homo Mensura.

The doctrine of Protagoras maintains that all things are relative to the percipient, cogitant, concipient, mind: that all Object is implicated with a Subject: that as things appear to me, so they are to me—as they appear to you, so they are to you. Plato denies this, and says: "All things have a fixed essence of their own, absolutely and in themselves, not relative to any percipient or cogitant—nor dependent upon any one's appreciative understanding, or emotional susceptibility, or will. Things are so and so, without reference to us as sentient or cogitant beings: and not only the things are thus independent and absolute, but all their agencies are so likewise—agencies either by them or upon them. Cutting, burning, speaking, naming, &c., must be performed in a certain determinate way, whether we prefer it or not. A certain Name belongs, by Nature or absolutely, to a certain thing, whether we choose it or not: it is not relative to any adoption by us, either individually or collectively."

This Protagorean theory is here set forth by the Platonic Sokrates as the antithesis or counter-theory, to that which he is himself advancing, viz.—That Names are significant by nature and not by agreement of men:—That each Nomen is tied to its Nominatum by a natural and indissoluble bond. His

[x] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397, 425, 438.

remarks imply, that those who do not accept this last-mentioned theory must agree with Protagoras. But such an antithesis is noway necessary: since (not to speak of Hermogenes himself in this very dialogue) we find also that Aristotle—who maintains that Names are significant by convention and not by nature—dissents also from the theory of Protagoras; and would have rested his dissent from it on very different grounds.

Objection by Sokrates—That Protagoras puts all men on a level as to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance.

This will show us—what I have already remarked in commenting on the Theætêtus—that Plato has not been very careful in appreciating the real bearing of the Protagorean doctrine. He impugns it here by the same argument which we also read in the Theætêtus. "Every one admits" (he says) "that there are some men wise and good—others foolish and wicked. Now if you admit this, you disallow the Protagorean doctrine. If I contend that as things appear to me, so they truly are to me—as things appear to you or to him, so they truly are to you or to him—I cannot consistently allow that any one man is wiser than any other. Upon such a theory, all men are put upon the same level of knowledge or ignorance."

But the premisses of Plato here do not sustain his inference.

Objection unfounded—What the Protagorean theory really affirms—Belief always relative to the believer's mind.

The Protagorean doctrine is, when stated in its most general terms,—That every man is and must be his own measure of truth or falsehood—That what appears to him true, *is true to him*, however it may appear to others—That he cannot by any effort step out of or beyond his own individual belief, conviction, knowledge—That all his Cognita, Credita, Percepta, Cogitata, &c., imply himself as Cognoscens, Credens, Percipiens, Cogitans, inseparably and indivisibly—That in affirming an object, he himself is necessarily present as affirming subject, and that Object and Subject are only two sides of the same indivisible fact[y]—That though there are some matters which

[y] M. Destutt Tracy observes, Logique, ch. ix. p. 347, ed. 1825:

"En effet, on ne saurait trop le redire, chacun de nous, et même tout être animé quelconque, est pour lui-même le centre de tout. Il ne perçoit par un sentiment direct et une conscience intime, que ce qui affecte et émeut sa sensibilité. Il ne conçoit et ne connait son existence que par ce qu'il sent, et celle des autres êtres que par ce qu'ils lui font sentir. Il n'y a

all men agree in believing, there is no criterion at once infallible and universally recognised, in matters where they dissent: moreover, the matters believed are just as much relative where all agree, as where some disagree.

This doctrine is not refuted by the fact, that every man believes others to be wiser than himself on various points. A man is just as much a measure to himself when he acts upon the advice of others, or believes a fact upon the affirmation of others, as when he judges upon his own unassisted sense or reasoning. He is a measure to himself when he agrees with others, as much as when he disagrees with them. Opinions of others, or facts attested by others, may count as materials determining his judgment; but the judgment is and must be his own. The larger portion of every man's knowledge rests upon the testimony of others; nevertheless the facts thus reported become portions of *his* knowledge, generating conclusions *in him* and relatively *to him*. I believe the narrative of travellers, respecting parts of the globe which I have never seen: I adopt the opinion of A a lawyer, and of B a physician, on matters which I have not studied: I understand facts which I did not witness, from the description of those who did witness them. In all these cases the act of adoption is my own, and the grounds of belief are relative to my state of mind. Another man may mistrust completely the authorities which I follow: just as I mistrust the authority of Mahomet or Confucius, or various others, regarded as infallible by a large portion of mankind. The

Each man believes others to be wiser on various

tagoras.

de réel pour lui que ses perceptions, ses affections, ses idées: et tout ce qu'il peut jamais savoir, n'est toujours que des conséquences et des combinaisons de ces premières perceptions ou idées."

The doctrine of the Sceptical philosophers, is explicitly announced by Sextus Empiricus as his personal belief: that which appears true to him, as far as his enquiry had reached. The passage deserves to be cited.

Sextus Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotypos. i. sect. 197-199.

"Οταν οὖν εἴπῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς, οὐδὲν ὁρίζω—τοῦτό φησι λέγων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον περὶ τῶν προκειμένων, οὐκ ἀπαγγελτικῶς μετὰ πάσχει, διηγούμενος. . . . Καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λέγων, περιπατῶ, δυνάμει φησὶν, ἐγὼ περιπατῶ—οὕτως ὁ λέγων, πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα, συσσημαίνει καθ' ἡμᾶς, τὸ ὡς πρὸς ἐμὲ ἢ ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον—ὅσα ἐπῆλθον τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων, τοιαῦτά μοι φαίνεται, ὡς μηδὲν αὐτῶν τοῦ μαχομένου προῦχειν δοκεῖν κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν.

grounds of belief are to a certain extent similar, to a certain extent dissimilar, in different men's minds. Authority is doubtless a frequent ground of belief; but it is essentially variable and essentially relative to the believer. Plato himself, in many passages, insists emphatically upon the dissensions in mankind respecting the question—"*Who are* the good and wise men?" He tells us that the true philosopher is accounted by the bulk of mankind foolish and worthless.

Analogy of

In the Kratylus, Sokrates says (and I agree with him) that there are laws of nature respecting the processes of cutting and burning: and that any one who attempts to cut or burn in a way unconformable to those laws, will fail in his purpose. This is true, but it proves nothing against Protagoras. It is an appeal to a generalisation from physical facts, resting upon experience and induction—upon sensation and inference which we and others, Protagoras as well as Plato, have had, and which we believe to be common to all. We know this fact, or have a full and certain conviction of it; but we are not brought at all nearer to the Absolute (*i. e.* to the Object without Subject) which Plato's argument requires. The analogy rather carries us away from the Absolute: for cutting and burning, with their antecedent conditions, are facts of sense: and Plato himself admits, to a great extent, that the facts of sense are relative. All experience and induction, and all belief founded thereupon, are essentially relative. The experience may be one common to all mankind, and upon which all are unanimous:[z] but it is not the less

tagoras.

[z] Proklus, in his Scholia on the Kratylus, p. 32, ed. Boisson, cites the argument used by Aristotle against Plato on this very subject of names—τὰ μὲν φύσει, παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ παρὰ πᾶσι τά αὐτά· ὥστε τὰ φύσει ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν ὀνόματα, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει. Ammonius ad Aristot. De Interpretat. p. 100, a. 28, Schol. Bekk. Sextus Empiricus adv. Mathemat. i. 145-147, p. 247, Fab.

Plato had assimilated naming to cutting and burning. Aristotle denies the analogy: he says that cutting and burning are the same to all, or *are by nature:* naming is not the same to all, and is therefore not by nature.

We find here the test pointed out to distinguish what *is by nature* (that which Plato calls the οὐσίαν βέβαιον τῶν πραγμάτων—p. 386 E),—viz. That it is the same to all or among all. What it is to one individual, it is to another also. There are a multitude of different judging subjects, but no dissentient subjects: myself, and in my belief all other subjects, are affected alike. This is the true and real Objective: a particular fact of sense, where

relative to each individual of the multitude. What is relative to all, continues to be relative to each: the fact that all sentient individuals are in this respect alike, does not make it cease to be relative, and become absolute. What I see and hear in the theatre is relative to me, though it may at the same time be relative to ten thousand other spectators, who are experiencing like sensations. Where all men think or believe alike, it may not be necessary for common purposes to distinguish the multiplicity of individual thinking subjects: yet the subjects are nevertheless multiple, and the belief, knowledge, or fact, is relative to each of them, whether all agree, or whether beliefs are many and divergent. We cannot suppress ourselves as sentient or cogitant subjects, nor find any *locus standi* for Object pure and simple, apart from the ground of relativity. And the Protagorean dictum brings to view these subjective conditions, as being essential, no less than the objective, to belief and disbelief.

Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections.

Protagoras would have agreed with Plato as to combustion—that there were certain antecedent conditions under which he fully expected it, and certain other conditions under which he expected with confidence that it would not occur. Only he would have declared this (assuming him to speak conformably to his own theory) to be his own full belief and conviction, derived from certain facts and comparisons of sense, which he also *knew* to be shared by most other persons. He would have pronounced farther, that those who held opposite opinions were in his judgment wrong: but he would have recognised that their opinion was true to themselves, and that their belief must be relative to

Subject is not eliminated altogether, but becomes a constant quantity, and therefore escapes separate notice. An Objective *absolute* (*i. e.* without Subject altogether) is an impossibility.

In the Aristotelian sense of φύσει, it would be correct to say that Language, or Naming *in genere*, is natural to man. No human society has yet been found without some language—some names—some speech employed and understood by each individual member. But many different varieties of speech will serve the purpose, not indeed with equal perfection, yet tolerably: enough to enable a society to get on. The uniformity (τὸ φύσει) here ceases. To a certain extent, the objects and agencies which are named, are the same in all societies: to a certain extent different. If we were acquainted with all the past facts respecting the different languages which have existed or do exist on the globe, we should be able to assign the reason which brought each particular *Nomen* into association with its *Nominatum*. But this past history is lost.

causes operating upon *their* minds. Farthermore, he would have pointed out, that combustion itself, with its antecedents, were facts of sense, relative to individual sentients and observers, remembering and comparing what they had observed. This would have been the testimony of Protagoras (always assuming him to speak in conformity with his own theory), but it would not have satisfied Plato: who would have required a peremptory, absolute affirmation, discarding all relation to observers or observed facts, and leaving no scope for error or fallibility.

Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief,

nds of f and disbelief, different with different men and different ages.

Those who agree with Plato on this question, impugn the doctrine of Protagoras as effacing all real, intrinsic, distinction between truth and falsehood. Such objectors make it a charge against Protagoras, that he does not erect his own mind into a peremptory and infallible measure for all other minds.[a] He expressly recognises the distinction, so far as his own mind is concerned: he admits that other men recognise it also, each for himself. Nevertheless, to say that, all men recognise one and the same objective distinction between truth and falsehood, would be to contradict palpable facts. Each man has a standard, an ideal of truth in his own mind: but different men have different standards. The grounds of belief, though in part similar with all men, are to a great extent dissimilar also: they are dissimilar even with the same man, at different periods of his life and circumstances. What all men have in common is the feeling of belief and the feeling of disbelief: the matters believed or disbelieved, as well as the ideal standard to which any new matter presented for belief or disbelief is referred, differ considerably. By rational discussion—by facts and reasonings set forth on both sides, as in the Platonic dialogues—opinions may be overthrown or modified; dissentients may be brought into agreement, or at least each may be rendered more fully master of the case on both

[a] To illustrate the impossibility of obtaining any standard absolute and purely objective, without reference to any judging Subject, I had transcribed a passage from Steinthal's work on the Classification of Human Languages; but I find it too long for a note.

Steinthal, Charakteristik der Hauptsächlichen Typen des Sprachbaues, 2nd edit. Berlin, 1860, pp. 313-314-315.

sides. But this dialectic, the Platonic question and answer, is itself an appeal to the free action of the individual mind. The questioner starts from premisses conceded by the respondent. He depends upon the acquiescence of the respondent for every step taken in advance. Such a proceeding is relative, not absolute: coinciding with the Protagorean formula rather than with the Platonic negation of it.[b] No man ever claimed the right of individual judgment more emphatically than Sokrates: no man was ever more special in adapting his persuasions to the individual persons with whom he conversed.

The grounds of belief, according to Protagoras, relative to the individual, are not the same with all men at all times. But it does not follow (nor does Protagoras appear to have asserted) that they vary according to the *will* or *inclination* of the individual. Plato, in impugning this doctrine, reasons as if these two things were one and the same—as if, according to Protagoras, a man believed whatever he chose.[c] This, however, is not an exact representation of the

Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or each individual, but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind.

[b] See the striking passages in the Gorgias, pp. 472 B, 474 B, 482 B; Theætêtus, p. 171 D.

Also in proclaiming the necessity of specialty of adaptation to individual minds—Plato, Phædrus, pp. 271-272, 277 B.

[c] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 387-389, where *πρὸς ἡμᾶς* is considered as equivalent to *ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλώμεθα—ἢ ἂν ἡμεῖς βουληθωμεν*—both of them being opposed to *οἷον ἐπεφύκει—τὸ κατὰ φύσιν —ἰδίαν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἔχουσαι.*

The error here noted is enumerated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, among the specimens of Fallacies of Confusion, in his System of Logic, Book v. ch. vi. p. 381.

"The following is an argument of Descartes to prove, in his *à priori* manner, the being of a God. The conception (says he) of an infinite Being proves the real existence of such a Being. For if there be not really any such Being, I must have made the conception: but if I could make it, I can also unmake it—which evidently is not true: therefore there must be, externally to myself, an archetype from which the conception is derived. In this argument (which, it may be observed, would equally prove the existence of ghosts and witches) the ambiguity is in the pronoun *I*; by which, in one place, is to be understood *my will*—in another, the *laws of my nature*. If the conception, existing as it does in my mind, *has* no original without, the conclusion must unquestionably follow that *I* made it—that is, the laws of my nature must have spontaneously evolved it: but that *my will* made it would not follow. Now when Descartes afterwards adds, that I cannot unmake the conception, he means that I cannot get rid of it by an act of my will—which is true, but is not the proposition required. I can as much unmake this conception as I can any other: no conception, which I have once had, can I ever dismiss by mere volition; but what some of the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or those same laws in other circumstances, may, and often do, subsequently efface."

doctrine "Homo Mensura:" which does not assert the voluntary or the arbitrary, but simply the relative as against the absolute. What a man believes does not depend upon his own will or choice: it depends upon an aggregate of circumstances, partly peculiar to himself, partly common to him with other persons more or fewer in number:[d] upon his age, organisation, and temperament—his experience, education, historical and social position—his intellectual powers and acquirements—his passions and sentiments of every kind, &c. These and other ingredients—analogous, yet neither the same nor combined in the same manner, even in different individuals of the same time and country, much less in those of different times and countries—compose the aggregate determining grounds of belief or disbelief in every one. Each man has in his mind an ideal standard of truth and falsehood: but that ideal standard, never exactly the same in any two men, nor in the same man at all times, often varies in different men to a prodigious extent. Now it is to this standard in the man's own mind that those reasoners refer who maintain that belief is relative. They do not maintain that it is relative simply to his wishes, or that he believes and disbelieves what he chooses.

When Plato says that combustibility and secability of objects are properties fixed and determinate,[e] this is perfectly

[d] To show how constantly this Protagorean dictum is misconceived, as if Protagoras had said that things were to each individual what he was pleased or chose to represent them as being, I transcribe the following passage from Lassalle's elaborate work on Herakleitus (vol. ii. p. 381)—"Des Protagoras Prinzip ist es, dass überhaupt Nichts Objektives ist; dass vielmehr alles Beliebige was Einem scheint, auch für ihn sey. Dies Selbstsetzen des Subjekts ist die einzige Wahrheit der Dinge, welche an sich selbst Nichts Objektives haben, sondern zur gleichgültigen Fläche geworden sind, auf die das Subjekt willkührlich und beliebig seine Charaktere schreibt."

Protagoras does not (as is here asserted) deny the Objective: he only insists on looking at it in conjunction with, or measured by, some Subject; and that Subject, not simply as desiring or preferring, but clothed in all its attributes.

[e] When Plato asserts not only that Objects are absolute and not relative to any Subject—but that the agencies or properties of Objects are also absolute—he carries the doctrine farther than modern defenders of the absolute. M. Cousin, in the eighth and ninth Lectures of his Cours de Philosophie Morale au 18me Siècle, lays down the contrary, maintaining that objects and essences alone are absolute, though unknowable; but that their agencies are relative and knowable.

"Nous savons qu'il existe quelque chose hors de nous, parceque nous ne pouvons expliquer nos perceptions sans

true, as meaning that a certain proportion of the facts of sense affect in the same way the sentient and appreciative powers of each individual, determining the like belief in every man who has ever experienced them. Measuring and weighing are sensible facts of this character: seen alike by all, and conclusive proofs to all. But this implies, to a certain point, fundamental uniformity in the individual sentients and judges. Where such condition is wanting—where there is a fundamental difference in the sensible apprehension manifested by different individuals—the unanimity is wanting also. Such is the case in regard to colours and other sensations: witness the peculiar vision of Dalton and many others. The unanimity in the first case, the discrepancy in the second, is alike an aggregate of judgments, each individual, distinct, and relative. You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence or authority which satisfies *his* senses or *his* reason, he remains unconvinced. Your individual opinion stands good *to you;* his opinion stands good *to him.* You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel persuaded that he will be brought to that result by future experience, which of course must be relative to him and to

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all s subj others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity.

les rattacher à des causes distinctes de nous-mêmes: nous savons de plus que ces causes, dont nous ne connaissons pas d'ailleurs l'essence, *produisent les effets, les plus variables, les plus divers, et même les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle ou telle nature du sujet.* Mais savons nous quelque chose de plus? et même, vû le caractère indéterminé des causes que nous concevons dans les corps, y a-t-il quelque chose de plus à savoir? Y a-t-il lieu de nous enquérir si nous percevons *les choses telles qu'elles sont? Non, évidemment. Je ne dis pas que le problême est insoluble: je dis qu'il est absurde, et renferme une contradiction.* Nous ne savons pas ce que ces causes sont en elles-mêmes, et la raison nous défend de chercher à les connaître: mais il est bien évident *à priori*, qu'elles ne sont pas en elles-mêmes ce qu'elles sont par rapport à nous: *puisque la présence au sujet modifie nécessairement leur action.* Supprimez tout sujet pensant, ces causes agiraient encore, puisqu'elles continueraient d'exister: mais elles agiraient autrement: elles seraient encore des qualités et des propriétés, mais qui ne ressembleraient à rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le feu ne manifesterait aucune des propriétés que nous lui connaissons: que seroit-il? C'est ce que nous ne saurons jamais. C'est d'ailleurs peut-être un problême qui ne répugne pas seulement à la nature de notre esprit mais à l'essence même des choses. Quand même en effet on supprimerait par la pensée tous les sujets sentans, il faudrait encore admettre que nul corps ne manifesterait ses propriétés autrement qu'en relation avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas *ses propriétés ne seraient encore que relatives:* en sorte qu'il me parait fort raisonnable d'admettre que les propriétés déterminées des corps *n'existent pas indépendamment d'un sujet quelconque.*"

his appreciative powers. He entertains the like persuasion in regard to you.

Sokrates explains his view of the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transitions.

It is thus that Sokrates, in the first half of the Kratylus, lays down his general theory that names have a natural and inherent propriety: and that naming is a process which cannot be performed except in one way. He at the same time announces that his theory rests upon a principle opposed to the "Homo Mensura" of Protagoras. He then proceeds to illustrate his doctrine by exemplification of many particular names, which are alleged to manifest a propriety of signification in reference to the persons or matters to which they are applied. Many of these are proper names, but some are common names or appellatives. Plato regards the proper names as illustrating, even better than the common, the doctrine of inherent rectitude in naming: especially the names of the Gods, with respect to the use of which Plato was himself timidly scrupulous—and the names reported by Homer as employed by the Gods themselves. We must remember that nearly all Grecian proper names had some meaning: being compounds or derivatives from appellative nouns.

The proper names are mostly names of Gods or Heroes: then follow the names of the celestial bodies (conceived as Gods), of the elements, of virtues and vices, &c. All of them, however, both the proper and the common names, are declared to be compound, or derivative; presupposing other simple and primitive names from which they are formed.[f]

[f] See the Introduction to Pape's Wörterbuch der Griechischen Eigennamen.

Thus Proklus observes:—"The recklessness about proper names is shown in the case of the man who gave to his son the name of Athanasius" (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 5, ed. Boiss.) Proklus adopts the distinction between divine and human names, citing the authority of Plato in Kratylus. The words of Proklus are remarkable, ad Timæum, ii. p. 197, Schneid. Οἰκεῖα γὰρ ἐστιν ὀνόματα πάσῃ τάξει τῶν πραγμάτων, θεῖα μὲν τοῖς θείοις, διανοητὰ δὲ τοῖς διανοητοῖς, δοξαστὰ δὲ τοῖς δοξαστοῖς. See Timæus, p. 29 B. Compare also Kratylus, p. 400 E, and Philêbus, p. 12 C.

When Plato (Kratylus, pp. 391-392; compare Phædrus, p. 252 A) cites the lines of Homer mentioning appellations bestowed by the Gods, I do not understand him, as Gräfenhahn and others do, to speak in mockery, but *bonâ fide*. The affirmation of Clemens

Sokrates declares the fundamental theory on which the primitive roots rest; and indicates the transforming processes, whereby many of the names are deduced or combined from their roots. But these processes, though sometimes reasonable enough, are in a far greater number of instances forced, arbitrary, and fanciful. The transitions of meaning imagined, and the structural transformations of words, are alike strange and violent.[8]

Alexandrinus (Stromat. i. 104) gives a probable account of Plato's belief:—'Ο Πλάτων καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς διαλεκτὸν ἀπονέμει τινὰ, μάλιστα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνειράτων τεκμαιρόμενος καὶ τῶν χρη μῶν. See Gräfenhahn, Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie, vol. i. p. 176.

When we read the views of some learned modern philologists, such as Godfrey Hermann, we cannot be surprised that many Greeks in the Platonic age should believe in an ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων applicable to their Gods and Heroes:—"Unde intelligitur, ex nominibus naturam et munia esse cognoscenda Deorum: Nec Deorum tantum, sed etiam heroum, omninoque rerum omnium, nominibus quæ propria vocantur appellatarum" (De Mythologiâ Græcorum Antiquissimâ — in Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 167).

"Bey euch, Ihr Hernn, kann man das Wesen
Gewöhnlich aus dem Nahmen lesen," &c.
Goethe, Faust.

See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, adv. Kolôten, c. 22, p. 1119 E, respecting the essential rectitude and indispensable employment of the surnames and appellations of the Gods.

The supposition of a mysterious inherent relation, between Names and the things named, has found acceptance among expositors of many different countries.

M. Jacob Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de Moyse, B. x. vol. iii. p. 136) says respecting the Jewish Cabbala:—"Que dirai-je de leur Cabbale? mot signifiant aussi *tradition*? Elle se composait originairement de tous les principes abstraits qui ne se répandent pas chez le vulgaire: elle tomba bientôt dans la folie. Cacher quelques idées metaphysiques sous les figures les plus bizarres, et prendre ensuite une peine infinie pour retrouver ces idées premières: s'imaginer qu'il existe entre les noms et les choses une corrélation inévitable, et que la contexture littérale des livres sacrés par example, doit éclairer sur l'essence même et sur tous les secrets du Dieu qui les a dictés: tourmenter, dès-lors, chaque phrase, chaque mot, chaque lettre, avec la même ardeur qu'on met de nos jours à décomposer et à recomposer tous les corps de la nature: enfin, après avoir établi la corrélation entre les mots et les choses, croire qu'en changeant, disposant, combinant, ces mots, on traverse de prétendus *canaux* d'influence qui les unissent à ces choses, et qu'on agit sur elles: voilà, ce me semble les principales prétensions de cette espèce de science occulte, échappée de l'Égypte, qui a dévoré beaucoup de bons esprits, et qui d'une part, donne la main à la théologie, d'autre part à l'astrologie et aux combinaisons magiques."

[8] I cite various specimens of the etymologies given by Plato:—

1. Ἀγαμέμνων—ὁ ἀγαστὸς κατὰ τὴν ιμονήν—in consequence of his patience in remaining (μονὴ) with his army before Troy (p. 395 B).

2. Ἀτρεὺς—κατὰ τὸ ἀτειρὲς, καὶ ἄτρεστον, καὶ ἀτηρόν (p. 395 C).

3. Πέλοψ—ὁ τὸ ἐγγὺς (πέλας) μόνον ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ παραχρῆμα (p. 395 D).

4. Τάνταλος—ταλάντατος (p. 395 E).

5. Ζεὺς—Δία—Ζῆνα—δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ. ἰσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει—quasi unum debuerit esse vocabulum Διαζῆνα. Stallbaum, ad p. 396 A. Proklus admired these etymologies (ad Timæum, ii. p. 226, ed Schneid.)

6. Οἱ θεοὶ—Sun, Moon, Earth, Stars, Uranus—ὁρῶντες αὐτὰ πάντα ἀεὶ ἰόντα ὁρόμῳ καὶ θέοντα, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως τῆς τοῦ θεῖν θεοὺς φύτους ὀνομάσαι (p. 397 D).

7. Δαίμονες—ὅτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαή-

Such is the light in which these Platonic etymologies appear to a modern critic. But such was not the light in

ω, δαίμονας αὐτοὺς ὠι
(Hesiod) p. 398 B.

8. *Ἥρως*—either from *ἔρως*, as one sprung from the union of Gods with human females: or from *ἐρωτᾷν* or *εἴρειν*,—from oral or rhetorical attributes, as being *ῥήτορες καὶ ἐρωτητικοί* p. 398 D).

9. *Δίφιλος*—*Διὶ φίλος* (p. 399 B).

10. *Ἄνθρωπος*—*ὁ ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπεν* (p. 399 C).

11. *Ψυχή*—a double derivation is proposed: first, *τὸ ἀνάψυχον*, next, a second, *i.e.* *ψυχὴ=φυσέχη, ἡ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχει*, which second is declared to be *τεχνικώτερον*, and the former to be ridiculous (p. 400 A-B).

12. *Σῶμα=τὸ σῆμα τῆς ψυχῆς*, because the soul is buried in the body. Or *σῶμα*, that is, preserved or guarded by the body as by an exterior wall, in order that it may expiate wrongs of a preceding life (p. 400 C).

13. The first imposer of names was a philosopher who followed the theory of Herakleitus — perpetual flux of everything. Pursuant to this theory he gave to various Gods the names Kronos, Rhea, Tethys, &c., all signifying flux (p. 402 A-D).

14. Various derivations of the names Poseidon, Hades or Pluto, Persephonê or Pherrephatta, &c., are given (pp. 404-405); also of Apollo, so as to fit on to the four functions of the last-named God, *μουσικὴ, μαντικὴ, ἰατρικὴ, τοξικὴ* (p. 406).

15. *Μοῦσα—μουσικὴ*, from *μῶσθαι* (recognised in Liddell and Scott from *μάω*). *Ἀφροδίτη* from *ἀφροῦ γένεσιν*, the Hesiodic derivation (p. 406 B-D).

16. *Ἀήρ—ὅτι αἴρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς—ἢ ὅτι ἀεὶ ῥεῖ—ἢ ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται ῥέοντος* — quasi *ἀητόῤῥουν*—*Αἰθὴρ—ὅτι ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέων* (p. 410 B-C).

17. *Φρόνησις—φορᾶς καὶ ροῦ νόησις*, or, *τὸ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορᾶς*. This and the following are put as derivatives from the Herakleitean theory (p. 411 D). *Νόησις=τοῦ νέου ἕσις. Σωφροσύνη—σωτηρία φρονήσεως*. This is recognised by Aristotle in the Nikom. Ethica, vi. 5.

18. *Ἐπιστήμη=ἐπιστημένη—ὡς φέτοῖς πράγμασιν*
χῆς (p. 412 A).

19. *Δικαιοσύνη—ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου συνέσει* (p. 412 C).

20. *Κακία=τὸ κακῶς ἰόν. Δειλία—τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμὸς ἰσχυρός—ὃ δεῖ λίαν. Ἀρετὴ=ἀειρείτη*—that which has an easy and constant flux, or perhaps *αἱρετή* (p. 415 B-D). *Αἰσχρὸν=τὸ ἀεισχοροῦν—τὸ ἀεὶ ἴσχον τὸν ῥοῦν* (p. 416 B). *Σύμφερον=τὴν ἅμα φορὰν*

s λύον τὸ τέλος (p. 417 C-E). *Βλαβερὸν=τὸ βλάπτον τὸν ῥοῦν.*

The names of favourable import are such as designate facility of the universal flux, according to the Herakleitean theory. The names of unfavourable import designate obstruction of the flux.

21. *Ζυγὸν=δυογόν* (p. 418 D).

22. *Εὐφροσύνη — ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς*

εὐφεροσύνη (p. 419 D).

23. *Θυμὸς — ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἐπιθυμία—ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰοῦσα δύναμις* (p. 419 E).

24. *Τὸ ὄν=τὸ οὗ τυγχάνει ζῆτημα. τὸ ὄνομα. Ὀνομαστὸν=ὂν, οὗ*

ζητεῖν) (p. 421 A).

25. *Ἀληθεία—θεία ἄλη*, or *ἡ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φορά. Ψεῦδος* from *εὕδειν*, with *ψι* prefixed, as being the opposite of movement and flux (p. 421 B-C).

26. Several derivations of names are given by Sokrates, as founded upon the theory opposed to Herakleitus—*i. e.* the theory that things were not in perpetual flux, but stationary:—

Ἐπιστήμη — ὅτι ἵστησιν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχήν.
Ἱστορία—ὅτι ἵστησι τὸν ῥ
Πιστὸν—ἱστᾷν παντάπασι
Μνήμη—μονὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (437 A-C).

27. We found before that some names of *good* attributes were founded on the Herakleitean theory. But there are also names of *bad* attributes founded on it.

Ἀμαθία=ἡ τοῦ ἅμα θεῷ ἰόντος πορεία.
Ἀκολασία=ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν (p. 437 C).

Sokrates contrasts the two theories of *στάσις* and *κίνησις*, and says that he believes the first Name-Givers to have apportioned names in conformity to the theory of *κίνησις*, but that he thinks

which they appeared either to the ancient Platonists, or to critics earlier than the last century. The Platonists even thought them full of mysterious and recondite wisdom. Dionysius of Halikarnassus highly commends Plato for his speculations on etymology, especially in the Kratylus.[h] Plutarch cites some of the most singular etymologies in the Kratylus as serious and instructive. The modesty of the Protagorean formula becomes here especially applicable: for so complete has been the revolution of opinion, that the Platonic etymologies are *now* treated by *most* critics as too absurd to have been seriously intended by Plato, even as conjectures. It is called "a valuable discovery of modern times" (so Schleiermacher[i] terms it) that Plato meant all or

These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists.

they were mistaken in adopting that theory (p. 439 C).

[h] Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verb. s. 16, p. 196, Schaefer. *τὰ κράτιστα δὲ νέμω, ὡς πρώτῳ τὸν ὑπὲρ ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγοντι λόγον, Πλάτωνι τῷ*

About Plato's etymologies, as seriously intended, see Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 375 C-D-E, with the note of Wyttenbach. Harris, in his Hermes (pp. 369-370-407), alludes to the etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus as being ingenious, though disputable, but not at all as being derisory caricatures. Indeed the etymology of *Scientia*, which he cites from Scaliger, p. 370, is quite as singular as any in the Kratylus. Sydenham (Notes to the translation of Plato's Philêbus, p. 35) calls the Kratylus "a dialogue, in which is taught the nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient, from a supposed etymology of names and words."

I find, in the very instructive comments of Bishop Colenso on the Pentateuch (Part iv. ch. 24. p. 250), a citation from St. Augustine, illustrating the view which I believe Plato to have taken of these etymologies; "Quo loco prorsus non arbitror prætereundum, quod pater Valerius animadvertit admirans, in quorundam rusticanorum [*i.e.* Africans, near Carthage] collocutione. Cum enim alter alteri dixisset *Salus*—quæsivit ab eo, qui et Latiné nosset et Punicé, quid esset *Salus:* responsum est, *Tria*. Tum ille agnoscens cum gaudio, salutem nostram esse Trinitatem, convenientiam linguarum non fortuitu sic sonuisse arbitratus est, sed occultissimâ dispensatione divinæ providentiæ—ut cum Latiné nominatur *Salus*, à Punicis intelligantur *Tria*—et cum Punici linguâ suâ *Tria* nominant à Latinis intelligatur *Salus*. Sed *hæc verborum convenientia*, sive provenerit sive provisa sit, *non pertinaciter agendum est ut ei quisque consentiat, sed quantum interpretantis elegantiam hilaritas audientis admittit.*"

So in the etymologies of the Kratylus: Plato follows out threads of analogy, which, with indulgent hearers, he reckons will be sufficient for proof: and which, even when not accepted as proof, will be pleasing to the fancy of unbelieving hearers, as they are to his own. There is no intention to caricature: no obvious absurdities piled up with a view to caricature.

[i] Schleiermacher, Introduction to Kratylus, vol. iv. p. 6: "Dagegen ist viel gewonnen durch die Entdeckung neuerer Zeiten," &c. To the same purpose, Zeller, Griech. Philos., part ii. p. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, Geschichte der Griech.-Römischen Philosophie, part ii. sect. cvii. p. 285.

Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Cratylum, p. 4, says: "Quod mirum est non esse ab iis animadversum, qui Platonem

most of them as mere parody and caricature. We are now told that it was not Plato who misconceived the analogies, conditions, and limits, of etymological transition, but others; whom Plato has here set himself to expose and ridicule, by mock etymologies intended to parody those which they had proposed as serious. If we ask who the persons thus ridiculed were, we learn that they were the Sophists, Protagoras, or Prodikus, with others; according to Schleiermacher, Antisthenes among them.[k]

putaverunt de linguæ et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam explicare voluisse. Isti enim adeo nihil senserunt irrisionis, ut omnia atque singula pro philosophi decretis venditarint, ideoque ei absurdissima quæque commenta affinxerint. Ita Menagius, nec Tiedemannus in Argum. Dial. Plat. multo rectius judicat. Irrisionem primi senserunt Garnierius et Tennemann," &c. Stallbaum, moreover, is perpetually complaining in his notes, that the Etymological Lexicons adopt Plato's derivations as genuine. Ménage (ad Diogen. Laert. iii. 25) declares most of the etymologies of Plato in the Kratylus to be ψευδέτυμα, but never hints at the supposition that they are intended as caricatures. During the centuries between Plato and Ménage, men had become more critical on the subject of etymology; in the century after Ménage, they had become more critical still, as we may see by the remarks of Turgot on the etymologies of Ménage himself.

The following are the remarks of Turgot, in the article 'Etymologie' (Encycl. Franc. in Turgot's collected works, vol. iii. p. 33): "Ménage est un exemple frappant des absurdités dans lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggère la malheureuse facilité de supposer tout ce qui est possible: car il est très vrai qu'il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilité ne soit justifiée par des exemples. Mais nous avons prouvé, qu'en multipliant à volonté les altérations intermédiaires, soit dans le son, soit dans la signification, il est aisé de dériver un mot quelconque de tout autre mot donné. C'est le moyen *d'expliquer tout*, et *dès-lors de ne rien expliquer*: c'est le moyen aussi de justifier tous les mépris de l'ignorance."

Steinhart (Einleitung zum Kratylus, pp. 551-552) agrees with Stallbaum to a certain extent, that Plato in the Kratylus intended to mock and caricature the bad etymologists of his own day; yet also that parts of the Kratylus are seriously intended. And he declares it almost impossible to draw a line between the serious matter and the caricature.

It appears to me that the Platonic critics here exculpate Plato from the charge of being a bad etymologist, only by fastening upon him another intellectual defect quite as serious.

Dittrich, in his Dissertation De Cratylo Platonis, Leipsic, 1841, adopts the opinion of Schleiermacher and the other critics, that the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates announces them as proving and illustrating his own theory seriously laid down, are really bitter jests and mockery, intended to destroy it—"hanc sententiam facetissimis et irrisione plenis exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, reverâ infringit" (p. 12). Dittrich admits that Kratylus, who holds the theory derided, understands nothing of this *acerbissima irrisio* (p. 18). He thinks that Protagoras, not Prodikus nor Antisthenes, is the person principally caricatured (pp. 32-34-38).

[k] Schleiermacher, Introd. to Kratyl. pp. 8-16; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 17. Winckelmann suspects that Hermogenes in the Kratylus is intended to represent Antisthenes (Antisth. Fragment. p. 49).

Lobeck (Aglaophamus, p. 866) says that the Pythagoreans were among the earliest etymologising philosophers, proposing such etymologies as now appear very absurd.

To me this modern discovery or hypothesis appears inadmissible. It rests upon assumptions at best gratuitous, and in part incorrect: it introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. We find no proof that the Sophists ever proposed such etymologies as those which are here supposed to be ridiculed—or that they devoted themselves to etymology at all. If they etymologised, they would doubtless do so in the manner (to our judgment loose and fantastic) of their own time and of times long after them. But what ground have we for presuming that Plato's views on the subject were more correct? and that etymologies which to them appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and ridiculous?

Dissent from this ... Nor the Sophists ever ... posed

Now if the persons concerned were other than the Sophists, scarcely any critic would have thought himself entitled to fasten upon them a discreditable reputation without some evidence. Of Prodikus we know (and that too chiefly from some sarcasms of Plato) that he took pains to distinguish words apparently, but not really, equivalent: and that such accurate distinction was what he meant by "rectitude of names" (Plato, Euthydêm. 277 E.) Of Protagoras we know that he taught, by precept or example, correct speaking or writing: but we have no information that either of them pursued etymological researches, successfully or unsuccessfully.[1]

[1] See a good passage of Winckelmann, Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydemum, p. xlvii., respecting Protagoras and Prodikus, as writers and critics on language.

Stallbaum says, Proleg. ad Krat. p. 11:—"Quibus verbis *haud dubie* notantur Sophistæ; qui, neglectis linguæ elementis, derivatorum et compositorum verborum originationem temeré et ad suum arbitrium tractabant." (p. 4):—"In Cratylo ineptæ etymologiæ specimina exhibentur, ita quidem ut *haud quaquam dubitare liceat*, quin ista omnia ad mentem sophistarum maximeque Protagoreorum *joculari imitatione* explicata sint."

In spite of these confident assertions,—first, that the Sophists are the persons *intended* to be ridiculed, next, that they *deserved* to be so ridiculed,—Stallbaum has another passage, p. 15, wherein he says, "Jam vero quinam fuerint philosophi isti atque etymologi, qui in Cratylo ridentur et explodantur, *vulgo parum exploratum habetur.*" He goes on to say that neither Prodikus nor Antisthenes is meant, but Protagoras and the Protagoreans. To prove this he infers, from a passage in this dialogue (c. 11, p. 391 C), that Protagoras had written a book περὶ ὀρθότητος τῶν ὀνομάτων (Heindorf and Schleiermacher, with better reason, infer from the passage nothing more than the circumstance that Protagoras taught ὀρθοεπείαν or correct speaking and writing). The passage does not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the book? Stallbaum tells us:—"Jam si quæras, quid tandem Protagoras ipse de nominum ortu

Moreover this very dialogue (Kratylus) contains strong presumptive evidence that the Platonic etymologies could never have been intended to ridicule Protagoras. For these etymologies are announced by Sokrates as exemplifying and illustrating a theory of his own respecting names: which theory (Sokrates himself expressly tells us) is founded upon the direct negation of the cardinal doctrine of Protagoras.[m] That Sophist, therefore, could not have been ridiculed by any applications, however extravagant, of a theory directly opposed to him.[n]

Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one.

Suppose it then ascertained that Plato intended to ridicule and humiliate some rash etymologists, there would still be no propriety in singling out the Sophists as his victims—except that they are obnoxious names,

censuerit, *fateor unâ conjecturâ nitendum esse, ut de hâc re aliquid eruatur*" (p. 17). He then proceeds to *conjecture*, from the little which we know respecting Protagoras, what that Sophist *must* have laid down upon the origin of names; and he finishes by assuming the very point which he ought to have proved:—"*ex ipso Cratylo intelligimus et cognoscimus*, mox inter Protagoræ amicos extitisse qui, inepté hæc studia persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humanæ notiones elicere et illustrare, sed in verba et nomina sua ipsi decreta transferre et sic ea probare et confirmare niterentur. Qui quidem homines à Platone hoc libro *facetissimâ irrisione* exagitantur," &c. (p. 17). I repeat, that in spite of Stallbaum's confident assertions, he fails in giving the smallest proof that Protagoras or the Sophists proposed etymologies such as to make them a suitable butt for Plato on this occasion. Ast also talks with equal confidence and equal absence of proof about the silly and arbitrary etymological proceedings of the Sophists, which (he says) this dialogue is intended throughout to ridicule (Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 253-254-264, &c.)

[m] Plato, Kratylus, c. 4-5, pp. 386-387.

[n] Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 379-384) asserts and shows very truly that Protagoras cannot be the person intended to be represented by Plato under the name of Kratylus, or as holding the opinion of Kratylus about names. Lassalle affirms that Plato intends Kratylus in the dialogue to represent Herakleitus himself (p. 385); moreover he greatly extols the sagacity of Herakleitus for having laid down the principle, that "Names are the essence of things," in which principle Lassalle (so far as I understand him) himself concurs.

Assuming this to be the case, we should naturally suppose that if Plato intends to ridicule any one, by presenting caricatured etymologies as flowing from this principle, the person intended as butt must be Herakleitus himself. Not so Lassalle. He asserts as broadly as Stallbaum that it was Protagoras and the other Sophists who grossly abused the doctrine of Herakleitus, for the purpose of confusing and perverting truth by arbitrary etymologies. His language is even more monstrous and extravagant than that of Stallbaum; yet he does not produce (any more than Stallbaum) the least fragment of proof that the Sophists or Protagoras did what he imputes to them (pp. 400-401-403-422).

M. Lenormant, in his recent edition of the Kratylus (Comm. p. 7-9), maintains also that neither the Sophists nor the Rhetors pretended to etymologise, nor are here ridiculed. But he ascribes to Plato in the Kratylus a mystical and theological purpose which I find it difficult to follow.

against whom every unattested accusation is readily believed. But it is neither ascertained, nor (in my judgment) probable, that Plato here intended to ridicule or humiliate any one. The ridicule, if any was intended, would tell against himself more than against others. For he first begins by laying down a general theory respecting names: a theory unquestionably propounded as serious, and understood to be so by the critics:[o] moreover, involving some of his favourite and peculiar doctrines. It is this theory that his particular etymologies are announced as intended to carry out, in the way of illustration or exemplification. Moreover, he undertakes to prove this theory against Hermogenes, who declares himself strongly opposed to it: and he proves it by a string of arguments which (whether valid or not) are obviously given with a serious and sincere purpose of establishing the conclusion. Immediately after having established that there *was* a *real* rectitude of names, and after announcing that he would proceed to enquire wherein such rectitude consisted,[p] what sense or consistency would there be in his inventing a string of intentional caricatures announced as real etymologies? By doing this, he would be only discrediting and degrading the very theory which he had taken so much pains to inculcate upon Hermogenes. Instead of ridiculing Protagoras, he would ridicule himself and his own theory for the benefit of opponents generally, one among them being Protagoras: who (if we imagine his life prolonged), would have had the satisfaction of seeing a theory, framed in direct opposition to his doctrine, discredited and parodied by his own advocate. Hermogenes, too (himself an opponent of the theory, though not concurring with Protagoras), if these etymologies were intended as caricatures, ought to be made to receive them as such, and to join in the joke at the expense of the persons derided. But Hermogenes is not made to manifest any sense of their being so intended: he accepts them all as serious, though some as novel and surprising, in the same passive way

Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understands the etymologies as caricature.

[o] Schleiermacher, Introd. to Krat. pp. 7-10; Lassalle, Herakleit. ii. p. 387.
[p] Plato, Kratylus, p. 391 B.

which is usual with the interlocutors of Sokrates in other dialogues. Farther, there are some among these etymologies plain and plausible enough, accepted as serious by all the critics.[q] Yet these are presented in the series, without being parted off by any definite line, along with those which we are called upon to regard as deliberate specimens of mock-etymology. Again, there are also some, which, looking at their etymological character, are as strange and surprising as any in the whole dialogue: but which yet, from the place which they occupy in the argument, and from the plain language in which they are presented, almost exclude the supposition that they can be intended as jest or caricature.[r] Lastly,

[q] See, as an example, his derivation of Δίφιλος from Διὰ φίλος, p. 399: Μοῦσα, p. 406: δαίμων, from δαήμων, p. 398: for Ἀφροδίτη he takes the Hesiodic etymology, p. 406. Ἄρης and ἄρρην (p. 407). His derivation of αἰθήρ—ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ θέειν (p. 410) is given twice by Aristotle (De Cœlo, i. 3, p. 270, b. 22; Meteorol. i. 3, p. 339, b. 25) as well as in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo, p. 392, a. 8. None of the Platonic etymologies is more strange than that of ψυχή, quasi φυσέχη, ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν φύσιν ὀχεῖν καὶ ἔχειν (Krat. c. 37, p. 400). Yet Proklus cites this as serious, Scholia in Kratylum, p. 4, ed. Boissonnade. Plato, in the Treatise De Legibus, derives χόρος from χαρὰ, and νόμος from νοῦς or νόος (ii. 1, p. 654 A, xii. 8, p. 957 D).

[r] See Plato, Kratyl. c. 114, p. 437 A-B.

This occurs in the latter portion of the dialogue carried on by Sokrates with Kratylus, and is admitted by Lassalle to be seriously meant by Plato: though Lassalle maintains that the etymologies in the first part of the dialogue (between Sokrates and Hermogenes) are mere mockery and parody. (Lassalle, Herakl. der Dunkle, vol. ii. pp. 402-403).

I venture to say that none of those Platonic etymologies, which Lassalle regards as caricatures, are more absurd than those which he here accepts as serious. Liddell and Scott in their Lexicon say about θυμὸς, "probably rightly derived by Plato (Crat. 419) from θύω—ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς." The manner in which Schleiermacher and Steinhart also (Einl. zum Kratylos, pp. 552-554), analysing this dialogue, represent Plato as passing backwards and forwards from mockery to earnest and from earnest to mockery, appears to me very singular: as well as the principle which Schleiermacher lays down (Introd. p. 10), that Plato intended the general doctrines to be seriously understood, and the particular etymological applications to be mere mockery and extravagance (um wer weiss welche Komödie aufzuführen). What other philosopher has ever propounded serious doctrines, and then followed them up by illustrations knowingly and intentionally caricatured so as to disparage the doctrines instead of recommending them?

It is surely less difficult to believe that Plato conceived as plausible and admissible those etymologies which appear to us absurd.

As a specimen of the view entertained by able men of the seventeenth century respecting the Platonic and Aristotelian etymologies, see the Institutiones Logicæ of Burgersdicius, Lib. i. c. 25, not. 1. Lehrsch (Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten, Part i. p. 34-35) agrees with the other commentators, that the Platonic etymologies in the Kratylus are caricatured to deride the boastful and arbitrary etymologies of the Sophists about language. But he too produces no evidence of such etymologies on the part of the Sophists; nay, what is

Kratylus, whose theory all these etymologies are supposed to be intended to caricature, is so far from being aware of this, that he cordially approves everything which Sokrates had said.[8]

I cannot therefore accept as well-founded this "discovery of modern times," which represents the Platonic etymologies in the Kratylus as intentionally extravagant and knowingly caricatured, for the purpose of ridiculing the Sophists or others. In my judgment, Plato did not put them forward as extravagant, nor for the purpose of ridiculing any one, but as genuine illustrations of a theory of his own respecting names. It cannot be said indeed that he advanced them as proof of his theory: for Plato seldom appeals to particulars, except when he has a theory to attack. When he has a theory to lay down, he does not generally recognise the necessity of either proving or verifying it by application to particular cases. His proof is usually deductive or derived from some more general principle asserted *à priori* — some internal sentiment enunciated as a self

Plato intended his theory as

He not cite

proofs of a theory, but only as illustrating what he means.

remarkable, he supposes that *both* Protagoras and Prodikus agreed in the Platonic doctrine that names were φύσει (see pp. 17-19).

[8] Plato, Kratylus, p. 429 C. Steinhart (Einleit. zum Krat. pp. 549-550) observes that both Kratylus and Hermogenes are represented as understanding seriously these etymologies which are now affirmed to be meant as caricatures.

As specimens of Plato's view respecting admissible etymologies, we find him in Timæus, p. 43 C, deriving αἴσθησις from ἀΐσσω: again in the same dialogue, p. 62 A, θερμὸς from κερματίζειν. In Legg. iv. 714, we have τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντες νόμον. In Phædrus, p. 238 C, we find ἔρως derived from [illegible] ρωυνεισθαι.

Aristotle derives ὄσφυς from ἰσοφυές, Histor. Animal. i. 13, p. 493, a. 22; also δίκαιον from δίχα, Ethic. Nikom. v. 7, 1132, a. 31; μεθύειν—μετὰ τὸ θύειν, Athenæus, ii. 40. The Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise Περὶ Κόσμου (p. 401, a. 15) adopts the Platonic etymology of Δία-Ζῆνα as δι' ὃν ζῶμεν.

Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, c. 9, p. 948, derives κνέφας from κενὸν φάους.

The Emperor Marcus Antoninus derives ἀκτὶς, the ray of the Sun, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτείνεσθαι, Meditat. viii. 57.

The Stoics, who were fond of etymologising, borrowed many etymologies from the Platonic Kratylus (Villoison, de Theologiâ Physicâ Stoicorum, in Osann's edition of Cornutus, De Naturâ Deorum, p. 512). Specimens of the Stoic etymologies are given by the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, ii. 25-29 (64-73).

Dähne (in his Darstellung der Judisch-Alexandrinischen Religions-Philosophie, i. p. 73 seq.) remarks on the numerous etymologies not merely propounded, but assumed as grounds of reasoning by Philo Judæus in commenting upon the Pentateuch, etymologies totally inadmissible and often ridiculous.

justifying maxim. Particular examples serve to illustrate what the principle is, but are not required to establish its validity.[t] But I believe that he intended his particular etymologies as *bonâ fide* guesses, more or less probable (like the developments in the Timæus, which he[u] repeatedly designates as εἰκότα, and nothing beyond): some certain, some doubtful, some merely novel and ingenious: such as would naturally spring from the originating *afflatus* of diviners (like Euthyphron, to whom he alludes more than once[x]) who stepped beyond the ordinary regions of human affirmation. Occasionally he proposes alternative and distinct etymologies: feeling assured that there was some way of making out the

[t] See some passages in this very dialogue, Krat. pp. 436 E, 437 C, 438 C.

Lassalle remarks that neither Herakleitus nor Plato were disposed to rest the proof of a general principle upon an induction of particulars (Herakleitos, p. 406.)

[u] Spengel justly remarks (Art. Scr. p. 52) respecting the hypotheses of the Platonic commentators:—"Platonem quidem liberare gestiunt, falsâ ironiâ, non exanimi sententiâ omnia in Cratylo prolata esse dicentes. Sed præter alia multa et hoc neglexerunt viri docti, easdem verborum originationes, quas in Cratylo, in cæteris quoque dialogis, ubi nullus est facetiis locus, et seria omnia aguntur, recurrere."

This passage is cited by K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, not. 474, p. 656. Hermann's own remarks on the dialogue (pp. 494-497) are very indistinct, but he seems to agree with Schleiermacher in singling out Antisthenes as the object of attack.

The third portion of Lehrsch's work, *Ueber die Sprachphilosophie der Alten*, cites numerous examples of the etymologies attempted by the ancients, from Homer downwards, many of them collected from the Etymologicon Magnum. When we read the etymologies propounded seriously by Greek and Latin philosophers (especially the Stoic Chrysippus), literary men, jurists and poets, we shall not be astonished at those found in the Platonic Kratylus. The etymology of Θεὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν, given in the Kratylus (p. 397 D), as well as in the Pythagorean Philolaus (see Boeckh, Philolaus, pp. 168-175), and repeated by Clemens Alexandrinus, is not more absurd than that of θεὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖναι, given by Herodot. ii. 52, and also repeated by Clemens, see Wesseling's note. None of the etymologies of the Kratylus is more strange than that of Ζεὺς-Δία-Ζῆνα (p. 396 B). Yet this is reproduced in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise, Περὶ Κόσμου (p. 401, a. 15), as well as by the Stoic Zeno (Diogen. Laert. vii. 147). The treatise of Cornutus, De Naturâ Deorum, with Osann's Commentary, is instructive in enabling us to appreciate the taste of ancient times as to what was probable or admissible in etymology. There are few of the etymologies in the Kratylus more singular than that of ἄνθρωπος from ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπεν. Yet this is cited by Ammonius as a perfectly good derivation, ad Aristot. De Interpret. p. 103, b. 8, Schol. Bekk., and also in the Etymologicon Magnum.

[x] Compare Plato, Euthyphron, p. 6 D. Origination and invention often pass in Plato as the workings of an ordinary mind (sometimes even a feeble mind) worked upon from without by divine inspiration, quite distinct from the internal force, reasoning, judging, testing, which belongs to a powerful mind. See Phædrus, pp. 235 C, 238 D, 244 A; Timæus, p. 72 A; Menon, p. 81 A.

conclusion—but not feeling equally certain about his own way of making it out. The sentiment of belief attaches itself in Plato's mind to general views and theorems: when he gives particular consequences as flowing from them, his belief graduates down through all the stages between full certainty and the lowest probability, until in some cases it becomes little more than a fanciful illustration—like the mythes which he so often invents to expand and enliven these same general views.[y]

Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other of Plato.

We must remember that Sokrates in the Kratylus explicitly announces himself as having no formed opinion on the subject, and as competent only to the prosecution of the enquiry, jointly with the others. What he says must therefore be received as conjectures proposed for discussion. I see no ground for believing that he regarded any of them, even those which appear to us the strangest, as being absurd or extravagant—or that he proposed any of them in mockery and caricature, for the purpose of deriding other Etymologists. Because these etymologies, or many of them at least, appear to us obviously absurd, we are not warranted in believing that they must have appeared so to Plato. They did not appear so (as I have already observed) to Dionysius of Halikarnassus—nor to Diogenes, nor to the Platonists of antiquity, nor to any critics earlier than the seventeenth century.[z] By many of these critics they were deemed not

[y] I have made some remarks to this effect upon the Platonic mythes in my notice of the Phædon, see ch. xxiii. p. 191, ad Phædon, p. 114.

[z] Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. c. 16, p. 96, Reisk; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. c. 60, p. 375.

Proklus advises that those who wish to become dialecticians should begin with the study of the Kratylus (Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 3, ed. Boiss.)

We read in the Phædrus of Plato (p. 244 B), in the second speech ascribed to Sokrates, two etymologies; derived from μανικὴ by the insertion of τ, which Sokrates declares to be done in bad taste, οἱ λοντες μαντικὴν ἐκάλεσαν. 2. οἰωνιστικὴ, quasi οἰονοϊστικὴ, from οἴησις, νοῦς, ἱστορία. Compare the etymology of Ἔρως, p. 238 C. That these are real word-changes, which Plato believes to have taken place, is the natural and reasonable interpretation of the passage. Cicero (Div. i. 1) alludes to the first of the two as Plato's real opinion; and Heindorf as well as Schleiermacher accept it in the same sense, while expressing their surprise at the want of etymological perspicacity in Plato. Ast and Stallbaum, on the contrary, declare that these two etymologies are mere irony and mockery, spoken by Plato, *ex mente Sophistarum*, and intended as a sneer at the perverse

merely serious, but valuable. Nor are they more absurd than many of the etymologies proposed by Aristotle, by the Stoics, by the Alexandrine critics, by Varro, and by the *grammatici* or literary men of antiquity generally; moreover, even by Plato himself in other dialogues occasionally.[a] In determining what etymologies would appear to Plato reasonable or admissible, Dionysius, Plutarch, Proklus, and Alkinous, are more likely to judge rightly than we: partly because they

and silly Sophists. No reason is produced by Ast and Stallbaum to justify this hypothesis, except that you cannot imagine "*Platonem tam cæcum fuisse*," &c. To me this reason is utterly insufficient; and I contend, moreover, that sneers at the Sophists would be quite out of place in a speech, such as the palinode of Sokrates about Eros.

[a] See what Aristotle says about Πάντη in the first chapter of the treatise De Cœlo: also about αὐτόματον from αὐτὸ μάτην, Physic. ii. 5, p. 197, b. 30.

Stallbaum, after having complimented Plato for his talent in caricaturing the etymologies of others, expresses his surprise to find Aristotle reproducing some of these very caricatures as serious, see Stallbaum's note on Kratyl. p. 411 E.

Respecting the etymologies proposed by learned and able Romans in and before the Ciceronian and Augustan age, Ælius Stilo, Varro, Labeo, Nigidius, &c., see Aulus Gellius, xiii. 10; Quintilian, Inst. Or. i. 5; Varro, de Linguâ Latinâ.

Even to Quintilian, the etymologies of Varro appeared preposterous; and he observes, in reference to those proposed by Ælius Stilo and by others afterwards, "Cui non post Varronem sit venia?" (i. 6, 37). This critical remark, alike good-tempered and reasonable, might be applied with still greater pertinence to the Kratylus of Plato. In regard to etymology, more might have been expected from Varro than from Plato; for in the days of Plato etymological guesses were almost a novelty; while during the three centuries which elapsed between him and Varro, many such conjectures had been hazarded by various scholars, and more or less of improvement might be hoped from the conflict of opposite opinions and thinkers.

M. Gaston Boissier (in his interesting Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de M. Terentius Varron, p. 152, Paris, 1861) observes respecting Varro, what is still more applicable to Plato:—"Gardons nous bien d'ailleurs de demander à Varron ce qu'exige la science moderne: pour n'être pas trop sévères, remettons-le dans son époque et jugeons-le avec l'esprit de son tems. Il ne semble pas qu'alors on réclamât, de ceux qui recherchaient les étymologies, beaucoup d'exactitude et de sévérité. *On se piquait moins d'arriver à l'origine réelle du mot, que de le décomposer d'une manière ingénieuse et qui en gravât le sens dans la mémoire.* Les jurisconsultes eux-mêmes, malgré la gravité de leur profession et l'importance pratique de leurs recherches, ne suivaient pas une autre méthode. Trebatius trouvait dans *sacellum* les deux mots *sacra cella:* et Labéon faisait venir *soror* de *seorsum*, parceque la jeune fille se sépare de le maison paternelle pour suivre son époux: tout comme Nigidius trouvait dans *frater*, *ferè alter*—c'est à dire, un autre soi-même," &c.

Lobeck has similar remarks in his Aglaophamus (pp. 867-869):—"Sané ita J. Capellus veteres Juris-Consultos excusat, *mutuum* interpretantes, *quod ex meo tuum fiat—testamentum* autem, *testationem mentis:* non quod eam verborum originem esse putarent, sed ut significationem eorum altius in legentium animis defigerent. Similiterque ecclesiastici quidam auctores, quum nomen Pascha a græco verbo πάσχειν repetunt, non per ignorantiam lapsi, sed allusionis quandam gratiam aucupati videntur."

had a larger knowledge of the etymologies proposed by Greek philosophers and *grammatici* than we possess—partly because they had no acquaintance with the enlarged views of modern etymologists—which, on the point here in question, are misleading rather than otherwise. Plato held the general theory that names, in so far as they were framed, with perfect rectitude, held embodied in words and syllables a likeness or imitation of the essence of things. And if he tried to follow out such a theory into detail, without any knowledge of grammatical systems, without any large and well-chosen collection of analogies within his own language, or any comparison of different languages with each other—he could scarcely fail to lose himself in wonderful and violent transmutations of letters and syllables.[b]

Continuance of the dialogue—Sokrates endeavours to explain how it is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and spoiled.

Having expressed my opinion that the etymologies propounded by Sokrates in the Kratylus are not intended as caricatures, but as *bonâ fide* specimens of admissible etymological conjecture, or, at the least, of discoverable analogy—I resume the thread of the dialogue.

These etymologies are the hypothetical links whereby Sokrates reconciles his first theory of the essential rectitude of Names (that is, of Naming, as a process which can only be performed in one way, and by an Artist who discerns and uses the Name-Form), with the names actually received and current. The contrast between the sameness and perfection postulated in the theory, and the

[b] Gräfenhahn (Geschichte der classischen Philologie, vol. i. sect. 36, pp. 151-164) points out how common was the hypothesis of fanciful derivation of names or supposed etymologies among the Greek poets, and how it passed from them to the prose writers. He declares that the etymologies in Plato not only in the Kratylus but in other dialogues are "etymologische monstra," but he professes inability to distinguish which of them are serious (pp. 163-164).

Lobeck remarks that the playing and quibbling with words, widely diffused among the ancient literati generally, was especially likely to belong to those who held the Platonic theory about language:—"Is intelligat necesse est, hoc universum genus ab antiquitatis ingenio non alienum; ei vero, qui imagines rerum in vocabulis sic ut in cerâ expressas putaret, convenientissimum fuisse" (Aglaophamus, p. 870).

confusion of actual practice, is not less manifest than the contrast between the benevolent purposes ascribed to the Demiurgus, (in the Timæus) and the realities of man and society:—requiring intermediate assumptions, more or less ingenious, to explain or attenuate the glaring inconsistencies. Respecting the Name-Form, Sokrates intimates that it may often be so disguised by difference of letters and syllables, as not to be discernible by an ordinary man, or by any one except an artist or philosopher. Two names, if compound, may have the same Name-Form, though few or none of the letters in them be the same. A physician may so disguise his complex mixtures, by apparent differences of colour or smell, that they shall be supposed by others to be different, though essentially the same. *Beta* is the name of the letter B: you may substitute, in place of the three last letters, any others which you prefer, and the name will still be appropriate to designate the letter B.[c]

Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to

To explain the foundations of the onomastic (name-giving or speaking) art,[d] we must analyse words into their primordial constituent letters. The name-giving Artists have begun from this point, and we must follow in their synthetical track. We must distinguish letters with their essential forms—we must also distinguish things with their essential forms—we must then assign to each essence of things that essence of letters which has a natural aptitude to signify it, either one letter singly or several conjoined. The rectitude of the compound names will depend upon that of the simple and primordial.[e] This is the only way in which we can track out the rectitude of names: for it is no account of the matter to say that the Gods bestowed them, and that therefore they are right: such recourse to a *Deus ex machinâ* is only

[c] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 393-394.

[d] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 425 A. τῇ ὀνοματικῇ, ἢ ῥητορικῇ, ἢ ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ

[e] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 424 B-E, 426 A, 434 A.

This extreme postulate of analysis and adaptation may be compared with that which Sokrates lays down, in the Phædrus, in regard to the art of Rhetoric. You must first distinguish all the different forms of mind—then all the different forms of speech; you must assign the sort of speech which is apt for persuading each particular sort of mind. Phædrus, pp. 271-272.

one among the pretexts for evading the necessity of explanation.[f]

Essential aptitude for signification consists in resemblance between the essence of the letter and that of the thing signified. Thus the letter *Rho*, according to Sokrates, is naturally apt for the signification of rush or vehement motion, because in pronouncing it the tongue is briskly agitated and rolled about. Several words are cited, illustrating this position.[g] *Iota* naturally designates thin and subtle things, which insinuate themselves everywhere. *Phi*, *Chi*, *Psi*, *Sigma*, the sibilants, imitate blowing. *Delta* and *Tau*, from the compression of the tongue, imitate stoppage of motion, or stationary condition. *Lambda* imitates smooth and slippery things. *Nu* serves, as confining the voice in the mouth, to form the words signifying indoors and interior. *Alpha* and *Eta* are both of them large letters: the first is assigned to signify size, the last to signify length. *Omicron* is suited to what is round or circular.[h]

Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance.

It is from these fundamental aptitudes, and some others analogous, that the name-giving Artist, or Lawgiver, first put together letters to compound and construct his names. Herein consists their rectitude, according to Sokrates. Though in laying down the position Sokrates gives it only as the best which *he* could discover, and intimates that some persons may turn it into derision—yet he evidently means to be understood seriously.[i]

[f] Plato, Kratyl. p. 425 E.

[g] Plato, Kratyl. p. 426 D-E. *θραύειν, κρούειν, ἐρείκειν*, &c. Leibnitz (Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, Book iii. ch. 2, p. 300 Erdm.); and Jacob Grimm (in his Dissertation Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache, Berlin, 1858, ed. 4) give views very similar to those of Plato, respecting the primordial growth of language, and the original significant or symbolising power supposed to be inherent in each letter (Kein Buchstabe, "ursprünglich steht bedeutungslos oder ueberflüssig" pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here also affirms) that Rho designates the Rough—Lambda, the Smooth: see also what he says about Alpha, Iota, Hypsilon. Compare, besides, M. Renan, Origines du Langage, vi. p. 137.

The comparison of the Platonic speculations on the primordial powers of letters, with those of a modern linguistic scholar so illustrious as Grimm (the earliest speculations with the latest) are exceedingly curious—and honourable to Plato. They serve as farther reasons for believing that this dialogue was not intended to caricature Protagoras.

[h] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426-427.

[i] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 426 B, 427 D.

In applying this theory—about the fundamental significant aptitudes of the letters of the alphabet—to show the rectitude of the existing words compounded from them—Sokrates assumes that the name-giving Artists were believers in the Herakleitean theory: that is, in the perpetual process of flux, movement, and transition into contraries. He cites a large variety of names, showing by their composition that they were adapted to denote this all-pervading fact, as constituting the essence of things.[j] The names given by these theorists to that which is good, virtuous, agreeable, &c., were compounded in such a manner as to denote what facilitates, or falls in with, the law of universal movement: the names of things bad or hurtful, denote what obstructs or retards movement.[k]

giving Law giver was a believer in the Herakleitean theory.

Many names (pursues Sokrates), having been given by artistic lawgivers who believed in the Herakleitean theory, will possess intrinsic rectitude, if we assume that theory to be true. But how if the theory be not true? and if the name-givers were mistaken on this fundamental point? The names will then not be right. Now we must not assume the theory to be true, although the Name-givers believed it to be so. Perhaps they themselves (Sokrates intimates) having become giddy by often turning round to survey the nature of things, mistook this *vertige* of their own for a perpetual revolution and movement of the things which they saw, and gave names accordingly.[l] A Name-Giver who is real and artistic is rare and hard to find: there are more among them incompetent than competent: and the name originally bestowed represents only the opinion or conviction of him by whom it is bestowed.[m] Yet the names bestowed will be consistent with themselves, founded on the same theory.

But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent —the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge.

[j] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 401 C-402 B, 436 E. ὡς τοῦ παντὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερομένου καὶ ῥέοντος φαμὲν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὀνόματα,—also p. 439 B.

[k] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 415-416-417, &c.

[l] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 429-411 C. Αἰτιῶνται δὴ οὐ τὸ παρὰ σφίσι πάθος αἴτιον εἶναι ταύτης τῆς δόξης, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα οὕτω πεφυκέναι, &c.

"He that is giddy thinks the world turns round," &c.

[m] Plato, Kratyl. p. 418 C. Οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι μόνον τοῦτο δηλοῖ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄνομα, τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεμένου; p. 419 A.

Changes and transpositions introduced in the name—hard to follow.

Again, the names originally bestowed differ much from those in use now. Many of them have undergone serious changes: there have been numerous omissions, additions, interpolations, and transpositions of letters, from regard to euphony or other fancies: insomuch that the primitive root becomes hardly traceable, except by great penetration and sagacity.[n] Then there are some names which have never been issued at all from the mint of the name-giver, but have either been borrowed from foreigners, or perhaps have been suggested by super-human powers.[o]

Sokrates qualifies and attenuate his original thesis.

To this point Sokrates brings the question during his conversation with Hermogenes: against whom he maintains—That there is a natural intrinsic rectitude in Names, or a true Name-Form—that naming is a process which must be performed in the natural way, and by an Artist who knows that way. But when, after laying down this general theory, he has gone a certain length in applying it to actual names, he proceeds to introduce qualifications which attenuate and explain it away. Existing names were bestowed by artistic law-givers, but under a belief in the Herakleitean theory—which theory is at best doubtful: moreover the original names have, in course of time, undergone such multiplied changes, that the original point of significant resemblance can hardly be now recognised except by very penetrating intellects.

Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus: who upholds that original thesis without any qualification.

It is here that Sokrates comes into conversation with Kratylus: who appears as the unreserved advocate of the same general theory which Sokrates had enforced upon Hermogenes. He admits all the consequences of the theory, taking no account of qualifications. Moreover he announces himself as having already bestowed reflection on the subject, and as espousing the doctrine of Herakleitus.[p]

[n] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 394 B, 399 B, 414 C, 418 A.

[o] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 397 B, 409 B.

[p] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 428 B, 440 E.

It appears that on this point the opinion of Herakleitus coincided with that of the Pythagoreans, who held that names were φύσει καὶ οὐ θέσει,

If names are significant by natural rectitude, or by partaking of the Name-Form, it follows that all names must be right or true, one as well as another. If a name be not right, it cannot be significant: that is, it is no name at all: it is a mere unmeaning sound. A name, in order to be significant, must imitate the essence of the thing named. If you add anything to a number, or subtract anything from it, it becomes thereby a new number: it is not the same number badly rendered. So with a letter: so too with a name. There is no such thing as a bad name. Every name must be either significant, and therefore, right—or else it is not a name. So also there is no such thing as a false proposition: you cannot say the thing that is not: your words in that case have no meaning; they are only an empty sound. The hypothesis that the law-giver may have distributed names erroneously is therefore not admissible.[q] Moreover, you see that he must have known well, for otherwise he would not have given names so consistent with each other, and with the general Herakleitean theory.[r] And since the name is by

and maintained as a corollary that there could be only one name for each thing and only one thing signified by each name (Simplikius ad Aristot. Categ. p. 43, b. 32, Schol. Bekk.).

In general Herakleitus differed from Pythagoras, and is described as speaking of him with bitter antipathy.

[q] Plato, Kratyl. p. 429 C.

So. Πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα

Krat. Ὅσα γε ὀνόματα ἔστιν.

So. Τί οὖν; Ἑρμογένει τῷδε πότερον μηδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως προσήκει, ἢ κεῖσθαι μέν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε;

Krat. Οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοὔνομα, οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῦσα.

The critics say that these last words ought to be read ἦν τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ, as Ficinus has translated, and Schleiermacher after him. They are probably in the right: at the same time, reasoning upon the theory of Kratylus, we might say without impropriety, that "the thing indicates the name."

That which is erroneously called a bad name is no name at all (so Kratylus argues), but only seems to be a name to ignorant persons. Thus also in the Platonic Minos (c. 9, p. 317); a bad law is no law in reality, but only seems to be a law to ignorant men, see above, ch. xii. p. 421.

Compare the like argument about *νόμος* in Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 42-47, and Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 392.

[r] Plato, Krat. p. 436 D. Ἀλλὰ μὴ

εἰ

εἴη. Μέγιστον τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε οὕτω ξύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ ἅπαντα. ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα;

These last words allude to the various particular etymologies which had been enumerated by Sokrates as illustrations of the Herakleitean theory. They confirm the opinion above expressed, that Plato intended his etymologies seriously, not as mockery or caricature. That Plato should have

necessity a representation or copy of the thing, whoever knows the name, must also know the thing named. There is in fact no other way of knowing or seeking or finding out things, except through their names.[s]

Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it.

These consequences are fairly deduced by Kratylus from the hypothesis, of the natural rectitude of names, as laid down in the beginning of the dialogue, by Sokrates: who had expressly affirmed (in his anti-Protagorean opening of the dialogue) that unless the process of naming was performed according to the peremptory dictates of nature and by one of the few privileged name-givers, it would be a failure and would accomplish nothing;[t] in other words, that a non-natural name would be no name at all. Accordingly, in replying to Kratylus, Sokrates goes yet farther in retracting his own previous reasoning at the beginning of the dialogue—though still without openly professing to do so. He proposes a compromise.[u] He withdraws the pretensions of his theory, as peremptory or exclusive; he acknowledges the theory of Hermogenes as true, and valid in conjunction with it. He admits that non-natural names also, significant only by convention, are available as a makeshift—and that such names are in frequent use. Still however he contends, that natural names, significant by likeness, are the best, so far as they can be obtained: but inasmuch as that principle will not afford sufficiently extensive holding-ground, recourse must be had by way of supplement to the less perfect rectitude (of names) presented by customary or conventional significance.[x]

You say (reasons Sokrates with Kratylus) that names must be significant by way of likeness. But there are degrees

intended them as caricatures of Protagoras and Prodikus, and yet that he should introduce Kratylus as welcoming them in support of *his* argument, is a much greater absurdity than the supposition that Plato mistook them for admissible guesses.

[s] Plato, Krat. c. 111, pp. 435-436.

[t] Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 D. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξαμαρτήσεταί τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσει. Compare c. 13, p. 389 A.

[u] Plato, Kratyl. p. 430 A. φέρε δὴ, ἐάν πῃ

[x] Plato, Krat. p. 435. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς γλισχρὰ ᾖ ἡ ὁλκὴ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δ' ᾖ καὶ

ἰὸς ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα·

ἀ γε τὸ δυνατὸν

ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίοις λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἔστι προσήκουσιν—

of likeness. A portrait is more or less like its original, but it is never exactly like: it is never a duplicate, nor does it need to be so. Or a portrait, which really belongs to and resembles one person, may be erroneously assigned to another. The same thing happens with names. There are names more or less like the thing named—good or bad: there are names good with reference to their own object, but erroneously fitted on to objects not their own. The name does not cease to be a name, so long as the type or form of the thing named is preserved in it: but it is worse or better, according as the accompanying features are more or less in harmony with the form.[y] If names are like things, the letters which are put together to form names, must have a natural resemblance to things—as we remarked above respecting the letters Rho, Lambda, &c. But the natural, inherent, powers of resemblance and significance, which we pronounced to belong to these letters, are not found to pervade all the actual names, in which they are employed. There are words containing the letters *Rho* and *Lambda*, in a sense opposite to that which is natural to them—yet nevertheless at the same time significant; as is evident from the fact, that you and I and others understand them alike. Here then are words significant, without resembling: significant altogether through habit and convention. We must admit the principle of convention as an inferior ground and manner of significance. Resemblance, though the best ground as far as it can be had, is not the only one.[z]

There are more or less like to the things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior way.

All names are not like the things named: some names are bad, others good: the law-giver sometimes gave names under an erroneous belief. Hence you are not warranted in saying that things must be known and investigated through names, and that whoever knows the name, knows also the thing named. You say that the names given are all coherent and grounded upon the Herakleitean theory of perpetual flux. You take this as a proof that that theory is true in itself, and that the law-giver

All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it.

[y] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 432-434. [z] Plato, Krat. pp. 434-435.

adopted and proceeded upon it as true. I agree with you that the law-giver or name-giver believed in the Herakleitean theory, and adapted many of his names to it: but you cannot infer from hence that the theory is true—for he may have been mistaken.[a] Moreover, though many of the existing names consist with, and are based upon, that theory, the same cannot be said of all names. Many names can be enumerated which are based on the opposite principle of permanence and stand-still. It is unsafe to strike a balance of mere numbers between the two: besides which, even among the various names founded on the Herakleitean theory, you will find jumbled together the names of virtues and vices, benefits and misfortunes. That theory lends itself to good and evil alike: it cannot therefore be received as true —whether the name-giver believed in it or not.[b]

Lastly, even if we granted that things may be known and studied through their names, it is certain that there must be some other way of knowing them: since the first name-givers (as you yourself affirm) knew things, at a time when no names existed.[c] Things may be known and ought to be studied, not through names, but by themselves and through their own affinities.[d]

It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their names.

Sokrates then concludes the dialogue by opposing the Platonic ideas to the Herakleitean theory. I often dream of or imagine the Beautiful *per se*, the Good *per se*, and such like existences or Entia.[e] Are not

Unchangeable Platonic Forms—opposed to the Hera-

[a] Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 B. Ἔτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταὐτὸν τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, καὶ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες τε ἔθεντο ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων—φαίνονταί γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—τὸ δὲ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, &c.

These words appear to me to imply that Sokrates is perfectly serious, and not ironical, in delivering his opinion, that the original imposers of names were believers in the Herakleitean theory. However strange the verbal transitions and approximations may appear to us, I think it clear that he intends to be understood seriously.

[b] Plato, Krat. pp. 437-438 C. Sokrates here enumerates the particular names illustrating his judgment.

[c] Plato, Krat. p. 438 A-B. Kratylus here suggests that the first names may perhaps have been imposed by a superhuman power. But Sokrates replies, that upon that supposition all the names must have been imposed upon the same theory: there could not have been any contradiction between one name and another.

[d] Plato, Krat. pp. 438-439. δι' ἀλλήλων γε, εἴ πῃ ξυγγενῆ ἐστι, καὶ αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν.

[e] Plato, Krat. p. 439 C. σκέψαι δ πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω, πότερον

which is true only respecting sensible particulars.

such existences real? Are they not eternal, unchangeable and stationary? Particular beautiful things—particular good things—are in perpetual change or flux: but The Beautiful, The Good—the Ideas or Forms of these and such like—remain always what they are, always the same.

The Herakleitean theory of constant and universal flux is true respecting particular things, but not true respecting these Ideas or Forms. It is the latter alone which know or are known: it is they alone which admit of being rightly named. For that which is in perpetual flux and change can neither know, nor be known, nor be rightly named.[f] Being an ever-changing subject, it is never in any determinate condition: and nothing can be known which is not in a determinate condition. The Form of the knowing subject, as well as the Form of the known object, must both remain fixed and eternal, otherwise there can be no knowledge at all.

To admit these permanent and unchangeable Forms is to deny the Herakleitean theory, which proclaims constant and universal flux. This is a debate still open and easy to decide. But while it is yet undecided, no wise man ought to put such implicit faith in names and in the bestowers of names, as to feel himself warranted in asserting confidently the certainty of the Herakleitean theory.[g] Perhaps that theory is true, perhaps not. Consider the point strenuously, Kratylus. Be not too easy in acquiescence—for you are still young, and have time

theory must not be assumed as certain. We

in names.

τι εἶναι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν τῶν ὄντων οὕτως, ἢ μή;

μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστι καλὸν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷον ἔστιν;

[f] Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 E.

Ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνο ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι, καὶ

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπ' οὐδενός.

Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μένει.

[g] Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 B.

ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥᾷδιον ᾖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόματα αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, διϊστι εἰδότα, καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενὸς, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κερά-, &c.

enough before you. If you find it out, give to me also the benefit of your solution.[h]

Kratylus replies that he will follow the advice given, but that he has already meditated on the matter, and still adheres to Herakleitus. Such is the close of the dialogue.

Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists.

One of the most learned among the modern Platonic commentators informs us that the purpose of Plato in this dialogue was, "to rub over Protagoras and other Sophists with the bitterest salt of sarcasm."[i] I have already expressed my dissent from this theory, which is opposed to all the ancient views of the dialogue, and which has arisen, in my judgment, only from the anxiety of the moderns to exonerate Plato from the reproach of having suggested as admissible, etymologies which now appear to us fantastic. I see no derision of the Sophists, except one or two sneers against Protagoras and Prodikus, upon the ever-recurring theme that they took money for their lectures.[j] The argument against Protagoras at the opening of the dialogue—whether conclusive or not—is serious and not derisory. The discourse of Sokrates is neither that of an anti-sophistical caricaturist, on the one hand—nor that of a confirmed dogmatist who has studied the subject and made up his mind on the other (this is the part which he ascribes to Kratylus)[k]—but the tentative march of an enquirer groping after truth, who follows the suggestive promptings of his own invention, without knowing whither it will conduct him: who having in his mind different and even opposite points of view, unfolds first arguments on behalf of one, and next those on behalf of the other, without pledging himself either to the one or to the other,

[h] Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 D.

[i] Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Kratyl. p. 18 —"quos Plato hoc libro acerbissimo sale perfricandos statuit." Schleiermacher also tells us (Einleitung, pp. 17-21) that "Plato had much delight in heaping a full measure of ridicule upon his enemy Antisthenes; and that he at last became tired with the exuberance of his own philological jests." Lassalle shows, with much force, that the persons ridiculed (even if we grant the derisory purpose to be established) in the Kratylus, cannot be Protagoras and the Protagoreans (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 376-384).

[j] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 B, 391 B.

[k] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 428 A, 440 D.

or to any definite scheme of compromise between them.[1] Those who take no interest in such circuitous gropings and guesses of an inquisitive and yet unsatisfied mind—those who ask for nothing but a conclusion clearly enunciated along with one or two affirmative reasons—may find the dialogue tiresome. However this may be—it is a manner found in many Platonic dialogues.

Theory laid in the +— Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary to bring it into harmony with facts.

Sokrates opens his case by declaring the thesis of the Absolute (Object *sine* Subject), against the Protagorean thesis of the Relative (Object *cum* Subject). Things have an absolute essence: names have an absolute essence:[m] each name belongs to its own thing, and to no other: this is its rectitude: none but that rare person, the artistic name-giver, can detect the essence of each thing, and the essence of each name, so as to apply the name rightly. Here we have a theory truly Platonic: impressed upon Plato's mind by a sentiment *à priori*, and not from any survey or comparison of particulars. Accordingly when Sokrates is called upon to apply his theory to existing current words, and to make out how any such rectitude can be shown to belong to them—he finds the greatest divergence and incongruity between the two. His ingenuity

[1] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 B, 391 A. *συζητεῖν ἕτοιμός εἰμι καὶ σοὶ καὶ κοινῇ—ὅτι οὐκ ἀλλὰ ν μετὰ σοῦ.*

One cannot but notice how Plato, shortly after having declared war against the Relativity affirmed by Protagoras, falls himself into that very track of Relativity when he comes to speak about actual language, telling us that names are imposed on grounds dependant on or relative to the knowledge or belief of the Name-givers. Kratylus, pp. 397, B-399, A-401, A-B-411, B-436 B.

The like doctrine is affirmed in the Republic, vi. p. 515 B. *δῆλον ὅτι ὁ θέμενος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἠγεῖτο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα.*

Leibnitz conceived an idea of a "Lingua Characterica Universalis, quæ simul sit ars inveniendi et judicandi" (see Leibnitz Opp. Erdmann, pp. 162-163), and he alludes to a conception of Jacob Böhme, that there once existed a Lingua Adamica or Natur-Sprache, through which the essences of things might be contemplated and understood. "Lingua Adamica vel certé vis ejus, quam quidam se nosse, et in nominibus ab Adamo impositis essentias rerum intueri posse contendunt—nobis certé ignota est" (Opp. p. 93). Leibnitz seems to have thought that it was possible to construct a philosophical language, based upon an Alphabetum Cogitationum Humanarum, through which problems on all subjects might be resolved, by a *calculus* like that which is employed for the solution of arithmetical or geometrical problems (Opp. p. 83; compare also p. 356).

This is very analogous to the affirmations of Sokrates, in the first part of the Kratylus, about the essentiality of Names discovered and declared by the *νομοί*

is hardly tasked to reconcile them: and he is obliged to have recourse to bold and multiplied hypotheses. That the first Name-Givers were artists proceeding upon system, but incompetent artists proceeding on a bad system—they were Herakleiteans who believed in the universality of movement, and gave names having reference to movement:[n] That the various letters of the alphabet, or rather the different actions of the vocal organism by which they are pronounced, have each an inherent, essential, adaptation, or analogy to the phenomena of movement or arrest of movement:[o] That the names originally bestowed have become disguised by a variety of metamorphoses, but may be brought back to their original by probable suppositions, and shown to possess the rectitude sought. All these hypotheses are only violent efforts to reconcile the Platonic *à priori* theory, in some way or other, with existing facts of language. To regard them as intentional caricatures, would be to suppose that Plato is seeking intentionally to discredit and deride his own theory of the Absolute: for the discredit could fall nowhere else. We see that Plato considered many of his own guesses as strange and novel, some even as laying him open to ridicule.[p] But they were indispensable

[n] Plato, Kratyl. p. 436 D.

[o] Plato, Krat. pp. 424-425. Schleiermacher declares this to be among the greatest and most profound truths which have ever been enunciated about language (Introduction to Kratylus, p. 11). Stallbaum, on the contrary, regards it as not even seriously meant, but mere derision of others (Prolegg. ad Krat. p. 12). Another commentator on Plato calls it "eine Lehre der Sophistischen Sprachforscher" (August Arnold, Einleitung in die Philosophie —durch die Lehre Platons vermittelt —p. 178, Berlin, 1841).

Proklus, in his Commentary, says that the scope of this dialogue is to exhibit the imitative or generative faculty which essentially belongs to the mind, and whereby the mind (aided by the vocal or pronuntiative imagination—λεκτικὴ φαντασία) constructs names which are natural transcripts of the essences of things (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. pp. 1-21 ed. Boissonnade; Alkinous, Introd. ad Platon. c. 6).

Ficinus, too, in his Argument to the Kratylus (p. 768), speaks much about the mystic sanctity of names, recognised not merely by Pythagoras and Plato, but also by the Jews and Orientals. He treats the etymologies in the Kratylus as seriously intended. He says not a word about any intention on the part of Plato to deride the Sophists or any other Etymologists.

So also Sydenham, in his translation of Plato's Philêbus (p. 33), designates the Kratylus as "a dialogue in which is taught the nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient, by a supposed etymology of Names and Words."

[p] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 425 D, 426 B. Because Sokrates says that these etymologies may appear ridiculous, we are not to infer that he proposed them as caricatures; see what Plato says in the Republic, v. p. 452, about his own propositions respecting the training of women, which others (he says) will think ludicrous, but which he proposes with the most thorough and serious conviction.

to bring his theory into something like coherence, however inadequate, with real language.

Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue—he disconnects his theory of Naming from doctrine.

In the second part of the dialogue, where Kratylus is introduced as uncompromising champion of this same theory, Sokrates changes his line of argument, and impugns the peremptory or exclusive pretensions of the theory: first denying some legitimate corollaries from it—next establishing by the side of it the counter-theory of Hermogenes, as being an inferior though indispensable auxiliary—yet still continuing to uphold it as an ideal of what is Best. He concludes by disconnecting the theory pointedly from the doctrine of Herakleitus, with which Kratylus connected it, and by maintaining that there can be no right naming, and no sound knowledge, if that doctrine be admitted.[q] The Platonic Ideas, eternal and unchangeable, are finally opposed to Kratylus as the only objects truly knowable and nameable —and therefore as the only conditions under which right naming can be realised. The Name-givers of actual society have failed in their task by proceeding on a wrong doctrine: neither they nor the names which they have given can be trusted.[r] The doctrine of perpetual change or movement is true respecting the sensible world and particulars, but it is false respecting the intelligible world or universals—Ideas and Forms. These latter are the only things knowable: but we cannot know them through names: we must study them by themselves and by their own affinities.

How this is to be done, Sokrates professes himself unable to say. We may presume him to mean, that a true Artistic Name-giver must set the example, knowing these Forms or

[q] Plato, Kratyl. p. 439 D. Ἆρ' οὖν οἷόν τε πρυσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἴπερ ἀεὶ

[r] Plato, Kratyl. p. 440 C. Compare pp. 436 D, 439 B.

Lassalle contends that Herakleitus and his followers considered the knowledge of names to be not only indispensable to the knowledge of things, but equivalent to and essentially embodying that knowledge. (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 363-368-387.) See also a passage of Proklus, in his Commentary on the Platonic Parmenidês, p. 476, ed. Stallbaum.

The remarkable passage in the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysica, wherein he speaks of Plato and Plato's early familiarity with Kratylus and the Herakleitean opinions, coincides very much with the course of the Platonic dialogue Kratylus, from its beginning to its end (Aristot. Metaphys. i. p. 987 a-b).

essences beforehand, and providing for each its appropriate Name, or Name-Form, significant by essential analogy.

Herein, so far as I can understand, consists the amount of positive inference which Plato enables us to draw from the Kratylus. Sokrates began by saying that names having natural rectitude were the only materials out of which a language could be formed: he ends by affirming merely that this is the best and most perfect mode of formation: he admits that names may become significant, though loosely and imperfectly, by convention alone—yet the best scheme would be, that in which they are significant by inherent resemblance to the thing named. But this cannot be done until the Name-giver, instead of proceeding upon the false theory of Herakleitus, starts from the true theory recognising the reality of eternal, unchangeable, Ideas or Forms. He will distinguish, and embody in appropriate syllables, those Forms of Names which truly resemble, and have natural connection with, the Forms of Things.

Ideal best of na the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them.

Such is the ideal of perfect or philosophical Naming, as Plato conceives it—disengaged from those divinations of the origin and metamorphoses of existing names, which occupy so much of the dialogue.[s] He does not indeed attempt to

[s] Deuschle (Die Platon. Sprach-philosophie, p. 57) tells us that in this dialogue "Plato *intentionally* presented many of his thoughts in a covert or contradictory and unintelligible manner." (Vielos absichtlich verhüllt oder widersprechend und missverständlich dargestellt wird.)

I see no probability in such an hypothesis.

Respecting the origin and primordial signification of language, a great variety of different opinions have been started.

William von Humboldt (Werke, vi. 80) assumes that there must have been some primitive and natural bond between each sound and its meaning (*i.e.* that names were originally significant φύσει), though there are very few particular cases in which such connexion can be brought to evidence or even divined. (Here we see that the larger knowledge of etymology possessed at present deters the modern philologer from that which Plato undertakes in the Kratylus.) He distinguishes a threefold relation between the name and the thing signified. 1. Directly imitative. 2. Indirectly imitative or symbolical. 3. Imitative by one remove, or analogical; where a name becomes transferred from one object to another, by virtue of likeness between the two objects. (Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechtes, p. 78, Berlin, 1836.)

Mr. Hensleigh Wedgwood, in his Etymology of the English Language (see Prelim. Disc. p. 10 seq.), recognises the same imitative origin, and tries to apply the principle to particular English words. Mr. F. W. Farrar, in his recent interesting work (Chapters on Language) has explained and en-

construct a body of true names *à priori*, but he sets forth the real nameable permanent essences, to which these names might be assimilated: the principles upon which the construction ought to be founded, by the philosophic law-giver following out a good theory:[t] and he contrasts this process with two rival processes, each defective in its own way. This

forced copiously the like thesis—onomatopœic origin for language generally. He has combated the objections of Professor Max Müller, who considers the principle to be of little applicability or avail. But M. Renan assigns to it not less importance than Mr. Wedgwood and Mr. Farrar. (See sixth chapter of his ingenious dissertation, Sur les Origines du Langage, pp. 136-146-147).

"L'imitation, ou l'onomatopée, parait avoir été le procédé ordinaire d'après lequel les premiers hommes formèrent les appellations. D'ailleurs, comme le choix de l'appellation n'est point arbitraire, et que jamais l'homme ne se décide à assembler des sons au hasard pour en faire des signes de la pensée—on peut affirmer que de tous les mots actuellement usités, il n'en est pas un seul qui *n'ait eu sa raison suffisante*, et ne se rattache, à travers mille transformations, à *une élection primitive*. Or, le motif déterminant pour le choix des mots, a dû être, dans la plupart des cas, le désir d'imiter l'objet qu'on vouloit exprimer. L'instinct de certains animaux suffit pour les porter à ce genre d'imitation, qui, faute de principes rationnels, reste chez eux infécond.

"En résumé, *le caprice* n'a eu aucune part dans la formation du langage. Sans doute, on ne peut admettre qu'il y ait une relation intrinséque entre le nom et la chose. Le système que Platon a si subtilement développé dans le Cratyle—cette thèse qu'il y a des dénominations naturelles, et que la propriété des mots se reconnâit à l'imitation plus ou moins exacte de l'objet,—pourrait tout au plus s'appliquer aux noms formés par onomatopée: et pour ceux-ci mêmes, la loi dont nous parlons n'établit qu'une convenance. *Les appellations n'ont pas uniquement leur cause dans l'objet appelé*—(sans quoi, elles seraient les mêmes dans toutes les langues)—*mais dans l'objet appelé, vu à travers les dispositions personnelles du sujet appelant.* La raison qui a déterminé le choix des premiers hommes peut nous échapper: mais elle a existé. La liaison du sens et du mot n'est jamais *nécessaire*, jamais *arbitraire:* toujours elle est *motivée.*"

When M. Renan maintains the Protagorean doctrine, that it is not the Object which is cause of the denomination given, but the Object seen through the personal dispositions of the denominating Subject—he contradicts the reasoning of the Platonic Sokrates in the conversation with Hermogenes (pp. 386-387; compare 424 A). But he adopts the reasoning of the same in the subsequent conversation with Kratylus; wherein the relative point of view is introduced for the first time (pp. 429 A-B, 431 E), and brought more and more into the foreground (pp. 436 B-D-437 C-439 C).

The distinction drawn by M. Renan between *l'arbitraire* and *le motivé* appears to me unfounded: at least, it requires a peculiar explanation of the two words—for if by *le caprice* and *l'arbitraire* be meant the exclusion of *all* motive, such a state of mind could not be a preliminary to any proceeding at all. M. Renan can only mean that the motive which led to the original choice of the name, was peculiar to the occasion, and has since been forgotten. And this is what he himself says in a note to his Preface (pp. 18-19), replying to M. Littré: "L'Arien primitif a eu un motif pour appeler le frère *bhratr* ou *fratr*, et le Sémite pour l'appeler *ah:* peut on dire que cette différence resulte ou des aptitudes différentes de leur esprit, ou du spectacle extérieur? Chaque objet, les circonstances restant les mêmes, a été susceptible d'une foule de dénominations: le choix, qui a été fait de l'une d'elles, tient à des causes impossibles à saisir."

[t] Plato (in Timæus, p. 29 B) recognises an essential affinity between the eternal Forms and the words or propositions in which they become subjects of discourse.

same contrast, pervading Plato's views on other subjects, deserves a few words of illustration.

Respecting social institutions and government, there is one well-known theory to which Sir James Mackintosh gave expression in the phrase—"Governments are not made, but grow." The like phrase has been applied by an eminent modern author on Logic, to language—"Languages are not made, but grow."[u] One might suppose, in reading the second and third books of the Republic of Plato, that Plato also had adopted this theory: for the growth of a society, without any initiative or predetermined construction by a special individual, is there strikingly depicted.[x] But in truth it is this theory which stands in most of the Platonic works, as the antithesis depreciated and discredited by Plato. The view most satisfactory to him contemplates the analogy of a human artist or professional man; which he enlarges into the idea of an originating, intelligent, artistic, Constructor, as the source of all good. This view is exhibited to us in the Timæus, where we find the Demiurgus, building up by his own fiat all that is good in the Kosmos: in the Politikus, where we find the individual dictator producing by his uncontrolled ordinance all that is really good in the social system: —lastly, here also in the Kratylus, where we have the scientific or artistic Name-giver, and him alone, set forth as competent to construct an assemblage of names, each possessing full and perfect rectitude. To this theory there is presented a counter theory, which Plato disapproves—a Kosmos which grows by itself and keeps up its own agencies, without any extra-kosmic constructor or superintendent: in like manner, an aggregate of social customs, and an aggregate of names, which have grown up no one knows how; and which sustain and perpetuate themselves by traditional force—by movement already acquired in a given direction. The idea of growth,

Comparison of Plato's views about [illegible] social institutions. Artistic, systematic construction—contrasted with unpremeditated, unsystematic growth.

[u] See Mr. John Stuart Mill's Logic, Book i. ch. viii. p. 172, fourth ed.

[x] Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 seq., where the γένεσις of a social community, out of common necessity and desire acting upon all and each of the individual citizens, is depicted in a striking way. The ἀρχή of the City (p. 369 B) as Plato there presents it, is Aristotelian rather than Platonic.

by regular assignable steps and by regularising tendencies instinctive and inherent in Nature, belongs rather to Aristotle: Plato conceives Nature as herself irregular, and as persuaded or constrained into some sort of regularity by a supernatural or extranatural artist.[y]

compared with Kratylus.

Looking back to the Politikus (reviewed in the last chapter), we find Plato declaring to us wherein consists the rectitude of a social Form: it resides in the presiding and uncontrolled authority of a scientific or artistic Ruler, always present and directing every one: or of a few such Rulers, if there be a few—though this is more than can be hoped. But such rectitude is seldom or never realised. Existing social systems are bad copies of this type, degenerating more or less widely from its perfection. One

[y] M. Destutt de Tracy insists upon the emotional initiative force, as deeper and more efficacious than the intellectual, in the first formation of language.

"Dans l'origine du langage d'action, un seul geste dit—je veux cela, ou je vous montre cela, ou je vous demande secours: un seul cri dit, je vous appelle, ou je souffre, ou je suis content, &c.; mais sans distinguer aucune des idées qui composent ses propositions. Ce n'est point par les détails, mais par les masses, que commencent toutes nos expressions, aussi bien que toutes nos connaissances. Si quelques langages possédent des signes propres à exprimer des idées isolées, ce n'est donc que par l'effet de la décomposition qui s'est operée dans ces langages; et ces signes ou noms propres d'idées, ne sont, pour ainsi dire, que des débris, des fragmens, ou du moins, des émanations de ceux qui d'abord exprimaient, bien ou mal, les propositions toutes entières." (Destutt de Tracy, Grammaire, ch. i. p. 23, ed. 1825; see also the Idéologie of the same author, ch. xvi. p. 215.)

M. Renan enuntiates in the most explicit terms this comparison of the formation of language to the growth and development of a germ:—"Les langues doivent êtres comparées, non au cristal qui se forme par agglomération autour d'un noyau, mais au germe qui se développe par sa force intime, et par l'appel nécessaire des parties." (De l'Origine du Langage, ch. iii. p. 101; also ch. iv. pp. 115-117.)

The theory of M. Renan, in this ingenious treatise is, that language is the product of "la raison spontanée, la raison populaire," without reflexion. "La réflexion n'y peut rien: les langues sont sorties toutes faites du moule même de l'esprit humain, comme Minerve du cerveau de Jupiter. Maintenant que la raison réfléchie a remplacé l'instinct créateur, à peine le génie suffit il pour analyser ce que l'esprit des premiers hommes enfanta de toutes pièces, et sans y songer" (pp. 98-99.) This theory appears to me very doubtful: as much as there is proved in it, is stated in a good passage cited by M. Renan from Will. Humboldt (pp. 106-107). But there are two remarks to be made, in comparing it with the Kratylus of Plato. 1. That the hypothesis of a philosopher "qui compose un langage de sang-froid," which appears absurd to Turgot and M. Renan (p. 92), did not appear absurd to Plato, but on the contrary as the only sure source of what is good and right in language. 2. That Plato, in the Kratylus, takes account only of *naming*, and not of the grammatical structure of language, which M. Renan considers the essential part (p. 106; compare also pp. 208-209). Grammar, with its established analogies, does not seem to have been present to Plato's mind as an object of reflexion: there existed none in his day.

or a Few persons arrogate to themselves uncontrolled power, without possessing that science or art which justifies the exercise of it in the Right Ruler. These are, or may become, extreme depravations. The least bad, among all the imperfect systems, is an aggregate of fixed laws and magistrates with known functions, agreed to by convention of all and faithfully obeyed by all. But such a system of fixed laws, though second-best, falls greatly short of rectitude. It is much inferior in every way to the uncontrolled authority of the scientific Ruler.[z]

That which Plato does for social systems in the Politikus, he does for names in the Kratylus. The full rectitude of names is when they are bestowed by the scientific Ruler, considered in the capacity of Name-giver. He it is who discerns, and embodies in syllables, the true Name-Form in each particular case. But such an artist is seldom realised: and there are others who, attempting to do his work without his knowledge, perform it ignorantly or under false theories.[a] The names thus given are imperfect names: moreover, after being given, they become corrupted and transformed in passing from man to man. Lastly, the mere fact of convention among the individuals composing the society, without any deliberate authorship or origination from any Ruler, bad or good—suffices to impart to Names a sort of significance, vulgar and imperfect, yet adequate to a certain extent.[b] The Name-giving Artist or Lawgiver is here superseded by King Nomos.

Ideal of Plato—Postulate of the One Wise Man—Badness of all reality.

It will be seen that in both these cases the Platonic point of view comes out—deliberate authorship from the scientific or artistic individual mind, as the only source of rectitude and perfection. But when Plato looks at the reality of life, either in social system or in names, he finds no such perfection anywhere: he discovers a divine agency originating what is good; but there is an

[z] See Plato, Politikus, pp. 300-301.

[a] Plato, Kratyl. p. 432 E.

[b] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 434 E, 435 A-B. This unsystematic, spontaneous, origin and growth of language is set forth by Lucretius, who declares himself opposed to the theory of an originating Name-giver (v. pp. 1021-1060). Jacob Grimm and M. Renan espouse a theory, in the main, similar.

independent agency necessary in the way of co-operation, though it sometimes counteracts and always debases the good.[c] We find either an incompetent dictator who badly imitates the true Artist—or else we have fixed, peremptory, laws; depending on the unsystematic, unauthorised, convention among individuals, which has grown up no one knows how—which is transmitted by tradition, being taught by every one and learnt by every one without any privileged caste of teachers—and which in the Platonic Protagoras is illustrated in the mythe and discourse ascribed to that Sophist;[d] being in truth, common sense, as contrasted with professional specialty. In regard to social systems, Plato pronounces fixed laws to be the second-best—enjoining strict obedience to them, wherever the first-best cannot be obtained. In the Republic he enumerates what are the conditions of rectitude in a city: but he admits at the same time that this Right Civic Constitution is an ideal, nowhere to be found existing: and he points out the successive stages of corruption by which it degenerates more and more into conformity with the realities of human society. As with Right Civic Constitution, so with Right Naming: Plato shows what constitutes rectitude of Names but he admits that this is an ideal seen nowhere, and he notes the various causes which deprave the Right Names into that imperfect and semi-significant condition, which is the best that existing languages present.[e]

Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês in treatment

One more remark, in reference to the general spirit and reciprocal bearing of Plato's dialogues. In three distinct dialogues—Kratylus, Theætêtus, Sophistês—one and the same question is introduced into the dis-

[c] Plato, Timæus, p. 68 E.

[d] See my remarks on the Politikus, in the last chapter: also Protagoras, p. 320 seq.

Compare Plato, Kriton, p. 48 A. ὁ ἰκανῶν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς.

In the Menon also the same question is broached as in the Protagoras, whether virtue is teachable or not? and how any virtue can exist, when there are no special teachers, and no special learners of virtue? Here we have, though differently handled, the same antithesis between the ethical sentiment which grows and propagates itself unconsciously, without special initiative—and that which is deliberately prescribed and imparted by the wise individual: common sense versus professional specialty.

[e] See the conditions of the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία, and its gradual depravation and degeneracy into the state of actual governments, in Republic, v. init. p. 449 B, viii. 544 A-B.

cussion: a question keenly debated among the contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle. How is a false proposition possible? Many held that a false proposition and a false name were impossible: that you could not speak the thing that *is not*, or Non Ens (τὸ μὴ ὄν): that such a proposition would be an empty sound, without meaning or signification: that speech may be significant or insignificant, but could not be false, except in the sense of being unmeaning.[f]

and the possibility of false propositions.

Now this doctrine is dealt with in the Theætêtus, Sophistês, and Kratylus. In the Theætêtus,[g] Sokrates examines it at great length, and proposes several different hypotheses to explain how a false proposition might be possible: but ends in pronouncing them all inadmissible. He declares himself incompetent and passes on to something else. Again, in the Sophistês, the same point is taken up, and discussed there also very copiously.[h] The Eleate in that dialogue ends by finding a solution which satisfies him (viz.: that τὸ μὴ ὂν=τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος). But what is remarkable is, that the solution does not meet any of the difficulties propounded in the Theætêtus; nor are those difficulties at all adverted to in the Sophistês. Finally, in the Kratylus, we have the very same doctrine, that false affirmations are impossible—which both in the Theætêtus and in the Sophistês is enunciated, not as the decided opinion of the speaker, but as a problem which embarrasses him—we have this same doctrine averred unequivocally by Kratylus as his own full conviction. And Sokrates finds that a very short argument, and a very simple comparison, suffice to refute him.[i] The supposed "aggressive cross-examiner," who

[f] Plato, Kratyl. p. 429.

Ammonius, Scholia εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας of Aristotle (Schol. Brandis, p. 60, a. 15).

τι
ταῦτα ·
ἡμετέρας διανοίας, λέγοντες ὅτι οὕτως
οὐκ ἐστὶ φύσει τὰ πρός τι ἀλλὰ θέσει.
τούτοις
τι
, Πρωταγόρας ὁ σοφιστὴς· διὸ καὶ
εγεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τινὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν·
γὰρ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ
καὶ δοκοῦν ἀποφαίνεται περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐκ ἐχόντων ὡρισμένην φύσιν
ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς σχέσει τὸ εἶναι
των.

Plato, Theætêt. pp. 187 D to 201 D. The discussion of the point is continued through thirteen pages of Stephan. edit.

[h] Plato, Sophistês, pp. 237 A, 264 B, through twenty-seven pages of Steph. edit.—though there are some digressions included herein.

[i] Plato, Kratyl. pp. 430-431

presses Sokrates so hard in the Theætêtus, is not allowed to put his puzzling questions in the Kratylus.[k]

Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject.

How are we to explain these three different modes of handling the same question by the same philosopher? If the question about Non-Ens can be disposed of in the summary way which we read in the Kratylus, what is gained by the string of unsolved puzzles in the Theætêtus—or by the long discursive argument in the Sophistês, ushering in a new solution noway satisfactory? If, on the contrary, the difficulties which are unsolved in the Theætêtus, and imperfectly solved in the Sophistês, are real and pertinent—how are we to explain the proceeding of Plato in the Kratylus, when he puts into the mouth of Kratylus a distinct averment of the opinion about Non-Ens, yet without allowing him, when it is impugned by Sokrates, to urge any of these pertinent arguments in defence of it? If the peculiar solution given in the Sophistês be the really genuine and triumphant solution, why is it left unnoticed both in the Kratylus and the Theætêtus, and why is it contradicted in other dialogues? Which of the three dialogues represents Plato's real opinion on the question?

No common

its own peculiar argument.

To these questions, and to many others of like bearing, connected with the Platonic writings, I see no satisfactory reply, if we are to consider Plato as a positive philosopher, with a scheme and edifice of methodised opinions in his mind: and as composing all his dialogues with a set purpose, either of inculcating these opinions on the reader, or of refuting the opinions opposed to them. This supposition is what most Platonic critics have in their minds, even when professedly modifying it. Their admiration for Plato is not satisfied unless they conceive him in the professorial chair as a teacher, surrounded by a crowd of learners, all under the obligation (incumbent on learners generally) to believe what they hear. Reasoning upon such a basis, the Platonic dialogues present themselves to me as a mystery. They exhibit

[k] Plato, Theætêt. p. 200 A. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει.

neither identity of the teacher, nor identity of the matter taught: the composer (to use various Platonic comparisons) is Many, and not One—he is more complex than Typhos.[m]

If we are to find any common purpose pervading and binding together all the dialogues, it must not be a didactic purpose, in the sense above defined. The value of them consists, not in the result, but in the discussion—not in the conclusion, but in the premisses for and against it. In this sense all the dialogues have value, and all the same sort of value—though not all equal in amount. In different dialogues, the same subject is set before you in different ways: with remarks and illustrations sometimes tending towards one theory, sometimes towards another. It is for you to compare and balance them, and to elicit such result as your reason approves. The Platonic dialogues require, in order to produce their effect, a supplementary responsive force, and a strong effective reaction, from the individual reason of the reader: they require moreover that he shall have a genuine interest in the process of dialectic scrutiny (*τὸ φιλομαθὲς, φιλόλογον*)[n] which will enable him to perceive beauties in what would appear tiresome to others.

Such manner of proceeding may be judicious or not, according to the sentiment of the critic. But it is at any rate Platonic. And we have to recall this point of view when dismissing the Kratylus, which presents much interest in the premisses and conflicting theories, with little or no result. It embodies the oldest speculations known to us respecting the origin, the mode of signification, and the functions of words as an instrument: and not the least interesting part of it, in my judgment, consists in its etymological conjectures, affording evidence of a rude etymological sense which has now passed away.

[m] Plato, Phædrus, p. 230 A.

[n] Plato, Republic, v. p. 475; compare Phædon, pp. 89-90. Phædrus, p. 230 E.

CHAPTER XXX.

PHILEBUS.

THE Philêbus, which we are now about to examine, is not merely a Dialogue of Search, but a Dialogue of Exposition, accompanied with more or less of search made subservient to the exposition. It represents Sokrates from the first as advancing an affirmative opinion—maintaining it against Philêbus and Protarchus—and closing with a result assumed to be positively established.[a]

Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus.

The question is, Wherein consists the Good—The Supreme Good—Summum Bonum. Three persons stand before us: the youthful Philêbus: Protarchus, somewhat older, yet still a young man; and Sokrates. Philêbus declares that The Good consists in pleasure or enjoyment; and Protarchus his friend advocates the same thesis, though in a less peremptory manner. On the contrary, Sokrates begins by proclaiming that it consists in wisdom or intelligence. He presently however recedes from this doctrine, so far as to admit that wisdom, alone and *per se*, is not sufficient to constitute the Supreme Good: and that a certain combination of pleasure along with it is required. Though the compound total thus formed is superior both to wisdom and to pleasure taken separately, yet comparing the two elements of which it is compounded, wisdom (Sokrates contends) is the most important of the two, and pleasure the least important. Neither wisdom nor pleasure can pretend to claim the first prize; but wisdom is fully entitled to the second, as being far more cognate than pleasure is, with the nature of Good.

[a] Schleiermacher says, about the Philêbus (Einl. p. 136), "Das Ganze liegt fertig in dem Haupte des Sokrates, und tritt mit der ganzen Persönlichkeit und Willkühr einer zusammenhängenden Rede heraus," &c.

must be perfect and all-sufficient in itself: the object of desire, aspiration, choice, and attachment, by all men, and even by all animals and plants, who are capable of attaining it. Every man who has it, is satisfied, desiring nothing else. If he neglects it, and chooses any thing else, this is contrary to nature: he does so involuntarily, either from ignorance or some other untoward constraint.[d] Thus, the characteristic mark of Good or Happiness is, That it is desired, loved, and sought by all, and that, if attained, it satisfies all the wishes and aspirations of human nature.

Good—object of universal choice and by men, sufficient—satisfies all desires.

Sokrates then remarks that pleasure is very multifarious and diverse: and that under that same word, different forms and varieties are signified, very unlike to each other, and sometimes even opposite to each other. Thus the intemperate man has his pleasures, while the temperate man enjoys his pleasures also, attached to his own mode of life: so too the simpleton has pleasure in his foolish dreams and hopes, the intelligent man in the exercise of intellectual force. These and many others are varieties of pleasure not resembling, but highly dissimilar, even opposite.—Protarchus replies—That they proceed from dissimilar and opposite circumstances, but that in themselves they are not dissimilar or opposite. Pleasure must be completely similar to pleasure—itself to itself.—So too (rejoins Sokrates) colour is like to colour: in that respect there is no difference between them. But black colour is different from, and even opposite to, white colour.[e] You will go wrong if

Pleasures and even opposite wise.

[d] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 11 C, 20 C-D. Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον, ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι; Πάντων δήπου τελεώτατον. Τί δέ· ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων. Τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γίγνωσκον αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.

P. 22 B. ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις αἱρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτω διὰ βίου ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἥρεῖθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

Pp. 60 C, 61 A, c. 37, p. 61 E. τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον. P. 64 C. τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν, p. 67 A.

"Omnibus naturæ humanæ desideriis prorsus satisfacere" (Stallbaum ad Philêb. p. 18 D-E).

[e] Plat. Philêb. p. 12 D-E.

you make things altogether opposite, into one. You may call all pleasures by the name *pleasures:* but you must not affirm between them any other point of resemblance, nor call them all *good.* I maintain that some are bad, others good. What common property in all of them, is it, that you signify by the name *good?* As different pleasures are unlike to each other, so also different cognitions (or modes of intelligence) are unlike to each other; though all of them agree in being *cognitions.* To this Protarchus accedes.[f]—We must enter upon our enquiry after The Good with this mutual concession: That Pleasure, which you affirm to be The Good—and Intelligence, which I declare to be so—is at once both Unum, and Multa et Diversa.[g]

In determining between the two competing doctrines—pleasure on one side and intelligence on the other —Sokrates makes appeal to individual choice. "Would *you* be satisfied" (he asks Protarchus) "to live your life through in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? Would *any one of us* be satisfied to live, possessing the fullest measure and variety of intelligence, reason, knowledge, and memory—but having no sense, great or small, either of pleasure or pain?" And Protarchus replies, in reference to the joint life of intelligence and pleasure combined, "Every man will choose this joint life in preference to either of them separately. It is not one man who will choose it, and another who will reject it: but every man will choose it alike."[h]

Whether choice.

[f] Plat. Philêb. pp. 13 D-E, 14 A.
[g] Plat. Philêb. p. 14 B.
[h] Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 A.

; ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;

P. 21 E. εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν, &c.

P. 22 A. Πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὔ.

P. 60 E. εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἄν, &c.

Here again in appealing to the individual choice and judgment, the Platonic Sokrates indirectly recognises what, in the Theætêtus and other dialogues, we have seen him formally rejecting and endeavouring to confute—the Protagorean canon or measure. Protarchus is the measure of truth or falsehood, of belief or disbelief, to Protarchus himself: every other man is so *to himself.* Sokrates may be a wiser man, in the estimation of the public, than Protarchus; and if Protarchus believes him to be such, that very belief may amount to an authority, determining Protarchus to accept or reject various opinions propounded by Sokrates: but the ulti-

The point, which Sokrates submits to the individual judgment of Protarchus, is—"Would *you* be satisfied to pass your life in the enjoyment of the most intense pleasures, and would you desire nothing farther?" The reply is in the affirmative. "But recollect" (adds Sokrates) "that you are to have nothing else. The question assumes that you are to be without thought, intelligence, reason, sight, and memory: you are neither to have opinion of present enjoyment, nor remembrance of past, nor anticipation of future: you are to live the life of an oyster, with great present pleasure?" The question being put with these additions, Protarchus alters his view, and replies in the negative: at the same time expressing his surprise at the strangeness of the hypothesis.[1]

t Question—Intelligence—He declines to accept it.

Sokrates now proceeds to ask Protarchus, whether he will

mate verdict must emanate from the bosom of the acceptor or rejector. I have already observed elsewhere, that a large part of the conversation which the Platonic dialogues put into the mouth of Sokrates, is addressed to individualities and specialities of the other interlocutors; that this very power of discriminating between one mind and another, forms the great superiority of dialectic colloquy as compared with written treatise or rhetorical discourse—both of which address the same terms to a multitude of hearers or readers differing among themselves, without possibility of separate adaptation to each. (See above, ch. xxiv. pp. 257-261, on the Phædrus.)

[1] Plato, Philêb. p. 21.

Such an hypothesis does indeed depart so totally from the conditions of human life, that it cannot be considered as a fair test of any doctrine. A perpetuity of delicious sensations cannot be enjoyed, consistent with the conditions of animal organization. A man cannot realise to himself that which the hypothesis promises; much less can he realise it without those accompaniments which it assumes him to renounce. The loss stands out far more palpably than the gain. It is no refutation of the theory of Philêbus; who, announcing pleasure as the Summum Bonum, is entitled to call for pleasure in all its varieties, and for exemption from all pains. Sokrates himself had previously insisted on the great variety as well as on the great dissimilarity of the modes of pleasure and pain. To each variety of pleasure there corresponds a desire: to each variety of pain, an aversion.

If the Summum Bonum is to fulfil the conditions postulated—that is, if it be such as to satisfy all human desires, it ought to comprise all these varieties of pleasure. It ought, *e.g.*, to comprise the pleasures of self-esteem, and conscious self-protecting power, affording security for the future: it ought to comprise exemption from the pains of self-reproach, self-contempt, and conscious helplessness. These are among the greatest pleasures and pains of the mature man, though they are aggregates formed by association. Now the alternative tendered by Sokrates neither includes these pleasures nor eliminates these pains. It includes only the pleasures of sense; and it is tendered to one who has rooted in his mind desires for other pleasures, and aversions for other pains, besides those of sense. It does not therefore come up to the requirements fairly implied in the theory of Philêbus.

accept a life of full and all-comprehensive intelligence, purely and simply, without any taste either of pleasure or pain. To which Protarchus answers, that neither he nor any one else would accept such a life.[k] Both of them agree that the Summum Bonum ought to be sought neither in pleasure singly, nor in intelligence singly, but in both combined.

Second Question—Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer—*No.*

Sokrates then undertakes to show, that of these two elements, intelligence is the most efficacious and the most contributory to the Summum Bonum—pleasure the least so. But as a preparation for this enquiry, he adverts to that which has just been agreed between them respecting both Pleasure and Intelligence—That each of them is Unum, and each of them at the same time Multa et Diversa. Here (argues Sokrates) we find opened before us the embarrassing question respecting the One and the Many. Enquirers often ask—"How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? How can the same thing be both One and Many?" They find it difficult to understand how you, Protarchus, being One person, are called by different names—tall, heavy, white, just, &c.: or how you are affirmed to consist of many different parts and members. To this difficulty, however (says Sokrates), the reply is easy. You, and other particular men, belong to the gene-

It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure.

Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity—how it is distributed among species and individuals.

[k] Plato, Philêbus, ch. 11, pp. 21-22.

It is to be remarked, however, that there was more than one Grecian philosopher who described the Summum Bonum as consisting in absence of pain (ἀλυπία); even without the large measure of intelligence which Sokrates here promises, and without any positive pleasure. These men would of course have accepted the second alternative put by Sokrates, which Protarchus here refuses. They took their standard of comparison from the actualities of human life around them, which exhibited pain and suffering universal, frequent, and unavoidable. They conceived that if painlessness could be obtained, it was as much as could reasonably be demanded, and that pleasure might be dispensed with. In laying down any theory about the Bonum, the preliminary question ought always to be settled—What are the conditions of human life which are to be assumed as peremptory and unalterable? What circumstances are we at liberty to suppose to be suppressed, modified, or reversed? According as these fundamental postulates are given in a larger or narrower sense, the ideal Summum Bonum will be shaped differently. This preliminary requisite to the investigation was little considered by the ancient philosophers.

rated and the perishable. You partake of many different Ideas or Essences, and your partaking of one among them does not exclude you from partaking also of another distinct and even opposite. You partake of the Idea or Essence of Unity—also of Multitude—of tallness, heaviness, whiteness, humanity, greatness, littleness, &c. You are both great and little, heavy and light, &c. In regard to generated and perishable things, we may understand this. But in regard to the ungenerated, imperishable, absolute Essences, the difficulty is more serious. The Self-existent or Universal Man, Bull, Animal—the Self-existent Beautiful, Good—in regard to these Unities or Monads there is room for great controversy. First, Do such unities or monads really and truly exist? Next, assuming that they do exist, how do they come into communion with generated and perishable particulars, infinite in number? Is each of them dispersed and parcelled out among countless individuals? or is it found, whole and entire, in each individual, maintaining itself as one and the same, and yet being parted from itself? Is the Universal Man distributed among all individual men, or is he one and entire in each of them? How is the Universal Beautiful (The Self-Beautiful—Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? How does this one monad, unchangeable and imperishable, become embodied in a multitude of transitory individuals, each successively generated and perishing? How does this One become Many, or how do these Many become One?[1]

Active disputes upon this question at the time.

These (says Sokrates) are the really grave difficulties respecting the identity of the One and the Many: difficulties which have occasioned numerous controversies, and are likely to occasion many more. Youthful speculators, especially, are fond of trying their first efforts of dialectical ingenuity in arguing upon this paradox —How the One can be Many, and the Many One.[m]

[1] Plato, Philêbus, p. 15 B.

[m] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 15-16.

In reading the difficulties thus started by Sokrates, we perceive them to be the same as those which we have seen set forth in the dialogue called Parmenidês, where they are put into the mouth of the philosopher so-called; as objections requiring to be removed by Sokrates, before the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas, universal, eternal and unchangeable, can be admitted. We might expect that Plato having so emphatically and repeatedly

It is a primæval inspiration (he says) granted by the Gods to man along with the fire of Prometheus, and handed down to us as a tradition from that heroic race who were in nearer kindred with the Gods—That all things said to exist are composed of Unity and Multitude, and include in them a natural coalescence of Finiteness and Infinity.[n] This is the fundamental order of Nature, which we must assume and proceed upon in our investigations. We shall find everywhere the Form of Unity conjoined with the Form of Infinity. But we must not be satisfied simply to find these two forms. We must look farther for those intermediate Forms which lie between the two. Having found the Form of One, we must next search for the Form of Two, Three, Four, or some definite number: and we must not permit ourselves to acquiesce in the Form of Infinite, until no farther definite number can be detected. In other words, we must not be satisfied with knowing only one comprehensive Genus, and individuals comprised under it. We must distribute the Genus into two, three, or more Species: and each of those Species again into two or more sub-Species, each characterised by some specific mark: until no more characteristic marks can be discovered upon which to found the establishment of a distinct species. When we reach this limit, and when we have determined the number of subordinate species which the case presents, nothing remains except the indefinite mass and variety of individuals.[o] The whole scheme

Order of Finite and Infinite Many.

announced his own sense of the difficulty, would proceed to suggest some mode of replying to it. But this he never does. In the Parmenidês, he does not even promise any explanation; in the Philêbus, he seems to promise one, but all the explanation which he gives ignores or jumps over the difficulty, enjoining us to proceed as if no such difficulty existed.

[n] Plato, Philêbus, c. 6, p. 16 C. ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων.

[o] Plato, Philêbus, c. 6, p. 16 D. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς, τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσ-

παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν· ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μιὰν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τὸ ἓν ἑκείνων

περ

ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις ἀλλ' ὅποσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς· τότε δ' εἰς τὸ

Plato here recognises a Form of the Infinite, ἀπείρου ἰδέαν; again, c. 8, p. 18 A, ἀπείρου

will thus comprise — The One, the Summum Genus, or Highest Form: The Many, a definite number of Species or sub-Species or subordinate Forms: The Infinite, a countless heap of Individuals.

Mistake commonly made — To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions.

The mistake commonly made (continues Sokrates) by clever men of the present day, is, that they look for nothing beyond the One and the Infinite Many: one comprehensive class, and countless individuals included in it. They take up carelessly any class which strikes them,[p] and are satisfied to have got an indefinite number of individuals under one name. But they never seek for intermediate subdivisions between the two, so as to be able to discriminate one portion of the class from other by some definite mark, and thus to constitute a sub-class. They do not feel the want of such intermediate subdivisions, nor the necessity of distinguishing one portion of this immense group of individuals from another. Yet it is exactly upon these discriminating marks that the difference turns, between genuine dialectical argument and controversy without result.[q]

Illustration from Speech and Music.

This general doctrine is illustrated by two particular cases — Speech and Music. The voice (or Vocal Utterance) is One — the voice is also Infinite: to know only thus much is to know very little. Even when you know, in addition to this, the general distinction of sounds into acute and grave, you are still far short of the knowledge of music. You must learn farthermore to distinguish all the intermediate gradations, and specific varieties of sound, into which the infinity of separate sounds admits of being distributed: what and how many these gradations are? what are the numerical ratios upon which they depend — the rhythmical and harmonic systems? When you have learnt to know the One Genus,

[p] Plato, Philêbus, c. 6, p. 17 A. *οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἓν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει*, &c.

Stallbaum conjectures that the words *καὶ πολλὰ* after *τύχωσι* ought not to be in the text. He proposes to expunge them. The meaning of the passage certainly seems clearer without them.

[q] Plato, Philêbus, c. 6, p. 17 A. *οἷς διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.*

the infinite diversity of individual sounds, and the number of subordinate specific varieties by which these two extremes are connected with each other—then you know the science of music. So too, in speech: when you can distinguish the infinite diversity of articulate utterance into vowels, semi-vowels, and consonants, each in definite number and with known properties—you are master of grammatical science. You must neither descend at once from the One to the Infinite Multitude, nor ascend at once from the Infinite Multitude to the One: you must pass through the intermediate stages of subordinate Forms, in determinate number. All three together make up scientific knowledge. You cannot know one portion separately, without knowing the remainder: all of them being connected into one by the common bond of the highest Genus.[r]

Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing.

Such is the explanation which Plato gives as to the identity of One and Many. Considered as a reply to his own previous doubts and difficulties, it is altogether insufficient. It leaves all those doubts unsolved. The first point of enquiry which he had started, was, Whether any universal or Generic Monads really existed: the second point was, assuming that they did exist, how each of them, being essentially eternal and unchangeable, could so multiply itself or divide itself as to be at the same time in an infinite variety of particulars.[s] Both points are left untouched by the explanation. No proof is furnished that Universal Monads exist—still less that they multiply or divide their one and unchangeable essence among infinite particulars—least of all is it shown, how such multiplication or division can take place, consistently with the fundamental and eternal sameness of the Universal Monad. The explanation assumes these difficulties to be eliminated, but does not suggest the means of eliminating them. The Philêbus, like the Parmenidês, recognises the difficulties as existing, but leaves them unsolved, though the dogmas to which they

[r] Plato, Philêbus, c. 8, p. 18 C-D.

καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα, μιὰν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς γραμ- [illegible] ἔχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.

Plato, Philêbus, c. 5, p. 15 B-C.

attach are the cardinal and peculiar tenets of Platonic speculation. Plato shows that he is aware of the embarrassments: yet he is content to theorize as if they did not exist. In a remarkable passage of this very dialogue, he intimates pretty clearly that he considered the difficulty of these questions to be insuperable, and never likely to be set at rest. This identification of the One with the Many, in verbal propositions (he says) has begun with the beginning of dialectic debate, and will continue to the end of it, as a stimulating puzzle which especially captivates the imagination of youth.[t]

It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification.

But though the difficulties started by Plato remain unexplained, still his manner of stating them is in itself valuable and instructive. It proclaims—1. The necessity of a systematic classification, or subordinate scale of species and sub-species, between the highest Genus and the group of individuals beneath. 2. That each of these subordinate grades in the scale must be founded upon some characteristic mark. 3. That the number of subdivisions is definite and assignable, there being a limit beyond which it cannot be carried. 4. That full knowledge is not attainable until we know all three—The highest Genus—The intermediate species and sub-species; both what they are, how many there are, and how each is characterised—The infinite group of individuals. These three elements must all be known in conjunction: we are not to pass either from the first to the third, or from the third to the first, except through the second.

[t] Plato, Philêbus, c. 6, p. 15 D. *ῥαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. Καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος*

The sequel (too long to transcribe) of this passage (setting forth the manner in which this apparent paradox worked upon the imagination of youthful students)is very interesting to read, and shows (in my opinion) that Stallbaum's interpretation of it in his note is not the right one. Plato is here talking (in my judgment) about the puzzle and paradox itself: Stallbaum represents Plato as talking about his pretended solution of it, which has not as yet been at all alluded to.

Plato seems to give his own explanation without full certainty or confidence: see c. 6, p. 16 B. And when we turn to c. 9, pp. 18-19, we shall see that he forgets the original difficulty which had been proposed (compare c. 5, p. 15 B), introducing in place of it another totally distinct difficulty, as if *that* had been in contemplation.

The general necessity of systematic classification — of generalisation and specification, or subordination of species and sub-species, as a condition of knowing any extensive group of individuals—requires no advocate at the present day. But it was otherwise in the time of Plato. There existed then no body of knowledge, distributed and classified, to which he could appeal as an example. The illustrations to which he himself refers here, of language and music as systematic arrangements of vocal sounds, were both of them the product of empirical analogy and unconscious growth, involving little of predetermined principle or theory. All the classification then employed was merely that which is included in the structure of language: in the framing of general names, each designating a multitude of individuals. All that men knew of classification was, that which is involved in calling many individuals by the same common name. This is the defect pointed out by Plato, when he remarks that the clever men of his time took no heed except of the One and the Infinite (Genus and Individuals): neglecting all the intermediate distinctions. Upon the knowledge of these *media* (he says) rests the difference between true dialectic debate, and mere polemic.[u] That is—when you have only an infinite multitude of individuals, called by the same generic name, it is not even certain that they have a single property in common: and even if they have, it is not safe to reason from one to another as to the possession of any other property beyond the one generic property—so that the debate ends in mere perplexity. All pleasures agree in being pleasures (Sokrates had before observed to Protarchus), and all cognitions agree in being cognitions. But you cannot from hence infer that there is any other property belonging in common to all.[x] That is a point which you cannot determine without farther observation

At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process.

[u] Plato, Philêbus, c. 6, p. 17 A. οἱ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς ἀ, θᾶττον λόγους. ποιουσι τοῦ

[x] Plato, Philêbus, c. 3, p. 13 B. c. 4, p. 14 A. δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθὺς—τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διακεχώρισται ἡ

of individuals, and discrimination of the great multitude into appropriate subdivisions. You will thus bring the whole under that triple point of view which Plato requires:—the highest Genus,—the definite number of species and subspecies,—the undefined number of individuals.

Classification—unconscious and conscious.

Here we have set before us one important branch of logical method—the necessity of classification, not simply arising as an incidental and unconscious effect of the transitive employment of a common name, but undertaken consciously and intentionally as a deliberate process, and framed upon principles predetermined as essential to the accomplishment of a scientific end. This was a conception new in the Sokratic age. Plato seized upon it with ardour. He has not only emphatically insisted upon it in the Philêbus and elsewhere, but he has also given (in the Sophistês and Politikus) elaborate examples of systematic logical subdivision applied to given subjects.

Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas.

We may here remark that Plato's views as to the necessity of systematic classification, or of connecting the Summum Genus with individuals by intermediate stages of gradually decreasing generality—are not necessarily connected with his peculiar theory of Ideas as Self-existent objects, eternal and unchangeable. The two are indeed blended together in his own mind and language: but the one is quite separable from the other; and his remarks on classification are more perspicuous without his theory of Ideas than with it. Classification does not depend upon his hypothesis—That Ideas are not simply Concepts of the Reason, but absolute existences apart from the Reason (Entia Rationis apart from the Ratio)—and that these Ideas correspond to the words *Unum, Multa definité, Multa indefinité*, which are put together to compose the totality of what we see and feel in the Kosmos.

Applying this general doctrine (about the necessity of establishing subordinate classes as intermediate between the Genus and Individuals) to the particular subject debated between Sokrates and Protarchus—the next step in the procedure would naturally be, to distinguish the subordinate classes

comprised first under the Genus Pleasure—next, under the Genus Intelligence (or Cognition). And so indeed the dialogue seems to promise[y] in tolerably explicit terms.

But such promise is not realised. The dialogue takes a different turn, and recurs to the general distinction already brought to view between the Finient (Determinans) and the Infinite (Indeterminatum). We have it laid down that all existences in the universe are divided into four Genera: 1. The Infinite or Indeterminate. 2. The Finient or the Determinans. 3. The product of these two, mixed or compounded together Determinatum. 4. The Cause or Agency whereby they become mixed together.—Of these four, the first is a Genus, or is both One and Many, having numerous varieties, all agreeing in the possession of a perpetual More and Less (without any limit or positive quantity): that which is perpetually increasing or diminishing, more or less hot, cold, moist, great, &c., than any given positive standard. The second, or the Determinans, is also a Genus, or One and Many: including equal, double, triple, and all fixed ratios.[z]

Quadruple distribution of existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient. 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency.

The third Genus is laid down by Plato as generated by a mixture or combination of these two first—the Infinite and the Determinans. The varieties of this third or compound Genus comprise all that is good and desirable in nature—health, strength, beauty, virtue, fine weather, good temperature:[a] all agreeing, each in its respective sphere, in presenting a right measure or proportion as opposed to excess or deficiency.

Fourthly, Plato assumes a distinct element of causal agency which operates such mixture of the Determinans with the Infinite, or banishment and supercession of the latter by the former.

We now approach the application of these generalities to the question in hand—the comparative estimate of pleasure and intelligence in reference to Good. It has been granted that neither of them separately is

Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes—Cognition or

[y] Plato, Philêbus, p. 19 B, p. 20 A. [z] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 24-25.
[a] Plato, Philêbus, p. 26 A-B.

Intelligence belongs to the fourth.

sufficient, and that both must be combined to compose the result Good: but the question remains, which of the two elements is the most important in the compound? To which of the four above-mentioned Genera (says Sokrates) does Pleasure belong? It belongs to the Infinite or Indeterminate: so also does Pain. To which of the four does Intelligence or Cognition belong? It belongs to the fourth, or to the nature of Cause, the productive agency whereby definite combinations are brought about.[b]

In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents.

Hence we see (Sokrates argues) that pleasure is a less important element than Intelligence, in the compound called Good. For pleasure belongs to the Infinite: but pain belongs to the Infinite also: the Infinite therefore, being common to both, cannot be the circumstance which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good: they must derive that affinity from some one of the other elements.[c] It is Intelligence which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good: for Intelligence belongs to the more efficacious Genus called Cause. In the combination of Intelligence with Pleasure, indispensable to constitute Good, Intelligence is the primary element, Pleasure only the secondary element. Intelligence or Reason is the ruling cause which pervades and directs both the smaller body called Man, and the greater body called the Kosmos. The body of man consists of a combination of the four elements, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire: deriving its supply of all these elements from the vast stock of them which constitutes the Kosmos. So too the mind of man, with its limited reason and intelligence, is derived from the vast stock of mind, reason, and intelligence, diffused throughout the Kosmos, and governing its great elemental body. The Kosmos is animated and intelligent, having body and mind like man, but in far higher measure and perfection. It is from this source alone that man can derive his supply of mind and intelligence.[d]

[b] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 27-28, p. 31 A.

[c] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 27-28.

The argument of Plato is here very obscure and difficult to follow. Stallbaum in his note even intimates that Plato uses the word ἄπειρον in a sense different from that in which he had used it before: which I think doubtful.

[d] Plato, Philêbus, p. 29 C, p. 30 A.

Sokrates thus arrives at the conclusion, that in the combination constituting Good, Reason or Intelligence is the regulating principle: and that Pleasure is the Infinite or Indeterminate which requires regulation from without, having no fixed measure or regulating power in itself.[e] He now proceeds to investigate pleasure and intelligence as phenomena: to enquire in what each of them resides, and through what affection they are generated.[f]

Intelligence is the regulating principle—Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated.

We cannot investigate pleasure (Sokrates continues) apart from pain: both must be studied together. Both pleasure and pain reside in the third out of the four above-mentioned Genera:[g] that is, in the compound Genus formed out of that union (of the Infinite with the Determinans or Finient) which includes all animated bodies. Health and Harmony reside in these animated bodies: and pleasure as well as pain proceed from modifications of such fundamental harmony. When the fundamental harmony is disturbed or dissolved, pain is the consequence: when the disturbance is rectified and the harmony restored, pleasure ensues.[h] Thus hunger, thirst, extreme heat and cold, are painful, because they break up the fundamental harmony of animal nature: while eating, drinking, cooling under extreme heat, or warming under extreme cold, are pleasurable, because they restore the disturbed harmony.

Pleasure and Pain must be explained together—Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system—Pleasure from the restoration of it.

This is the primary conception, or original class, of pleasures and pains, embracing body and mind in one and the same fact. Pleasure cannot be had without antecedent pain: it is in fact a mere reaction against pain, or a restoration from pain.

Pleasure presupposes Pain.

γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶι μὴ τὸ ἐτύγχανε, ταὐτά λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ —κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν. Compare p. 32 B. τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος.

Plato had before said that ἡδονὴ belonged to the Infinite (compare p. 41 D), or to the *first* of the four above-mentioned genera, not to the third.

[e] Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 A.

[f] Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 B. δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον, ὅποταν γίγνησθον, ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς.

[g] Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 C. ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα

[h] Plato, Philêbus, p. 31 D.

But there is another class of pleasures, secondary and derivative from these, and belonging to the mind alone without the body. The expectation of future pleasures is itself pleasurable,[i] the expectation of future pains is itself painful. In this secondary class we find pleasure without pain, and pain without pleasure: so that we shall be better able to study pleasure by itself, and to decide whether the whole class, in all its varieties, be good, welcome and desirable,—or whether pleasure and pain be not, like heat and cold, desirable or undesirable according to circumstances—*i.e.* not good in their own nature, but sometimes good and sometimes not.[k]

mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain.

In the definition above given of the conditions of pleasure, as a re-action from antecedent pain, it is implied that if there be no pain, there can be no pleasure: and that a state of life is therefore conceivable which shall be without both—without pain and without pleasure. The man who embraces wisdom may prefer this third mode of life. It would be the most divine and the most akin to the nature of the Gods, who cannot be supposed without indecency to feel either joy or sorrow.[l] At any rate, if not the best life of all, it will be the second-best.

A life of intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best.

Those pleasures, which reside in the mind alone without the body, arise through memory and by means of reminiscence. When the body receives a shock which does not go through to the mind, we call the fact insensibility. In sensation, the body and mind are both affected:[m] such sensation is treasured up in the memory, and the mental part of it is recalled (without the bodily part) by reminiscence.[n] Memory and reminiscence are the foundations of desire or

Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here

pleasure therein.

[i] Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 C. ἡδονῆς ... οἷς τοῦ

Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 D.

[l] Plato, Philêbus, p. 33 B.

Οὐκοῦν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς ὅτε τὸ ἐναντίον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ

Plato, Philêbus, p. 33 E, 34 A. ἐπονόμασον—τὸ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ ... κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' ἄν.

[n] Plato, Philêbus, p. 34 A-B. σωτηρίαν αἰσθήσεως μνήμην.

Μνήμη and ἀνάμνησις are pronounced to be different.

appetite. When the body suffers the pain of hunger or thirst, the mind recollects previous moments of satisfaction, and desires a repetition of that satisfaction by means of food or drink. Here the body and the mind are not moved in the same way, but in two opposite ways: the desire belongs to the mind alone, and is turned towards something directly opposed to the affection of the body. That which the body feels is emptiness: that which the mind feels is desire of replenishment, or of the condition opposed to emptiness. But it is only after experience of replenishment that the mind will feel such desire. On the first occasion of emptiness, it will not desire replenishment, because it will have nothing, neither sensation nor memory, through which to touch replenishment: it can only do so after replenishment has been previously enjoyed, and through the memory. Desire therefore is a state of the mind apart from the body, resting upon memory.[o] Here then the man is in a double state: the pain of emptiness, which affects the mind through the body, and the memory of past replenishment, or expectation of future replenishment, which resides in the mind. Such expectation, if certain and immediate, will be a state of pleasure: if doubtful and distant, it will be a state of pain. The state of emptiness and consequent appetite must be, at the very best, a state of mixed pain and pleasure: and it may perhaps be a state of pain only, under two distinct forms.[p] Life composed of a succession of these states can afford no true or pure pleasure.

What do you mean (asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? How can pleasures or pains be either true or false?

[o] Plato, Philêbus, p. 35 C.

τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπὸν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτ' ἀλλῷ ἐφάψαιτο;

P. 35 D. *τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην, ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τήν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζώου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.*

[p] Plato, Philêbus, p. 36 A-B.

This analysis of desire is in the main just: antecedent to all gratification, it is simple uneasiness: gratification having been supplied, the memory thereof remains, and goes along with the uneasiness to form the complex mental state called *desire*.

But there is another case of desire. While tasting a pleasure, we desire the continuance of it: and if the expectation of its continuance be assured this is an additional pleasure: two sources of pleasure instead of one. In this last case, there is no such conjunction of opposite states, pain and pleasure, as Plato pointed out in the former case.

Opinions and expectations may be true or false; but not pleasures, nor pains.

Can pleasures be true or false?

That is an important question (replies Sokrates), which we must carefully examine. If opinions may be false or true, surely pleasures may be so likewise.

they are so.

When a man holds an opinion, there is always some Object of his opinion, whether he thinks truly or falsely: so also when a man takes delight, there must always be some Object in which he takes delight, truly or falsely. Pleasure and pain, as well as opinion, are susceptible of various attributes; vehement or moderate, right or wrong, bad or good. Delight sometimes comes to us along with a false opinion, sometimes along with a true one.

Yes (replies Protarchus), but we then call *the opinion* true or false—not *the pleasure*.[q]

You will not deny (says Sokrates) that there is a difference between the pleasure accompanying a true opinion, and that which accompanies a false opinion. Wherein does the difference consist? Our opinions, and our comparisons of opinions, arise from sensation and memory:[r] which write words and impress images upon our mind (as upon a book or canvass), sometimes truly, sometimes falsely,[s] not only respecting the past and present, but also respecting the future. To these opinions respecting the future are attached the pleasures and pains of expectation, which we have already recognised as belonging to the mind alone,—anticipations of bodily pleasures or pains to come—hopes and fears. As our opinions respecting the future are sometimes true, sometimes

Reasons

true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him.

[q] Plato, Philêbus, p. 37.

[r] Plato, Philêbus, p. 38 C. *Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.*

It seems odd that Plato here puts the painter *after* the scribe, and not *before* him. The images or phantasms of sense must be painted on the mind before any words are written upon it (if we are to adopt both these metaphors).

The comparison of the mind to a sheet of paper or a book begins with the poets (Æschyl. Prometh. 790), and passes into philosophy with Plato.

[s] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 38-39. *δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τινὶ προσεοικέναι—ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ξυμπίπτουσα εἰς ταυτὸν, κἄκεινα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ παθήματα, φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους.*

δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε

false, so also are our hopes and fears: but throughout our lives we are always full of hopes and fears.[t] Now the just and good man, being a favourite of the Gods, will have these visions or anticipations of the future presented to him truly and accurately: the bad man on the contrary will have them presented to him falsely. The pleasures of anticipation will be true to the former, and false to the latter:[u] his false pleasures will be a ludicrous parody on the true ones.[x] Good or bad opinions are identical with true or false opinions: so also are good or bad pleasures identical with true or false pleasures: there is no other ground for their being good or bad.

I admit this identity (remarks Protarchus) in regard to opinions, but not in regard to pleasures. I think there are other grounds, and stronger grounds, for pronouncing pleasures to be bad—independently of their being false. We will reserve that question (says Sokrates) for the present—whether there are or are not pleasures bad on other grounds.[y] I am now endeavouring to show that there are some pleasures which are *false:* and I proceed to another way of viewing the subject.

Protarchus disputes this—He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false—Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question.

We agreed before that the state, called Appetite or Desire, was a mixed state comprehending body and mind: the state of body affecting the mind with a pain of emptiness,—the state of mind apart from body being either a pleasure of expected replenishment, or a pain arising from our regarding replenishment as distant or unattainable. Appetite or Desire, therefore, is sometimes mixed pleasure and pain; both, of the genus Infinite, Indeterminate. We desire to compare these pleasures and pains, and to value their magnitude in relation to each other, but we have no means of performing the process.

No means of estimate habitual—These are the false pleasures.

[t] Plato, Philêbus, p. 39 E. *ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων.* P. 40 E. *οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων καὶ θυμῶν,* &c. p. 40 D.

[u] Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 A-B. Prophets and prophecies, inspired by the Gods, were phenomena received as frequently occurring in the days of Plato.

[x] Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 C. *μεμέναι μέντοι τὰς τὰ*

[y] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 40-41. *Sokr.* *Οὐδ' ἡδονάς γ' οἶμαι, κατανοοῦ, ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἶσι τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι. Protarch.* *οὖν τοὐναντίον εἴρηκας,* &c.

We not only cannot perform it well, but we are sure to perform it wrongly. For future pleasure or pain counts for more or less in our comparison, according to its proximity or distance. Here then is a constant source of false computation: pleasures and pains counted as greater or less than they really are: in other words, false pleasures and pains. We thus see that pleasures may be true or false, no less than opinions.[z]

Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure.

We have also other ways of proving the point that much of what is called pleasure is false and unreal[a]—either no pleasure at all, or pleasure mingled and alloyed with pain and relief from pain. According to our previous definition of pain and pleasure—that pain arises from derangement of the harmony of our nature, and pleasure from the correction of such derangement, or from the re-establishment of harmony—there may be and are states which are neither painful nor pleasurable. Doubtless the body never remains the same: it is always undergoing change: but the gentle and gradual changes (such as growth, &c.) escape our consciousness, producing neither pain nor pleasure: none but the marked, sudden, changes force themselves upon our consciousness, thus producing pain and pleasure.[b] A life of gentle changes would be a life without pain as well as without pleasure. There are thus three states of life[c]—painful—pleasurable—neither painful nor pleasurable. But *no pain* (absence of pain), is not identical with pleasure: it is a third and distinct state.[d]

Now there are some philosophers who confound this distinction:[e] Philosophers respectable, but stern, who hate the

[z] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 41-42.

[a] Plato, Philêbus, p. 42 C. *ἀπαντῶμεν ἡδὲ συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀνα-*

οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζώοις.

This argument is continued, though in a manner desultory and difficult to follow, down to c. 31, p. 51 A. *πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ' οὐδαμῶς· καὶ μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς*

[b] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 42-43.

[c] Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. *τριττοὺς βίους, ἕνα μὲν ἡδὺν, τὸν δ' αὖ ἰρὸν, τὸν δ' ἕνα μηδέτερα.*

Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. *οὐκ ἂν*

[d] Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 C. *καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ ὑσιν, οἱ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν*

very name of pleasure, deny its existence as a separate state *per se*, and maintain it to be nothing more than relief from pain: implying therefore, perpetually and inevitably, the conjunction or antecedence of pain. They consider the seduction of pleasure in prospect to be a mere juggle—a promise never realised. Often the expected moment brings no pleasure at all: and even when it does, there are constant accompaniments of pain, which always greatly impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail, its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil—removal or mitigation of pain as the good—of human life.

Opinion of the Philosophers: That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle—no reality except pain, and the relief from pain.

These philosophers (continues Sokrates) are like prophets who speak truth from the stimulus of internal temperament, without any rational comprehension of it. Their theory is partially true, but not universally.[f] It is true of a large portion of what are called pleasures, but it is not true of all pleasures. Most pleasures (indeed all the more vehement and coveted pleasures), correspond to the description given in the theory. The moment when the supposed intense pleasure arrives, is a disappointment of the antecedent hopes, either by not bringing the pleasure promised, or by bringing it along with a preponderant dose of pain. But there are some pleasures of which this cannot be said—which are really true and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates), I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the pleasure-hating philosophers, as far as I go along with it.

Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly.

When we are studying any property (they say), we ought to examine especially those cases in which it appears most fully and prominently developed: thus, if we are enquiring into hardness, we must take for our first objects of investigation the hardest things, in preference to those which are less hard or scarcely hard at all.[g] So in enquiring into pleasure gene-

Theory of the pleasure-haters—We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures—These are connected

εἶναι—λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀπονὺν οἱ

Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 C.

προσχρῆσθαί τισι, μαντευομένους οὐ τινι

ὡς οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, &c. p. 51 A.

Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 E. ὡς εἰ

with distempered body and mind.

rally, we must investigate first the pleasures of extreme intensity and vehemence. Now the most intense pleasures are enjoyed not in a healthy state of body, but on the contrary under circumstances of distemper and disorder: because they are then preceded by the most violent wants and desires. The sick man under fever suffers greater thirst and cold than when he is in health, but in the satisfaction of those wants, his pleasure is proportionally more intense. Again when he suffers from the itch or an inflamed state of body, the pleasure of rubbing or scratching is more intense than if he had no such disorder.[h] The most vehement bodily pleasures can only be enjoyed under condition of being preceded or attended by pains greater or less as the case may be. The condition is not one of pure pleasure, but mixed between pain and pleasure. Sometimes the pain preponderates, sometimes the pleasure: if the latter, then most men, forgetting the accompanying pain, look upon these transient moments as the summit of happiness.[i] In like manner the violent and insane man, under the stimulus of furious passions and desires, experiences more intense gratifications than persons of sober disposition: his condition is a mixed one, of great pains and great pleasures. The like is true of all the vehement passions—love, hatred, revenge, anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.[k]

ὁτουοῦν εἴδους τὴν φύσιν εἶν, οἷον εἰς τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ εἰς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; Answer. πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.

[h] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 45-46.

[i] Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 A.

[k] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and comedy—especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon (ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἐστι, p. 48 B). But his explanation is not clear, and the sense which he gives to the word φθόνος is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least one among the objects) which a man laughs at, is the intellectual and moral infirmities of persons with whom he is in friendly intercourse, when such persons are not placed in a situation of power, so as to make their defects or displeasure pregnant with dangerous consequences. The laugher is amused with exaggerated self-estimation or foolish vanity displayed by friends, δοξοσοφία, δοξοκαλία, &c. (49 E.) But how the laugher can be said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he can

Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the question here is not whether *more pleasure* is enjoyed, *on the whole*, in a state of health than in a state of sickness—by violent rather than by sober men. The question is, about the intense modes of pleasure. Respecting these, I have endeavoured to show that they belong to a distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of body and mind:—and that they cannot be enjoyed pure, without a countervailing or preponderant accompaniment of pain.[l] This is equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the subject.[m]

The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health.

Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on behalf of the pleasure-haters. Though I deny their full doctrine,—that there is no pleasure except cessation from pain—I nevertheless agree with them, and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so called pleasures, and those precisely the most intense, are false and unreal; being poisoned and drenched in accompaniments of pain.[n] But there are some pleasures true, genuine, and untainted. Such are those produced by beautiful colours and figures—by many odours—by various sounds: none of which are preceded by any painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, &c.: the colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in them-

Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, smells, &c. Pleasures of acquiring knowledge.

be said to feel *φθόνος*, I do not clearly see. At least *φθόνος* is here used in the very unusual sense (to use Stallbaum's words, note p. 48 B) of "injusta lætitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus:" a sense altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor. iii. 9, 8; which Stallbaum himself cites, as if the definition of *φθόνος* were the same in both.

[l] Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 C-E. *μὴ με ἠγῇ διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾷν σε, εἰ πλείᾳ χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶι ὑγιαινόντων, ἀλλ' οἷον μέγεθός μι ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ ποτὲ γίγνεται ἐκά στοτε*, &c.

[m] Plato, Philêbus, p. 50 E. *αὔριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον* ---- *μι*, &c.

[n] Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A.

selves—not simply in relation to (or relatively to) some special antecedent condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain.[o] To these must be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but only by a select few.[p]

Pure and proportion.

Having thus distinguished the pure and moderate class of pleasures, from the mixed and vehement—we may remark that the former class admit of measure and proportion, while the latter belong to the immeasurable and the infinite. Moreover, look where we will, we shall find truth on the side of the select, small, unmixed specimens—rather than among the large and mixed masses. A small patch of white colour, free from all trace of any other colour, is truer, purer, and more beautiful, than a large mass of clouded and troubled white. In like manner, gentle pleasure, free from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful, than intense pleasure coupled with pain.[q]

generation, not substance or essence; it cannot therefore be an End, because all

sure therefore cannot be the Good.

There are yet other arguments remaining (continues Sokrates) which show that pleasure cannot be the Summum Bonum. If it be so, it must be an End, not a Means: it must be something for the sake of which other things exist or are done—not something itself exists or is done for the sake of someelse. But pleasure is not an End: it is essena means, as we may infer from the reasonings of its own advocates. They themselves tell us that it is generation, not substance:—essentially a process of transition or change, never attaining essence or permanence.[r]

[o] Plato, Philêbus, p. 51. τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἧττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμίχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας, &c.

[p] Plato, Philêbus, p. 52 A. ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον, καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπω τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

[q] Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 B-C.

[r] Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 C. περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι παράπαν ἡδονῆς· κομψοὶ γὰρ δ

But generation or transition is always for the sake of the thing to be generated, or for Substance,—not substance for the sake of generation: the transitory serves as a road to the permanent, not *vice versâ*. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.[s]

Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good.

Indeed we cannot reasonably admit that there is no Good in bodies and in the universe generally, nor anywhere except in the mind:—nor that, within the mind, pleasure alone is good, while courage, temperance, &c., are not good:—nor that a man is good only while he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever may be his character and merits.[t]

Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and computation.

Having thus (continues Sokrates) gone through the analysis of pleasures, distinguishing such as are true and pure, from such as are false and troubled—we must apply the like distinctive analysis to the various modes of knowledge and intelligence. Which varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? Some sciences and arts (we know) are intended for special professional practice: others are taught as subjects for improving the intellect of youth. As specimens of the former variety, we may notice music, medicine, husbandry, navigation, generalship, joinery, ship-building, &c. Now in all these the guiding and directing elements are computation, mensuration, and statics—the sciences or arts of computing, measuring, weighing. Take away these three—and little would be left worth having, in any of the sciences or arts before named. There would be no exact assignable rules, no definite proportions: everything would be left to vague conjecture, depending upon each artisan's knack and practice which some erroneously call Art. In

[s] τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι ἰὼν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

ἔστον δή τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' οὑτὸ, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου—τὸ . . . τὸ δὲ ἐκείνου.

[s] Plato, Philêbus, p. 54 E. εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην η την τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν.

[t] Plato, Philêbus, p. 55 B.

proportion as each of these professional occupations has in it more or less of computation and mensuration, in the same proportion is it exact and true. There is little of computation or mensuration in music, medicine, husbandry, &c.: there is more of them in joinery and ship-building, which employ the line, plummet, and other instruments: accordingly these latter are more true and exact, less dependent upon knack and conjecture than the three former.[u] They approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the non-scientific, variable, conjectural, elements.

Arithmetic and Geometry are two-fold: As studied by the philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan.

But a farther distinction must here be taken (Sokrates goes on). Even in such practical arts as ship-building, which include most of computation and mensuration—these two latter do not appear pure, but diversified and embodied in a multitude of variable particulars. Arithmetic and geometry, as applied by the ship-builder and other practical men, are very different from arithmetic and geometry as studied and taught by the philosopher.[x] Though called by the same name, they are very different; and the latter alone are pure and true. The philosopher assumes in his arithmetic the exact equality of all units, and in his geometry the exact ratios of lines and spaces: the practical man adds together units very unlike each other—two armies, two bulls, things little or great as the case may be: his measurement too, always falls short of accuracy.[y] There are in short two arithmetics and two geometries[z]—very different from each other, though bearing a common name.

We thus make out (continues Sokrates) that there is a difference between one variety and another variety of science

[u] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 55-56.

[x] Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 E.

Ἀριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἆρ' οὐκ
μέν τινα τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον
δ' αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;
καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκ-
καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν, τῆς κατὰ
δίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν
κτέον, ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;

Compare Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, p. 1098, a. 30.

[y] Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 E. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μ
τῶν μυρίων

Plato, Philêb. p. 57 D.

or knowledge, analogous to that which we have traced between the varieties of pleasure. One pleasure is true and pure; another is not so, or is inseparably connected with pain and non-pleasurable elements — there being in each case a difference in degree. So too one variety of science, cognition, or art, is more true and pure than another: that is, it is less intermingled with fluctuating particulars and indefinite accompaniments. A science, bearing one and the same name, is different according as it is handled by the practical man or by the philosopher. Only as handled by the philosopher, does science attain purity; dealing with eternal and invariable essences. Among all sciences, Dialectic is the truest and purest, because it takes comprehensive cognizance of the eternal and invariable—*Ens semper Idem*—presiding over those subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter in partial and separate departments.[a]

Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between purity.

Your opinion (remarks Protarchus) does not agree with that of Gorgias. He affirms, that the power of persuasion (Rhetoric) is the greatest and best of all arts: inasmuch as it enables us to carry all our points, not by force, but with the free will and consent of others. I should be glad to avoid contradicting either him or you.

Difference with Gorgias, who claims Rhetoric is superior, in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims truth.

There is no real contradiction between us (replies Sokrates). You may concede to Gorgias that his art or cognition is the greatest and best of all—the most in repute, as well as the most useful to mankind. I do not claim any superiority of *that* kind, on behalf of my cognition.[b] I claim for it superiority in truth and purity. I remarked before, that a small patch of unmixed white colour was superior in truth and purity to a large mass of white tarnished with other colours—a gentle and unmixed pleasure, in like manner, to one that is more intense but alloyed with

[a] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 57-58.

[b] Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B.
Οὐ τοῦτ' ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω, τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνίνασα. Τοῦτ' ἦ ζητοῦμεν.

pains. It is this superiority that I assert for Dialectic and the other sister cognitions. They are of little positive advantage to mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an impulse to love and strain after truth.[c]

As far as straining after truth is concerned, (says Protarchus) Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable superiority.

Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained.

You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other arts or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard, in opinions alone: while of those who study Nature, the greater number confine their investigations to this Kosmos, to its generation and its phenomenal operations—its manifestations past, present, and future.[d] Now all these manifestations are in perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason and Intelligence—can be found only in essences, eternal and unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.[e]

Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately is the Good, but a mixture of the two—Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed?

We have now (continues Sokrates) examined pleasure separately and intelligence separately. We have agreed that neither of them, apart and by itself, comes up to the conception of Good; the attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing besides.[f] We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or combination of the two—Pleasure and Intelligence: and we must determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good which we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cognitions, at once and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the

[c] Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 E.
ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾷν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν, &c.

[d] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 58-59.
εἴτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγεῖταί τις εἶν, οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον , ὅπῃ τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου.

[e] Plato, Philêbus, p. 59.

[f] Plato, Philêbus, p. 60 C. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων—ᾧ τέλους πάντως καὶ ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι ἱκανὸν τι

truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with fluctuating particulars). Will such a combination suffice to constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satisfactory existence? Or do we want anything more besides?[g] Suppose a man cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other essential Ideas: and able to render account of his cognition, in proper words: Will this be sufficient?[h] Suppose him to be cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?[i]

That would be a ludicrous position indeed, (remarks Protarchus) to have his mind full of the divine Ideas or cognitions only.

We must include all Cognitions—not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both.

What! (replies Sokrates) must he have cognition not only of the true line and circle, but also of the false, the variable, the uncertain?

Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this farther cognition, if we are to find our way from hence to our own homes.[k]

Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music, which we declared to be full of conjecture and imitation, without any pure truth or certainty?

We must admit them (says Protarchus), if life is to be worth anything at all. No harm can come from admitting all the other cognitions, provided a man possesses the first and most perfect.

Well then (continues Sokrates), we will admit them all. We have now to consider whether we can in like manner admit all pleasures without distinction. The true and pure

[g] Plato, Philêbus, p. 61 E.

[h] Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. Ἔστω δή τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅ, τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος;

[i] Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. Ἆρ' οὖν οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἕξει κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, &c.

[k] Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 B. Ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ ... ὁδὸν ἑκάστοτε ἐξευρήσειν ...

must first be let in: next, such as are necessary and indis-

But we must

pensable: and all the rest also, if any one can show that there is advantage without mischief in our enjoying every variety of pleasure.[1] We must put the question first to pleasures, next to cognitions—whether they can consent respectively to live in company with each other. Now pleasures will readily consent to the companionship of cognitions: but cognitions (or Reason upon whom they depend) will not tolerate the companionship of all pleasures indiscriminately. Reason will welcome the true and pure pleasures: she will also accept such as are indispensable, and such as consist with health, and with a sober and virtuous disposition. But Reason will not tolerate those most intense, violent, insane, pleasures, which extinguish correct memory, disturb sound reflection, and consist only with folly and bad conduct. Excluding these violent pleasures, but retaining the others in company with Reason and Truth—we shall secure that perfect and harmonious mixture which makes the nearest approximation to Good.[m]

Indispensable with Cognition or Intelligence —especially the intense sexual pleasures.

This mixture as Good (continues Sokrates) will be accept-

What causes the excellence of this

able to all.[n] But what is the cause that it is so? and is that cause more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? The answer is, that this mixture and combination, like every other that is excellent, derives its excellence from Measure and Proportion. Thus

more akin than Pleasure.

the Good becomes merged in the Beautiful: for measure and proportion (Moderation and Symmetry) constitute in every case beauty and excellence.[o] In this case, Truth has been recognised as a third element of the mixture: the three together coalesce into Good, forming a Quasi-Unum, which serves instead of a Real Unum or Idea of Good.[p] We

[1] Plato, Philêbus, p. 63 A *πάσας ἡδονὰς ἥδεσθαι διὰ βίου σ... τε ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασι, πάσας ...ρατέον.*

Plato, Philêbus, pp. 63-64.

Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 C. *Τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν, τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφι τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν;*

Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E. *νῦν ... εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν· μετριότης γὰρ ... πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.*

[p] Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E. *Οὐκοῦν*

must examine these three elements separately—Truth—Moderation — Symmetry — Measure — Proportion — to find whether each of them is most akin to Reason or to Pleasure. There can be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure: and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and antipathy to all the three.[q]

We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the debate with Philêbus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor second in the scale of approximation to Good. First comes Measure—the Moderate—the Seasonable—and all those eternal Forms and Ideas which are analogous to these.[r] Secondly, come the Symmetrical—the Beautiful—the Perfect—the Sufficient—and other such like Forms and Ideas.[s] Thirdly, come Reason and Intelligence. Fourthly, the various sciences, cognitions, arts, and right opinions—acquirements embodied in the mind itself. Fifthly, those pleasures which we have discriminated as pure pleasures without admixture of pain; belonging to the mind itself, but consequent on the sensations of sight, hearing, smell.[t]

Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures.

It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has been shown, against Philêbus—That though neither Intelligence separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodiment of Good, which requires both of them conjointly—yet Intelligence is more akin to Good, and stands nearer to it in nature, than Pleasure.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor and poetry of the Phædrus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks with great admiration of Plato in his appro-

εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατ' τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

[q] Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 C.

[r] Plato, Philebus, p. 66 A. ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἐστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον ὅποσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα ἀΐδιον

[s] Plat. Phil. p. 66 B. δεύτερον μὴν ερὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ καὶ ἱκανὸν, καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης

[t] Plat. Philêb. p. 66 C.

priate walk of the Sokratic dialogues; and selects specially the Philêbus, as his example of these latter. I confess that this selection surprises me: for the Philêbus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic—cannot be said to possess high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of the Republic.[u] Every commentator of Plato, from Galen downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philêbus.

Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an

Sokrates concludes his task, in the debate with Protarchus, by describing Bonum or the Supreme Good as a complex aggregate of five distinct elements, in a graduated scale of affinity to it and contributing to composition in a greater or less degree according the order in which they are placed. Plato does not intimate that these five complete the catalogue; but that after the fifth degree, the affinity becomes too feeble to deserve notice.[x] According to this view, no Idea of Good, in the strict Platonic sense, is affirmed. Good has not the complete unity of an Idea, but only the quasi-unity of analogy between its diverse elements; which are attached by different threads to the same root, with an order of priority and posteriority.[y]

Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view,

In the discussions about Bonum, there existed among the contemporaries of Plato a great divergence of opinions. Eukleides of Megara represents the extreme absolute, ontological, or objective view: Sokrates (I

[u] Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. ap. Demosthen. p. 1025.

Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. 136) admits the comparatively tiresome character and negligent execution of the Philêbus.

Galen had composed a special treatise, Περὶ τῶν ἐν Φιλήβῳ μεταβάσεων, now lost (Galen, De Libris Propriis, 13, vol. xix. 46, ed. Kühn).

We have the advantage of two recent editions of the Philêbus by excellent English scholars, Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste: both are valuable, and that of Dr. Badham is distinguished by sagacious critical remarks and conjectures, but the obscurity of the original remains incorrigible.

[x] Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.

[y] Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 A. The passage is cited in note *p*, p. 582.

About the difference recognised partly by Plato but still more insisted on by Aristotle, between τὰ λεγόμενα καθ' ἓν (κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν) and τὰ λεγόμενα πρὸς ἕν (πρὸς μίαν τινὰ φύσιν), see my note towards the close of the Lysis, vol. i. ch. 18, p. 524.

Aristotle says about Plato (Eth. Nikom. i. 6). Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην, οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, &c.

mean the historical Sokrates, as reported by Xenophon) enunciated very distinctly the relative or subjective view. "Good" (said Eukleides) "is the One: the only real, eternal, omnipresent Ens—always the same or like itself—called sometimes God, sometimes Intelligence, and by various other names: the opposite of Good has no real existence, but only a temporary, phenomenal, relative, existence." On the other hand, the Xenophontic Sokrates affirmed—"The Good and The Beautiful have no objective unity at all; they include a variety of items altogether dissimilar to each other, yet each having reference to some human want or desire: sometimes relieving or preventing pain, sometimes conferring pleasure. That which neither contributes to relieve any pain or want, nor to confer pleasure, is not Good at all."[z] In the Philêbus, Plato borrows in part from both of these points of view, though inclining much more to the first than to the last. He produces a new eclectic doctrine, comprising something from both, and intended to harmonise both; announced as applying at once to Man, to Animals, to Plants, and to the Universe.[a]

maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine.

Unfortunately, the result has not corresponded to his intentions. If we turn to the close of the dialogue, we find that the principal elements which he assigns as explanatory of Good, and the relation in which they stand to each other, stand as much in need of explanation as Good itself. If we follow the course of the dialogue, we are frequently embarrassed by the language, because he is seeking for phrases applicable at once to the Kosmos and to Man: or because he passes from one to the other, under the assumption of real analogy between them. The extreme generalities of Logic or Ontology, upon

Inconvenience of his method,

[z] Diogen. Laert. ii. 106; Cicero, Academic. ii. 42; Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 3-5.

[a] Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 A. ἐν τί ποτε θρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν, καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε.

Schleiermacher observes about the Philêbus:—"Dieses also lag ihm (Plato) am Herzen, das Gute zu bestimmen nicht nur für das Leben des Menschen, sondern auch zumal für das ganze Gebiet des gewordenen Seins," &c.

The partial affinity between the Kosmos and the human soul is set forth in the Timæus, pp. 37-43-44.

which Sokrates here dwells—the Determinant and Indeterminate, the Cause, &c.—do not conduct us to the attainment of Good as he himself defines it—That which is desired by, and will give full satisfaction to, all men, animals, and plants. The fault appears to me to lie in the very scheme of the dialogue. Attempts to discuss Ontology and Ethics in one and the same piece of reasoning, instead of elucidating both, only serve to darken both. Aristotle has already made a similar remark: and it is after reading the Philêbus that we feel most distinctly the value of his comments on Plato in the first book of the Nikomachean Ethics. Aristotle has discussed Ontology in the Metaphysica and in other treatises: but he proclaims explicitly the necessity of discussing Ethics upon their own principles: looking at what is good for man, and what is attainable by man.[b] We find in the Philêbus many just reflections upon pleasure and its varieties: but these might have been better and more clearly established, without any appeal to the cosmical dogmas. The parallelism between Man and the Kosmos is overstrained and inconclusive, like the parallelism in the Republic between the collective commonwealth and the individual citizen.

of Man to the Kosmos, which has reason, but no emotion, is unnecessary and confusing.

Moreover, when Plato, to prove the conclusion that Intelligence and Reason are the governing attributes of man's mind, enunciates as his premiss that Intelligence and Reason are the governing attributes in the Kosmos[c]—the premiss introduced is more debateable than the conclusion; and would (as he himself intimates) be contested by those against whose oppo-

[b] See especially Ethic. Nikom. i. 4, 1096-1097. Aristotle reasons there directly against the Platonic *ἰδέα ἀγαθοῦ*, but his arguments have full application to the exposition in the Philêbus. He distinguishes pointedly the ethical from the physical point of view. In his discussion of friendship, after touching upon various comparisons of the physiological poets, and of Plato himself repeating them, he says:—*τὰ οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων παρα-οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης ὅσα δ' ἔστιν ἀ ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ'* Ethic. Nikom. viii. 1, 1155, b. 10.

The like contrast is brought out (though less clearly) in the Eudemian Ethics, viii. 1, 1235, a. 30.

He animadverts upon Plato on the same ground in the Ethica Magna, i. 1, 1182, a. 23-30. *ὑπὲρ γὰρ τῶν ὄν καὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα, οὐ δεῖ ὑ ἀρετῆς φράζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτῳ κείνῳ κοινόν.*

[c] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20-30.

sition he was arguing. In fact, the same proposition (That Reason and Intelligence are the dominant and controlling attributes of man, Passion and Appetite the subordinate) is assumed without any proof by Sokrates, both in the Protagoras and in the Republic. The Kosmos (in Plato's view) has reason and intelligence, but experiences no emotion either painful or pleasurable: the rational nature of man is thus common to him with the Kosmos, his emotional nature is not so. That the mind of each individual man was an emanation from the all-pervading mind of the Kosmos or universe, and his body a fragmentary portion of the four elements composing the cosmical body—these are propositions which had been laid down by Sokrates, as well as by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans, (perhaps by Pythagoras himself) before the time of Plato.[d] Not only that doctrine, but also the analysis of the Kosmos into certain abstract constituent *principia*—(the Finient or Determinant—and the Infinite or Indeterminate)—this too seems to have been borrowed by Plato from Philolaus.[e]

Plato borrows from Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling on classification.

But here in the Philêbus, that analysis appears expanded into a larger scheme going beyond Philolaus or the Pythagoreans; viz. the recognition of a graduated scale of limits, or a definite number of species and sub-species—intermediate between the One or Highest Genus, and the Infinite Many or Individuals—and descending by successive stages of limitation from the Highest to the Lowest. What is thus described, is the general framework of systematic logical classification, deliberately contrived, and founded upon known attributes, common as well as differential. It is prescribed as essential to all real cognition: if we conceive only the highest Genus or generic name as comprehending an infinity of diverse particulars, we have no real cognition, until we can assign the intermediate stages of specification by which we

[d] Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 11, 27; De Senectute, 21, 78; Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 7-8; Cicero, Nat. D. ii. 6, 18; Plato, Timæus, pp. 37-38, &c.

In the Xenophontic dialogue here referred to, Sokrates inverts the premiss and the conclusion: he infers that Mind and Reason govern the Kosmos, because the mind and reason of man govern the body of man.

[e] See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Philêb. ch. 4, pp. 41-42.

descend from one to the other.[f] The step here made by Plato, under the stimulus of the Sokratic dialectic, from the Pythagorean doctrine of Finient and Infinite to the idea of gradual, systematic, logical division and subdivision, is one very important in the history of science. He lays as much stress upon the searching out of the intermediate species, as Bacon does upon the Axiomata Media of scientific enquiry.[g]

Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended—yet feebly applied—in this dialogue.

Though there are several other passages of the Platonic dialogues in which the method of logical division is inculcated, there is none (I think) in which it is prescribed so formally, or enunciated with such comprehensive generality, as this before us in the Philêbus. Yet the method, after being emphatically announced, is but feebly and partially applied, in the distinction of different species, both of pleasure and of cognition.[h] The announcement would come more suitably, as a preface

[f] Ueberweg (Ueber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften, pp. 204-207) considers the Philêbus, as well as the Sophistês and Timæus, to be compositions of Plato's very late age—partly on the ground of their didactic and expository style, the dialogue serving only as form to the exponent Sokrates—partly because he thinks that the nearest approach is made in them to that manner of conceiving the doctrine of Ideas which Aristotle ascribes to Plato in his old age—that is, the two στοιχεῖα or factors of the Ideas. 1. Τὸ ἓν. 2. Τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν. This last argument seems to me far-fetched. I see no real and sensible approach in the Philêbus to this Platonic doctrine of the στοιχεῖα of the Ideas; at least, the approach is so vague, that one can hardly make it a basis of reasoning. But the didactic tone is undoubtedly a characteristic of the Philêbus, and seems to indicate that the dialogue was composed after Plato had been so long established in his school, as to have acquired a pedagogic ostentation.

[g] Bacon, Augment. Scient. v. 2. Nov. Organ. Aph. 105. "At Plato non semel innuit particularia infinita esse maximè: rursus generalia minus certa documenta exhibere. Medullam igitur scientiarum, quâ artifex ab imperito distinguitur, in mediis propositionibus consistere, quas per singulas scientias tradiditet docuit experientia."

[h] The purpose of discriminating the different sorts of pleasure is intimated, yet seemingly not considered as indispensable, by Sokrates; and it is executed certainly in a very unsystematic and perfunctory manner, compared with what we read in the Sophistês and Politikus. (Philêbus, pp. 19 B, 20 C, 32 B-C.)

Mr. Poste, in his note on p. 55 A, expresses surprise at this point; and notices it as one among other grounds for suspecting that the Philêbus is a composition of two distinct fragments, rather carelessly soldered together:—"Again after Division and Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the Philêbus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two originally separate dialogues."

Acknowledging the want of coherence in the dialogue, I have difficulty in conceiving what the two fragments could have been, out of which it was compounded. Schleiermacher (Einleit. pp. 136-137) also points out the negligent execution and heavy march of the dialogue.

to the Sophistês and Politikus: wherein the process is applied to given subjects in great detail, and at a length which some critics consider excessive: and wherein moreover the particular enquiry is expressly proclaimed as intended to teach as well as to exemplify the general method.[i]

What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic. Comparison.

The same question as that which is here discussed in the Philêbus, is also started in the sixth book of the Republic. It is worth while to compare the different handling here and there. "Whatever else we possess (says Sokrates in the Republic), and whatever else we may know, is all of no value, unless we also possess and know Good. In the opinion of most persons, Pleasure is The Good: in the opinion of accomplished and philosophical men, intelligence (*φρόνησις*) is the Good. But when we ask, Intelligence, *of what?* these philosophers cannot inform us: they end by telling us, ridiculously enough, Intelligence of *The Good.* Thus, while blaming us for not knowing what The Good is, they make an answer which implies that we do already know it: in saying, Intelligence of the Good, they of course presume that we know what they mean by the word. Then again, those who pronounce Pleasure to be the Good, are not less involved in error; since they are forced to admit that some Pleasures are Evil; thus making Good and Evil to be the same. It is plain therefore that there are many and grave disputes what the Good is."[k]

In this passage of the Republic Plato points out that Intelligence cannot be understood, except as determined by

[i] See Politikus, pp. 285-286; Philêbus, p. 205; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, ---

I have already observed that Socher (Ueber Platon. pp. 260-270) and Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Politik. pp. 52-54-65-67, &c.) agree in condemning the extreme minuteness, the tiresome monotony, the useless and petty comparisons, which Plato brings together in the multiplied bifurcate divisions of the Sophistês and Politikus. Socher adduces this as one among his reasons for rejecting the dialogue as spurious.

[k] Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 D. *οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι τις φρόνησις ἀλλ' ἀναγ-*
ι οὐκ
λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι· φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων ὅ, τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ

In the Symposion, there is a like tenor of questions about Eros or Love. Love must be Love of something: the term is relative. You confound Love with the object loved. See Plato, Symposion, pp. 199 C, 204 C.

When we read the objection here advanced by Plato (in the above passage of the Republic) as conclusive against the appeal to *φρόνησις* absolutely (without specifying *φρόνησις of what*), we are surprised to see that it is not even mentioned in the Philêbus.

or referring to some Object or End: and that those who tendered Intelligence *per se* for an explanation of The Good (as Sokrates does in the Philêbus), assumed as known the very point in dispute which they professed to explain. This is an important remark in regard to ethical discussions: and it were to be wished that Plato had himself avoided the mistake which he here blames in others. The Platonic Sokrates frequently tells us that he does not know what Good is. In the sixth book of the Republic, having come to a point where his argument required him to furnish a positive explanation of it, he expressly declines the obligation and makes his escape amidst the clouds of metaphor.[1] In the Protagoras, he pronounces Good to be identical with pleasure and avoidance of pain, in the largest sense and under the supervision of calculating Intelligence.[m] In the second book of the Republic, we find what is substantially the same explanation as that of the Protagoras, given (though in a more enlarged and analytical manner) by Glaukon and assented to by Sokrates; to the effect that Good is tripartite,[n] viz.: 1. That which we desire for itself, without any reference to consequences—*e. g.* enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures. 2. That which we desire on a double account, both for itself and by reason of its consequences—*e. g.* good health, eyesight, intelligence, &c. 3. That which we do not desire, perhaps even shun, for itself: but which we desire, or at least accept, by reason of its consequences—such as gymnastics, medical treatment, discipline, &c. Again, in the Gorgias and elsewhere, Plato seems to confine the definition of Good to the two last of these three heads, rejecting the first: for he distinguishes pointedly the Good from the Pleasurable. Yet while thus wavering in his conception of the term, Plato often admits it into the discussions as if it were not merely familiar, but clear and well understood by every one.

Mistake of talking about Bonum constant dispute.

Plato himself wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently.

[1] Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 E. Compare also Republic, vii. p. 533 C. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὃ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι;

[m] Plato, Protagoras.

[n] Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357 B.

In the present dialogue, Plato lays down certain characteristic marks whereby The Supreme Good may be known. These marks are subjective—relative to the feelings and appreciation of sentient beings—to all mankind, and even to animals and plants. Good is explicitly defined by the property of conferring happiness. The Good is declared to be "that habit and disposition of mind which has power to confer on all men a happy life:"[o] it is perfect and all-sufficient: every creature that knows Good, desires and hunts after it, demanding nothing farther when it is attained, and caring for nothing else except what is attained along with it:[p] it is the object of choice for all plants and animals, and if any one prefers anything else, he only does so through ignorance or from some untoward necessity:[q] it is most delightful and agreeable to all.[r] This is what Plato tells us as to the characteristic attributes of Good. And the test which Sokrates applies, to determine whether Pleasure does or does not correspond with these attributes, is an appeal to individual choice or judgment. "Would you choose? Would *any one* be satisfied?" Though this appeal ought by the conditions of the problem to be made to mankind generally, and is actually made to Protarchus as one specimen of them—yet Sokrates says at the end of the dialogue that all except philosophers choose wrong, being too ignorant or misguided to choose aright. Now it is certain that what these philosophers choose, will not satisfy the aspirations of all other persons besides. It may be Good, in reference to the philosophers themselves: but it will fail to answer those larger conditions which Plato has just laid down.

Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philêbus tests.

In submitting the question to individual choice Plato does

o Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 E.

p Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. *αὐταρκεία*, &c.

Sydenham, Translation of Philêbus, note, p. 48, observes—"Whether Happiness be to be found in Speculative Wisdom or in Pleasure, or in some other possession or enjoyment, it can be seated nowhere but in the soul. For Happiness has no existence anywhere but where it is felt and known. Now, it is no less certain, that only the soul is sensible of pain and pleasure, than it is, that only the soul is capable of knowledge, and of thinking either foolishly or wisely."

q Plato, Philêbus, pp. 22 B, 61 A.

r Plato, Philêbus, pp. 61 E, 64 C. *τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον πᾶσι προσφιλῆ.*

Aristotle, Ethic. Nikomach. i. init. *τἀγαθὸν, οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται.*

Seneca, Epistol. 118. "Bonum est quod ad se impetum animi secundum naturam movet."

not keep clear either of confusion or of contradiction. If this Summum Bonum be understood as the End comprising the full satisfaction of human wishes and imaginations, without limitation by certain given actualities—and if the option be tendered to a man already furnished with his share of the various desires generated in actual life—such a man will naturally demand entire absence of all pains, with pleasures such as to satisfy all his various desires: not merely the most intense pleasures (which Plato intends to prove, not to be pleasures at all), but other pleasures also. He will wish (if you thus suppose him master of Fortunatus's wishing-cap) to include in his enjoyments pleasures which do not usually go together, and which may even, in the real conditions of life, exclude one another: no boundary being prescribed to his wishing power. He will wish for the pleasures of knowledge or intelligence, of self-esteem, esteem from others, sympathy, &c., as well as for those of sense. He will put in his claim for pleasures, without any of those antecedent means and conditions which, in real life, are necessary to procure them. Such being the state of the question, the alternative tendered by Plato—Pleasure, versus Intelligence or Knowledge—has no fair application. Plato himself expressly states that pleasure, though generically One, is specifically multiform, and has many varieties different from, even opposite to, each other: among which varieties one is, the pleasure of knowledge or intelligence itself.[s] The person to whom the question is submitted, has a right to claim these pleasures of knowledge among the rest, as portions of his Summum Bonum. And when Plato proceeds to ask—Will you be satisfied to possess pleasure only, without the least spark of intelligence, without memory, without eyesight?—he departs from the import of his previous question, and withdraws from the sum total of pleasure many of its most important items: since we must of course understand that the pleasures of intelligence will disappear along with intelligence itself,[t] and that the pains of conscious want of intelligence will be felt instead of them.

Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question—The alternative which he tenders has no fair application.

[s] Plato, Philêbus, p. 12 D.

[t] Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 C.

That the antithesis here enunciated by Plato is not legitimate or logical, we may see on other grounds also. Pleasure and Intelligence cannot be placed in competition with each other for recognition as Summum Bonum: which, as described by Plato himself, is of the nature of an End, while Intelligence is of the nature of a means or agency—indispensable indeed, yet of no value unless it be exercised, and rightly exercised towards its appropriate end, which end must be separately declared.[u] Intelligence is a durable acquisition stored up, like the good health, moral character, or established habits, of each individual person: it is a capital engaged in the production of interest, and its value is measured by the interest produced. You cannot with propriety put the means—the Capital—in one scale, and the End—the Interest—in the other, so as to ascertain which of the two weighs most. A prudent man will refrain from any present enjoyment which trenches on his capital: but this is because the maintenance of the capital is essential to all future acquisitions and even future maintenance. So, too, Intelligence is essential as a means or condition to the attainment of pleasure in its largest sense—that is, including avoidance or alleviation of pain or suffering: if therefore you choose to understand pleasure in a narrower sense, not including therein avoidance of pain (as Plato understands it in this portion of the Philêbus), the comprehensive end to which Intelligence corresponds may be compared with Pleasure and declared more valuable—but Intelligence itself cannot with propriety be so compared. Such a comparison can only be properly

Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared—Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End.

[u] Compare Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 D (referred to in a previous note); also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 3, 1095, b. 30; i. 8, 1099, a. 1.

Respecting the value of Intelligence or Cognition, when the end towards which it is to be exercised is undetermined, see the dialogue between Sokrates and Kleinias—Plato, Euthydêm. pp. 289-292 B-E.

Aristotle, in the Nikomach. Ethic. (i. 4, 1096, b. 10), makes a distinction between—1. τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ ἀγαπώμενα—2. τὰ ἡ φυλακτικὰ ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων [illegible], and Plato himself makes the same distinction at the beginning of the second book of the Republic. But though it is convenient to draw attention to this distinction, for the clear understanding of the subject, you cannot ask with propriety which of the two lots is most valuable. The value of the two is equal: the one cannot be had without the other.

instituted when you consider the exercise of Intelligence as involving (which it undoubtedly does[x]) pleasures of its own; which pleasures form part of the End, and may fairly be measured against other pleasures and pains. But nothing can be properly compared with Pleasure, except some other supposed End: and those theorists who reject Pleasure must specify some other *Terminus ad quem*—otherwise intelligence has no clear meaning.

The Hedonists, while they laid ... sure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence agency.

Now the Hedonists in Plato's age, when they declared Pleasure to be the supreme Good, understood Pleasure in its widest sense, as including not merely all varieties of pleasure, mental and bodily alike, but also avoidance of pain (in fact Epikurus dwelt especially upon this last point). Moreover, they did not intend to depreciate Intelligence, but on the contrary postulated it as a governing agency, indispensable to right choice and comparative estimation between different pleasures and pains. That Eudoxus,[y] the geometer and astronomer, did this, we may be sure: but besides, this is the way in which the Hedonistic doctrine is expounded by Plato himself. In his Protagoras, Sokrates advocates that doctrine, against the Sophist who is unwilling to admit it. In the exposition there given by Sokrates, Pleasure is announced as The Good to be sought, Pain as The Evil to be avoided or reduced to a minimum. But precisely because the End, to be pursued through constant diversity of complicated situations, is thus defined—for that very reason he declares that the dominant or sovereign element in man must be, the measuring and calculating Intelligence; since such is the sole condition under which the End can be attained or approached. In the theory of the Hedonists, there was no antithesis, but indispensable conjunction and implication, between Pleasure and Intelligence.[z] And if it be said, that by declaring Pleasure (and avoidance of Pain) to be the End,

[x] Plato, Philêb. p. 12 D.

[y] Eudoxus is cited by Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. x. 2) as the great champion of the Hedonistic theory. He is characterised by Aristotle as διαφερόντως σ...

[z] The implication of the intelligent and emotional is well stated by Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. x. 8, 1178, a. 16). συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ..., καὶ αὐτὴ τῇ φρονήσει,

Intelligence the means,—they lowered the dignity of the latter as compared with the former:—we may reply that the dignity of Intelligence is exalted to the maximum when it is enthroned as the ruling and controuling agent over the human mind.

In a scheme of mental philosophy, Emotion and Intellect are properly treated as distinct phenomena requiring to be explained separately, though perpetually co-existent and interfering with each other. But in an ethical discourse about Summum Bonum, the antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence, on which the Philêbus turns, is from the outset illogical. What gives to it an apparent plausibility, is, That the exercise of Intelligence has pleasures and pains of its own, and includes therefore in itself a part of the End, besides being the constant and indispensable directing force or Means. Now, though pleasure *in genere* cannot be weighed in the scale against Intelligence, yet the pleasures and pains of Intelligence may be fairly and instructively compared with other pleasures and pains. You may contend that the pleasures of Intelligence are superior in quality, as well as less alloyed by accompanying pains. This comparison is really instituted by Plato in other dialogues;[a] and

Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value. This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.

εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν κατὰ τὴν συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί, καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη, &c. Compare also the first two or three sentences of the tenth Book of Eth. Nik.

[a] See Republic. ix. pp. 581-582, where he compares the pleasures of the three different lives. 1. Ὁ φιλόσοφος 2. Ὁ φιλότιμος. 3. Ὁ

Again in the Phædon, he tells us that we are not to weigh pleasures against pleasures, or pains against pains, but all of them against φρόνησις or Intelligence (p. 69 A-B). This appears distinctly to contradict what Sokrates affirms in the Protagoras. But when we turn to another passage of the Phædon (p. 114 E), we find Sokrates recognising a class of pleasures attached to the exercise of Intelligence, and declaring them to be more valuable than the pleasures of sense, or any others. This is a very different proposition: but in both passages Plato had probably the same comparison in his mind.

Sydenham, in a note to his translation of the Philêbus (pp. 42-43), observes—"If Protarchus, when he took on himself to be an advocate for pleasure, had included, in his meaning of the word, all such pleasures as are purely mental, his opinion, fairly and rightly understood, could not have been different in the main, from what Sokrates here professes—That in every particular case, to discern what is best in action, and to perceive what is true in speculation, is the chief good of man; unless, indeed, it should afterwards come into question which of the two kinds of pleasure, the sensual or the mental, was to be preferred. For

we find the two questions apparently running together in his mind as if they were one and the same. Yet the fact is, that those who affirm the pleasures attending the exercise of Intelligence to be better and greater, and the pains less, than those which attend other occupations, are really arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.[b] Far from establishing any antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence, they bring the two into closer conjunction than was done by Epikurus himself.

Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between Pleasure and avoidance of pain.

Another remark may be made on the way in which Plato argues the question in the Philêbus against the Hedonists. He draws a marked line of separation between Pleasure—and avoidance, relief, or mitigation, of Pain. He does not merely distinguish the two, but sets them in opposing antithesis. Wherever there is pain to be relieved, he will not allow the title of *pleasurable* to be bestowed on the situation. That is not *true* pleasure: in other words, it is no pleasure at all. He does not

if it should appear that in this point they were both of the same mind, the controversy between them would be found a mere logomachy, or contention about words (as between Epikureans and Stoics) of the same kind, as that would be between two persons, one of whom asserted that to a musical ear the proper and true good was Harmony; while the other contended that the good lay not in the Harmony itself, but in the pleasure which the musical ear felt from hearing it: or like a controversy among three persons, one of whom having asserted that to all animals living under the northern frigid zone, the Sun in Cancer was the greatest blessing; and another having asserted that not the Sun was that chief blessing to those northern animals, but the warmth which he afforded them; the third should imagine that he corrected or amended the two former by saying—That those animals were thus highly blest neither by the Sun, nor by the warmth which his rays afforded them, but by the joy or pleasure which they felt from the return of the Sun and warmth."

[b] Plato, in Philêbus, p. 63 C-D. denounces and discards the vehement pleasures because they disturb the right exercise of Reason and Intelligence. Aristotle, after alluding to this doctrine, presents the same fact under a different point of view, as one case of a general law. Each variety of pleasure belongs to, and is consequent on, a certain ἐνέργεια of the system. Each variety of pleasure promotes and consummates its own ἐνέργεια, but impedes or arrests other different ἐνεργείας. Thus the pleasures of hunting, of gymnastic contest, of hearing or playing music—cause each of these ἐνεργείαι, upon which each pleasure respectively depends, to be more completely developed; but are unfavourable to different ἐνεργείαι, such as learning by heart, or solving a geometrical problem. The pleasure belonging to these latter, again, is unfavourable to the performance of the former ἐνεργείαι. Study often hurts health or good management of property; but if a man has pleasure in study, he will perform that work with better fruit and result.

This is a juster view of ἡδονὴ than what we read in the Philêbus. The illogical antithesis of Pleasure *in genere*, against Intelligence, finds no countenance from Aristotle.

See Ethic. Nikom. vii. 13, 1153, a. 20; x. 5, p. 1175; also Ethic. Magna, ii. p. 1206, a. 3.

go quite so far as some contemporary theorists, the Fastidious Pleasure-Haters, who repudiated all pleasures without exception.[c] He allows a few rare exceptions; the sensual pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell—and the pleasures of exercising Intelligence, which (these latter most erroneously) he affirms to be not disentitled by any accompanying pains. His catalogue of pleasures is thus reduced to a chosen few, and these too enjoyable only by a chosen few among mankind.

Now this very restricted sense of the word Pleasure is peculiar to Plato, and peculiar even to some of the Platonic dialogues. Those who affirmed Pleasure to be the Good, did not understand the word in the same restricted sense. When Sokrates in the Protagoras affirms, and when Sokrates in the Philêbus denies that Pleasure is identical with Good,—the affirmation and the denial do not bear upon the same substantial meaning.[d]

nists did not recognise this distinction—They included both in their acknowledged End.

[c] Plato, Philêb. p. 44 B.

[d] Among the arguments employed by Sokrates in the Philêbus to disprove the identity between ἡδονὴ and ἀγαθόν, one is, that ἡδονὴ is a γένεσις, and is therefore essentially a process of imperfection or transition into some ulterior οὐσία, for the sake of which alone it existed (Philêbus, pp. 53-55); whereas Good is essentially an οὐσία—perfect, complete, all-sufficient—and must not be confounded with the process whereby it is brought about. He illustrates this by telling us that the species of γένεσις called ship-building exists only for the sake of the ship—the οὐσία in which it terminates; but that the fabricating process, and the result in which it ends, are not to be confounded together.

The doctrine that pleasure is a γένεσις, Plato cites as laid down by others: certain κομψοὶ, whom he does not name, but whom the critics suppose to be Aristippus and the Kyrenaici. Aristotle (in the seventh and tenth books of Ethic. Nik.) also criticises and impugns the doctrine that pleasure is a γένεσις: but he too omits to name the persons by whom it was propounded.

Possibly Aristippus may have been the author of it; but we can hardly tell what he meant, or how he defended it. Plato derides him for his inconsistency in calling pleasure a γένεσις, while he at the same time maintained it to be the Good: but the derision is founded upon an assumption which Aristippus would have denied. Aristippus would not have admitted that all γένεσις existed only for the sake of οὐσία: and he would have replied to Plato's argument, illustrated by the example of ship-building, by saying that the οὐσία called a *ship* existed only for the sake of the services which it was destined to render in transporting persons and goods: that if γένεσις existed for the sake of οὐσία, it was no less true that οὐσία existed for the sake of γένεσις. Plato therefore had no good foundation for the sarcasm which he throws out against Aristippus.

The reasoning of Aristotle (E. N. x. 3-4; compare Eth. Magn. ii. 1204-1205) against the doctrine, that pleasure is γένεσις or κίνησις, is drawn from a different point of view, and is quite as unfavourable to the opinions of Plato as to those of Aristippus. His language however in the Rhetoric is somewhat different (i. p. 1370, b. 33).

Aristippus is said to have defined pleasure as λεία κίνησις, and pain as τραχεῖα κίνησις (Diog. L. ii. 86-89). The word κίνησις is so vague, that one can hardly say what it means, without some words of context: but I doubt whether he meant anything more than "*a marked change of consciousness.*" The word γένεσις is also very obscure: and we are not sure that Aristippus employed it.

Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures—The Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view.

Again, in the arguments of Sokrates against pleasure *in genere*, we find him also singling out as examples the intense pleasures, which he takes much pains to discredit. The remarks which he makes here upon the intense pleasures, considered as elements of happiness, have much truth taken generally. Though he exaggerates the matter when he says that many persons would rejoice to have itch and irritation, in order that they might have the pleasure of scratching [e]—and that persons in a fever have greater pleasure as well as greater pain than persons in health—yet he is correct to this extent, that the disposition to hanker after intense pleasures, to forget their painful sequel in many cases, and to pay for them a greater price than they are worth, is widely disseminated among mankind. But this is no valid objection against the Hedonistic theory, as it was enunciated and defended by its principal advocates—by the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras), by Aristippus, Eudoxus,[f] Epikurus. All of them took account of this frequent wrong tendency, and arranged their warnings accordingly. All of them discouraged, not less than Plato, such intense enjoyments as produced greater mischief in the way of future pain and disappointment, or as obstructed the exercise of calm reason.[g] All of them, when they talked of pleasure as the Supreme Good, understood thereby a rational estimate and comparison of pleasures and pains, present and future, so as to ensure the maximum of the former and the minimum of the latter. All of them postulated a calculating and governing Reason. Epikurus undoubtedly, and I believe the other two also, recommended a life of

[e] Plato, Philêb. p. 47 B.

[f] I have already remarked that Eudoxus is characterised by Aristotle as being διαφερόντως σώφρων (Ethic. Nikom. x. 3). The strong interest which he felt in scientific pursuits is marked by a story in Plutarch (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi; see Epikur. p. 1094 A).

[g] The equivocal sense of the word Pleasure is the same as that which Plato notes in the Symposion to attach to Eros or Love (p. 205). When employed in philosophical discussion, it sometimes *is* used (and always *ought* to be used) in its full extent of generic comprehension: sometimes in a narrower sense, so as to include only a few of the more intense pleasures, chiefly the physical, and especially the sexual; sometimes in a sense still more peculiar, partly as opposed to *duty*, partly as opposed to *business*, *work*, *utility*, &c. Opponents of the Hedonists took advantage of the unfavourable associations attached to the word in these narrower and special senses, to make objections tell against the theory which employed the word in its widest generic sense.

moderation, tranquillity, and meditative reason: they deprecated the violent emotions, whether sensual, ambitious, or money-getting.[h] The objections therefore here stated by Sokrates, in so far as they are derived from the mischievous consequences of indulgence in the intense pleasures, do not avail against the Hedonistic theory, as explained either by Plato himself (Protagoras) or by any theorists of the Platonic century.

We find Plato in his various dialogues working out different points of view, partly harmonious, partly conflicting, upon ethical theory. Thus in the Gorgias, Sokrates insists eloquently upon the antithesis between the Immediate and Transient on the one hand, which he calls Pleasure or Pain — and the Distant and Permanent on the other, which he calls Good or Profit, Hurt or Evil. In the Protagoras, Sokrates acknowledges the same antithesis: but he points out that the Good or Profit, Hurt or Evil, resolve themselves into elements generically the same as those of the Immediate and Transient—Pleasure and Pain: so that all which we require is, a calculating Intelligence to assess and balance correctly the pleasures and pains in every given case. In the Philêbus, Sokrates takes a third line, distinct from both the other two dialogues: he insists upon a new antithesis, between True Pleasures—and False Pleasures. If a Pleasure be associated with any proportion, however small, of Pain or Uneasiness—or with any false belief or impression—he denounces it as false and impostrous, and strikes it out of the list of pleasures. The small residue which is left after such deduction, consists of pleasures recommended altogether by what Plato calls their truth, and addressing themselves to the love of

Different points of view worked out by Plato in different dialogues—Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus—True and False Pleasures.

[h] See the beautiful lines of Lucretius, Book ii. init. When we read the three acrimonious treatises in which Plutarch attacks the Epikureans (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi, adv. Koloten, De Latenter Vivendo), we find him complaining, not that Epikurus thought too much about pleasures, or that he thought too much about the intense pleasures, but quite the reverse. Epikurus (he says) made out too poor a catalogue of pleasures: he was too easily satisfied with a small amount and variety of pleasures: he dwelt too much upon the absence of pain, as being, when combined with a very little pleasure, as much as man ought to look for: he renounced all the most vehement and delicious pleasures, those of political activity and contemplative study, which constitute the great charms of life (1097 F-1098 E-1092 E-1093-1094). Plutarch attacks Epikurus upon grounds really Hedonistic.

truth in a few chosen minds. The attainment of Good—the object of the practical aspirations—is presented as a secondary appendage of the attainment of Truth—the object of the speculative or intellectual energies.

Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gor-

How much the Philêbus differs in its point of view from the Gorgias,[1] is indicated by Plato himself in a remarkable passage. "I have often heard Gorgias affirm" (says Protarchus) "that among all arts, the art of persuasion stands greatly pre-eminent: since it ensures subservience from all, not by force, but with their own free consent." To which Sokrates replies—"I was not then enquiring what art or science stands pre-eminent as the greatest, or as the best, or as conferring most benefit upon us—but what art or science investigates clear, exact, and full truth, though it be in itself small, and may afford small benefit. You need not quarrel with Gorgias, for you may admit to him the superiority of his art in respect of usefulness to mankind, while my art (dialectic philosophy) is superior in respect of accuracy. I observed just now, that a small piece of white colour which is pure, surpasses in truth a large area which is not pure. We must not look to the comparative profitable consequences or good repute of the various sciences or arts, but to any natural aspiration which may exist in our minds to love truth, and to do everything for the sake of truth. It will then appear that no other science or art strives after truth so earnestly as Dialectic."[k]

[1] Sokrates in the Gorgias insists upon the constant intermixture of pleasure with pain, as an argument to prove that pleasure cannot be identical with good: pleasure and pain (he says) go together, but good and evil cannot go together: therefore pleasure cannot be good, pain cannot be evil (Gorgias, pp. 496-497). But he distinguishes pleasures into the good and the bad; not into the true and the false, as they are distinguished in the Philêbus and the Republic (ix. pp. 583-585).

[k] Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B-D-E.

Οὐ τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω, τίς ἡ τις ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ι τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνίναισα. Ἀλλ' ὅρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσει Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπερέχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πρὸς ἀκριβείαν δὲ ᾗ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματείᾳ—μήτ' εἴς τινας ὠφελεῖ μῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινας ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾷν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν.

Here, as elsewhere, I translate the substance of the passage, adopting the amendments of Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste (see Mr. Poste's note), which appear to me valuable improvements of a confused text.

It seems probable enough that what

If we turn to the Gorgias, we find the very same claim advanced by Gorgias on behalf of his own art, as that which Protarchus here advances: but while Sokrates here admits it, in the Gorgias he repudiates it with emphasis, and even with contumely: ranking rhetoric among those employments which minister only to present pleasure, but which are neither intended to yield, nor ever do yield, any profitable result. Here in the Philêbus, the antithesis between immediate pleasure and distant profit is scarcely noticed. Sokrates resigns to Gorgias and to others of the like stamp, a superiority not merely in the art of flattering and tricking the immediate sensibilities of mankind, but in that of contributing to their permanent profit and advantage. It is in a spirit contrary to the Gorgias, and contrary also to the Republic (in which latter we read the memorable declaration—That the miseries of society will have no respite until government is in the hands of philosophers[1]), that Sokrates here abnegates on behalf of philosophy all efficacious pretension of conferring profit or happiness on mankind generally, and claims for it only the pure delight of satisfying the truth-seeking aspirations. Now these aspirations have little force except in a few chosen minds; in the bulk of mankind the love of truth is feeble, and the active search for truth almost unknown. We thus see that in the Philêbus it is the speculative few who are present to the imagination of Plato, more than the ordinary working, suffering, enjoying many.

Peculiarity of the Philêbus—Plato applies the same principle of classification—true and false—to Cognitions and Pleasures.

Aristotle, in the commencement of his Metaphysica, recommends Metaphysics or First Philosophy to the reader, by affirming that, though other studies are more useful or more necessary to man, none is equal to it in respect of truth and exactness,[m] because it teaches us to understand First Causes and Principles. The like pretension is put forward by Plato in the Philêbus[n] on behalf of Dialectic; which he designates as the

is here said, conceding so large a measure of credit to Gorgias and his art, may be intended expressly as a mitigation of the bitter polemic assigned to Sokrates in the Gorgias. This is, however, altogether conjecture.

[1] Plato, Republ. v. 473 D.

[m] Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 983, a. 25, b. 10.

[n] Plato, Philêb. pp. 57-58. Compare Republic, vii. pp. 531-532.

science of all real, permanent, unchangeable, Entia. Taking Dialectic as the maximum or Verissimum, Plato classifies other sciences or cognitions according as they approach closer to it in truth or exactness—according as they contain more of precise measurement and less of conjecture. Sciences or cognitions are thus classified according as they are more or less true and pure. But because this principle of classification is fairly applicable to cognitions, Plato conceives that it may be made applicable to Pleasures also. One characteristic feature of the Philêbus is the attempt to apply the predicates, *true* or *false*, to pleasures and pains, as they are applicable to cognitions or opinions: an attempt against which Protarchus is made to protest, and which Sokrates altogether fails in justifying,[o] though he employs a train of argument both long and diversified.

Distinction of true and false—not applicable to pleasures.

In this train of argument we find a good deal of just and instructive psychological remark: but nothing at all which proves the conclusion that there are or can be *false pleasures* or *false pains*. We have (as Sokrates shows) false remembrances of past pleasures and pains—false expectations, hopes, and fears of future: we have pleasures alloyed by accompanying pains, and pains qualified by accompanying pleasures: we have pleasures and pains dependent upon false beliefs: but false pleasures we neither have nor can have. The predicate is altogether inapplicable to the subject. It is applicable to the intellectual side of our nature, not to the emotional. A pleasure (or a pain) is what it seems, neither more nor less; its essence consists in being felt.[p] There are false beliefs, disbeliefs, judgments, opinions,—but

[o] Plato, Philêb. pp. 36 C, 38 A.

The various arguments, intended to prove this conclusion, are continued from p. 36 to p. 51. The same doctrine is advocated by Sokrates in the Republic, ix. pp. 583-584.

The doctrine is briefly stated by the Platonist Nemesius, De Natur. Hominis, p. 223. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ Ψευδεῖς μὲν, ὅσαι μετ' γινονται καὶ δόξης οὐκ λύπας αὐτῆς ἐαυτὴν μετ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ εως, καθαραὶ καὶ ἀνεπίμικτοι αἷς οὐδεμία μετάνοια παρακολουθεῖ ποτέ.

A brief but clear abstract of the argument will be found in Dr. Badham's Preface to the Philêbus (pp. viii.-xi.). Compare also Stallbaum's Prolegg. ch. v. p. 50, seq.

[p] This is what Aristotle means when he says:—τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος—τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή (Eth. Nik. x. 3, 1174, b. 4).

not false pleasures or pains. The pleasure of the dreamer or madman is not false, though it may be founded on illusory belief: the joy of a man informed that he has just been appointed to a lucrative and honourable post, the grief of a father on hearing that his son has been killed in battle, are neither of them false, though the news which both persons are made to believe may be totally false, and though the feelings will thus be of short duration. Plato observes that the state which he calls neutrality or indifference appears pleasurable when it follows pain, and painful when it results from an interruption of pleasure: here is a state which appears alternately to be both, though it is in reality neither: the pleasure or pain, therefore, whichever it be, he infers to be *false*.[q] But

[q] Plato, Philêb. pp. 43-44; Republic, ix. p. 583.

I copy the following passage from Professor Bain's work on "The Emotions and the Will," the fullest and most philosophical account of the emotions that I know (pp. 615-616):—

"It is a general law of the mental constitution, more or less recognised by inquirers into the human mind, that change of impression is essential to consciousness in every form. There are notable examples to shew, that one unvarying action on the senses fails to give any perception whatever. Take the motion of the earth about its axis and through space, whereby we are whirled with immense velocity, but at an uniform pace, being utterly insensible of the circumstance. It is the change from rest to motion that wakens our sensibility, and conversely from motion to rest. An uniform condition, as respects either state, is devoid of any quickening influence on the mind. We have repeatedly seen pleasures depending for their existence on previous pains, and pains on pleasures experienced or conceived. Such are the contrasting states of Liberty and Restraint, Power and Impotence. Many pleasures owe their effect as such to mere cessation. For example, the pleasures of exercise do not need to be preceded by pain: it is enough that there has been a certain intermission, coupled with the nourishment of the exhausted parts. These are of course our best pleasures. By means of this class, we might have a life of enjoyment without pain: although, in fact, the other is more or less mixed up in every one's experience. Exercise, Repose, the pleasures of the different Senses and Emotions, might be made to alternate, so as to give a constant succession of pleasure: each being sufficiently dormant during the exercise of the others, to reanimate the consciousness when its turn comes. It also happens that some of those modes of delight are increased, by being preceded by a certain amount of a painful opposite. Thus, confinement adds to the pleasure of exercise, and protracted exertion to that of repose. Fasting increases the enjoyment of meals; and being much chilled prepares us for a higher zest in the accession of warmth. It is not necessary, however, in those cases, that the privation should amount to positive pain, in order to the existence of the pleasure. The enjoyment of food may be experienced, although the previous hunger may not be in any way painful: at all events, with no more pain than the certainty of the coming meal can effectually appease. There is still another class of our delights depending entirely upon previous suffering, as in the sudden cessation of acute pains, or the sudden relief from great depression. Here the rebound from one nervous condition to another is a stimulant of positive pleasure: constituting a small, but altogether inadequate, compensation for the prior misery. The pleasurable sen-

there is no falsehood in the case: the state described is what it appears to be—pleasurable or painful: Plato describes it erroneously when he calls it the same state, or one of neutrality. Pleasure and Pain are both of them phenomena of present consciousness. They are what they seem: none of them can be properly called (as Plato calls them) "apparent pleasures which have no reality."[r]

What seems present to the mind of Plato in this doctrine

sation of good health presupposes the opposite experience in a still larger measure. Uninterrupted health, though an instrumentality for working out many enjoyments, of itself gives no sensation."

It appears to me that this passage of Mr. Bain's work discriminates and sets out what there is of truth in Plato's doctrine about the pure and painless pleasures. In his first volume (The Senses and the Intellect) Mr. Bain has laid down and explained the great fundamental fact of the system, that it includes spontaneous sources of activity; which, after repose and nourishment, require to be exerted, and afford a certain pleasure in the course of being exerted. There is no antecedent pain to be relieved: but privation (which is only a grade and variety of pain, and sometimes considerable pain) is felt if the exertion be hindered. This doctrine of spontaneous activity, employed by Mr. Bain successfully to explain a large variety of mental phenomena, is an important and valuable extension of that which Aristotle lays down in the Ethics, that pleasure is an accessory or adjunct of *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος* (*ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως*, Eth. N. vii. 13, 1153, a. 15), without any view to obtain any separate extraneous pleasure or to relieve any separate extraneous pain (*καθ' αὐτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ, ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, E. N. x. 6, 1176, b. 6).

[r] Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A. *πρὸς τό τινας ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ' οὐδαμῶς*, &c. *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν*, p. 42 C, which last sentence is better explained (I think) in the note of Dr. Badham than in that of Mr. Poste.

Mr. Poste observes justly, in his note on p. 40 C:—"The falsely anticipated pleasure in mistaken Hope may be called, as it is here called, False Pleasure. This is, however, an inaccurate expression. It is not the Pleasure, but the Imagination of it (*i. e.* the Imagination or Opinion) that is false. Sokrates therefore does not dwell upon this point, though Protarchus allows the expression to pass." The last phrase of the passage which I have thus transcribed ("Sokrates *therefore* does not dwell upon this point") is less accurate than that which precedes: for it seems to imply that the Sokrates of Philêbus *admits* the inaccuracy of the expression, which seems to me not borne out by the text of the dialogue. Both here and elsewhere in the dialogue, the doctrine, that many pleasures are false, is maintained by Sokrates distinctly—*τὸ ἥδεσθαι* is put upon the same footing as *τὸ δοξάζειν*, which may be either *ἀληθῶς* or *ψευδῶς*.

When Sokrates (p. 37 B) puts the question, "You admit that *δόξα* may be either *ἀληθὴς* or *ψευδής*: how then can you argue that *ἡδονή* must be always *ἀληθής*?" the answer is, that pleasure is not, if we speak correctly, either true or false: neither one predicate nor the other is properly applicable to it: we can only so apply them by a metaphor, altogether misleading in philosophical reasoning. When Sokrates farther argues (37 D), "You admit that some qualifying predicates may be applied to pleasures and pain, great or small, durable or transient, &c. You admit that an opinion may be correct or mistaken in its object, and when it is the latter you call it *false:* why is not the pleasure which accompanies a false opinion to be called false also?" Protarchus refuses distinctly to admit this, saying, "I have already affirmed that on that supposition the *opinion* is false: but no man will call the *pleasure* false" (p. 38 A).

is the antithesis between the absolute and the relative. He will allow reality only to the absolute: the relative he considers (herein agreeing with the Eleates) to be all seeming and illusion. Thus when he comes to describe the character of those few pleasures which he admits to be true, we find him dwelling upon their absolute nature. 1. The pleasures derived from perfect geometrical figures: the exact straight line, square, cube, circle, &c.: which figures are always beautiful *per se*, not by comparison or in relation with anything else:[s] and "which have pleasures of their own, no way analogous to those of scratching" (*i. e.* not requiring to be preceded by the discomfort of an itching surface). 2. The pleasures derived from certain colours beautiful in themselves: which are beautiful always, not merely when seen in contrast with some other colours. 3. The pleasures of hearing simple sounds, beautiful in and by themselves, with whatever other sounds they may be connected. 4. The pleasures of sweet smells, which are pleasurable though not preceded by uneasiness. 5. The pleasures of mathematical studies: these studies do not derive their pleasurable character from satisfying any previous uneasy appetite, nor do they leave behind them any pain if they happen to be forgotten.[t]

Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute—Pleasures which he admits to be true—and why.

[s] Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 C. *ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ κατὰ καθ' αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι, καί τινας ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς.*

τὰς τῶν φωνῶν τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπρὰς, τὰς ἔν τι καθαρὸν ἰείσας μέλος, πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὑτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ξυμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἑπομένας.

[t] Plato, Philêbus, p. 52 B.

We may illustrate the doctrine of the Philêbus about pleasures and pains, by reference to a dictum of Sokrates quoted in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 13).

Some person complained to Sokrates that he had lost his appetite—that he no longer ate with any pleasure (*ὅτι ἀηδῶς ἔσθιοι*). "The physician Akumenus (so replied Sokrates) teaches us a good remedy in such a case. Leave off eating: after you have left off, you will come back into a more pleasurable, easy, and healthful condition."

Now let us suppose the like complaint to be addressed to the Platonic Sokrates. What would have been *his* answer?

The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have regarded the complainant as suffering under a misfortune, and would have tried to suggest some remedy: either the prescription of Akumenus, or any other more promising that he could think of. The Sokrates of the Phædon, on the contrary, would have congratulated him on the improvement in his condition, inasmuch as the misguiding and degrading ascendancy, exercised by his body over his mind, was suppressed in one of its most influential channels; just as Kephalus, in the Republic (i. 329), is made to announce it as one of the blessings of old age, that the sexual appetite has left him. The Sokrates of the Philêbus, also, would have treated the

These few are all the varieties of pleasure which Plato admits as true: they are alleged as cases of the absolutely pleasurable (Αὐτὸ-ἡδύ)—that which is pleasurable *per se*, and always, without relation to anything else, without dependence on occasion or circumstance, and without any antecedent or concomitant pain. All other pleasures are pleasurable, relatively to some antecedent pain, or to some contrasting condition, with which they are compared: accordingly Plato considers them as false, unreal, illusory: pleasures and not pleasures at once, and not more one than the other.[u] Herein

case as one for congratulation, but he would have assigned a different reason. He would have replied: "The pleasures of eating are altogether false. You never really had any pleasure in eating. If you believed yourself to have any, you were under an illusion. You have reason to rejoice that this illusion has now passed away: and to rejoice the more, because you have come a step nearer to the most divine scheme of life."

Speusippus (the nephew and successor of Plato), if he had been present, would have re-assured the complainant in a manner equally decided. He would have said nothing, however, about the difference between true and false pleasures: he would have acknowledged them all as true, and denounced them all as mischievous. He would have said (see Aul. Gell. ix. 5): "The condition which you describe is one which I greatly envy. Pleasure and Pain are both, alike and equally, forms of Evil. I eat, to relieve the pain of hunger: but unfortunately, I cannot do so without experiencing some pleasure; and I thus incur evil in the other and opposite form. I am ashamed of this, because I am still kept far off from Good, or the point of neutrality: but I cannot help myself. *You* are more fortunate: you avert one evil, *pain*, without the least alloy of the other evil, *pleasure*: what you attain is thus pure Good. I hope your condition may long continue, and I should be glad to come into it myself."

Not only the sincere pleasure-haters, but also other theorists indicated by Aristotle, would have warmly applauded this pure ethical doctrine of Speusippus; not from real agreement with it, but in order to edify the audience. They would say to one another aside: "This is not true; but we must do all we can to make people believe it. Since every one is too fond of pleasures, and suffers himself to be enslaved by them, we must pull in the contrary direction, in order that we may thereby bring people into the middle line." (Aristot. Eth. Nikom. x. 1, 1172, a. 30.)

It deserves to be remarked that Aristotle, in alluding to these last theorists, disapproves their scheme of Ethical Fictions, or of falsifying theory in order to work upon men's minds by edifying imposture; while Plato approves and employs this scheme in the Republic. Aristotle even recognises it as a fault in various persons, that they take too little delight in bodily pleasures—that a man is τοιοῦτος οἷος

(Ethic. Nikom. vii. 11, 1151, b. 24).

[u] Compare, respecting this Platonic view, Republic, v. pp. 478-479, and ix. pp. 583-585, where Plato contrasts the παναληθὴς or γνησία ἡδονὴ, which arises from the acquisition of knowledge (when the mind nourishes itself with real essence), with the νόθη (p. 587 B) or ἐσκιαγραφημένη ἡδονὴ, εἴδωλον τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς, arising from the pursuits of wealth, power, and other objects of desire.

The comic poet Alexis adverts to this Platonic doctrine of the absolutely pleasurable, here, there, and everywhere,—τὸ δ' ἡδὺ πάντως ἡδύ, κἀκεῖ κἄνθαδε, Athenæ. viii. 354; Meineke, Com. Frag. p. 453.

In the Phædrus (258 E), we find this same class of pleasures, those which cannot be enjoyed unless preceded by some pain, asserted to be called *for that reason slavish* (ἀνδραποδώδεις), and depreciated as worthless. Nearly all the

he conforms to the Eleatic or Parmenidean view, according to which the relative is altogether falsehood and illusion: an intermediate stage between Ens and Non-Ens, belonging as much to the first as to the last.

The catalogue of pleasures recognised by Plato being so narrow (and much of them attainable only by a few persons), the amount of difference is really very small between him and his pleasure-hating opponents, who disallowed pleasure altogether. But small as the catalogue is, he could not consistently have defended it against them, upon his own principles. His opponents could have shown him that a considerable portion of it must be discarded, if we are to disallow all pleasures which are preceded by or intermingled with pain—or which are sometimes stronger, sometimes feebler, according to the relations of contrast or similarity with other concomitant sensations. Mathematical study certainly, far from being all pleasure and no pain, demands an irksome preparatory training (which is numbered among the miseries of life in the Axiochus[x]), succeeded by long

Plato could

altogether.

pleasures connected with the body are said to belong to this class; but those of rhetoric and dialectic are exempted from it, and declared to be of superior order.

The pleasure of gaining a victory in the stadium at Olympia was ranked by Greeks generally as the maximum of pleasure: and we find the Platonic Sokrates (Republ. v. 465 D) speaks in concurrence with this opinion. But this pleasure ought in Plato's view to pass for a false pleasure; since it was invariably preceded by the most painful, long-continued training.

The reasoning of Sokrates in the Philêbus (see especially pp. 46-47) against the intense and extatic pleasures, as being never pure, but always adulterated by accompanying pain, misfortune, disappointment, &c., is much the same as that of Epikurus and his followers afterwards. The case is nowhere more forcibly put than in the fourth book of Lucretius (1074 seq.): where that poet deprecates passionate love, and points out that pure or unmixed pleasure belongs only to the man of sound and healthy reason.

[x] See the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus, pp. 366-367. Compare Republic, vii. 526 C, vi. 504 C.

The Sokratic method, in creating consciousness of ignorance, is exhibited not less in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iv. 2, 40) than in various Platonic dialogues, Alkibiades I., Theætêtus, &c. We read it formally proclaimed by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology.

Aristotle repeats the assertion contained in the Philêbus about the list of painless pleasures—ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵτε μαθηματικαί, &c. (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2, 1173, b. 16; 7, 1177, a. 25). He himself says in another place (vii. 13, 1153, a. 20) that τὸ θεωρεῖν sometimes hurts the health, and if he had examined the lives of mathematicians, especially that of Kepler, he would hardly have imagined that mathematical investigations have no pains attached to them. He probably means that they are not preceded by painful appetites such as hunger and thirst. But they are preceded by acquired impulses or desires, which in reference to the present question are upon the same footing as the natural appetites.

laborious application, together with a fair share of vexatious puzzle and disappointment. The love of knowledge grows up by association (like the thirst for money or power), and includes an uncomfortable consciousness of ignorance: nay, it is precisely this painful consciousness which the Sokratic method was expressly intended to plant forcibly in the student's mind, as an indispensable antecedent condition. Requital doubtless comes in time; but the outlay is not the less real, and is quite sufficient to disentitle the study from being counted as a *true* pleasure, in the Platonic sense. Nor could Plato, upon his own principles, defend the pleasures of sight, sound, and smell. For though he might justly contend that there were some objects originally agreeable to these senses, yet all these objects will appear more or less agreeable, according to the accompanying contrasts under which they are presented, while, in particular states of the organ, they will not appear agreeable at all. Now such variability of estimate is among the grounds alleged by Plato for declaring pleasures to be false.[y]

Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure-haters.

How little the Sokrates of this dialogue differs, at the bottom, from the fastidious pleasure-haters, may be seen by the passage in which he proclaims that the life of intelligence alone, without the smallest intermixture of pleasure or pain, is the really perfect life: that the Gods and the divine Kosmos have no enjoyment and no suffering.[z] The emotional department of human nature is here regarded as a degenerate and obstructive appendage:

A healthy and temperate man, leading a regular life and in easy circumstances, knows little of hunger and thirst as pains; he knows them only as appetites which give relish to his periodical meals. It is only when this periodical satisfaction is withheld that his appetite grows to a painful and distressing height. So too the φιλομαθής; his appetite for study, when regularly gratified to an extent consistent with health and other considerations, is not painful; but it will rise to the height of a most distressing privation if he be debarred from gratifying it, excluded from books and papers, disturbed by noises and intrusions. Kepler, if interdicted from pursuing his calculations, would have been miserable. Jason of Pheræ was heard to say that he felt hungry so long as he was not in possession of supreme power—πεινῆν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, Aristot. Politic. iii. 4, 1277, a. 24; thus intimating that the acquired appetite of ambition had in his mind reached the same intensity as the natural appetite of hunger.

[y] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 41-42. In the Phædon (p. 60 B) Sokrates makes a striking remark on the inseparable conjunction of pleasure with pain generally.

[z] Plato, Philêbus, p. 33 B.

so that it was an inauspicious act of the sons of the Demiurgus (in the Timæus[a])when they attached the spherical head (the miniature parallel of the Kosmos, with the rotatory movements of the immortal soul in the brain within) at the summit of a bodily trunk and limbs, containing the thoracic and abdominal cavities: the thoracic cavity embodying a second and inferior soul with the energetic emotions and passions—the abdominal region serving as lodgment to a third yet baser soul with the appetites. From this conjunction sprang the corrupting influence of emotional impulse, depriving man of his close parallelism with the Kosmos, and poisoning the life of pure exclusive Intelligence—regular, unfeeling, undisturbed. The Pleasure-haters, together with Speusippus and others, declared that pleasure and pain were both alike enemies to be repelled, and that neutrality was the condition to be aimed at.[b] And

[a] Plato, Timæus, pp. 43 A, 44 D, 69 D, 70-71. The same fundamental idea, though embodied in a different illustration, appears also in the Phædon; where Sokrates depicts life as a period of imprisonment, to which the immortal rational soul is condemned, in a corrupt and defective body, with perpetual stream of disturbing sensations and emotions (Phædon, pp. 64-65).

Aristotle observes, De Animâ, i. p. 407, b. 2:—*ἐπίπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ νῷ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴωθέ τε λέγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ.*

We find in one of the Fragments of Cicero, quoted by Augustin from the lost work Hortensius (p. 485, ed. Orelli):—"An vero, inquit, voluptates corporis expetendæ, quæ veré et graviter dictæ sunt à Platone illecebræ et escæ malorum? Quis autem bonâ mente præditus, non mallet nullas omnino nobis à naturâ voluptates esse datas?" This is the same doctrine as what is ascribed to Speusippus.

[b] Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. vii. 14, p. 1153, b. 5; x. 2, p. 1173, a. 8; Aulus Gellius, ix. 5. "Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter se: bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret."

Compare Plato, Philêbus, pp. 43 D-E, 33 B.

To whom does Plato here make allusion, under the general title of the Fastidious (*οἱ δυσχερεῖς*) Pleasure-haters? Schleiermacher (note to his translation, p. 487), Stallbaum, and most critics down to Dr. Badham inclusive, are of opinion, that he alludes to Antisthenes—among whose *dicta* we certainly read declarations expressing positive aversion to pleasure—*μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην*. Diog. L. vi. 3; compare ix. 101, and Winckelmann (Frag. Antisthen. xii.). Mr. Poste, on the contrary, thinks it improbable that Antisthenes is alluded to (see p. 80 of his Philêbus). I confess that I think so too. Mr. Poste points out that these *δυσχερεῖς* are characterised by Plato (p. 44 B), as *μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους περὶ φύσιν*:—whereas we are informed that speculations on *φύσις* were neglected by Antisthenes, who confined his attention to *τὰ ἠθικά*. This is a strong reason for believing that Antisthenes cannot be here meant; and there are some other reasons also.

First, in describing the *δυσχερεῖς*, Plato notes it as one among their attributes, that they *hold in thorough detestation the indecorous pleasures* (p. 46 A). Now this is surely not likely to have been affirmed about Antisthenes. It was the conspicuous characteristic of the Cynic sect, begun

such appears to me to be the drift of Plato's reasonings in the Philêbus: though he relaxes somewhat the severity of his requirements in favour of a few pleasures, towards which he feels the same indulgence as towards Homer in the Republic.[c] When Ethics are discussed, not upon principles of their own (*οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαὶ*), but upon principles of Kosmology or Ontology, no emotion of any kind can find consistent place.

by Antisthenes, and carried still farther by his pupil Diogenes, that they reduced to its minimum the distinction between the decorous and the indecorous.

Next, we may observe that these *δυσχερεῖς*, whoever they were, are spoken of with much respect by Plato, even while he combats their doctrine (p. 44 C). I think it not likely that he would have spoken thus of Antisthenes. We are told that there prevailed between the two a great and reciprocal acrimony. And this sentiment is manifested in the Sophistês (p. 251 B), where the opponents whom Plato is refuting are described with the most contemptuous bitterness; and where Schleiermacher, and the critics generally, declare that he alludes to Antisthenes. The passage in the Sophistês represents, in my judgment, the probable sentiment of Plato towards Antisthenes: the passage in the Philêbus is at variance with it.

I imagine that the *δυσχερεῖς* to whom Plato makes allusion in the Philêbus, are the persons from whom his nephew and successor Speusippus derived the doctrine declared in the first portion of this note. The "vetus omnis Academia" of Aulus Gellius is an exaggerated phrase; but many of the old Academy, or companions of Plato, probably held the theory that pleasure was only one form of evil,—especially the pythagorising *Platonici*, adopting the tendencies of Plato himself in his old age. That Speusippus was among the borrowers from the Pythagoreans, we know from Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. i. 4, 1096, b. 8).

Now the Pythagorean canon of life, like the Orphic (both of them supposed by Herodotus to be derived in great part from Egypt—ii. 81), was distinguished by a multiplicity of abstinences, disgusts, antipathies, in respect to alimentation and other physical circumstances of life—which were held to be of the most imperative force and necessity; so that offences against them were of all others the most intolerable. A remarkable fragment of the Κρῆτες of Euripides describes a variety of this *purism* analogous to the Orphic and Pythagorean:—Γ

δ' ἔχων εἵματα φεύγω Γι
βρότων, καὶ νεκροθήκης οὐ
μενος· τὴν δ' ἐμψύχων βρῶσιν
πεφύλαγμαι. Compare Eurip. Hippol. 957; Alexis Comicus, ap. Athenæ. iv. p. 161. See the work of M. Alfred Maury, Histoire des Religions de la Grèce Antique, vol. iii. pp. 368-384.

It appears to me that the *δυσχερεῖς*, to whom Plato alludes in the Philêbus, were most probably pythagorising friends of his own; who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards *τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων*. Plato speaks of them with respect; partly because ethical theorists, who denounce *pleasure*, are usually characterised in reverential terms, as persons of exalted principle, even by those who think their reasonings inconclusive; partly because these men only pushed the consequences of Plato's own reasonings, rather farther than Plato himself did. In fact they were more consistent than Plato was: for the principles laid down in the Philêbus, if carried out strictly, would go to the exclusion of all pleasures—not less of the few which he tolerates, than of the many which he banishes. These pythagorising *Platonici* might well be termed *δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν*. They paid much attention to the interpretation of nature, though they did so according to a numerical and geometrical symbolism.

[c] Plato, Republ. x. p. 607.

In my judgment, this is one main defect pervading the Platonic Philêbus—the forced conjunction between Kosmology and Ethics—the violent pressure employed to force Pleasures and Pains into the same classifying framework as cognitive Beliefs—the true and the false. In respect to the various pleasures, the dialogue contains many excellent remarks, the value of which is diminished by the purpose to which they are turned.[d] One of Plato's main batteries is directed against the intense, extatic, momentary enjoyments, which he sets in contrast against the gentle, serene, often renewable.[e] That the former are often purchaseable only at the cost of a distempered condition of body and mind, which ought to render them objects shunned rather than desired by a reasonable man—this is a doctrine important to inculcate: but nothing is gained by applying the metaphorical predicate *false*, either to them, or to the other classes of mixed pleasures, &c., which Plato discountenances under the same epithet. By thus condemning pleasures in wholesale and in large groups, we not only set aside the innocuous as well as others, but we also leave unapplied, or only half applied, that principle of Measure or Calculation which Plato so often extols as the main item in Summum Bonum.

Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics—defect of the Philêbus.

In this dialogue as well as others, Measure is thus exalted, and exalted with emphasis, at the final conclusion: but it is far less clearly and systematically applied, as far as human beings are concerned, than in the Protagoras. The Sokrates of the Protagoras does not recognise any pleasures as false—nor any class of pleasures as absolutely unmixed with pain: he does not set pleasure in pointed opposition to the avoidance of pain, nor the intense momentary pleasures to the gentle and more durable. He considers that the whole course of life is a

Directive sovereignty of Measure—how explained and applied in the Protagoras.

[d] We read in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (Book. i. ch. 7, pp. 168-170) some very good remarks on the erroneous and equivocal assertions which identify Truth and Good—a thesis on which various Platonists have expended much eloquence. Dr. Campbell maintains the just distinction between the Emotions and Will on one side, and the Understanding on the other.

"Passion" (he says) "is the mover to action, Reason is the guide. Good is the object of the Will; Truth the object of the Understanding."

[e] Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 D. *ἐν ὕβρει μείζους ἡδονὰς, οὐ πλείους λέγω*, &c.

So in the Republic, also, *ἡδονὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα* is declared to be inconsistent with *σωφροσύνη* (iii. 402 E).

perpetual intermixture of pleasures and pains, in proportions variable and to a certain extent modifiable: that each item in both lists has its proper value, commensurable with the others; that the purpose of a well-ordered life consists, in rendering the total sum of pleasure as great, and the total sum of pain as small, as each man's case admits: that avoidance of pain and attainment of pleasure are co-ordinate branches of this one comprehensive End. He farther declares that men are constantly liable to err by false remembrances, estimates, and comparisons, of pleasures and pains past—by false expectations of pleasures and pains to come: that the whole security of life lies in keeping clear of such error—in right comparison of these items and right choice between them: that therefore the full sovereign controul of each man's life must be vested in the Measuring Science or Calculating Intelligence.[1] Not only all comprehensive sovereignty, but also ever-active guidance, is postulated for this Measuring Science: while at the same time its special function, and the items to which it applies, are more clearly defined than in any other Platonic dialogue. If a man be so absorbed by the idea of an intense momentary pleasure or pain, as to forget or disregard accompaniments or consequences of an opposite nature, greatly overbalancing it—this is an error committed from default of the Measuring Science: but it is only one among many errors arising from the like deficiency. Nothing is required but the Measuring Science or Intelligence, to

[1] This argument is carried on by Sokrates from p. 351 until the close of the Protagoras, p. 357 A. *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἱρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὖσα, τοῦ τε πλέονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτεροῦ καὶ ποῤῥωτέρω καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἆρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὖσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; Ἐπεὶ καὶ*

Yet Plato in the Philêbus, imputing to the Hedonistic theory that it sets aside all idea of measure, regulation, limit, advances as an argument in the case, that Pleasure and Pain in their own nature have no limit (Philêbus, pp. 25-26 B, 27 E. Compare Dr. Badham's note, p. 30 of his edition).

The imputation is unfounded, and the argument without application, in regard to the same theory as expounded by Sokrates in the Protagoras.

At the end of the Philêbus (p. 67 B) Plato makes Sokrates exclaim, "We cannot put Pleasure first among the items of Good, even though all oxen, horses, and other beasts affirm it." This rhetorical flourish is altogether misplaced in the Philêbus: for Plato had already specified it as one of the conditions of the Good, That it must be acceptable and must give satisfaction to all animals, and even to all plants (pp. 22 B, 60 C), as well as to men.

enable a man to make the best of those circumstances in which he may be placed: this is true of all men, under every variety of place and circumstances. Measure is not the Good, but the one condition which is constant as well as indispensable to any tolerable approach towards Good.

In the Philêbus, too, Measure—The Exact Quantum—The Exact Moment—are proclaimed as the chief item in the complex called—The Good.[g] But to what Items does Sokrates intend the measure to be applied? Not certainly to pleasures: the comparison of quantity between one pleasure and another is discarded as useless or misleading, and the comparison of quality alone is admitted—*i. e.* true and false: the large majority of human pleasures being repudiated in the lump as false, and a small remnant only being tolerated, on the allegation that they are true. Nor, again, is the measure applied to pains: for though Plato affirms that a life altogether without pains (as without pleasures) would be the truly divine Idéal, yet he never tells us that the Measuring Intelligence is to be made available in the comparison and choice of pains, and in avoidance of the greater by submitting to the less. Lastly, when we look at the concession made in this dialogue to Gorgias and his art, we find that Plato no longer claims for his Good or Measure any directive function, or any paramount influence, as to utility, profit, reputation, or the greater ends which men usually pursue in life:[h] he claims for it only the privilege of satisfying the aspiration for truth, in minds wherein such aspiration is preponderant over all others.

How explained—it is applied.

Comparing the Philêbus with the Protagoras, therefore, we see that though, in both, Measuring Science or Intelligence is proclaimed as supreme, the province assigned to it in the Philêbus is comparatively narrow. Moreover the practical side or activities of life (which are prominent in the Protagoras) appear in the Philêbus thrust into a corner; where scanty room is found for them on ground nearly covered by the speculative, or theorising, truth-seeking, pursuits. Practical reason is forced into the same categories as theoretical.

[g] Plato, Philêbus, p 66 A. *μέτρον—τὸ μέτριον—τὸ καίριον.*

[h] Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B-D.

The classification of *true* and *false* is (as I have already remarked) unsuitable for pleasures and pains. We have now to see how Plato applies it to cognitions, to which it really belongs.

Classifications.

The highest of these Cognitions is set apart as Dialectic or Ontology: the Object of which is, Ens or Entia, eternal, ever the same and unchangeable, ever unmixed with each other: while the corresponding Subject is, Reason, Intelligence, Wisdom, by which it is apprehended and felt. In this Science alone reside perfect Truth and Purity. Where the Objects are shifting, variable, mixed or confounded together, there Reason cannot apply herself; no pure or exact truth can be attained.[1] These unchangeable Entities are what in other dialogues Plato terms Ideas or Forms—a term scarcely used in the Philêbus.

Though pure truth belongs exclusively to Dialectic and to the Objects thereof, there are other Sciences which, having more or less of affinity to Dialectic, may thus be classified according to the degree of such affinity. Mathematics approach most nearly to Dialectic. Under Mathematics are included the Sciences or Arts of numbering, measuring, weighing—Arithmetic, Metrêtic, Static—which are applied to various subordinate arts, and impart to these latter all the scientific guidance and certainty which is found in them. Without Arithmetic, the subordinate arts would be little better than vague guesswork or knack. But Plato distinguishes two varieties of Arithmetic and Metrêtic: one purely theoretical, prosecuted by philosophers, and adapted to satisfy the love of abstract truth—the other applied to some department of practice, and employed by the artist as a guide to the execution of his work. Theoretical Arithmetic is characterised by this feature, that it assumes each unit to be equal, like, and interchangeable with every other unit: while practical Arithmetic adds together concrete realities, whether like and equal to each other or not.[k]

[1] Plato, Philêbus, p. 59 C. *ὡς ἡ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα—ἢ δευτέρως ἐκείνων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔστι ξυγγενές· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.* P. 62 A. *αὐτῆς περὶ λόγον εἰῶ—κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας ἧς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων.*

[k] Plato, Philêb. p. 56 E.

It is thus that the theoretical geometer and arithmetician, though not coming up to the full and pure truth of Dialectic, is nevertheless nearer to it than the carpenter or the ship-builder, who apply the measure to material objects. But the carpenter, ship-builder, architect, &c., do really apply measure, line, rule, &c.: they are therefore nearer to truth than other artists, who apply no measure at all. To this last category belong the musical composer, the physician, the husbandman, the pilot, the military commander, neither of whom can apply to their processes either numeration or measurement: all of them are forced to be contented with vague estimate, conjecture, a practised eye and ear.[1]

Valuable principles of this classification—difference with other dialogues.

The foregoing classification of Sciences and Arts is among the most interesting points in the Philêbus. It coincides to a great degree with that which we read in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic, though it is also partially different: it differs too in some respects from doctrines advanced in other dialogues. Thus we find here (in the Philêbus) that the science or art of the physician, the pilot, the general, &c., is treated as destitute of measure and as an aggregate of unscientific guesses: whereas in the Gorgias[m] and elsewhere, these are extolled as genuine arts, and are employed to discredit Rhetoric by contrast. Again, all these arts are here placed lower in the scientific scale than the occupations of the carpenter or the ship-builder, who possess and use some material measures. But these latter, in the Republic,[n] are dismissed with the disparaging epithet of *snobbish* (βάναυσοι) and deemed unworthy of consideration.

Dialectic appears here exalted to the same pre-eminence which is assigned to it in the Republic—as the energy of the pure Intellect, dealing with those permanent real Essences which are the objects of Intellect alone, intelligible only and not visible. The distinction here drawn by Plato between the theoretical and practical arithmetic and geometry, compared with numeration or mensuration of actual objects of sense—is also remarkable in two ways: first, as it marks his

[1] Plato, Phileb. p. 56 A-B. Compare Republic, i. pp. 341-342.
[m] Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501 A, 518 A. [n] Plato, Republic, vii. p. 522 B.

departure from the historical Sokrates, who recognised the difference between the two, but discountenanced the theoretical as worthless:[o] next as it brings clearly to view, the fundamental assumption or hypothesis upon which abstract arithmetic proceeds—the concept of units all perfectly like and equal. That this *is* an assumption (always departing more or less from the facts of sense)—and that upon its being conceded depends the peculiar certainty and accuracy of arithmetical calculation—was an observation probably then made for the first time; and not unnecessary to be made even now, since it is apt to escape attention. It is enuntiated clearly both here and in the Republic.[p]

The long preliminary discussion of the Philêbus thus brings us to the conclusion—That a descending scale of value, relatively to truth and falsehood, must be recognised in cognitions as well as in pleasures: many cognitions are not entirely true, but tainted in different degrees by error and falsehood: most pleasures also, instead of being true and pure, are alloyed by concomitant pains or delusions or both: moreover, all the intense pleasures are incompatible with

[o] Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7, 2-8. The contrast drawn in this chapter of the Memorabilia appears to me to coincide pretty exactly with that which is taken in the Philêbus, though the preference is reversed. Dr. Badham (p. 78) and Mr. Poste (pp. 106-113) consider Plato as pointing to a contrast between pure and applied Mathematics: which I do not understand to be his meaning. The distinction taken by Aristotle in the passage cited by Mr. Poste is different, and does really designate Pure and Applied Mathematics. Mr. Poste would have found a better comparison in Ethic. Niko. i. 7, 1098, a. 29.

[p] Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 E. *οἱ δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει*— where it is formally proclaimed as an assumption or postulate. See Republic, vii. pp. 525-526, vi. p. 510 C.

Mr. John Stuart Mill thus calls attention to the same remark in his instructive chapters on Demonstration and Necessary Truth (System of Logic, Book. ii. ch. vi. sect. 3).

"The inductions of Arithmetic are of two sorts: first, those that we have just expounded, such as One and One are Two, Two and One are Three, &c., which may be called the definitions of the various numbers, in the improper or geometrical sense of the word Definition; and, secondly, the two following Axioms. The sums of Equals are equal, the differences of Equals are equal.

"These axioms, and likewise the so-called Definitions, are (as already shown) results of induction; true of all objects whatsoever, and as it may seem, exactly true, without the hypothetical assumption of unqualified truth where an approximation to it is all that exists. On more accurate investigation, however, it will be found that even in this case, there is one hypothetical element in the ratiocination. In all propositions concerning numbers a condition is implied without which none of them would be true, and that condition is an assumption which may be false. The condition is that 1 = 1: that all the numbers are numbers of the same or of equal

Measure, or a fixed standard,[q] and must therefore be excluded from the category of Good.

In arranging the quintuple scale of elements or conditions of the Good, Plato adopts the following descending order: I report them as well as I can, for I confess that I understand them very imperfectly.

Close of the Philêbus—Graduated elements of Good.

1. Measure; that which conforms to Measure and to proper season: with everything else analogous, which we can believe to be of eternal nature.—These seem to be unchangeable Forms or Ideas, which are here considered objectively, apart from any percipient Subject affected by them.[r]

2. The Symmetrical, Beautiful, Perfect, Sufficient, &c.—These words seem to denote the successive manifestations of the same afore-mentioned attributes; but considered both objectively and subjectively, as affecting and appreciated by some percipient.

3. Intelligent or Rational Mind.—Here the Subject is brought in by itself.

4. Sciences, Cognitions, Arts, Right Opinions, &c.—Here we have the intellectual manifestations of the Subject, but of

units. Let this be doubtful, and not one of the propositions in arithmetic will hold true. How can we know that one pound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy and the other avoirdupois? They may not make two pounds of either or of any weight. How can we know that a forty-horse power is always equal to itself, unless we assume that all horses are of equal strength? One actual pound weight is not exactly equal to another, nor one mile's length to another; a nicer balance or more exact measuring instruments would always detect some difference."

[q] Plato, Philêb. pp. 52 D-57 B.

[r] Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A.

The Appendix B, subjoined by Mr. Poste to his edition of the Philêbus (pp. 149-165), is a very valuable Dissertation, comparing and explaining the abstract theories of Plato and Aristotle. He remarks, justly contrasting the Philêbus with the Timæus, as to the doctrine of Limit. "In the Philêbus the limit is always quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination. Just, however, as Quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timæus calls the Vehicle or Receptacle (τὸ δεκτικόν), and Aristotle in his writings the primary Matter (πρώτη ὕλη). The Philêbus, however, does not carry the analysis so far. It regards quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and measured out in due quantity by the quantitative limit," p. 160.

I doubt whether the Platonic idea of τὸ μέτριον is rightly expressed by Mr. Poste's translation—a *mean* (p. 158). It rather implies, even in Politikus, p. 306, to which he refers, something adjusted according to a positive standard or conformable to an assumed measure or perfection: there being undoubtedly error in excess above it and error in defect below it—but the standard being not necessarily midway between the two. The Pythagoreans used καιρὸς in a very large sense, describing it as the First Cause of Good. Proklus ad Plat. Alkib. i. p. 270-272, Cousin.

a character inferior to No. 3, descending in the scale of value relatively to truth.

5. Lastly come the small list of true and painless pleasures. —These being not intellectual at all, but merely emotional, (some as accompaniments of intellectual, others of sensible, processes) are farther removed from Good and Measure than even No. 4—the opining or uncertain phases of the intellect.[s]

The four first elements belong to the Kosmos as well as to man: for the Kosmos has an intelligent soul. The fifth marks the emotional nature of man.

I see no sufficient ground for the hypothesis of Stallbaum and some other critics, who, considering the last result abrupt and unsatisfactory, suspect that Plato either intended to add more, or did add more which has not come down to us.[t] Certainly the result (as in many other Platonic dialogues) is inconsiderable, and the instruction derivable from the dialogue must be picked out by the reader himself from the long train of antecedent reasoning. The special point emphatically brought out at the end is the discredit thrown upon the intense pleasures, and the exclusion of them from the list of constituents of Good. If among Plato's contemporaries who advocated the Hedonistic doctrine, there were any who laid their main stress upon these intense pleasures, he may be considered to have replied to them under the name of Philêbus. But certainly this result might have been attained with a smaller array of preliminaries.

Contrast between the Phædrus, and Symposion, in respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally.

Moreover, in regard to these same intense emotions we have to remark that Plato in other dialogues holds a very different opinion respecting them—or at least respecting some of them. We have seen that at the close of the Philêbus he connects Bonum and Pulchrum principally, and almost exclusively, with the Reason; but we find him, in the Phædrus and

[s] Neither the Introduction of Schleiermacher (p. 134 seq.), nor the elucidation of Trendelenburg (De Philebi Consilio, pp. 16-23), nor the Prolegomena of Stallbaum (pp. 76-77 seq.), succeed in making this obscure close of the Philêbus clearly intelligible. Stallbaum, after indicating many commentators who have preceded him, observes respecting the explanations which they have given: "Ea sunt adeo varia atque inter se diversa, ut tanquam adversâ fronte inter se pugnare dicenda sint" (p. 72).

[t] Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 10.

Symposion, taking a different, indeed an opposite, view of the matter; and presenting Bonum and Pulchrum as objects, not of the unimpassioned and calculating Reason, but of ardent aspiration and even of extatic love. Reason is pronounced to be insufficient for attaining them, and a peculiar vein of inspiration—a species of madness, *eo nomine*—is postulated in its place. The life of the philosophical aspirant is compared to that of the passionate lover, beginning at first with attachment to some beautiful youth, and rising by a gradual process of association, so as to transfer the same fervent attachment to his mental companionship, as a stimulus for generating intellectual sympathies and recollections of the world of Ideas. He is represented as experiencing in the fullest measure those intense excitements and disturbances which Eros alone can provoke.[u] It is true that Plato here repudiates sensual excitements. In this respect the Phædrus and Symposion agree with the Philêbus. But as between Reason and Emotion, they disagree with it altogether: for they dwell upon ideal excitements of the most vehement character. They describe the highest perfection of human nature as growing out of the better variety of madness—out of the glowing inspirations of Eros: a state replete with the most intense alternating emotions of pain and pleasure. How opposite is the tone of Sokrates in the Philêbus, where he denounces all the intense pleasures as belonging to a distempered condition—as adul-

[u] See in the Symposion the doctrines of the prophetess Diotima, as recited by Sokrates, pp. 204-212: also the Phædrus, the second *ἐγκώμιον* delivered by Sokrates upon Eros, pp. 36-60, repeated briefly and confirmed by Sokrates, pp. 77-78.

Compare these with the latter portion of the Philêbus; the difference of spirit and doctrine will appear very manifest.

To illustrate the contrast between the Phædrus and the Philêbus, we may observe that the former compares the excitement and irritation of the inspired soul when its wings are growing to ascend to Bonum and Pulchrum, with the *κνῆσις* or irritation of the gums when a child is cutting teeth—*ἴ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ὅλη καὶ ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυούντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται ὅταν ἄρτι φυῶσι κνῆσις καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὖλα, ταὐτὸν δὴ πέπονθεν ἡ τοῦ πτεροφυεῖν ἀρχομένου ψυχή· ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτέρα.* These are specimens of the strong metaphors used by Plato to describe the emotional condition of the mind during its fervour of aspiration towards Bonum and Pulchrum. On the other hand, in the Philêbus, *κνῆσις* and *γαργαλισμὸς* are noted as manifestations of that distempered condition which produces indeed moments of intense pleasure, but is quite inconsistent with Reason and the attainment of Good. See Philêbus, pp. 46 E, 51 D, and Gorgias, p. 494.

terated with pain, and as impeding the tranquil process of Reason—and where he tolerates only such gentle pleasures as are at once unmixed with pain and easily controuled by Reason! In the Phædrus and Symposion, we are told that Bonum and Pulchrum are attainable only under the stimulus of Eros, through a process of emotion, feverish and extatic, with mingled pleasure and pain: and that they crown such aspirations, if successfully prosecuted, with an emotional recompense, or with pleasure so intense as to surpass all other pleasures. In the Philêbus, Bonum and Pulchrum come before us as measure, proportion, seasonablenes: as approachable only through tranquil Reason—addressing their ultimate recompense to Reason alone—excluding both vehement agitations and intense pleasures—and leaving only a corner of the mind for gentle and unmixed pleasures.[x]

The comparison, here made, of the Philêbus with the Phædrus and Symposion, is one among many proofs of the different points of view with which Plato, in his different dialogues,[y] handled the same topics of ethical and psychological discussion. And upon this point of dissent, Eudoxus and Epikurus, would have agreed with the Sokrates of the Philêbus, in deprecating that extatic vein of emotion which is so greatly extolled in the Phædrus and Symposion.

[x] Plato, Philêbus.

[y] Maximus Tyrius remarks this difference (between the erotic dialogues of Plato and many of the others) in one of his discourses about the ἐρωτικὴ of Sokrates. Οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅμοιος ὁ Σωκράτης τῷ σωφρονοῦντι, καὶ ὁ ἐκπλήττων τοὺς καλοὺς τῷ ἐλέγχοντι τοὺς ἄφρο &c. (24, b).

END OF VOLUME II.

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